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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with what contemporary Australian novels can 
do amid Crises of Ecologies. Crises of Ecologies involve the entanglements 
of climate change, mass extinction, planetary degradation and capitalism 
with crises of agency and of subjectivity: Indigenous and non-indigenous; 
human and non-and-more-than-human.  
To conceptualise literary practices for Crises of Ecologies, I draw upon 
Deleuzo-Guattarian and New Materialist ontologies, epistemologies and 
ethics, their comportments towards ecology, sense, and Crises of 
Ecologies, and the literary practices towards which they already gesture. I 
focus upon three intensive literary practices: writing the posthuman, writing 
affect and becomings, and minor literature. I argue that these practices 
carry potentials to cultivate our sensuous attunements to our critical states 
of affairs (our ecological sense) and to enhance our capacities to relate, 
resist and renew amid them (our powers of acting, or living). I explore these 
literary practices and their capacities for transformation via three 
contemporary Australian novels: Tim Winton’s Eyrie (2013), Alexis Wright’s 
The Swan Book (2013), and Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster (1996).   
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Introduction 
 
There is no return to nature, but only a political problem of the 
collective soul, the connections of which a society is capable, the 
flows it supports, invents, leaves alone, or does away with. 
(Deleuze, 1997, p. 52) 
 
This thesis is concerned with contemporary Australian novels’ work amid 
Crises of Ecologies. Drawing upon Deleuzo-Guattarian and New Materialist 
thought to conceptualise what literature can do, I pursue intensive1 
trajectories for “the socio-political functions of literature and its reception” 
(Clark, 2015, p. 190). I do not propose that literature will solve our collective 
“wicked” problems (Morton, 2016, pp. 36-37), nor offer ways out. Rather, I 
conceptualise intensive literary practices that carry potentials to cultivate 
sensuous attunements to our critical states of affairs (our ecological sense) 
and enhance capacities to relate, resist and renew amid them (our powers 
of acting, or living (Deleuze, 1988b)). I offer studies of three contemporary 
Australian novels that inform and enrich these initial conceptualisations and 
affirm their potentials. This introduction expands on this work and the thesis 
structure, and addresses matters of scope.  
                                                          
1 For Deleuze (1994, p. 222), intensity shapes relations and transformations; the intensive field is the 
home of sense, experience and the source of thought. 
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In Chapter 1, I observe that we are entangled in Crises of Ecologies: 
global warming; mass extinction; planetary degradation; crises of agency 
and subjectivity; and, in Australia, though not only here, long-running 
annihilations of Indigenous peoples and country. Capitalism and 
colonialism, and we too, are agents of these crises. Some of us fear there 
are no ways out: no unproblematic technological-scientific, commercial, or 
government solutions; no cures; only chronic continuance for humans and 
non-and-more-than-humans.2 I map these Crises via a survey of thirty-two 
Australian novels published since the 1980s. This knotted-together 
contextualisation-cum-literary critique serves also to temper reservations 
expressed publicly about the degree of engagement by contemporary 
Australian novelists with these Crises, but it does not answer questions as 
to the efficacy of that engagement.   
In Chapter 2, I consider efficacy: the contemporary academy’s hopes for 
literature’s affirmative work amid Crises of Ecologies, and challenges to 
these hopes. Current critical thought on the work of literature in this context 
is as vibrantly unresolved as the Crises with which it engages. It is possible, 
though, to discern shared hopes that literature can critique and re-constitute 
our conceptions, perceptions, representations and imaginaries: of the 
Human, of Life/ecology, of Being(s), and of relations. There are also 
common expectations that literature can reorient ethics and enhance our 
capacities to adapt to, mitigate, reverse, or avoid, the impacts of Crises of 
                                                          
2 I use ‘non-and-more-than-human’ to indicate that non-human Life (organic and otherwise) is not 
lesser than the human and should not be viewed anthropocentrically, and to help differentiate this 
idea from uses of the Deleuzian (1983) concept of the nonhuman (impersonal desire, forces and 
flows). 
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Ecologies. However, there are also acknowledgements of the perceptual 
and representational complexities associated with ecological writing and 
literary efficacy amid these entangled, disruptive, and deranging Crises 
(Clark, 2012, 2015; Morton, 2007b, 2010b, 2013a, 2016).  
As one response to these issues, I explore the potentials of intensive 
literary practices. In Chapter 3, I conceptualise literary practices that carry 
potentials to cultivate ecological sense and enhance our powers of living. To 
do this, I embrace what I will refer to as Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist3 
comportments towards ecology, sense, and Crises of Ecologies, and the 
literary practices towards which they gesture. I begin by thinking ecology (or 
Life) and sense differently.  
We can conceptualise and perceive Life as processual, relational, and 
immanent. Life involves dynamic, varying productions and syntheses of 
lives—individuations (Deleuze, 2004, p. 86) –via intensive relations between 
bodies,4 not the transcendentally pre-determined relations and productions 
of prior beings (presumed to include identities, organisms, subjects, signs). 
While we might commonly consider Life as stratified and patterned, it is also 
capable of de-stratification, lines of flight (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 3),5 
and new connections: indeed, for Deleuze, “creativity comes first, then 
routinization” (Protevi, 2012, p. 250). Humans are not separate from Life (or 
                                                          
3 I do not claim New Materialist thought for Deleuze. This terminology is shorthand for the fruitful 
transversal relations/resonances between Deleuzian, Guattarian and New Materialist thought.  
4 These are not only human bodies but all corporeal and incorporeal phenomena entering into and 
arising from relations. 
5 Lines of flight are trajectories taken, entailing changes in nature and capacities, the forming of new 
connections, and entries into new dimensions of existence with new potentials. 
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Nature). Life is not anthropocentric. Rather, Life’s always collective 
productions occur across entangled physical, biological, psychical, and 
social registers, and (re)constitute worlds populated by “beings of totally 
different scales and kingdoms” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 238). 
Embracing this onto-epistemology opens us up to new Life practices amid 
“a field of new connections, creative and novel becomings that will give one 
new patterns and triggers of behaviour” (Protevi, 2012, p. 258). Ecology 
involves questions of what bodies can do and become amid forces working 
to limit the answers. 
In this thesis, I also adopt relational and processual conceptualisations of 
sense, as our trans-faculty attunements to the universal and irreducibly 
intricate relational field (Poxon & Stivale, 2014, p. 73) in which Life’s 
productions arise. Sense is not bound to judgement or orthodoxy (common 
or good sense (Deleuze, 1994, p. 33)), nor to a thing’s referential function 
(Williams, 2008). Sense has to do with what passes between relating 
bodies, how their powers of living vary, and their perceptions of those 
encounters and variations (Deleuze, 1997, p. 25). A process ontology that 
focuses upon affects—bodies’ capacities to have intensive effects upon 
each other, and their experience of those effects (Deleuze, 1988b)—is not 
circumscribed by reason. Sense becomes thinking-feeling (Massumi, 2015, 
p. xi): “thinking is not a natural exercise but always a second power of 
thought, born under the constraint of experience as a material power, a 
force” (Semetsky, 2005, p. 90). Thinking expands to enfold all faculties, 
challenging their limits (Deleuze, 1994, pp. 137 - 146), and allowing for their 
transformations. New sensations are experienced that cannot be reliably 
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articulated or categorised but are real nonetheless. Sense, then, has to do 
with an awareness of the particularity of encounters rather than their being 
repetitions of the same. We cannot know the world by relying upon what we 
came to know before. 
For Deleuze (1997), literature is part of Life: carrying it, and contributing 
to its dynamic and continuous variation; making sense in our encounters 
with it. It is in this context that I make the central claim of this thesis: that 
certain literary practices infuse literature with affirmative potentials amid 
Crises of Ecologies. Literature can cultivate ecological sense: fostering our 
sense of those forces of Life that we often hold at some distance, ignore, 
deny, or otherwise find imperceptible; encouraging our attendance to the 
agency of the non-and-more-than-human world; reconfiguring our sense of 
the subject and of our subjective interdependencies with all that is non-and-
more-than-human, and thus of our common vulnerability and our potential 
agency amid capitalism and ecological crises; enhancing our attunement to 
the ways in which we shape Crises and, through them, denude Life and our 
lives; and (re)invigorating our capacities to perceive and engage with affect 
as a vital register of existence (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p. 172), across 
which health can be nurtured and harm can be done. Following Deleuze 
(1988b) and Guattari (1995, pp. 7,13,19), we might think of subjectivity as a 
work of art; of a life as comprising continuous aesthetic renewals; and of art 
and literature as active participants in lives. I argue that literary cultivations 
of ecological sense enable the pursuit of creative, mutually beneficial, 
subjective renewals; resisting the violence and diminishments of Crises of 
Ecologies.  
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In Chapter 3 I outline three literary practices with potentials to cultivate 
ecological sense: writing the posthuman; writing affect and becomings; and 
minor literature. Writing the posthuman (Braidotti, 2013) involves writing 
lives after we realise we are not separable from—or over and above—Life, 
we are immanent and open to it. Posthuman literature attunes us to matter’s 
agency and unbounded material reach, and to the qualities and implications 
of our material permeability and interconnectedness. Our sense of the 
vitality of the world and of its sensitivity to our actions is expanded and 
intensified (Barad, 2007; J. Bennett, 2010; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). 
Writing affect provides for an attunement to other registers across which Life 
moves, bodies relate, and powers of living transform. Literary affects are 
important to thought: they rupture the sensible; they revitalize expression 
and drive becomings (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 256); and they offer 
access to worlds to which we are de-sensitised – worlds still to be created. 
Writing affect involves us in and allows for affirmative transformations and 
encounters amid Crises. We also improve our apprehension of the 
damaging affects that nourish capitalism and colonialism, and can access 
other trajectories for living along which we might outwit/outpace these power 
apparatuses (R.G. Smith, 2015). Writing affect is writing becomings-other. 
Such writing can be ethically generative: cultivating sense beyond the 
Human, or at least exposing us to, and encouraging our perceptions of, 
intensities that humans do not own. Literary becomings carry potentials to 
cultivate our sensitivity to the traumatized non-and-more-than-human bodies 
moving amid Crises, and to the interdependencies of our flourishing with the 
flourishing of those bodies. As we fold with (unfold from) the non-and-more-
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than-human, Life and our lives open out to the new. Minor literature 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1986) involves a political writing that employs 
expression to resist oppression and the forces of Crises, and to call out to 
(re-potentialise) a collective that did not exist beforehand or that has been 
broken (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 345). Minor literature unsettles 
dominant (Majoritarian) concepts, language, and figurations—Nature, 
Human, Aboriginal, and Animal, for example—that perpetuate Crises. It 
might also enable us to come to terms with Crises—even the most dire 
existential prognoses (Braidotti, 2013, p. 83; Collings, 2014)—and to renew 
our capacities to imagine other pathways for relations (Bogue, 2007, pp. 98-
99) and other worlds. I note, in the Australian context, that there are 
potentially affirmative resonances between Indigenous ontologies-practices 
and the conceptualisations of Life/ecology and cultural practices discussed 
here. In Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 I consider the prospects these resonances 
hold for Crises of Ecologies, ecological sense, literary practices, and non-
indigenous scholarship on Indigenous writing. 
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I explore literary practices for Crises of Ecologies 
and their potentials to cultivate ecological sense in three contemporary 
Australian novels: Tim Winton’s Eyrie (2013), Alexis Wright’s The Swan 
Book (2013), and Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster (1996). These studies 
expand upon the modest (albeit, recently, growing) amount of critical work 
occurring at the nexus between intensive literary practices, Deleuzo-
Guattarian New Materialist thought, and studies of the efficacies of 
contemporary Australian novels amid Crises of Ecologies.  
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In Chapter 4 I observe that Eyrie starkly conveys tragic trajectories for 
Life and lives amid capitalism: the ruin of the human and the non-and-more-
than-human, and the withdrawal of the promise of meaning, religion, family 
and community. Nonetheless, I argue that reading only for negation and 
loss risks leaving readers with an unassimilable traumatic burden of 
destruction, absence, and isolation. Winton’s literary practices in Eyrie carry 
potentials to cultivate ecological sense and offer painful affirmations, 
specifically: immersing readers in a dark ecology (Morton, 2007b); 
producing intensive cartographies of the vulnerable posthuman (Braidotti, 
2013), and of the agentic non-and-more-than-human (particularly, global 
warming as hyperobject (Morton, 2013a)); writing traumatic affect and 
becomings-child and -bird (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987); and employing an 
intensive, contagious, and resistant (a minor) writing style. 
In Chapter 5, acknowledging the importance of attending to the ethics of 
my non-indigenous scholarly encounter with Indigenous literature, I argue 
that Alexis Wright’s literary practices resonate with the philosophies 
engaged in Chapter 3 and inform and enrich—rather than follow—the 
literary conceptualisations advocated in that chapter. Wright’s (2008b) 
expectations for the political work of writing, The Swan Book’s immersion 
in/expression of Indigenous onto-epistemologies and ethics, and the refusal 
of her writing style to settle, combine to underpin the novel’s potentials to 
cultivate ecological sense and enhance Indigenous powers of living. The 
novel engages directly with Crises of Ecologies: Indigenous and non-
indigenous. Its stories involve readers in acts of resistance to attempted 
annihilations: of peoples, country and culture; of the forces of expression to 
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which Indigenous peoples attend in country; and of the subjective 
trajectories Indigenous peoples might pursue. The Swan Book is also a 
work of tending or custodianship: a calling-forth and repotentialising of Life 
that nurtures, is celebrated by, and is under the care of Indigenous peoples. 
Wright stories the health and irreducible relationality of peoples and country, 
and her style revitalises the sovereignty of expression critical to Indigenous 
lives.  
In Chapter 6, I argue that Hospital’s writing in Oyster entails an exposure 
to other modes of relation, other orders of resistance, and other trajectories 
of renewal amid the forces that work to close Life down. Hospital’s 
passionate, porous, material poetics cultivates a sense of the persistence of 
relations despite a community’s efforts to “seal itself off from the world” 
(Hospital, 1997, p. 243). Hospital writes Life and the productions of 
subjectivities across other registers: not only as processes involving human 
minds, discourse, and language, but also as involving non-and-more-than-
human agencies (the Fuckatoo, opals, heat, and water) and impersonal, 
nonhuman intensities that shape subjectivities: affects. Hospital’s affective 
and continuously varying style and form leave readers suspended and 
without judgement, sensuously opened to the new and the unknown.  
I conclude this thesis by returning to the findings of these three studies 
and recapitulating the contributions this thesis makes to knowledge. I 
critically consider the research pathways that might arise from the work 
herein: in particular the complexities that accompany scientific-empirical 
studies of the potential efficacies of the literary practices explored in this 
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thesis. I also attend briefly to the implications this thesis has for intensive 
reading practices for Crises of Ecologies, not only writing practices. 
A few comments on the scope of this thesis are appropriate to complete 
this introduction. Limiting my studies to contemporary Australian novels is 
not based upon a belief that the potentials of literary practices for Crises of 
Ecologies cannot be found elsewhere: whether in other novels, other 
periods, other countries, or other forms of writing. With regard to the thought 
upon which my thesis draws, I do not dive deeply into or attempt to calm the 
myriad differences agitating the waters of the deep well that is Deleuzian, 
Guattarian, and New Materialist concepts. While I acknowledge their 
differences, I attend chiefly to the ways in which these different thinkers 
come together productively. With regard to the contemporary Australian 
novels studied, I have not corresponded with Winton, Wright or Hospital to 
understand their literary intentions, nor their literary practices. I have, 
however, studied their publicly available statements on these matters. Also, 
while I acknowledge the possibilities for the ideas in this thesis to enter into 
productive research dialogue with the fields of scientific and empirical 
studies of literary experience—possibilities LeMenager (2012, p. 574) notes 
more broadly—my work is not empirical in the ways these fields might 
define it.6 It is speculative, exploratory, experimental and only empirical in 
the Deleuzian sense: attending to what becomes from encounters with 
Crises of Ecologies, Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist thought and 
contemporary novels, while not presuming these encounters define all that 
                                                          
6 Scholars in this field include Caracciolo (2016); Jacobs (2017); Oatley (2012); Zunshine (2015).  
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is possible. I acknowledge that this thesis could intersect with work on 
educational/pedagogical practices amid Crises of Ecologies. It may, for 
example, be of use in the design and implementation of curriculum by 
educational bodies (including teachers) and institutions across a number of 
disciplines, not least literary studies. However, I do not pursue these 
possibilities in this thesis.7 With regard to the conceptualisations of literary 
practices offered here, I do not presume them to be comprehensive. Rather, 
they are gestures toward ways of conceiving of practices and I fully 
anticipate that others will be found, and that the ways in which those 
outlined are used will vary. In this regard, the proposals of this thesis are not 
offered as solutions to the literary efficacy problems discussed in Chapter 2, 
nor in opposition to the literary practices critiqued in that chapter. They 
move, instead, along other, never entirely separable, trajectories. Most 
importantly, I reiterate that the pursuit of literary practices for Crises of 
Ecologies is not driven by a presumption that literature can save the human 
or the non-and-more-than-human. Rather, this research involves the pursuit 
of difference through literature: via ways of writing and reading that carry 
potentials to enhance our powers of living on the only planet in which we 
can find ourselves. 
  
                                                          
7 I acknowledge the wealth of pedagogical trajectories considered in Teaching Climate Change in the 
Humanities (Siperstein, Hall, & LeMenager, 2017). 
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Chapter 1 – Crises of Ecologies  
 
We all live, in Pickering's words, “in the thick of things,” even though 
the scientific and everyday stance of “detachment and domination” 
blocks this recognition. (Alaimo, 2012, p. 489) 
 
My concern with what contemporary Australian novels can do—and how 
they might do it—arises from our entanglements in Crises of Ecologies8 that 
seem to begin and end with us and that may not afford any tolerable ways 
through or out (Collings, 2014; Kolbert, 2014; Rockstrom et al., 2009). 
These Crises shape Life’s futurity—transforming biosphere, geosphere, 
atmosphere, and hydrosphere, the non-and-more-than-human and the 
human—and they encompass, exceed and are exceeded by climate change 
(Haraway, 2015, p. 160). They provide a material-discursive milieu for the 
work of this thesis, and this chapter maps three of their constitutive qualities: 
first, that we (humans) are entangled in multiple ecological catastrophes of 
our own making (enveloping the non-and-more-than-human), that these 
crises are, in their turn, entangled with each other, and that they are 
inescapable; second, that capitalism is an expression and agent of these 
catastrophes; and, third, that capitalism creates crises of agency and the 
contraction of the trajectories along which Life—and we—might pursue 
                                                          
8 While I employ this term rather than ‘Anthropocene’, this thesis uses scholarship engaging with the 
Anthropocene (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2011), and with issues beyond its earth-
science (T. Cohen, Colebrook, & Miller, 2016; Colebrook, 2012b, 2014c; Colebrook & Weinstein, 
2015; Dibley, 2012; Haraway, 2015; Latour, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Morton, 2013b; Robin, 2013). 
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resistance and renewal. This mapping also attends to Australia, corrects 
notions of ecological crises as contemporary, and acknowledges Indigenous 
crises—violence done to peoples and country—persisting over centuries. To 
produce this map, I knot together qualities of Crises of Ecologies and 
contemporary Australian novelists’ works. This knotted-together 
contextualisation-cum-literary-critique serves to temper reservations 
expressed about the degree of engagement by contemporary Australian 
novelists with these Crises, but it does not answer questions as to the 
efficacy of that engagement. Accordingly, it constitutes only the first step 
towards framing the primary question of this thesis. 
In 2002, Hughes-d’Aeth observed an “absence of writing which has 
addressed […] ‘the limits of liberal ecology’ (238). Also notably absent” he 
wrote “has been a measure of reflexivity in Australian novels that deal with 
environmental themes” (p. 21).9 In 2005, Potter acknowledged—and took 
issue with—a related thread of criticism:  
 
[that] literary fiction has been pointedly accused of lacking in 
engaged and insightful ecological discourse, trailing 'way behind' 
other fields in the eco-humanities, such as history and politics, in 'all 
respects' of activism and insight […]. In the face of pressing 
environmental concerns, let alone a host of social and political 
                                                          
9 Noting Julia Leigh’s novel The Hunter as an exception. 
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imperatives, Australian fiction, we are being told, has lost its sense 
of ethical urgency. (2005b, para. 1)   
 
Potter also noted Modjeska’s (2002, p. 208) diagnosis of a crisis in fiction: 
“Why are so few people writing novels about the lives we are living right 
now, here in Australia”. In 2014, White relayed—and also contested—
similar opinions: 
 
In Australia, texts reflecting climate change have also been 
somewhat sparse. […] Stephen Wright commented on “the 
conservatism and timidity of Australian fiction – which is also by 
more than implication, the conservatism of Australian publishers” 
(n.p.), and wondered why we aren’t fully conscious of the shadow of 
Indigenous dispossession and climate catastrophe. (p. 143)  
 
In 2015, Trexler noted—and also contested—Heise’s argument “that 
literature [presumably, this includes Australian literature] and criticism had 
yet had limited success in addressing climate change” (2015, p. 18). 
Huggan (2015a) also feared that the debate on the efficacy of the novel 
resembled a “conversation going nowhere”, although his paper does 
suggest some directions: 
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there seems to be little consensus on what a good […novel] might 
look like, while the dialogue is not helped by a deadening 
prescriptivism that sees the social realist novel as locked into the 
values of bourgeois individualism, the apocalyptic novel as duty-
bound to explore the “inexorable planetary disaster [that is currently 
unfolding] around us,” and speculative fiction as mapping formulaic 
routes to alternative futures that are already embedded within the 
present. (p. 87) 
  
In responding to these critiques, I note that concern with human-
environment relations and damage are not new to Australian literature. 
While there exists a thick literary thread of engagement with the continent 
as alien, strange, forbidding, adversarial and unsettling (Brady, 1999; 
Devlin-Glass, 2008a, p. 53; Hughes-d'Aeth, 2009; Rawlings, 2009, p. 134), 
scholars also note lively lines of affirmative literary attunement to Australian 
ecologies and to human impacts, spanning the twentieth century and earlier 
(Bonyhady, 2002; Brady, 1999; Hughes-d'Aeth, 2005, 2007, 2008; 
Rawlings, 2009; Robin, 2008; Tyas, 1995). A brief survey also suggests that 
ecological concerns are readily found in contemporary Australian novels 
and that they include and go beyond damage to the environment. Indeed, 
Huggan (2015a), Huggan and Tiffin (2015), Hughes-d’Aeth (2002), Potter 
(2005b), Trexler (2015), and White (2014) count among those making cases 
for such literary concerns. Furthermore, studies of contemporary Australian 
novelists’ engagements with aspects of Crises of Ecologies have increased 
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in recent years, particularly since 2011. Studies address Coetzee10, de 
Pierres11, Egan12, Faber13, Flanagan14, Grenville15, Hooper and Astley16, 
Hospital17, Leigh18, Malouf19, Mears20, Pilkington21, Scott22, Tsiolkas23, 
Winton24, and Wright25, as well as surveying Australian writers and climate 
change (Jordan, 2014). In this context, the survey below, of thirty-two 
Australian novels published since the 1980s,26 combines non-literary with 
literary engagements to map out our Crises: climate change, mass 
                                                          
10 Barrett (2014); Danta (2007); Deyo (2013); P. Dickinson (2013); Hallemeier (2013); Ley (2010); 
Neimneh and Muhaidat (2012); Patton (2004); Paula (2012); Rohman (2014). 
11 Weaver (2011). 
12 Hayles (2015). 
13 Dillon (2011). 
14 Deyo (2013); L. A. White (2012); Wiese (2014). 
15 Huggan (2015a).  
16 Potter (2003). 
17 Callahan (1997); Davies (2000a); Dunlop (2010); Herrero (2006). 
18 Bartosch (2016); Brewer (2009); Crane (2010, 2012); Kerridge (2002). 
19 Archer-Lean (2014); Grogan (2014); Mikkonen (2004); G. J. Murphy (2010). 
20 Nyman (2014). 
21 Klein (2016). 
22 Armellino (2007); Brewster (2012); Coralie (2008); Slater (2001, 2005, 2006); Hughes-d'Aeth 
(2016). 
23 Cummins (2015). 
24 Ashcroft (2014); Birns (2014, 2015); Harris (2015); Huggan (2015a). 
25 Barras (2015a, 2015b); Daley (2016a); Devlin-Glass (2007, 2008b); J. White (2014). 
26 The selected novels are: Steven Amsterdam’s Things we Didn’t See Coming (2009); Thea Astley’s 
Drylands (1999); Murray Bail’s Eucalyptus (2005); James Bradley’s Clade (2015); Peter Carey’s Bliss 
(1996), and The Tax Inspector (1991); JM Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello (2003); Richard Flanagan’s 
The Sound of Hand Clapping (1997), and The Unknown Terrorist (2012); Kate Grenville’s The Secret 
River (2005); Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster (2005); Dorothy Johnston’s Maralinga My Love (1988), 
and One for The Master (1997)); Mireille Juchau’s The World Without Us (2015); Julia Leigh’s The 
Hunter (2011); Gabrielle Lord’s Salt (1990); Andrew McGahan’s The White Earth (2004); James 
McQueen’s Hook’s Mountain (1982); Elliot Perlman’s Three Dollars (2011); Kim Scott’s Benang: from 
the heart (1999), and That Deadman Dance (2010); Christos Tsiolkas’ Dead Europe (2005); George 
Turner’s The Sea and Summer (1987); Sam Watson’s The Kadaitcha Sung (1990); Archie Weller’s 
Land of the Golden Clouds (1998); Michael Wilding’s Pacific Highway (1982); Tim Winton’s Blueback 
(1997), Shallows (1995), Breath (2009), and Eyrie (2013); and Alexis Wright’s Carpentaria (2006a), 
and The Swan Book (2013).  
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extinction, planetary degradation, Indigenous ecological crises, colonialism 
and capitalism as agents of crises, and associated crises of subjectivity and 
agency. It concurs with what this growing body of scholarship implies: that 
contemporary Australian novelists are engaging substantively with Crises of 
Ecologies.  
 
 
Climate change—mass extinction—planetary degradation 
 
There is overwhelming scientific confidence in, and public awareness of, 
the relationships between human actions, global warming, and climate 
change. However, global warming related transformations are 
accelerating,27 and the prospects for decisive restorative action are in crisis 
(Parr, 2013). Thinkers, including Baird Callicott (2016), Chakrabarty (2009), 
Colebrook (2012a, 2012b, 2014a; 2015), Flannery (2015), Haraway (2015), 
Latour (2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2015), and Morton (2013a), note that climate 
change entails epistemological, ontological, and ethical crises now and to 
come. Human and non-and-more-than-human bodies are experiencing 
transformations and pain; albeit, for too many of us, the pain in which we 
are implicated is not (yet) ours to feel.28 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (2013) tracks global warming and offers prognoses 
for our possible futures, but the damage to come is often beyond scientific 
                                                          
27 See World Meteorological Organisation (2017). 
28 See Nixon (2011). Huggan (2015) cites Ulrich Beck on this.  
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predictive capabilities; so complex and open are the systems to which 
climate change draws our attention. And, while we may well all say that we 
are and will be in it together, the burdens of Crises are and will not be borne 
equally (Braidotti, 2017, p. 18; Probyn, 2016, p. 12). For much of Humanity, 
climate change’s material expressions remain distant, can be avoided (for 
now), or are barely perceptible on the body. While some can already 
corporeally sense climate change, many cannot, or do not wish to: it is 
almost outside what can be thought. What is already here and to come are 
difficult to imagine via conventional human notions of body, duration, 
subjectivity, the social, and world. There are derangements of scale (Clark, 
2012)—spatial and temporal,29 material and discursive—associated with 
climate change and the human actions causing it. These derangements 
defeat our attempts to come to terms with the effects our living has on Life, 
not least because the responses required reach down the scales to our 
most habitual, seemingly inconsequential, actions (Clark, 2012; Morton, 
2016). 
Turner’s (1987), Amsterdam’s (2009), Winton’s (2013), Wright’s (2013), 
Juchau’s (2015) and Bradley’s (2015) novels span a period of growing 
scientific and public awareness of anthropogenic climate change (Black, 
Hassenzahl, Stephens, Weisel, & Gift, 2013, p. 1148). Turner, for example, 
imagines a water-inundated, post-greenhouse Australia progressing 
towards an ice age. Thirty years after publication, Turner’s novel reads as 
uncannily prescient of the forces at work, of the dangers of denial, and of 
                                                          
29 See Nixon (2011, p. 5) on “slow violence”. 
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what are now, for some, familiar threats to Life. Willed ignorance remains at 
the core of these crises: “Refusal to believe is our surety that disaster 
cannot happen – at any rate, not today. And, every time, it does” (p. 24). 
Wright’s The Swan Book is set in an Australian future in which global 
warming inflicts violence upon people, place, and all Life. For Bella Donna—
a climate change refugee—global warming’s forces have been devastating:  
 
She looked startled, as though she had been asked to describe the 
inexplicable, of what happened to people affected by the climate 
changing in wild weather storms, or the culmination of years of 
drought, high temperature and winds in some countries, or in 
others, the freezing depths of prolonged winters. (p. 25) 
 
Countries have disappeared; refugees lost at sea in their millions; and lives 
exiled and annihilated: "Ice-covered lakes dried up where the swans once 
lived [...]. Trees stopped measuring the season and died slowly in ground 
bone dry several metres deep" (p. 72). Hubristic humans have “sacrificed 
the whole earth” (p. 12).   
Observations suggest that via global warming (Urban, 2015) and other 
acts, humans have initiated the earth’s sixth mass extinction event 
(Barnosky et al., 2011; WWF International, 2016). Humans have for 
centuries been “co-opting resources, fragmenting habitats, introducing non-
native species, spreading pathogens, [and] killing species directly” 
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(Barnosky et al., 2011, p. 51). Although, for many humans, mass extinction 
is conceivable in the abstract, it is too often imperceptible: like climate 
change. For contemporary Australian novelists, violence to non-and-more-
than-human creatures and mass extinctions include and exceed whales and 
tigers. For example, Scott’s That Deadman Dance (2010, p. 281) and 
Winton’s Shallows (1996) attend to violence to whales conducted in the 
interests of profit or preserving community heritage: “But what about the 
whales? // Maybe we fished them out. // But no one could know for sure” 
(Scott, 2010, p. 298).30 Winton immerses readers in industrial whaling’s 
horrors: 
 
Down at the flensing deck, a long ramp running into the bloody 
shallows, a whale was being winched up, hooks through the flukes 
of its tail, chains and cables moving, taut, noisy. Men […] in 
gumboots and bloodied singlets. Plumes of putrid steam lifted from 
the sheds where boilers and furnaces and generators roared […] 
men went to work with their hockey sticks and sliced deep into the 
glistening, black blubber and proceeded to whittle the grey body 
down. […] Steadily, bloodily, the sperm whale was dismantled like a 
salvaged vessel. (1996, p. 32) 
 
                                                          
30 Hughes-d’Aeth (2016) notes that Scott attends to whaling as a realm of collectivity and affirmation 
for settlers and Indigenous peoples (p. 28). 
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Leigh’s The Hunter (2011) re-animates the extinct Thylacine and our 
consciousness of its history via the story of M, a mercenary employed to 
find and kill the last tiger and harvest its biological assets. M reflects on that 
“two-legged fearsome little pygmy, the human hunter” (p. 31) precipitating 
extinctions. Coetzee (2003), Juchau (2015), Winton (2013), and Wright 
(2013) also engage with other creatures’ fates: factory farmed animals; bee 
colony collapse; unhomed and slaughtered birds; and countless drowned, 
frozen and parched species, including homo sapiens.   
While there is compelling scientific evidence that humans are marking 
and transforming the earth materially and systemically (Rockstrom et al., 
2009), I cannot adequately represent the overwhelming scope of planetary 
degradation (including pollution, waste, resource scarcity, habitat damage, 
genetic mutation, and related sickness and death), nor the varying scales of 
its expressions.31 I can, however, observe that waste, as the material 
shadow of goods and services, is central to capitalism and to the cultures 
with which it is entangled (Muecke & Hawkins, 2002, p. x). It is now difficult 
to conceive of planetary locations entirely unaffected by human agency 
(Aronson, Thatje, McClintock, & Hughes, 2011, p. 101) or untouched by 
human garbage: whether that waste has broken down into smaller parts 
(Andrady, 2011; Talsness, Andrade, Kuriyama, Taylor, & vom Saal, 2009; 
S. L. Wright, Thompson, & Galloway, 2013), or remains in its original form. 
                                                          
31 Among the myriad published studies, Australia-related studies include Cowan and Evans (2010); 
Edwards (2013); Lowe (2014); Pike, Croak, Webb, and Shine (2010); Reisser et al. (2013); and 
Senior, Nakagawa, and Grimm (2014).  
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As producers and consumers, we want to hide our waste away, avoid its 
impurities, control it, and ignore the implications for others (Falasca-
Zamponi, 2011, pp. 3-4; Hawkins, 2004). Muecke and Hawkins (2002) 
argue that “expelling and discarding […is] fundamental to the ordering of the 
self” (p. xiii). But we cannot avoid waste; it returns to us. We are profoundly 
implicated with it (Muecke & Hawkins, 2002, p. xiv). It transforms non-and-
more-than-human and human lives. The novels surveyed often use the 
imagery of waste and degradation for characterisation: the ruined subject. In 
Winton’s Eyrie (2013), for example, the idea of the self and of Life as no 
more than waste seems to extend to family, work, consumer goods, cars, 
and religion; all no more than denuded, cast-off capitalist resources. 
However, novelists also attend directly to planetary degradation: with a 
sense of loss, with notes of complicity, and with gestures toward damage 
returning to humans. Winton writes, “Attractive isn’t it, lost beauty?” (2013, 
p. 216). For Amsterdam (2009), Astley (1999), Carey (Pollak & MacNabb, 
2000, p. 78), Flanagan (1997), Turner (1987), and Winton (2013), the city is 
a source of sickness and development makes it sick. In Eyrie, Fremantle is 
choked with detritus (pp. 119, 120, 158), the dynamic ocean of Winton’s 
prior novel, Breath (2009), becomes an ocean of waste, and Eyrie’s 
protagonist, Tom Keely, becomes a ruined part. The swamp in The Swan 
Book is the ocean’s kin: a wasteland (pp. 18, 58, 391), entangling swans, 
people, “decaying plastic, unwanted clothes, rotting vegetable matter or 
slime that bobbed, wanami diesel slick [...]" (p. 36).   
Industrial capitalism is commonly positioned as the root cause of pollution 
and degradation. Perlman (2011, p. 167) implicates heavy industry, while 
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Wright (2006a) and Winton (2013, pp. 5, 6, 193) single out mining.32 Carey 
(Pollak and McNabb (2000), Jose (2005), Flanagan (1997, p. 23), Johnston 
(1997, pp. 23, 30), , Leigh (2011), McQueen (1982), and Wilding (1982, pp. 
1-3) attend to logging and forestry damage, and to the threatening returns of 
industrial pollution to humans. Already inhabiting a toxic coastline, Wilding’s 
narrator observes that, in the forest, “The bulldozers clear out everything 
indiscriminately” (p. 108), while Leigh’s M “[…] is about to drink the [creek] 
water when it occurs to him that it might be poisoned by nearby properties; it 
might even have run through the log dump” (2011, p. 9).   
Read against the measures of geological time, humans might be likened 
to a virus colonising the earth (Braidotti, 2005/6). We participate in 
libertarian projects of resource consumption and destruction, and the 
apotheoses of these projects—the declaration of the Anthropocene (Steffen 
et al., 2011) and the triumph of global Capital—paradoxically double as their 
nadirs. With a rising global population (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2013) we have reason to 
fear the end of oil (Paul Roberts, 2004),33 conflicts for water (Munk 
Ravnborg, 2004; UNESCO, 2012), and the depletion of resources critical to 
conventionally defined human progress and survival. Drought and water 
scarcity permeate the novels surveyed, including Drylands, The Swan Book, 
The Sound of One Hand Clapping, Eyrie, The Hunter, Oyster, Carpentaria, 
and The White Earth. Writers’ concerns encompass Australia’s precarious 
                                                          
32 Winton also writes of wheat farming, which Hughes-d’Aeth (2007) describes as “the cause of the 
destruction of most of the ecological fabric of south-western Australia” (p. 59). 
33 LeMenager (2012) observes that there are great challenges in imagining alternatives “even as we 
recognise its [oil’s] unsustainability” (p. 61). 
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fresh water supply and the damage to water supplies of human actions and 
climate change. In numerous works, dust prevails, not agricultural plenty. 
Astley’s town, Drylands, is the tenuous, drought-devastated home to 
farmers: their cattle transformed into stumbling corpses (1999, p. 111); the 
land a dust bowl (p. 135). Water, so necessary to serve the agricultural 
lifestyles upon which colonial Australia relied, is scarce, and the place 
transmits “unspeakable gloom” (p. 24). Farming earth unable to support it 
serves only to worsen the health of that land. Hospital’s outback 
Queensland of Oyster seems worse: "there were children […] who had 
never seen rain." (1997, p. 3). Bradley (2015), Juchau (2015), Lord (1990), 
Turner (1987), Winton (2013), and Wright (2006a, 2013) are among the 
novelists writing Australia’s complicated relationships between scarcity and 
dangerous overabundance: humans and global warming bring both too 
much and too little water. 
 
 
Capitalism: an agent of crises 
 
Capitalism’s entanglements with ecological crises are undoubtable. For 
Guattari (2000, p. 6), capitalism is the “motor” of anthropogenic planetary 
damage. More recently, Latour (2004, 2011), J.W. Moore (2015), Parr 
(2013), and others have explored capitalism’s ecological entanglements. 
The Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2011) is the dominant term now proposed 
to convey the relationships between earth system transformations and the 
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forces of the human and modern capitalism;34 transformations which are 
neither solely geological (Dibley, 2012), nor solely non-and-more-than-
human. There is a devastating eco-logic (Guattari, 2000, p. 44) to 
capitalism. Privileging economic value, psychically naturalized (Malabou, 
2008, p. 53), and with all things appearing immanent to it (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983, p. 11), capitalism expands its processes and axiomatics in 
order to deal with complexity, diversity, hybridity and plurality, and to better 
suit the cultural norms of contemporary mass democracies (Lucarelli, 2010, 
p. 120). The potential for lives that do not serve Capital is contracted 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, pp. 28-29; Lazzarato, 2004) and all Life risks 
(re)constitution as resource to be mined (Braidotti, 2013, pp. 61-62; Cooper, 
2008, p. 9).  
For Deleuze and Guattari (1983, pp. 3-4), capitalism’s discursive forces 
and semiotic regimes convince us of our safe separation from the world we 
consume and damage. Capitalist consciousness is cultivated. We are 
persuaded that there are boundaries between capitalist systems: 
production, distribution, consumption and disposal. We are also convinced 
that these boundaries map to equally undeniable separations between 
Human and Nature. Alas, there are no independent spheres or circuits, and, 
worse, Life is often violated by attempts to produce separations. Braidotti 
(2002) considers the distinguishing of the animal from the human to be one 
violent imprint of capitalist consciousness. Asserting the animal’s 
otherness—as tool, technology, material, metaphor, labour (Braidotti, 
                                                          
34 The International Commission on Stratigraphy’s Working Group on The Anthropocene has 
proposed formalisation (Carrington, 2016). 
  
 
27 
 
2002)—and separating ourselves from it, underpins its (ab)use. Coetzee 
(2003, p. 111), Perlman (2011), Wilding (1982), and Winton (2013) explore 
a willed ignorance that we might associate with capitalist consciousness. As 
the grandfather in Amsterdam’s Things We Didn’t See Coming assures us, 
"‘Everything will be fine until it’s not. Then we can worry’" (p. 24).  
Everything challenging capitalism, attempting to differ, is axiomatised: 
recoded onto economic value. Where that which differs is not stigmatized or 
made an enemy, it is turned into a consumable good, commodified, and 
assigned a market niche (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; Genosko, 2002, p. 
235), including earth systems and earth system risks: the heralds of crises. 
Financial markets (insurances, derivatives, structured investment products) 
recode earth system risks we might associate with Crises of Ecologies, 
(re)positioning them as managed economic bodies (Dibley, 2012, p. 146). 
Capitalism, it seems, separates us from danger and enables the fantasy that 
we can be both pro-capital and green (Morton, 2010b, p. 110). Characters in 
the novels surveyed are subjected to forces that axiomatise, financialise and 
marketise resistance. In Three Dollars, for example, Tanya—Eddie’s 
partner—wants to explore the crises of capitalism in her academic thesis 
and Paul, her banker-friend, immediately claims her work—values it—for the 
“fear of fascism market’”. He concedes: “’There is, I’ll admit, probably a 
fortune to be made by the people who write these searing warnings of the 
next global catastrophe” (p. 141). The co-option and axiomatisation of 
conservation are also important in The Hunter (Crane, 2012, p. 107). 
Paradoxically, M’s job is to kill—the last thylacine—in order to conserve—
profit opportunities.  
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Winton’s novels consistently express a visceral distaste for big business, 
greed, “dealing” (2013, p. 82), and the exclusive pursuit of profit. Eyrie’s 
withered protagonist, Tom Keely, expresses a splenetic hatred for “diggers 
and dealers” (p. 141) and a dark cynicism towards consumerism, and 
towards money as an entirely negative force. Money “soothed all wounds” 
(p. 68) if we settled for work without any other redeeming features; it “talks” 
but has nothing “interesting to say” (p. 70); it funds mining “propaganda” that 
muffles the voice of environmental campaigns (p. 118); it suggests an 
absence of conscience (p. 208); it defines all things (“Cricket, he said. 
What’s that about? // Money, I guess” (p. 257)); it encourages violence to 
acquire it (“They want money. Otherwise they’ll fuck us up” (p. 265)); 
although it resolves nothing (“money would hardly be sufficient now” (p. 
405)).  
Often ironically, contemporary novelists place capitalism, big business, 
failed government, and the wealthy at the root of damage to psyches, 
bodies, and societies: to humans and the non-and-more-than-human. In 
Carpentaria, The Sound of One Hand Clapping, Three Dollars, and Eyrie, 
logging, mining and resource companies stand in for capitalism, while in 
Drylands, The White Earth, Things We Didn’t See Coming, and Eucalyptus, 
agriculture often appears as darkly ruined/ruinous, not as unproblematic 
nostalgia or elegy object. Carpentaria, Three Dollars, The Hunter, and 
Pacific Highway portray capitalism as shadowy, alien, untouchable, and 
distant, yet also global and omnipresent: able to surveil, impinge upon, and 
intimately shape Life. For example, while multinational capitalist power in 
Carpentaria is, no doubt, foolish, arrogant, ignorant and careless, it is also 
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invasive and intent on surveillance: tapping into local Aboriginal people’s 
words, reshaping words for consumption by “the multinational mining 
people”, and beaming them across the globe “before you have even had a 
chance to end your sentence” (p. 99). Wright connects surveillance to the 
enforcement of control—“It could cast a security net over the whole social 
reality of Desperance” (p. 441)—and the threat of appropriation of local 
knowledge: “‘They lock em up all the information inside for them own eyes 
only’” (pp. 158-159).  
Capitalism exhibits mythical, religious, cult-like qualities in The Hunter, 
Oyster, Eyrie, and Three Dollars. For example, Hospital’s (1997) Outer 
Maroo combines cult and capital to produce a control society that has, at its 
heart, the pursuit of transcendence and wealth. Capitalism and religion 
traverse each other to recode and control desire, and religion becomes 
monetised. To be rich is to be saved. The genesis of Life is the genesis of 
wealth (p. 324). Wealth and salvation are fused together in the narration of 
Oyster’s first “manifestation” (p. 309) in Outer Maroo. Biblical allusions and 
scriptural stylings attach themselves to references to “hard-earned cash” (p. 
328), to property, to getting “rich” (p. 330). Oyster’s mesmerism, the draw of 
wealth, the desire for opals, and the chance of redemption from apocalypse, 
combine to seduce. As foot-soldier of the corporation, M (The Hunter) 
embraces the centrality of capitalism to his life and to all Life and, at times, 
claims Life to be immanent to him, and, thereby, to capitalism. He 
contemplates his apotheosis: 
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tells himself that he is the only one: The only one, I am the only 
one. This thought grows light in him, incandescent. All the energy of 
the sun runs through him and into the earth; he is the source of all 
animation. (p. 167) 
 
Contemporary novelists portray capitalism as violent and mad: as 
destructive, exploitative, pillager (Carpentaria, Eyrie, The Sound of One 
Hand Clapping, The Hunter, and Pacific Highway); as violent, psychopathic, 
and Kafkaesque/Orwellian in its logic (The Hunter, Oyster, The Sound of 
One Hand Clapping, Carpentaria, and Pacific Highway); as systemically 
corrupt (Eyrie, Things We Didn’t See Coming, and The Hunter); as 
repressive (Carpentaria, Eyrie, The Secret River, Oyster, and Things We 
Didn’t See Coming); and as tied to animal atrocities (Elizabeth Costello). In 
Carpentaria, when local people, such as Will Phantom, protest or resist, 
they are run out of town or shot at (pp. 172-173). In Pacific Highway the 
confident, unsettling, and strange reverse logic of the capitalist powers-that-
be undergirds bizarre claims about the value of ecological destruction: “If 
you use the polluting by-products of industry instead of just dumping them, 
they can have all sorts of beneficial functions. Cleansing fog – wipes the 
beaches clean in a matter of seconds” (p. 115). For Wilding’s narrator, 
capitalism is monomaniacal, exploitative, destructive “evil” (pp. 142,156).  
Capitalism is adaptable. Its crises are the engines of its “health” (Aryal & 
Massumi, 2012, p. 75), not its demise (Guattari, 2000, p. 32). For Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983, p. 152), repeated disruptions are “all the misfirings and 
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failures in a system that is constantly reborn of its own disharmonies”. With 
the qualified exceptions of Carpentaria, Oyster and The Sound of One Hand 
Clapping, capitalism’s dominance is preserved in the novels surveyed. In 
Three Dollars, those who profit from capitalism are convinced that it is not in 
crisis, and does not present one. Paul assures Tanya that “’You’ll find it hard 
to convince anyone […] that there is anything faintly resembling a crisis 
here” (p. 140). Indeed, it is not Paul who experiences the crisis but those 
who, it seems, are destined to be excluded. Similarly, in Eyrie, Australian’s 
believe themselves immune to global financial crises: “at home hardly a 
ripple. Endless reserves of mining loot. Safe as houses” (p. 54). And while, 
conversely, Wilding’s narrator suggests that capitalism “will eliminate itself, 
of that there is no doubt”, there is an admission that “we do not know how 
long it will take” (p. 153). Meanwhile, M (The Hunter) imagines Capital’s 
immortal, monstrous, corporate Gorgons regenerating when attacked: “chop 
one head off […] and another will grow” (p. 19).  
 
 
Crises of agency 
 
If we are not the capitalist subject—and many empty variations are 
available—then we are excluded and in crisis. Indeed, even the capitalist 
subject is in crisis, or “at a critical juncture” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 155). The 
novels surveyed involve transformed characters, stripped of their agency: 
whether or not they resist, embrace, or are excluded by, capitalism. We find 
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among them Winton’s Keely and Stewie (2013); Astley’s Jim and Benny, 
and Briceland (1999); Leigh’s M (2011); Hospital’s Outer Maroo residents 
and the captives at Oyster’s Reef (1997); Perlman’s Eddie and Tanya, and 
Paul and Gerard (2011); Scott’s Harley and the Nyoongar people, and 
Coolman and the colonisers (1999); Amsterdam’s Angel and the agents of 
government (2009); Flanagan’s Bojan Buloh and Helvi (1997), and his 
Sydney pole dancers, socialites and celebrities (2012); and Wright’s 
Pricklebush and swamp peoples, and Stan Bruiser and Warren Finch 
(2006a, 2013). These crises of agency35 are shaped, not least, by the 
entangling forces of identity, consumption, affective capitalism and 
biopower, informationalisation and resourcification, and inequality and 
oppression.  
Capitalism proliferates identities and uses notions of individualism (desire 
to be different or the same) to assert control (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. xii-
xiii). Wishing to stand out, the capitalist individual ends up unable to live 
freely (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Guattari, 2009, p. 215). Amsterdam 
(2009), Flanagan (2012), Hospital (1997), Leigh (2011), Perlman (2011), 
Scott (1999), Winton (2013), and Wright (2013) are among those writers 
concerned with the intersections of capitalism and identity. As Perlman’s 
Eddie recalls ironically, we develop empty expectations: "she, like me, had 
just finished high school and was waiting to see which faculty at which 
university would metamorphose her into a solid pay-as-you-earn citizen" (p. 
32). Flanagan’s The Unknown Terrorist explores addiction to the cult of 
                                                          
35 Hughes-d’Aeth and Nabizadeh (2017) refer to ‘foreclosed agency’ (p. 440). 
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identity. We read about Jodie, a "pole dancer to whom the body mattered 
and who, at nineteen, was already a Botox junkie" (p. 5). How we look is 
central to the zeitgeist: "She [the Doll] had an open, oval face. It was exactly 
the wrong face for our age" (p. 6). The Americanisation of subjectivity 
progresses as the Doll's Australian half-brothers mouth Americanisms and 
dress "like two fat rappers" (p. 8).  
Consumerism impoverishes the vitality of the subject like drug addiction 
(Reber, 2012, p. 84), commodifies the commodity seeker, and drives 
ecological damage. The idea of the individual spoilt by freedom of choice 
hides a contraction of subjectivity if, after Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 
28), we consider freedom to be the opening out of opportunities for relations 
beyond what the market offers.36 Robinson (2013, p. 667) and Braidotti 
(2013, p. 61) see consumer identity as a bulwark of system stability: 
directing desire towards consumption not resistance; and limiting choices to 
those important to capitalism’s continuation. Indeed, in mass consumption 
cultures dominated by visual experience (Hetherington, 2007) and nurtured 
by the media (Killmeier, 2012, pp. 75-77), capitalist subjects define 
themselves by their pursuit of more and new goods and services. Their 
desire produces those goods and services rather than simply existing as a 
product of them (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 11; Morton, 2000, p. 125; 
2007b, p. 111). For many, there is no longer any outside of the workplace 
(Lazzarato, 1996; Marazzi, 2008; 2011, p. 51). Ways of life become modes 
                                                          
36 See also Braidotti and Dolphijn (2015, p. 19). 
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of employment and subjectivities other than the “consumer-producer” are 
subject to erasure (Lazzarato, 2004, p. 203; Stiegler, 2014, p. 43).  
Clough (2010), Massumi (2002a, 2015), Aryal and Massumi (2012), and 
Lazzarato and Jordan (2014) count among those analysing capitalism’s use 
of techniques of expression that work on pre-rational responses. As forces 
for subject formation, affects move outside of / beyond the abilities of the 
subject to think (rationalise) them and, thereby, to control the results of 
encounters with them. By marshalling the flows of affect, capitalism informs 
the directions that Life/lives can take: augmenting or diminishing bodies’ 
capacities to enter into affirmative relations (Clough, 2010). Anderson 
(2012), Clough (2010) and others consider affect to be critical to the 
operations of biopower (Dreyfus, Rabinow, & Foucault, 1983, pp. 126-
142).37 Namely, affect contributes to the shaping of consumers and 
producers (Picard, 2013) who can reliably perpetuate capital accumulation 
without significant resistance, including contemporary immaterial labourers 
who are ostensibly sheltered from traditional Fordist, workplace biopower 
deployments (Lazzarato, 1996; Virno, 2004).  
Affective strategies naturalise capitalism in the bodies and minds of 
citizens and drive acceptance of its inevitability (Aryal & Massumi, 2012, p. 
76) as our best and only possible social, economic and political world (J. 
Byrne & Martinez, 1989; Fukuyama, 1992; Zizek, 2008, p. 37). Central to 
                                                          
37 Rabinow and Rose (2006, pp. 203-204) suggest the forces of biopower are increasingly 
associated with the interests of Capital in value creation and capture via humans; traversing race, 
reproduction and genomic medicine (p. 204). Calarco (2016) includes animals (p. 13) and plant life (p. 
15). 
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the continuance of the way things should be is the encouragement of fear of 
alternatives, and of an attraction to the need for stability and to the idea that 
stability is guaranteed by the capitalist model of competition and 
consumption (Barthes, 1972; Catherwood & DiVanna, 2008; Murray & 
Chesters, 2012). Flanagan’s The Unknown Terrorist connects the 
production(s) of consumerism with fear, terrorism and the desire to protect 
the modern “civilisation [...] under attack" (p. 31). The media transforms the 
character of the Doll into a figure of fear and hate and, as terrorist, she 
becomes a modern consumer commodity, demanded by the public. She 
tells her friend, Wilder: 
 
‘People like fear. We all want to be frightened and we all want 
somebody to tell us how to live and who to fuck and why we should 
do this and think that. And that’s the Devil’s job. That’s why I’m 
important to them, Wilder, because if you can make up a terrorist 
you’ve given people the Devil. They love the Devil’. (p. 166) 
 
A more quotidian function of affective capitalism is to drive consumption 
(Clough, 2010; Reber, 2012; Wendling, 2012). Amsterdam (2009), Carey 
(1996),38 Coetzee (2003), Flanagan (2012), Hospital (1997), Perlman 
(2011), Tsiolkas (2005), Winton (2013), and Wright (2013) are among those 
writers engaging critically with consumerism. Although he is not immune, 
                                                          
38 See Hassall (1998, p. 5), Jose (2005), and Pollak and McNabb (2000, p. 79) on Carey. 
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Perlman’s Eddie narrates a sustained critique of the cult of consumption. 
Subjectivity, he observes, has come to be defined by “trivial […] obsessions” 
(p. 93) with material possessions. Possessions are what “a man is, both to 
the world and to his wife” he observes, and “no one could be fairly blamed 
for seeing it that way” (p. 13). Identity is tied to consumption and Perlman 
employs the language of escalating addiction:  
 
It might start with a vase but it progresses to china dinner services 
or silver cutlery and soon you are contemplating a personal loan to 
knock down one of the many walls you are having trouble paying off 
in order to install a brick fireplace because other people's lives 
seem so augmented by having one. (p. 131) 
 
Notions of self-made subjectivity are important to television’s 
reinforcement of the consumptive objectives of capitalism (Clough, 2010; 
Lazzarato, 2004, p. 190; Ouellette, 2014). Workers in media and television 
shows become affect commodities and transmitters: promoting consumption 
as a pathway to our desired selves. Television personalities/participants 
embody and pursue the features of paradigmatic capitalist subjects. In The 
Unknown Terrorist, the Doll and her colleagues’ aspirations are media-
saturated with “the idea of beautiful women as cadaverous children” (p. 6). 
Growing up and guided by television shows, the Doll also believes that by 
renovating her apartment, “changed as miraculously with it would be the 
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Doll’s life” (p. 57). In Three Dollars, an advertising break during a hospital 
drama presents a man “resembling one of the television doctors” and 
expressing self-entrepreneurship’s allure: 
 
[he] had come upon the ten points which distinguished successful 
people from the rest of us. He had managed to get these points 
down onto six cassette tapes […]. Some of those people happened 
to be near his swimming pool and were willing to testify to the 
beneficial effect these tapes had had on their lives. Previously they 
were us but now, after owning these tapes, they were them. (p. 
244) 
 
Beyond the media, some line workers are trained to transmit affect via 
facial expressions and body language (Lukács, 2010; Negishi, 2012). In 
Eyrie, affect workers are sad bodies. We might be reminded of Negishi’s 
(2012) Japanese affect workers—trained to smile—in Winton’s supermarket 
cashier’s “limp smile of boredom” (p. 17) and in his “fresh and endlessly 
replaceable” (p. 18) Fremantle charity workers. In The Unknown Terrorist, 
Flanagan connects trained affective responses, sex workers’ bodies, 
consumption, and money. The Doll’s job involves the routinized, repetitive 
and predictable transmission of lust affects. She knows how this affective 
power connects sexuality to the movement of money: 
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the Doll tried to entice them to tip, to persuade them that they 
needed to see what it was that a woman had beneath her knickers 
[…] but everything the Doll did, every word she said, every gesture 
she made, everything she revealed and the many more things she 
so carefully hid, all of it, she told herself, was about the money, to 
get and to keep money, for all the things that money could buy and 
for all the things that money made her feel. (p. 34) 
 
Affective capitalism returns us to identity. Rather than constituting a realm of 
expanded freedom of choice and self-creation, affective capitalism shapes 
our sense of self, places boundaries around the available aspirational 
selves, and monetizes being. The proliferation of mass subjectivities 
(Guattari, 2000, p. 50), and the affective charges attached (attaching us) to 
those subjectivities, drive production and consumption (Lewis, 2013, p. 
451), which, in turn, feed into ecological damage.  
As capitalism expands and runs out of earthly space and resources from 
which economic surplus is extracted, attention turns to humans and the non-
and-more-than-human as profitable biological or informational resources 
(Clough, 2010). The privileged human falls victim to a “unidimensionalizing 
value system” (Braidotti, 2013, pp. 61-62, 71; Guattari, 2000, p. 30) and all 
Life becomes resource for Capital (Cooper, 2008; Hardt & Negri, 2009; 
Lazzarato, 2004, p. 205). Affect and biopower support this turn to new 
sources of value exchange (Fumagalli & Lucarelli, 2011). Leigh (2011), 
Scott (1999), and Wright (2006a), are among those novelists engaging with 
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the resourcification and informationalisation of Life under capitalism and 
colonialism. For example, Leigh—Thylacines as biotechnological assets—
and Scott—colonial eugenics and assimilation—engage with the forces of 
control and repression. As Crane suggests (2010, p. 118), whether it is to 
be cloned or utilised genetically for commercial-military enterprise, or saved, 
the Thylacine in The Hunter has been entirely subsumed into Capital. In 
Benang, as colonial pastoralism delineates and orders country, colonists 
attempt to scientifically delineate, separate, and breed out Nyoongar people. 
Harley reads the “Captions to the photographs [of his people]; full-blood, 
half-caste (first cross), quadroon, octoroon” (p. 26). This photographing, 
categorising, and filing system at Chief Protector, Auber Neville’s office 
informationalises Nyoongar bodies and enables racism; processes that 
Clough (2010) deems central to the health of advanced capitalism. 
Inequality, control, exploitation and exclusion are pivotal to capitalism and 
the shaping of subjectivities. Just as capitalist States sanction and control 
the available consumerist subjectivities, they also deny subjectivities that 
threaten accepted norms, and exclude those with whom they cannot cope, 
those whom they seek to exploit (D. S. Byrne, 2005), and those who are 
surplus to Capital’s requirements (Kennedy, 2005). Billions live in poverty, 
deprivation and exclusion: our “surplus humanity” (Davis, 2006). They are 
locked out of gains in wealth and living standards (Piketty & Goldhammer, 
2014; W. Robinson, 2013), regardless of their proximity to holders of 
monetary wealth: in the global South (Davis, 2006), the North (Iceland, 
2013; Seymour, 2013), and Australia (Saunders, 2011). Amsterdam (2009), 
Flanagan (1997, 2012), Grenville (2005), Hospital (1992, 1997), Perlman 
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(2011), Scott (1999), Tsiolkas (2005), Turner (1987), Winton (2013), and 
Wright (2013) are among the novelists engaging with issues of inequality, 
oppression, and exclusion (and resistance). McCann (2010), for example, 
notes that Tsiolkas offers glimpses of a “dislocated global underclass” in 
Dead Europe. Likewise, Turner’s (1987) future Melbourne society is 
bifurcated into the haves (Sweet) and the have-nots (Swill): constituting ten 
and ninety percent of the population respectively. Furthermore, Wright’s 
withering critiques of persistent oppression in The Swan Book (2013, p. 50; 
Zable & Wright, 2013, p. 29) return us to the need for any mapping of Crises 
of Ecologies to attend to the experiences of Indigenous peoples and 
country. 
 
 
Indigenous Crises of Ecologies 
 
The rape of our land and people violated our relationship with the 
ruwe.39 Our ability to care for our self and land diminished. The 
dispossession of the naked peoples and the Raw Law40 is mirrored 
in the environmental devastation visited upon the ruwe. (I. Watson, 
2015, p. 21) 
                                                          
39 Watson defines ruwe as “the territories of the First Nations Peoples” (p. 10). 
40 Raw Law, Watson argues, is pre-existing Indigenous law practiced before and since colonisation. 
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In Carpentaria, Alexis Wright’s narrator talks of “two centuries full” of 
defeat (p. 407). For more than two-hundred years, Australian colonial-
capitalism’s “dual war”, on Indigenous peoples and on country (Rose & 
Robin, 2004; I. Watson, 2015),41 has produced and perpetuated profound 
ecological devastation (T. F. Flannery, 1997; Griffiths & Robin, 1997; 
Horton, 2000; Lunt, Jones, Spooner, & Petrow, 2006; Reynolds, 1987, 
1989, 2001, 2006, 2013; Rose, 2004; Rose & Robin, 2004). The colonial-
capitalist project, initially agricultural in expression, entails a domination of 
the human and the non-and-more-than-human, and its core practices are 
often entirely unsuited to the Life of the Australian continent (Gill, 2005; 
Griffiths, 2001; Heathcote, 1987).42 Irene Watson (2015) writes of 
colonisation as ongoing genocide and the expression of ‘muldarbi’ (demon 
spirit). Many colonisers possessed and expressed Eurocentric, 
anthropocentric, ‘civilising’, rationalist mindsets (Arthur, 2002; Coralie, 2008; 
Rose, 2004; I. Watson, 2015). Mindsets that were bolstered by notions of 
Terra Nullius (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2013, pp. 257-259), Vox Nullius 
(Heiss, Minter, & Jose, 2008, p. 2), and Darwinian survival of the fittest; by 
capitalist axioms of trade and acquisition; by religion, science (and pseudo-
science), and European concepts of law (Coralie, 2008, p. 52) and denial of 
                                                          
41 Haraway (2011, para. 6), after Rose, writes of country, “as a multidimensional matrix of 
relationships: ‘it consists of people, animals, plants, Dreamings, underground, earth, soils, minerals, 
waters, surface water, and air. … All living things are held to have an interest in the life of the 
country…those who destroy their country destroy themselves’ (Rose 153-54). Furthermore, countries 
are not equivalent, interchangeable, abstract; country is materially and semiotically distinctive, each 
with its own human beings created for that country and responsible for it through the generations”.  
42 Morton (2016) locates agrilogistics at the Anthropocene’s heart. 
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the existence of Indigenous law (I. Watson, 2015); all wrapped in outback 
mythologies (Gill, 2005; K. Myers, 2013), and, often, a sense of alienation 
from country: “settler fright. Scrub. Scrub-scare! It was alien, spiky, 
unwelcoming. To them, anyway” (Astley, 1999, p. 182). An “ethnocentric 
contempt for an ‘inferior’ race” (Coralie, 2008, p. 52) underpinned denials of 
Aboriginal humanity, along with claims of “savageness” (I. Watson, 2015, p. 
7), unfitness to care for the land (Chatwin, 1988, p. 62; Tiffin, 2010, pp. 89-
90), animality—“’You might as well bloody bark, mate…’” (Grenville, 2005, 
p. 144)—and childlike lack of agency (p. 141). Benny Shoforth, an 
Indigenous character in Drylands, names it: “[T]hat master-race assurance” 
(p. 189). Colonial violence toward peoples and country was also rationalised 
by and perpetuates an onto-epistemological error (Rose, 2004, pp. 188-
189): that there is some separable Nature, without agency, that can be 
distinguished from the Human. These mindsets informed the drive to 
control, instrumentalise and ‘resourcify’ country, and render passive, 
silence, and sweep aside Indigenous voices.  
Kwaymullina (2016) notes Atkinson’s description of three modes of 
violence facilitating Australian colonialism: “‘overt physical violence 
(invasion, disease, death and destruction), covert structural violence 
(enforced dependency, legislation, reserves and removals) and psycho-
social domination (cultural and spiritual genocide)’” (p. 440). The novels of 
Astley (1999), Bail (1998), Flanagan (1997), Grenville (2005), Hospital 
(1997), Johnston (1988), Leigh (2011), McGahan (2004), Perlman (2011), 
Scott (1999, 2010), S. Watson (1990), Weller (1998), Winton (2012), and 
Wright (2006a, 2013) are among those engaging with the violence that 
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colonisers inflict upon peoples and country. Rapacious greed, alien ethics, 
and the estrangement from country of white colonisers drives violent 
destruction. “[S]ettling” matters is the euphemistic reference Grenville’s 
William Thornhill makes to the atrocities he commits against Darug people 
(2005, p. 298). McGahan’s Robert McIvor (2004, pp. 99-100) refers to an 
erasure of people from country. Astley’s narrator considers it a battering 
(1999, p. 168) and a hunt (1999, p. 189). Flanagan’s (1997, pp. 21-22) 
narrator imagines a terrible revolution, while Bail’s (1998, pp. 5, 31) finds 
only simplistic thuggishness. 
While Herrero (2014) suggests that Grenville’s The Secret River explores 
and defamiliarises aspects of the colonial mind, the novel also attends to the 
material overwriting of peoples and country: to physical and mental 
colonisation; to battles against Nature; to the separation of Human and 
Nature; and to acquisition as progress. Colonisers imposed European form 
on country (Brady, 1999, p. 141), hoping to access a sense of belonging 
and control. Sal Thornhill, for example: 
 
had longed for trees: real trees, she insisted, with proper leaves that 
fall off in Autumn […]. A person was entitled to draw any picture 
they fancied on the blank slate of this place. […but] In spite of her 
care the garden did not thrive. (pp. 318-319)  
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Taming Nature is central to identity construction: “Chopping, clearing, 
building, he [Grenville’s protagonist, William Thornhill] was discovering a 
new William Thornhill, though: a man who could labour against wilderness 
until it yielded up a dwelling” (p. 160).  
It has been argued that Indigenous fiction engages differently with 
notions of ecology (Brady, 1999; Brewster, 2010; Devlin-Glass, 2008b; 
Ravenscroft, 2012; C. E. Rigby, 2013). Indigenous knowledge practices 
commonly embrace: dynamic notions of deep, cyclical time pervading the 
present (I. Watson, 2015, p. 17); accumulated intimacy with local and 
always, already vibrant bodies (composing environment, landscape, nature, 
or space); understandings of irreducible human and non-and-more-than-
human relationality and co-dependency for future sustainability; and the 
continuous collective expression (the practice, performance, and re-
embodiment) of these qualities through cultural production or world-
making.43 Ceremony—the performed repetition of relations with land, 
including story-telling via song, dance, movement, painting, and writing—is 
oriented toward the enactment and the repotentialisation of Life rather than 
its representation (Christie, 2015; Rose, 1996; I. Watson, 2015, p. 36). 
Employing these expanded, transversal onto-epistemologies of continuity 
(Grieves, 2009; Muecke, 2004; 2005, pp. 89-92; Rose, 1996, 2012b; I. 
Watson, 2015), contemporary Indigenous writers attend closely to the ways 
in which human violence to country cannot help but transmit enduring 
                                                          
43 Christie’s (2015) perspective on Yolnu knowledge practices informed this summary.  
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violence back upon the human—bodily and spiritually—and vice versa. 
Kwaymullina (2016) writes that, 
 
since all that would be defined in a linear sense as “past, present 
and future” is contained within the networks of relationships that 
comprise an animate reality, I understand the consequences of 
individual actions to radiate out across these relationships and 
hence have the potential to hold up or tear down all that was, is and 
will be. (p. 439) 
 
A gap opens up between non-indigenous and Indigenous knowledge of 
country (Brady, 1999, p. 145; Gleeson-White, 2013, p. 1) when country is 
known/lived as a vital and vibrant text to be read, sung, danced, painted, 
and cared for, which cares for us, and which is continuous with people. In 
their novels—and elsewhere—Scott (1999, 2010; Zable, Bradley, Scott, & 
Munkara, 2011, pp. 57-58) and Wright (Brewster, 2010, p. 92) express 
Indigenous onto-epistemologies (cosmologies) of interconnection; break 
down notions of separable Human and Nature or non-and-more-than-
human (Muecke, 2009); and articulate the ongoing urgent need for care for 
damaged, though still vital, country and peoples. In Carpentaria, the miner’s 
conceptualisations of Nature—as separate and instrumental resource that 
can be controlled and exploited and upon which acts of violence are 
justified—is contrasted with a cosmology “laden with its own creative 
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enormity” (p. 1). The serpent dreaming,44 and the ontological continuity of 
Nature and the Human—“It is about there being no difference between you 
and the movement of water” (p. 3) —are contrasted with coloniser 
conceptualisations of our relationship with the non-and-more-than-human: 
“‘If you can’t use it, eat it, or fuck it, then it’s no bloody use to you’” (p. 35). 
The swamp in The Swan Book—a future Indigenous detention camp, and, 
ostensibly, a ruined place—is a continuation both of the past and of the 
present violence: “And it’s still happening” (Zable & Wright, 2013, p. 29). 
Harley, in Scott’s Benang (1999), conveys the multiplicity of Indigenous 
peoples’ connections to country:  
 
it is not really me who sings […] through me we hear the rhythm of 
many feet pounding the earth, and the strong pulse of countless 
hearts beating. […] the creak and rustle of various plants in various 
winds, the countless beatings of different wings, the many strange 
and musical calls […]. (p. 7) 
 
                                                          
44 Irene Watson (2002) writes of the dreaming as “the creative processes which created the natural 
world and which seeks to continue the cycles of life” (para. 47) and, importantly, as continuously 
embodied in all Life and living practices. Dreamings come from a time and “place of lawfulness, a 
time before, a time now, and a time yet coming to us. A time when the first songs were sung, as they 
sang the law. Laws were birthed as were the ancestors - out of the land and the songs and stories 
recording our beginnings and birth connections to homelands and territories now known as Australia. 
Our laws are lived as a way of life; they are not written down as the knowledge of the law comes 
through the living of it. Law is lived, sung, danced, painted, eaten, walked upon, and loved; law lives 
in all things” (para. 16).  
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Harley’s perceptions fold together violated humans and the non-and-more-
than-human:  
 
We hummed along the black top. On either side of us trees, dying, 
turning white. Once there were many, many more of them, and they 
were alive, and they drank the rain and returned it to the sky. Now 
their roots shrivelled in salt water and – thus betrayed – they raised 
bare and brittle limbs to the sky. (p. 7)  
 
Human and tree become indiscernible or continuous by virtue of the 
language of “limbs” and “alive”, the notion of so many being lost, and 
anthropomorphised gestures toward betrayal. Country and people are 
turning white: a reference to Australian assimilationist policies and 
eugenics.45  
Anthropogenic global warming is bound up with colonial-capitalism and, 
together, they expose every body to crises. In engaging with climate 
change, The Swan Book stands apart from the contemporary Indigenous 
fiction surveyed. Global warming’s devastating forces and colonial-capitalist 
violence are entangled. Wright evokes apocalyptic events and her imagery 
folds together the human and the non-and-more-than-human world: 
countless climate refugees are lost, though they are not all Human: swans 
                                                          
45 Hughes-d’Aeth (2016) observes that “in the end, the logic of settler colonialism is eliminationist” (p. 
27). 
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become “gypsies” (p. 15); trees die “slowly in ground bone dry” (p. 72); 
finches flee; deer are frozen into “statues of yellow ice” (p. 17); and turtles 
crawl “away to die” (p. 16).   
Indigenous and non-indigenous fictions engage with Australia’s partially 
broken “great silence” (Stanner, 1969) about our colonial past and present 
violence. Moreover, perpetrator denial, forgetting, and the always 
inadequate su/repression of memory (Haraway, 2011) connect Indigenous 
and non-indigenous Crises of Ecologies. The novels surveyed do not evade 
the damage done; the culpability for that damage; the importance of naming 
the “smell” of death which Scott’s Harley detects in Benang (Birch, 2004, p. 
152; Scott, 1999, p. 9); the eventual uncovering of what William Thornhill, in 
The Secret River, tries (and fails) to bury (p. 316). Decades ago, Kevin 
Gilbert suggested that violence continued “to scar and affect the thinking” 
(Healy, 1988, p. 83). More recently, Tony Birch (2004) suggests that 
Indigenous fiction, including Benang, presents Indigenous traumas and 
crises as anything but closed: neither by processes of revelation, nor by 
coloniser gestures of regret and reconciliation. Flanagan (1997) and Wright 
(Devlin-Glass, 2008b, p. 406; A. Wright, 2013) dwell upon exclusion, 
forgetting, silence and the past’s capacity to breach willed ignorance. In 
Hospital’s Oyster, we read of Outer Maroo as a metonymic outback town: 
tabernacle for forgetting, including the history of violence toward Aboriginals 
(Fraile, 2011). We find Ethel, a Murri46 woman with a memory for a past still 
returning, and the “Old Fuckatoo”, an airborne presence that brings with it 
                                                          
46 Indigenous peoples of Queensland and New South Wales, among whom there are numerous 
cultural/language groups. 
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the sense of things to be revealed: “that suggested ... but no one wished to 
think about what it suggested" (p. 4). Following the thoughts of Coralie 
(2008, p. 69) and Plumwood (2002a, p. 22), there exists, perhaps, a three-
fold problem: our dis-attunement or constructed “deafness” toward our 
colonial history, our ecological damage, and our non-and-more-than-human 
interconnections. Kwaymullina (2016) asks, “is there truly a silence? Or is 
there a failure to hear?” (p.440). 
This necessarily limited survey of Crises of Ecologies and contemporary 
Australian novels is important to this thesis in two ways. The exploration of 
contemporary Australian novelists’ literary engagements—with entangled 
ecological crises (Indigenous and non-indigenous), the eco-logical violence 
of capitalism, and the denuding of agency (Human and non-and-more-than-
human)—complements and expands upon existing (recent) scholarship, 
and constructs a platform from which to launch the focus of this thesis. That 
is to say, while this survey explores these novels’ engagements with Crises, 
it does not address efficacy: the potential for these works to make a 
difference, or, as Modjeska puts it, the potential for “the imaginative 
exchange of fiction […to have] subversive freedom to create another order 
of truth” (2002, p. 219). Accordingly, Chapter 2 orients the focus of this 
thesis toward efficacy, with a critical overview of the contemporary 
academy’s expectations for the work of literature amid Crises of Ecologies. 
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Chapter 2 – Literary Hopes and Delusions 
 
 
Hopes for the work of literature 
 
[H]ow do we tell such a story? (Latour, 2014a, p. 3) 
 
[A]n overinvestment in the power of cultural representations, of the 
social importance of art and literature, becomes an understandable 
ethical temptation. (Clark, 2015, p. 196) 
 
Theoretical and critical discourses on the work of literature amid Crises of 
Ecologies are as vibrantly unresolved as the Crises with which they engage. 
Scholarship constitutes and traverses many mobile, varying, dialogical, 
neological, and increasingly imbricated disciplines, among them: 
ecopoetics;47 biosemiotics;48 ecofeminism, feminist ecocriticism, material 
feminism, and sexuality/gender (‘queer’) ecocriticism;49 postcolonial-
ecocriticism, as well as studies of Indigenous philosophies and practices;50 
                                                          
47 See Bate (2000); Nolan (2014, 2015); Rigby (2004a, 2004b; 2016).  
48 See Wheeler (2006, 2008, 2016); Wheeler and Westling (2015). 
49 See Adams and Gruen (2014); Alaimo & Henkman (2008); Gaard  (1993, 2001, 2010, 2011, 2015, 
2016); Gaard, Estok, and Oppermann (2013); Gaard and Murphy (1998); Westling (1998, 1999). 
50 See Banerjee (2012, 2016); Carrigan, DeLoughrey, and Didur (2015); Crane (2012); Heise (2010); 
Huggan and Tiffin (2010); Maxwell (2009); Nixon (2005, 2011); Mukherjee (2010); O'Brien (2007); 
Reed (2009); and A. Wright (2011c). For Australian indigenous studies and postcolonial cultural 
geography, see Bird Rose (1996, 2004, 2005, 2012b); Brewster (2010); Carter (1996, 2010); 
Morrissey (2015); Muecke (2004, 2005, 2009); Ravenscroft (2012); I. Watson (2015). 
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bioregionalism;51 animal studies;52 eco-cosmopolitanism;53 Frankfurt school 
ecocriticism;54 climate change studies;55 catastrophe and ecophobia 
studies;56 extinction studies;57 Anthropocene Studies;58 ecological affect 
studies;59 place and spatiality studies;60 environmental History61 and 
geography;62 environmental Justice ecocriticism;63 ecophenomenological 
ecocriticism;64 new nature writing;65 eco-historicism and ecocriticism of 
historical literary production;66 posthuman and embodiment studies;67 
ecocritique, including negative and dark ecology;68 new materialist/ material 
                                                          
51 See Cranston & Zeller (2007); Hughes-d’Aeth(2017); Armbruster, Glotfelty, Lynch and Zeitler 
(2012); Murphy (1990). 
52 See Calarco (2016); Crist (1999); Haraway (1991, 1992, 2003, 2008); Huggan & Tiffin (2010); 
McDonell (2013); Westling (2014a); Wolfe (2003). 
53 See Heise (2008); Weik von Mossner (2014a). 
54 See Biro (2011); Morton (2007b, p. 13); Soper (2011). 
55 See Clark (2010, 2012, 2013, 2015); Colebrook (2012a, 2012b, 2014a); Johns‐Putra (2016); 
Morton (2007b, 2010b, 2013a); Siperstein et al. (2017); Trexler (2015). 
56 See Estok (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015); Rigby (2015). 
57 See Bird Rose (2008b, 2011, 2012a); Colebrook (2014a); MacCormack (2014). 
58 See Clark (2010, 2012, 2015); Weik von Mossner (2014b). 
59 See Bristow (2015); Goldberg (2015); Houser (2014); LeMenager (2012); Weik von Mossner et al 
(2014); White (2012). 
60 See Carter (1996, 2010); Huggan (1989); Huggan and Tiffin (2015). 
61 See Cromwell and Levene (2007); Levene (2013); Penny Roberts, Johnson, and Levene (2010); 
Robin (1998, 2008, 2013); Robin, Griffiths, and Sherratt (2004); Robin and Steffen (2007);  
62 See Castree (1998; 2014; 2010). 
63 See Adamson, Evans & Stein (2002); Myers (2005); Reed (2009). 
64 See Westling (2011, 2014a). 
65 See Glotfelty & Fromm (1996); Kerridge (2014a); Tredinnick (2003). 
66 See Bate (2000); Hiltner (2003, 2011, 2015); Kroeber (1994); B.L. Moore (2008); Morton (1996, 
2000, 2006, 2007a, 2008, 2010a); Laroche and Munroe (2011); Rigby (2004, 2014); Wood (2008, 
2011). 
67 See Alaimo (2010); Iovino (2010, 2012; 2012a); Kilcup (2013); Westling (2007). 
68 See Morton (2007b, 2010b); Rigby (2004a). 
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ecocriticism;69 and the trans-disciplinary concerns of the environmental 
humanities.70 It is possible, nonetheless, to discern accords across these 
disciplines’ interdependent conceptualisations of the work of literature. First, 
literature’s capacities to critique and re-constitute conceptions, perceptions, 
and representations of the nature of the Human, of Being(s), and of Life and 
relations, including ecological crises. And second, literature’s capacities to 
reorient/renew ethics and better equip readers to adapt to, mitigate, reverse, 
or avoid the impacts of Crises.71  
Buell (1995) suggests that environmental crises are “of the imagination” 
(p. 2)72 and that one response is to re-imagine our relationships with nature. 
Rigby (2015) refers to literature cultivating “our ability to think ecologically”, 
to it giving the voices of all Life at risk “a better chance of being heard”, and 
to the need to transform how we read. Literature, she argues, should 
express an eco-social ethos, and help us to “remember […] the earth by 
attending to the interconnections that link all aspects of human culture, 
including the production and consumption of literary and other kinds of texts, 
to other-than-human entities and processes” (p. 126). Zapf (2016) also 
argues for literature as an affirmative participant in what he calls cultural 
ecology: a relational body possessing “transculturally effective ecological 
                                                          
69 See J. Bennett (2004, 2010); Oppermann (2016); Iovino and Oppermann (2012a, 2014); H.I. 
Sullivan (2012). 
70 See Bergthaller et al (2014); LeMenager (2014); LeMenager and Foote (2012); Robin (2008); 
Robin and Steffen (2007). 
71 This framing echoes expectations for humanities teaching practices in Siperstein et al. (2017, pp. 
21-22). 
72 Also Huggan and Tiffin (2015). 
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potency” (p. 5) which informs our capacities for “sustainability” and 
transforms culture.  
Scholars propose that literature can cultivate attention, engender new 
knowledge, and inspire new ethics via which we discover and embrace 
accountabilities and become actively responsive. For Kerridge, literature’s 
work is to “confront, convince and inspire large audiences” to change (2013, 
p. 356); engendering transformations in ethics and in the destructive living 
and acts of oppression and violence that shape so many human and non-
and-more-than-human experiences. Murphy (2014) characterises climate 
change writers as working towards a “great awakening” (p. 162), and, as 
Johns-Putra notes, encouraging readers “to move from denial to 
‘recognition, acceptance, and the will to act’” (2016, p. 274).  
Anthropocentrism and dominant notions of the human subject 
(eurowestern, Enlightenment, Cartesian, Christian) are deemed 
instrumental in the genesis, expansion, and intensification of Crises of 
Ecologies (Braidotti, 2013; Latour, 2004; Plumwood, 2002b). Literature, it is 
argued, can participate in the overcoming and reconceptualising of onto-
epistemological givens (Garrard, 2011; C. E. Rigby, 2015; K. Rigby, 2015). 
Readers become aware of our entanglements with that which many still 
believe to be separate: the non-and-more-than-human, and Crises of 
Ecologies. Similarly, Clark (2015, pp. 104, 192) and Kerridge (2013, p. 365) 
acknowledge expectations that literature might awaken readers—or remove 
our blinkers—to our destructive instincts and habits. Bergthaller et al (2014) 
propose that we become more aware of our “environing” practices—how we 
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materially shape(d) the world) (p. 267)—and, thereby, develop “greater 
reflexivity and a deeper understanding of human beings and their varied 
relationships” (p. 268). They write of the necessity to reveal violence arising 
from our anthropocentric “blind spots” (p. 265)—produced in part by how 
and what we write—while Kerridge (2013) calls for literary forms capable of 
“revealing what conventional forms obscure” (p. 361). Literature unsettles 
our attachments to binaries—Nature/Culture, Human/Animal, 
Object/Subject, and Matter/Discourse (Barad, 2003, 2007; Braidotti, 2002, 
2013; Haraway, 1997, 2003; Morton, 2007b)—and to the positioning of the 
non-and-more-than-human (and indeed many humans (Braidotti, 2013, p. 
63)) as a separable and “infinite body of matter” available for economic 
value creation (Macfarlane, 2016, para. 30). These literary potentials also 
encompass responses to ecophobia (Estok, 2011): the notion that nature is 
a fearsome object; a loathed and dangerous thing that can only result in 
pain and tragedy if left in control. For Estok (2014), literary engagements 
with ecophobia can play a part in revealing and demystifying “what it is 
about nonhuman agency that evokes such strong resistance” (p. 130) and in 
cultivating apprehension of our unavoidable and irreducible immersion in it. 
Beyond this myth-busting, literature holds potential to enrich readers’ 
awareness of Life’s vitality: re-constituting the non-and-more-than-human as 
active rather than passive matter; as agentic rather than entirely malleable 
in our human hands; as unpredictable and indeterminate; and in productive 
and non-linear relations with us. Jane Bennett (2004, 2010), Rose (2013), 
and Plumwood (2010) count among those acknowledging art’s potential to 
re-enchant and re-enspirit the material and, thereby, recuperate our 
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apprehension of—and renew our ethics regarding—the agency and the 
value of the non-and-more-than-human, including, though not limited to, the 
animal (Alaimo, 2010, 2016; Calarco, 2016; E. Flannery, 2015, p. 143; 
McFarland, 2014). Rigby (2013) argues that literature can bring us (to) non-
and-more-than-human voices that have been silenced, although, she 
cautions, such effects are not characteristic of the “eurowestern literary 
genre of the novel […which] is predominantly inter-human” (pp. 131-132). 
LeMenager (2012) notes the work done by Zunshine and others on 
literature’s potentials to cultivate empathy for all manner of others via 
informing our theories of mind: “literary forms prompt us to imagine, as 
communities, a world otherwise” (p. 575). 
In keeping with ideas of material agency, and with her insights into the 
transcorporeality of being, Alaimo (2012) writes that the perpetuated 
“scientific stance of [Human] distancing and mastery [in relation to the non-
and-more-than-human…] must be supplanted by more complicated models 
of entanglement and emergence” (pp. 489-90). While I return to these ideas 
in Chapter 3, I note here that literature can participate in a re-conception of 
the imbricated Human, not only in its decentering. Writers and readers can 
engage in exercises in humility: “to overcome anthropocentrism” (Garrard, 
2012, p. 202) and human attitudes of “mastery and possession” (Serres, 
1995, p. 23) towards the non-and-more-than-human, and to support 
environmental justice. Subjectivity is reconceptualised as enmeshed with, or 
as the dynamic folding of, non-and-more-than-human bodies and their 
forces. Notwithstanding the necessary illumination of our continuing 
complicity in epidemic acts of violence towards animals, Human/animal 
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distinctions are displaced (Calarco, 2016, p. 8) and common qualities and 
vulnerabilities (Alaimo, 2016, p. 12), even indiscernibilities, are explored. 
Writers and readers become immersed in the multiplicity, strangeness 
(Morton, 2010b), toxicity (Alaimo, 2010), and “polyphonic song’ of the 
damaged earth (Bate, 2000; C. E. Rigby, 2004a, p. 437), and torn from our 
presumed position of ascendant separation. Such literary reconstitutions 
and reorientations of being and of bodily relations hold prospects for 
heightening readers’ apprehension of our mutually entailed vulnerability 
amid Crises of Ecologies.73  
The work of de-naturalising the world, and reconstituting and reorienting 
knowledge of Crises of Ecologies, goes further than the revitalisation of the 
non-and-more-than-human and its imbrication with the Human. Literature is 
also implicated in enabling an ethics of networked complexity and, therein, a 
coming to terms with Crises that operate across multiple, spatio-temporal 
scales. Heise (2008), for example, contends that literature can contribute to 
cultivating our “sense of planet” (p. 21) and of interrelated 
global/transnational forces operating beyond the local, though always felt 
intimately, shaping us and the places we think we know. Ethical actions, 
Heise contends, can, therefore, only be based upon an apprehension of the 
local-and-more-than-local networked relations within which those actions 
take place. The possibilities for literature, here, are at least twofold: first, to 
convey the “mutually constitutive” deterritorialised relations that encompass 
the local and the global (Ray, 2009, p. 879), thereby enabling attentiveness 
                                                          
73 See Hughes-d’Aeth and Nabizadeh (2017, p. 440) on the mediation of risk via vulnerability and 
exposure. 
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to global phenomena (in particular risks) that are expressed intimately; and, 
second, to inspire a sense of accountability to the (often distant) bodies 
entangled in those relations.  
Literature, then, is involved in the work of revealing, resisting, navigating 
and transforming the entanglements of qualities of Crises of Ecologies with 
socio-material oppressions: sexual, racial, species, phyla-related, and 
otherwise existential. Importantly, we find feminist/female theorisations, 
critical studies and practices of cultural production as precursors to (and 
advancers of) many of the conceptualisations of this work (Gaard, 2010; 
Oppermann, 2013, p. 28). Ecofeminist thought often focuses on working 
toward sexual and environmental justice through literary critiques: of 
“master narratives of domination”, including the “categories of gendered 
human and nonhuman bodies” (Gaard et al., 2013, p. 3); of the forces 
producing gender and their shaping of ecological agency and relationships; 
of discourses of subordination, including feminisations and otherings of 
women and the-non-and-more-than-human; and of reproductive injustices, 
including overpopulation and the effects of ecological crises on 
reproduction. This work also involves literature that enables explorations of 
affirmative potentials still available to those who are reduced to identities. 
Ecofeminism recognises the varying, contextually particular expectations 
and potentials for the writer and reader amid Crises of Ecologies. On this 
matter, Kerridge (2013) notes that, in the colonial context, literature is a 
vehicle via which those silenced (or who choose silence) find expression. 
Writing, he argues, enacts and enables resistance to “historical ideologies 
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legitimating the oppression of women and those legitimating the heedless 
exploitation of natural environments” (p. 369).74 
Banerjee (2016) contends that literature can express an “activist 
aesthetics” (p. 194) amid post-colonial/neo-colonial Crises of Ecologies. 
Literature establishes the relations between colonialism and ecological 
violence, and readers’ connections with the suffering of temporally and 
geographically distant and proximate others. Garrard (2011) also notes (with 
some caution) that Reed (2009) sees literary texts as acts, and enablers, of 
political advocacy in colonial contexts, making visible where violence to 
people and places go “hand in hand” (pp. 53-54). Nixon (2011) affirms 
literature’s potential to reveal or attune readers to the “slow violence” 
exacted upon bodies amid Crises of Ecologies, via “devising iconic symbols 
that embody amorphous calamities as well as narrative forms that infuse 
those symbols with dramatic urgency.” (p. 10). In an interview with Kumar 
(2011, para. 4), Nixon asks, “In an age that genuflects to the divinities of 
spectacle and speed, how do we take seriously the forms of environmental 
slow violence that are deficient in instant drama but high in long-term 
catastrophic effects?”. For Nixon (2009), literary acts of human and non-
and-more-than-human “witnessing” such violence and its impacts can 
restore agency to violated bodies. He concurs with Banerjee’s observation 
that literary revelations and critiques, of the entanglements of colonial-
                                                          
74 See E. Flannery (2015, p. 140); Gaard (2016); and Bergthaller et al. (2014, p. 271) on “writer-
activists” and environmental and social justice. 
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capitalist cultural-ecological damage, can be delivered with aesthetic and 
political force, while avoiding explicit didacticism (p. 449).  
Kerridge (2013) concurs with Clark that literature has the potential to 
“imaginatively [explore] the futures that may arrive” or that already are with 
us (p. 350) and Bergthaller et al (2014) suggest that mapping (writing) our 
acts of “environing” might “make it possible for us to imagine alternatives” 
(p. 272). Suffering from “crisis fatigue”, Glotfelty (2016) argues for (non-
fictional and fictional) “narratives of ecological restoration offer[ing] a 
creative path of hope that can inspire effective action from the grassroots 
and provide an antidote to crippling despair” (p. 177). Albeit, others suggest 
that literature might also instil in readers a fear, not of nature, but of the 
future (and the present); issue a warning of loss; or engage in apocalyptic 
attempts to shock people to change. Robert Macfarlane (2016) writes that 
“Art and literature might, at their best, shock us out of the stuplime [sic]”, the 
“outrage-outage”, and the incapacitations produced by the overwhelming 
aesthetic force of the Anthropocene (para. 20). Literature might cultivate an 
ethics more appropriate to our state of affairs and to our future “increasingly 
common” eco-catastrophes (K. Rigby, 2015, p. 142). It might not signal 
ways out but, instead, prepare us for our entanglements (Collings, 2014; 
Kingsnorth, 2013), cultivating non-anthropocentric conceptions/perceptions 
of Life, and, perhaps, opening us to the notion of a world without the human 
(Colebrook, 2014a).  
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And “delusions of self-importance” (Clark, 2015, p. 198)  
 
It is difficult for literature to accommodate the paradoxes of Crises of 
Ecologies: their inaccessibility and strange intimacy; their unrepresentability 
and unavoidable material-discursive presence. One classical idea of the 
work of art, including literature (Carroll, 1999, pp. 20-23), is that it can bring 
readers closer (reconnect us) to an alienated Nature, and, no doubt, this 
could apply also to Crises of Ecologies. However, philosophers, theorists 
and critics (including ecocritics) acknowledge the difficulties with 
representational literary strategies in this regard (Gifford, 2008; Morton, 
2007b; Phillips, 1999, 2003, 2013). They question writers’ capacities to 
effect a reconnection of reader and the non-and-more-than-human through 
descriptive prose or poetry, by evoking the things of Nature, or the 
atmospherics or ambience of the outside/environment (C. E. Rigby, 2004a). 
Indeed, Rigby (2015, p. 140) is not alone in noting the risks of relying upon 
assumptions that human writing can disclose the world; such reliance 
serving to perpetuate our hubristic reliance on the privileged capacities of 
the human to know the world. 
Deleuze (1994) offers a compelling critique of representation which is 
directly relatable to writers’ and readers’ difficulties in capturing Life and 
Crises. For Deleuze, representations are mediations and maskings, 
fantasies and fixings (pp. 7, 17-19, 191, 264). They hide Life’s infinite 
complexity and they gesture, instead, towards identity, analogy, opposition 
and resemblance (p. 29). These operations of the rational mind risk blocking 
our access to the vitality and the vibrancy that flows behind the concepts we 
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create, and to what flows beyond “the limits of the organised; tumult, 
restlessness and passion under apparent calm” (p. 42). If Life is processual, 
and not static, then representations risk fixing the aspects of the world that 
are represented and, thereby, closing off the prospect of something new 
happening.  
Morton (2010b) suggests that “ecological thought” embraces non-identity 
and the non-definitive character of Life, such that there are no clear 
delineations for self or objects (p. 8). Closer inspection of the world yields 
greater complexity, strangeness and singularity as well as imbrication, 
enmeshment and accountability: “And yet there is not nothing; there “is not 
even nothing”, Morton concludes (2007b, p. 78). Consequently, 
representational approaches to truly conveying Life’s material complexity 
risk unmaking or dissolving literature. Nor can we hope to represent a 
concept that is not materially real beyond its cultural construction (in this 
case, Nature), and expect that representation to connect us more fully to 
something that was not there in the first place (Morton, 2007b; Phillips, 
2003, p. 161).  
In representational attempts to bring us closer to Crises of Ecologies and 
the non-and-more-than-human, literature risks re-affirming 
anthropocentrisms and implicitly validating the destructive relations shaping 
Crises. The very notion of an inside and an outside, of separation, is 
fundamentally important to the genealogies and cartographies of ecological 
damage. As noted in Chapter 1, the initiating error is to assume some 
disconnection between Human and Nature, rather than an interconnection 
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or ongoing and unavoidable relationality. Moreover, representation risks 
perpetuating notions of separation by virtue of its intent to capture 
something. In order to represent, something must be negated, something 
must be held in opposition to that represented, when what is there is, in 
truth, un-representable. Furthermore, where it seeks to re-inscribe 
differences between things—and even where it purports to be a work of 
reconnection as it does so—Art remains rooted in the idea of opposition and 
separation and, thereby, still gestures toward the idea of our condition being 
one of alienation from the world (Morton, 2007b, pp. 22-23). As I discuss in 
Chapter 3, one of Morton’s (2007b, 2010d) proposed responses is for 
literature to work with/on our strange estrangement in the world, rather than 
demystifying or reconnecting us to it; helping us to see Life and our Self—
our “no-self”—anew (2007b, p. 175).  
Literature, it appears, is both in crisis and flush with potential amid Crises 
of Ecologies. While Zapf (2016) confidently proclaims that “the enormous 
ecocultural potential of imaginative literature […] is just beginning to find the 
attention […] that it deserves” (p. 11), for others, high hopes seem risky. 
Garrard (2012) notes Clark’s challenge for literature: to “convey […] the 
seriousness, and the elusiveness, of global environmental crisis” (p. 243). In 
his work on the Anthropocene, Clark’s (2014) problematisations of 
representation have a familiar ring:75 irreducible material-discursive 
entanglements; our inability to adequately gauge the scales at which our 
actions and their effects operate; and the interconnections across existential 
                                                          
75 See Colebrook (2013a, 2014a); Morton (2013a). 
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registers that derange and outstrip Humanist conceptions of world and 
Life.76 Garrard (2012) suggested that this is why so “few serious works of 
literature, especially fiction or poetry” were written about climate change (p. 
238).  
Clark (2014) writes that, while literature might well break down Humanist 
binaries, “What was once the nature/culture distinction becomes the 
incalculable interaction of imponderable contaminated, hybrid elements with 
unpredictable emergent effects” (p. 80). He wonders how, in the 
Anthropocene, we are to think and write “almost everything at once” (2015, 
p. 78). After Clark, Flannery (2015) asks: 
 
how do writers and artists respond in representational terms to the 
‘unimaginable’ scalar proportions of anthropogenic climate change 
and environmental degradation? […] The urgency and scale of the 
nature of humanity’s relationship to its planetary environment in the 
contemporary moment, then, force an acute sense of both 
ontological and epistemological crises. (pp. 149-150) 
  
Some Anthropocenic literary scholarship still conceives of the 
problematics of literary efficacy in representational terms—of finding an 
image that gives meaning, or a unitary vision that makes climate change 
                                                          
76 Bergthaller et al (2014, p. 265) comment upon “the mind-bending ambiguities forced upon us” (p. 
265).  
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visible (Macfarlane, 2016, para. 26) —while others recognise the errand, 
couched in representational terms, as quixotic (Clark, 2010; Morton, 2013a). 
Literature faces the not necessarily negative challenge of engaging readers 
amid these Anthropocenic disruptions: with qualities of Crises that move 
beyond our con/perceptual grasp; with the limits to (and the illimitability of) 
our Humanity; with the warping and breaking of modes of cognition and 
sense-making once deemed reliable (Clark, 2012, 2015); and with the 
“short-circuiting [of] recognition” (Colebrook, 2014a, p. 25).  
Clark (2015) cautions against making “bizarre” claims for literature (p. 
196). He recommends scepticism in the face of those who might “ascribe an 
implausible amount of power to cultural representations, as if these and 
these alone had decisive agency in how people live and act, produce food, 
use resources, and so forth” (2014, p. 77). Indeed, and particularly in 
relation to Crises of Ecologies, there exists a gap between expectations for 
literature’s work and the evidence that it does such work. While the fields of 
scientific and empirical studies of literary experience are expanding,77 work 
on how literature changes minds, ethics and behaviours specifically in 
respect of Crises of Ecologies, is in its early stages. Other attributional 
temptations also need qualifying: all manner of forces participate in 
subjective and socio-material transformations, including, and stretching well 
beyond, novels and their audiences.  
                                                          
77 See Bortolussi and Dixon (2003, 2015); Burke and Troscianko (2017); Caracciolo (2016); Danta 
and Groth (2014); Jacobs (2017); Herman (2000, 2013); Popova (2014); Zunshine (2006). 
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We might argue that literary efficacy is, at least in part, a function of 
diffusion. Garrard’s (2010) “Horton hears a Who problem of ecocriticism – is 
anyone listening?” (p. 34) applies to literature too, and Bergthaller (2014) 
concurs that “When policy makers and mainstream media outlets seek 
expertise on the environmental crisis, they seldom turn to environmental 
historians and philosophers, much less ecocritics” (p. 262). Nor, I suspect, 
do they often turn to novelists. The follies of assuming that literary intent 
drives literary reception are well rehearsed.78 The potentials a writer or 
literary scholar might reasonably perceive in a novel are not necessarily the 
work the novel will do for readers encountering it (Caracciolo, 2016; K. 
Rigby, 2015), and never all the work of which it is capable. Nor do 
encounters that transform a reader’s knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, or 
capacities, make particular actions certain (Huggan & Tiffin, 2015, p. ix). 
Changing one’s understanding of climate change does not necessarily 
change how one shops or uses energy resources. Indeed, Dodds (2011) 
argues that psychological defence-mechanisms—‘splitting’ and 
dissociation—help explain why an acceptance by a reader of a link between 
consumption and risks to human existence does not lead to changes in 
behaviour (p. 44). Garrard (2010, p. 25) also notes Kerridge’s concern with 
“the baffling and disastrous disconnection between cognitive awareness of 
climate change and the generally insignificant alterations in lifestyle we 
seem prepared to countenance”.  
                                                          
78 See P. Sullivan (2002) for a succinct overview of thinkers. 
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Is it realistic to expect writers not only to be able to conceive of socio-
politico-cultural solutions to Crises but also to then produce literary vehicles 
that productively disseminate the “secrets” of those solutions? Where an 
encounter with a novel changes reader’s behaviours, it does not necessarily 
follow that those changes will be sufficient and occur at the necessary 
scale(s), or that literature’s slow work (Bergthaller et al., 2014, p. 265) can 
be done in time.79 Indeed, Clark (2012) points out that the “derangements of 
scale” attending the Anthropocene (and I suggest Crises of Ecologies more 
broadly) may well diminish “the scope for the likely significance or effect of 
any one action by any single group” (p. 150). Clark (2015) challenges 
assumptions that art will have only an affirmative effect, and states that “It is 
hard […] to endorse here the assumption [in this instance, by Timothy 
Morton] that knowledge of interconnection must somehow lead to an ethic of 
care” (p. 189). Art, Clark contends, might well produce fear, disgust, anxiety, 
fatalism, and inaction rather than affirmation (p. 189).80 He also queries 
whether artists’ attempts to respond differently run the risk of being 
“recuperated” into the very “ethical and cultural agendas one would have 
expected [them] to question”. Narrated shocks might become “sources of 
pleasure” (pp. 187-189)—entertainments assigned a market niche—and not 
the transformative encounters written about decades ago by Deitering 
(1996), and Pollak and MacNabb (2000).  
                                                          
79 See Cohen, Colebrook & Miller (2016, p. 15), and Morton (2016, pp. 36-37). 
80 Conversely, Siperstein et al. (2017) argue that despair and the undermining of self, and of the 
habitual upon which self might rely, might also be “a precondition for fresh thought, new habits, and 
rethinking the kinds of socioecological relationships that generate liveable futures” (p. 23). 
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Clark (2015) writes that the “institution of the novel [its very human 
constitution as written and read text] forms a limit both to the possible 
impact of climate change fiction and to the hope […] that the informed 
reading of it can take on a crucial role of political and social leadership” (pp. 
189-190). Literature, he claims, stands at an “indeterminate threshold” 
because it can engender experiences of both liberation (p. 191) and 
“entrapment” (p. 192). It works to release us “from false modes of reality 
taken as a norm” (p. 191), and to have us encounter “those structural and 
embodied limits and stupidities in which even the most intelligent are 
caught” (p. 191); the effects of which might inspire inaction as well as action.  
Writing on the Anthropocene, Clark (2015) asks how writers can 
overcome “the mode of the reader’s engagement” (p. 189) with fiction, 
namely the awareness that it is fiction and therefore at risk of being 
dismissed as no more than an imaginative representation of our Crises. 
When Clark expresses concern that reader expectations of “the institution of 
the novel” can neutralise its content (p. 189), he risks encouraging a 
presumption that the reader is at the controlling centre of an encounter with 
a literary work. While this concern might not be conventionally 
unreasonable, it too might risk “recuperating” the very anthropocentrism 
Clark worries artists might (re)produce, and limit the scope of our 
(re)conceptions of the agency of the work of art.  
While it is understandable to harbour reservations about literature’s 
efficacies, it is also prudent to continue to pursue its potentials to make a 
difference. An absence of empirical evidence does not mean that 
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discussions of the potential of literature and a conceptualisation of the work 
it might do are without value. Nor are the trajectories literary practice can 
take delimited by the problematics of representation. Indeed, Kerridge 
(2014b, p. 380) asks “Are there forms of imaginative representation that can 
begin to approach the visceral experience?”, gesturing toward “more-than-
representational” (Lorimer, 2008) literary trajectories.  
Might writers also pursue more contextually suitable (sensitive), more-
than-representational practices to respond to Crises of Ecologies? In 
Australia, might non-indigenous people become more open to Indigenous 
cultural productions (philosophy, story, painting, literature, dance, music and 
so on) that express and cultivate different ecological knowledges and, 
consequently, different capacities to engage with Crises of Ecologies?81 
Irene Watson (2015) asserts that “there are other ways of knowing and 
being” (p. 146), while Alexis Wright wonders why “we are not hearing about 
the ancient stories of how to respect the weather?” (p. 78) and writes of the 
“deep knowledge” in the custody of Indigenous peoples, “some of which 
may be shared if it is respected, honoured and upheld” (p. 79). Birch (2016) 
argues for social justice via respect for Indigenous knowledges: 
 
Greater recognition of the knowledge maintained within Indigenous 
communities relative to localized ecologies and the affects of 
climate change would go some way to addressing injustice by 
                                                          
81 See Brady (1999); Haraway (2011); Kearnes (2016); Potter (2017); Plumwood (1999); Rawlings 
(2009, p.124); Rose (2004); Rose and Robin (2004).  
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configuring Indigenous people globally as valuable arbiters of 
change rather than the helpless victims of the first World (p. 92) 
 
Birch notes Degawan’s and Krupnik’s (2011) argument that “Their 
accumulated knowledge makes them excellent observers of environmental 
change and related impacts” (p. 93).82 A number of scholars argue that 
Indigenous art and thought offer, to use Rawlings’ (2009) words, a "cultural 
foundation to incorporate sustainability into our lifestyles" (p. 124). Others 
note the potentially affirmative resonances between Indigenous 
philosophies and non-indigenous animistic, materialist, biocentric, 
ecocentric, and panpsychic thought, and the necessity for non-indigenous 
people to develop other knowledges (Devlin-Glass, 2008a; Mathews, 2006; 
Plumwood, 2002b; Rose, 1996, 2004, 2008a, 2012b, 2013).  
There are risks associated with calls to embrace Indigenous knowledge 
and, to be fair, they do not go unappreciated.83 Irene Watson (2015) raises 
the spectre of cultural appropriation: “we are now experiencing a new face 
of the muldarbi as it appropriates our culture and laws to legitimise its own 
unlawful identity” (p. 85). Brady (1999) warns that it “is simply not possible, 
nor would it be right, for non-Aboriginal Australians to adopt Aboriginal 
culture. This would involve a repetition of the original [and continuing] act[s] 
of appropriation, attempting to take possession of the culture as we took 
                                                          
82 See also Langton (1998). 
83 See Devlin-Glass (2008b, p. 406); Muecke (2009); Plumwood (2002b, p. 267); and Ravenscroft 
(2007; 2012, p. 1). 
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possession of the land” (pp. 146-147). Judith Wright also notes that any 
such transformations would be slow: "It will take four or five hundred years 
for us to become indigenes; and to write poetry, unless you are an indigene, 
is very difficult" (Strauss 1995, p59).84 Certainly, Birch, Irene Watson, and 
Alexis Wright stand among Indigenous writers who argue that non-
indigenous colonisers have still not learnt the value of Indigenous 
knowledges to their survival. While Birch argues for the necessity of 
engagement with “a new way of seeing” and sees potential for innovation 
amid climate change via such engagements (p. 97), Irene Watson (2015) 
expresses pessimism: “are the colonialists able to comprehend their plight 
when for centuries they have known us as the ‘Indigenous victim’ and they 
don’t know how to begin to see their own losses?” (p. 88). She suggests 
that respectful moves towards different knowledges require an expansive 
renunciation of many aspects of “the colonised self” by non-indigenous 
people (p. 146): a stepping outside the philosophies underpinning the 
continuation of colonial power and of human and non-and-more-than-human 
genocide. Non-indigenous Australians, it appears, have our own, perhaps 
unbridgeable, gaps to close.85  
If colonisers have not, so far, closed the gaps in ecological knowledge, 
and cannot hope to do so any time soon, what can we possibly expect to 
                                                          
84 See also Haraway (2011). Others are less optimistic about timeframes (Bignall, Hemming, & 
Rigney, 2016, p. 472). 
85 This is not to pass over the valuable works on (re)orientations of non-indigenous relations with 
country (including Carter (1996), Muecke (2004, 2005, 2009), Plumwood (1999, 2002a, 2002b), and 
Rose (1996, 2004, 2008a, 2012b, 2013)) but to acknowledge the task’s immensity. 
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achieve with regard to finding responses to Crises of Ecologies?86 If 
coloniser history attests to our inability to care for country, while those who 
are able to care for country remain disenfranchised, dispossessed and 
denied agency to make a difference (Patton, 2001, 2002; I. Watson, 2015), 
what is to be done next and who is capable of doing it? If non-indigenous 
solutions to Crises of Ecologies are based upon inadequate knowledge of 
country, and alien concepts of knowledge as thing rather than practice 
(Christie, 2015), will we cause more damage? How will these solutions 
remain respectful: of knowledges borne by the descendants of this 
continent’s earliest human inhabitants: and to “the legitimacy of beliefs that 
have held this land together for thousands of years” (A. Wright, 2011a, p. 
80)? Such questions should be profoundly discomforting for non-indigenous 
Australians—and, no doubt, for Indigenous people—when considering the 
prospects for literary responses to Crises of Ecologies amid Australia’s 
hardly post-colonial state of affairs. Hughes-d’Aeth (2009) gestures toward 
these challenges: “our literature bends with the effort of resolution” (p. 123). 
In the context of these varied hopes and concerns for the efficacies of 
literature, I concur with Clark (2015, p. 189) that “Discussions of art, 
literature […and Crises of Ecologies] are at an extremely early stage”. In 
Chapter 3, as one response to, but not as a solution for, the issues 
discussed here, I propose other trajectories for literary practices amid Crises 
of Ecologies. Assembling Deleuze’s, Guattari’s, and New Materialists’ 
thought on Life/ecology, sense, and the intensive qualities of literature, I 
                                                          
86 See Harris (2015, pp. 8-9) on Tredinnick’s articulation of this problem, and Minter (2013). 
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explore other “socio-political functions of literature and its reception” (Clark, 
2015, p. 190). These explorations go beyond Clark’s perceived “institution of 
the novel” and the representational problematics of literature. I argue for 
literature’s intensive capacities to produce the new rather than reveal the 
well-worn-out, and for its potential to cultivate ecological sense and 
augment our powers of living amid Crises of Ecologies. I also argue that 
Indigenous writing can inform, affirm and enrich these conceptualisations of 
literature’s intensive potentials.  
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Chapter 3 – Other Trajectories 
 
[T]hinking with Deleuze and Guattari does not merely supplement 
ecocritical practice. Rather, it helps conceptualize the connection 
between literature and ecology in the ﬁrst place and thus constitutes 
new practice. (Chisholm, 2011, p. 574) 
 
Having established a substantive engagement with Crises of Ecologies 
among contemporary Australian novelists in Chapter 1, and outlined 
expectations—and problems—for literary efficacies amid these Crises in 
Chapter 2, I turn now to the focus of this thesis: a Deleuzo-Guattarian New 
Materialist conceptualisation of ecological sense87 and literary practices for 
Crises of Ecologies. I first introduce how Deleuze, Guattari, and New 
Materialists’88 ideas of Life, ecology, living, subjectivity, relationality, and 
ethics are of value amid Crises of Ecologies. I outline how these ideas 
inform notions of the work of literature in cultivating ecological sense, and 
propose three literary practices—writing the posthuman; writing affect and 
becomings; and minor literature—with potentials to cultivate ecological 
sense and our capacities for subjective resistance and renewal amid Crises 
of Ecologies: our powers of living. In the chapter’s final section, I argue for 
the contributions these conceptualisations can make to Australian and 
international literary critical fields, and, to explore these literary practices 
                                                          
87 I acknowledge Chisholm’s (2011) and Miall’s (2007) prior use of the term “ecological sense”.  
88 See Dolphijn and van der Tuin (2012; 2010) on New Materialisms’ etymologies. 
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and their capacities for transformation, I propose studies of three 
contemporary Australian novels: Tim Winton’s Eyrie (2013), Alexis Wright’s 
The Swan Book (2013), and Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster (1996). 
 
 
A Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialism 
 
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist ideas can be transformative: of our 
approaches to Life, ecology, relationality, ethics, and, thereby, the self and 
the other; and of our capacities to live amid Crises of Ecologies. Embracing 
philosophical “counter-memories” (Braidotti, 2002, p. 7)89 and scientific 
disciplines,90 these thinkers have in common a materially grounded, 
processual world-view of heterogeneity and continuity. They are concerned 
with immanence and the relational production of the real, and they eschew 
oppositional dualisms—such as Nature/culture, Human/Nature, 
mind/body—as points of departure for our understanding of ecology and our 
responses to Crises of Ecologies. While they do not reject the 
                                                          
89 This counter-memory (involving Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Hume, Whitehead and Bergson) 
resists (and re-writes) the dominant vectors of Western thought shaped, for example, by Plato, 
Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel, Freud. See, for example, Deleuze on Spinoza (1988b, 1990a), on 
Nietzsche (2006), on Hume (1991), on Bergson (1988a) and on Leibniz (1993); Nail on Deleuze and 
Spinoza (2008); Robinson  on Deleuze, Bergson and Whitehead (2009); and Sellars (2007) and Bell 
(2009) on Deleuze and Hume.  
90 Deleuze and Guattari’s thought traverses psychoanalysis and philosophy, new physics, complexity 
and chaos theory (see Holland (2013), Marks (2006), Protevi (2013)). New Materialist thinkers work 
via thermodynamics (DeLanda, 2000; Deleuze, 1994), neuroscience and perception (M. R. Bennett & 
Hacker, 2003; Massumi, 1995, 2002b, 2011), population theory (DeLanda, 1997), evolutionary 
biology (Protevi, 2013), biotechnology and genetics (Cooper, 2008), quantum and new physics 
(Barad, 2007), materials science (J. Bennett, 2010; DeLanda, 2013), complexity, chaos theory and 
non-linear dynamics (Herzogenrath, 2010b; Protevi, 2006), technology (Braidotti, 2002, 2013; 
Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999), and topology (DeLanda, 1999). 
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linguisticality91 of the real, language is not granted ontological and 
epistemological pre-eminence (DeLanda, 2006, pp. 45-46). No doubt, 
language intervenes in the world but it is not the only intervening force, and 
it is also shaped in the world.92   
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialists seek no home in the Human or 
Nature because these concepts deny Life’s varied and irreducibly entangled 
registers. Nature, Barad (2003, p. 827) suggests, is “neither a passive 
surface awaiting the mark of culture nor the end product of cultural 
performances”. It is neither “mute” nor “immutable” and culture is not its sole 
change agent.93 Morton (2007b) promotes the erasure of Nature—as 
concept, thing, reality—if ecological thought (which entails an ethics) is to be 
undertaken. He asserts the enmeshed character of Life, rejecting the idea of 
the human and, thereby, Nature’s own interiority or separability, as “over 
there” (p. 1). It is not, then, a matter of reconnection, of bridging a gap, but 
of erasing a preconceived subject and object and replacing them with Life in 
its unspeakable complexity, its irreducible entanglements, and its inherent 
strangeness (p. 23).   
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, 1987) appeals to machinics gesture 
toward the untotalisable, processual multiplicity of Life’s productions:94 their 
                                                          
91 Gadamer’s term (Schmidt, 2000, p. 1). 
92 Deleuze and Guattari wrote expansively on language and its work (Deleuze, 1989, 1990b, 1997, 
2000; Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, 1987). 
93 See also Herzogenrath (2010a, p. 5), and Latour (2004) on ‘naturecultures’. 
94 Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 33) conceptualise complex dynamic assemblages (structures) that 
do not derive from some prior essence or unity, and qualitatively vary as they conduct their relations. 
Everything is a multiplicity in that it is composed of many elements in dynamic relations. All things are 
more than one, or of the many: collective rather than separate and unified. If we consider multiplicities 
as intensive bodies, then we might also note that a change to the components of the multiplicity will 
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singularity, their transversality, their openness to transformation, and their 
non-linearity. Life, then, is the production(s) of continuously varying, 
transversal encounters between desiring-machines which are not 
necessarily physical entities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Among machines 
there are “resonances, alliances, feedback loops between various regimes, 
signifying and non-signifying, human and nonhuman, natural and cultural, 
material and representational” (Herzogenrath, 2010a, p. 5). Machinic Life is 
neither deep nor shallow, but flat (non-hierarchical), intensive, and 
constructive. The living of desiring machines95 is not bounded by separable 
realms (neither subject nor object), nor by terms such as natural, artificial 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 155), animal, insect, or human. Nor are there ontological 
priors—structures,96 identities, things—only processes of relations, 
aggregations or encounters, producing machinic assemblages which are 
dynamic and impermanent wholes, characterised by relations of exteriority 
rather than interiority (DeLanda, 2006). These relations are bifurcatory, 
rhizomic not linear, and causal but not teleological or determinist.97 We 
might re-conceive of Life as “an infinite sum, that is, a sum which does not 
                                                          
change its intensive capacities. Consequently, the notion of multiplicity draws us towards the idea of 
the impact of changes to ecologies not solely being limited to numerical or extensive changes, but 
having implications for the health and intensive qualities of those ecologies (which are themselves, of 
course, multiplicities). The notion of multiplicity also opens up the irreducible potential for bodies to 
change (Roffe, 2005a, p. 177).  
95 Ross (2010, p. 66) notes that, for Deleuze, desire is a productive and affirmative social force; de-
sexualised and de-individualised; continuous and not akin to a psychoanalytic conception of desire as 
lack; and discharged in pleasure. Desire operates in the construction of assemblages and it is thus 
oriented externally and experimental. 
96 Barad (2007), Braidotti (2002), DeLanda (1997), Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and Massumi (Aryal 
& Massumi, 2012; Massumi, 2002a) problematise structure and promote process. 
97 DeLanda (1997, 1999) emphasises ongoing morphogenesis; Barad (2007), relations and the 
production of phenomena; Braidotti (2002), ongoing metamorphosis and material nomadism; and 
Morton (2011, 2012, 2013a), radical object-oriented realism. 
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totalise its own elements […] Nature is not attributive but conjunctive: it 
expresses itself through ‘and’ and not through ‘is’” (Deleuze, 1990b, pp. 
266-267). Additionally, Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the fold concerns 
itself with “the perception of the world as an open whole in flux and 
movement” (Conley, 2005, p. 201). Life’s productions are immanent to the 
foldings, unfolding, and refolding of matter as a single substance (Deleuze, 
1993, p. 3). One implication of the fold is irreducible interconnectivity: a unity 
that remains multiple and in continuous transformation. Fold, then, involves 
a particular sense of Life, things, subjectivity and causality. Boundaries 
expand, become radically permeable, and threaten to become 
unrepresentably exterior. Conley (2005, p. 202) writes that “in Deleuze’s 
world, everything is folded, and folds, in and out of everything else”. These 
conceptualisations of continuous relationality have onto-epistemological and 
ethical implications, not least with regard to our irreducible accountability. 
Barad (2010) reminds us that “The very nature of matter entails an exposure 
to the other” (p. 265).98  
While Deleuze and Guattari (1987) do not avoid the word Nature when 
thinking about matter, it is used in the conception of Life as: “an immense 
Abstract Machine […] its pieces are the various assemblages and 
individuals, each of which groups together an infinity of particles entering 
into an infinity of more or less connected relations” (p. 512). Life is non-
exclusionary; the outside is always and everywhere inside (Barad, 2007, p. 
161). Consequently, we are challenged to reconsider what we define as 
                                                          
98 See also Latour (2004, p. 58). 
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living and not living, what does and does not have agency.99 For Deleuze 
(1993), Life is open and affective; comprising vectors not bounded entities; 
producing singularities; swarming, multiplying, growing and pullulating (p. 
xi). Life is emergent from the vital, relational flows of the same, self-
organising matter,100 and Life’s productions are the dynamic assemblages of 
material and immaterial machines as singularities (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, 
p. 152): as the always different. Matter possesses duration: the capacity to 
inhabit and move through time (Deleuze, 2005, p. 80). Matter is not dumb, 
mute or fixed; it is intelligent, mobile and vibrant and, to differing degrees, 
capable of expression: as Barad puts it (2007), an active participant in the 
world’s becoming.  
While matter can be found in bodies, bodies need not be material in 
content. Rather, bodies are relationally, matter-discursively (Barad, 2003, p. 
822) and affectively constructed phenomena; dynamically produced as 
functions of exterior forces; their productions ungoverned by any 
sedimented psychic interior or conventionally conceived, pre-existing 
mind.101 Having eschewed normative ideas of what bodies should be or 
what they are, Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialism turns to questions of 
what bodies can do: toward vitality, affect, the unknown, potential and 
futurity, and away from thingness (Barad, 2007, 2012), identity (Deleuze, 
                                                          
99 See, for example, Braidotti (2013, p. 83), Conley in Deleuze (1993), Morton (2010b). 
100 We find varying assertions of monism, radical interconnectivity and immanence in Deleuze’s Fold 
(1993) and Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome (1987), in Barad’s entangled, agential realism and 
theorisation of ‘intraaction’ (2007), in Morton’s ‘mesh’ (2010b), in DeLanda’s matter-energy flows 
(1995), and in Braidotti’s Deleuzian posthumanism (2013).  
101 See Bowden (2015, p. 78) on Deleuzian expressive agency and the imbrication of human 
intentionality and the non-and-more-than-human. 
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1994), memory, history, representation, species, and the known. Ideas of 
the human account inadequately for the bodies / subjectivities that are 
irreducibly imbricated into a world that is non-and-more-than-human; that 
are immanent to that world; and that are multiple, fluid, assemblages of that 
world (Guattari, 2000, pp. 35-36). A traditional anti-human or post-humanist 
decentering is necessary but insufficient. A material de/re-construction 
enables a better understanding of the real productions of subjectivity. As 
Braidotti (2006a) suggests, “The Life in me is not only, not even, human” (p. 
6).  
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialism is concerned, then, with how to 
approach the subject and with existence beyond the still lively, dangerous, 
inadequate and limiting concept of the “Human”. Underneath thoughts of 
Humanness, we are porous, material beings; as processually exposed as 
any other being; not separate in our origins; not other to Life; made of the 
same matter; our future equally unpredictable (Haraway, 1997). We do not 
own the forces that shape relations and their productions: bodies are 
expressions of relations and the—corporeal and incorporeal—
transformations they catalyse. Subjectivity is not individualism—an ego or a 
mind closeted from, over and above, existence—and, like ecology, 
subjectivity does not reach an end point, climax state, or harmony. Rather, 
subjectivities arise from the ongoing, creative and entangled assemblings of 
elements; as the collective, heterogeneous production of forces that 
continue to flow beyond their expression; as a series of moments through 
which myriad crossings occur and decelerate, or thicken; as sensuous, 
dynamic, transversal, entirely relational productions, irreducible to an 
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essence, and moving out from the varying fields in which they are produced. 
Genosko (2010) describes the subject as “Emergent and processual, 
producing and produced by multiple self-engenderings” (p. 107).  
Braidotti’s (2006a) Zoe-centred egalitarianism positions the human 
neither at the centre, nor in control of, the unfolding of Life. Like Morton’s 
(2002, p. 144) subject—if he has one—Braidotti’s is a collective production; 
hybridised, and enmeshed in a network of interrelated material, social and 
discursive effects. The materialist subject lives in very much the Deleuzian 
minor and molecular modes (1987), as non-unitary, embodied, and 
emerging from the flows of intensities. For Braidotti (2013), then, the 
posthuman embraces other Life forms and unravels dominant concepts of 
subjectivity: “the subject is fully immersed in and immanent to a network of 
non-human (animal, vegetable, viral) relations” (2002, p. 122).102 
Importantly, Braidotti is not pinning a badge of immanence, multiplicity and 
exteriority on humans alone, but on all Life. She scrambles subjectivities for 
all through “a chain of connections which can best be described as an 
ecological philosophy of non-unitary, embodied subjects” (p. 134).  
Exploding the normative image of the embodied subject extends to its 
physical frame. Along with Haraway’s (1991) and Hayles’ (1999) important 
elucidations of the cyborg and the technologically extended Human, both 
Braidotti (2002, p. 124) and DeLanda (1995) assert the morphology of the 
body as immanent and open-ended, rather than its standing as a pre-
                                                          
102 See, also, Alaimo (2010); Wolfe (2003, 2010).  
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condition and determinant of the shape of Life forms.103 Deleuzo-Guattarian 
New Materialism also entails a revaluation of bodily capacities, beginning 
with the assumption that human capacities are neither necessarily unique to 
us, nor superior to the capacities of the non-and-more-than-human (Morton, 
2010b, pp. 71-72). Indeed, to begin with the human as the measure of all 
things is to miss and diminish Life’s potentials.  
While, for Barad (2003), the material and the discursive are entirely 
inseparable registers of the world’s becomings, for Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, pp. 261-269), the world is not only material-discursive but also 
nonhuman. Bodies are haecceities: unique, impermanent, nested 
aggregates of pre-personal and impersonal forces shaping their capacities 
and the social world as they move (Guattari, 1995, p. 61). These ideas 
encompass a Spinozan notion of being as the dynamic, relational and social 
production(s) of intensive/affective (transformational) encounters between 
bodies. Spinoza (2009) argued that a body’s desire—its Conatus or innate 
striving—is to expand its powers of living, or affective capacities; to become 
more and to increase the intensities of its encounters; to avoid painful and 
seek out joyful affections. The passage of affect between bodies in 
encounters shapes a body’s capacity to be different, and to make (a) 
difference.  
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialism supports conceptualisations of 
externally produced subjectivity and the residual character of consciousness 
that run hard against Cartesian ideas of Man and mind (Hall, 2004). 
                                                          
103 See, also, Berressem (2009, p. 66); Braidotti (2006a, 2006b, 2013). 
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Adapting Spinoza’s, Nietzsche’s and Hume’s notions of subjectivity 
produced by relations exterior to it, Deleuze (1991) asserts that “the mind 
therefore does not have the characteristics of a pre-existing subject” (p. 29). 
Consciousness is just one expression of the subject—though a dominant 
one—and not the only mode of relating to/in the world. The mind, body, and 
what lies beyond them, and indeed what serves to compose them, can only 
ever be separated in abstraction. Mind is part of Life; already bound up with 
it; immanent to it; dynamic; and, as Braidotti (2010a, p. 212) puts it, 
environmentally entangled. For Protevi (2013, p. 121), our emotions and 
feelings are “centripetal rather than centrifugal […] the subjectivation, the 
crystallization, of affect”.  
These re-constitutions of subjectivity do not mean that the subject is 
relieved of accountability for the affirmative or negative affects of its 
relations. Morton (2010b, p. 91) acknowledges that the ecological thought 
might not involve an image of the conventional human but a venture into a 
“subaesthetic level of being”: not pretty, difficult to love, strange the whole 
way down (no matter how much we excavate), without a human face, and 
heterogeneous to its unfathomable core. Nevertheless, Morton suggests, 
the idea of the “strange stranger” (p. 14) might also enliven our sense of 
care toward the unknowable other and our sensitivity to what produces us; 
to potentials for diversity and for the destabilisation of habits; and to 
potentials for a fuller perception of the chaos that we habitually reduce to 
protect our sense of order (Morton, 2010d). For Deleuze and Guattari, 
subjectivities become intrinsically political, precisely because they are not 
pre-existing; because they are materially-discursively, affectively, and 
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always collectively constructed;104 and because agency over a body’s 
transformations is dependent upon the body’s capacity to more fully 
perceive, and manage, the passage of affects, over and above the mind’s 
late and simplistic attempts to conceive of those forces (Lorraine, 2011, p. 
118). Importantly, Braidotti (2006a) injects a measure of consistency into 
subjectivity, noting Deleuze and Guattari’s observation that our subjectivity 
is always escaping us and yet, at the same time, enduring as we work to 
develop capabilities to bear the intensities to which we are exposed through 
our encounters with other bodies. We might conceive of this subjective work 
of capability development and endurance as an aesthetics of creative 
resingularisation; made possible, in part, via our encounters with literature.  
 
 
Ecological sense and literary practices for Crises of Ecologies  
 
One creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way an artist 
creates new forms from a palette. (Guattari, 1995, pp. 6-7) 
 
A book itself is a little machine (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 4) 
 
 
                                                          
104 See Lloyd and Gatens (1999, p. 2) on Spinoza, and freedom as collective production. 
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Having regard to Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist ontologies and 
epistemologies, I put forward the main proposition of this thesis. If a life 
occurs as becomings—as perceptual and subjective transformations 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.9)—born of sensuous, or affective, encounters, 
then subjectivity is an aesthetic pursuit. We might think of subjectivity as a 
work of art; of a life as comprising continuous aesthetic resingularisations; 
and of art and literature as active participants in lives (Guattari, 1995, pp. 
7,13,19). Works of art do not hold a single meaning, but function in 
encounters with other bodies, giving truth to variation, always producing 
something entirely new: exemplifying difference in itself as an ontology 
(Deleuze, 1994). The writer, in producing a text, introduces variation into the 
world (and into self). The writer works against the forces blocking affirmative 
relations and their associated transformations, and against contractions of 
subjectivity: significations, stratifications, and subjectifications (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983, 1987). Literature, then, as Braidotti (2010b, p. 243) suggests 
of art, might operate as a defence against capitalism and, more broadly, 
enable the expansion of subjective pathways (p. 242): augmenting our 
capacities to sense, adjust to, and respond affirmatively to the ecologies 
and Crises of Ecologies in which we participate (2013, pp. 51-52). 
Encounters with literature have the potential to lead us to “undertake[…] a 
radical reconsideration” of ourselves (Guattari, 2000, p. 68).  
In keeping with these ideas, I propose that certain literary practices infuse 
literature with potentials to cultivate ecological sense: fostering our 
apprehension of those forces of Life that we often hold at some distance, 
ignore, deny, or otherwise find imperceptible; encouraging our attendance to 
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the agency of the non-and-more-than-human world; reconfiguring our sense 
of the subject and of our subjective interdependencies with all that is non-
and-more-than-human, and thus of our common vulnerability and our 
potential agency amid capitalism and ecological crises; enhancing our 
attunement to the ways in which we shape Crises and, through them, 
denude Life and our lives; (re)invigorating our “affective athleticism” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p. 172), in particular augmenting our capacities to 
perceive and engage with affect as a vital register of existence (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1994, p. 172) across which capitalism, colonialism, ecological 
crises, and we, can find health and do material harm; and the reorientation 
of our living toward the pursuit of creative, mutually beneficial, subjective 
renewals amid these Crises. I conceptualise three literary practices for 
Crises of Ecologies: writing the posthuman, writing affect and becomings, 
and minor literature. 
 
Writing the posthuman 
 
In fact, the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two 
multiplicities. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 249)   
 
By exploring the exteriority of being(s), writers—and readers—might 
access more-than post-humanist, non-anthropocentric expressions of the 
non-and-more-than-human and subjectivity. By re-diagramming the 
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Human105 and turning toward the posthuman subject (Braidotti 2013), a 
writer might bring us (to) a new world of vital materiality. Morton (2007b) 
proposes writing not as distanced criticism but as eco-critique: a self-
deconstructing literature, responding to problems of the Human, ecologies 
and representation. While, prima facie, writing need not be concerned with 
conventionally environmental matters (p. 194), it might work upon the 
dialectics inherent in our “compelling illusion[s]” (p. 54) of how the world is. 
Writing might collapse and render problematic the aesthetic distance that 
practices of ecomimesis can produce between art, critique and capitalism 
(p. 164). Morton (2007b) imagines a critical art juxtaposing the subject and 
the object in all their indeterminacy; working through and upon the ambient 
poetics106 used to render Nature in order to expose the fissures in the 
artifice; and playing with the impossibility of the notion of our reconciling with 
something called Nature. Such work would draw attention to the instability 
and non-neutrality of the medium through which the world is being conveyed 
(p. 146), and of the notions of the Human and Nature. 
For Morton, ecological thought can be productive where it embraces our 
inability to establish some distance from Life. I suggest that Morton’s 
contention applies also to distancing ourselves from Crises of Ecologies.107 
He proposes that we spend more time becoming acquainted with the 
complexity and non-identity of Life and the “mud” in which ourselves are 
                                                          
105 I believe my approach is consistent with LeMenager’s call for “a more interesting and diffuse 
human turn” (2013, p. 403). 
106 Both “conjuring up a sense of a surrounding atmosphere or world” (p. 22) and “reading texts with 
a view to how they encode the literal space of their inscription – if there is such a thing […]” (p. 3). 
107 See, also, Hughes-d’Aeth (2009, p. 122). 
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irredeemably immersed and mixed. Two of the practices Morton (2007b) 
proposes are negative ecology and dark ecology.108 Negative ecology 
suggests a literature that works with the notion of environment (ecology) as 
that which cannot be indicated directly; of a world of endless alterity; and of 
no gap between the human and the non-and-more-than-human.109 All is 
“impenetrably real […] distant […] intangible” (p. 160). Literary negative 
ecology works to dissolve the subject and the object, place and mind. 
Ambient poetics is used for the very purpose of unmasking its own 
deceptions; opening out and evoking a rest-of-Life that we grasp only 
inconsistently and in fragments. This suggests a literature of unfulfilled 
promises. Dark ecology suggests a literature of pain and grief in all its 
meaninglessness; facing the implications of the loss of self amid ecologies 
with which we are irreducibly entangled, and, also amid Crises of Ecologies 
for which we are accountable. A dark ecological literature would be 
melancholic, hesitant, indeterminate, bleak, and ironic: embracing the ugly, 
the dirty, and the monstrous that comes from the loss of Nature and from 
Crises of Ecologies and our inescapable immersion in all that remains. Such 
an embrace might not, though, be deemed negative: indeed, Nietzsche 
(Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015, p. 27), Deleuze (1990b, pp. 149-150) and 
Collings (2014, p. 154) might acknowledge the affirmations—or amor fati—
in it.  
Literature has the potential to convey the vitality of matter or objects: the 
                                                          
108 Morton (2007b) proposes other practices not considered in this thesis: juxtaposition, radical 
ecological kitsch and ekphrasis. 
109 Morton acknowledges Rigby’s (2004a) ecopoetics of negativity as precursor. 
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agency of things. As Barad (2003) writes of giving “matter its due”, so Jane 
Bennett (2010) writes of the political importance of giving “the force of things 
more due” (p. viii). Bennett (2010) references Deleuze and Guattari (1987), 
as well as Nietzsche’s guidance that literature might connect us with Life: 
the “monster of energy…that does not expend itself but only transforms 
itself […]” (p. 54). Respectively, Bennett, and Iovino and Oppermann, 
suggest Kafka’s Odradek (2010, p.45-47) and Conrad’s river Congo (2012a, 
p.81) as examples of literary engagements with the agential forces of 
matter. Literature has, as its resource, an infinitely differing Life, moving 
across myriad scales, from which it draws its forces and into which it 
contributes (J. Bennett, 2010; Chakrabarty, 2009; Clark, 2012; Morton, 
2013b; Phillips & Sullivan, 2012). Furthermore, a literature of material 
agency might dwell down in Morton’s (2010b, pp. 91-92) mud and darkness, 
concerning itself with Life’s strangeness; with the detritus, the ugly, the 
excreta, and the abject from which we cannot separate; and, after Barad 
(2007), with the spatio-temporal, relational, impermanence of phenomena 
rather than with their stability and separateness. Writing the posthuman, 
then, might attune us to the dependence of our subjectivities upon bodies 
and forces that we have a limited capacity to control (Connolly, 2011, p. 
793); to our non-unitary existence in non-and-more-than-human, material-
discursive (Barad 2003, p. 822) assemblages;110 and to the flaws in our 
beliefs that we possess some prior essence or transcend the non-and-more-
than-human. Such literature might populate the world with porous bodies; 
                                                          
110 See, for example, Dickinson (2007). 
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make the directions of flows indeterminate; blur distinctions and categories; 
and lose the individual in multiplicity.  
Morton’s (2010b) reference to “beings who do not so easily wear a 
human face” (pp.91-92) and Deleuze and Guattari’s call for us to lose the 
face111 bring us back to a challenge for writing material vitality. On the one 
hand, writers risk re-inscribing and privileging the human where they use 
anthropomorphic tropes to convey the qualities of non-and-more-than-
human encounters and agencies. Conversely, though, we might risk losing 
the material object—Conrad’s river, Iovino and Opperman’s (2012a) 
lightning bolt, Hardy’s Egdon Heath (W. A. Cohen, 2006)—entirely, though 
not necessarily erroneously, if we accept Life’s dissolution into Morton’s 
(2007) non-identitarian mud and Barad’s objectless intraactive relata. And 
yet, the risk of losing the subject and the object might double as a resource 
for the exploration of the infinite multiplicity, relational dependency and 
processual dynamism of what we perceive as unitary and stable things: 
humans and the concept of the Human among them. We might, then, find 
potentials in literary practices beyond literary narratives that try to get to the 
truth of material agency in its own right. As Probyn (2016, p. 11) observes 
after Abrahamson et al, it might, “be more relevant to face the complexities, 
frictions, intractabilities, and conundrums of ‘matter in relation’” because 
                                                          
111 For Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 292), the face conveys the processes and power of the 
structured and controlled identity attributed to the subject that determines their acceptance into or 
rejection from the Capitalist regime. For our purposes, the idea of the face brings us back to the 
centrality of the dominant image of the Human and its relationship to Crises of Ecologies. 
  
 
90 
 
“matter is never matter by itself” (p. 52).112 
Writing the posthuman entails attunement to different expressions of 
space (and time) and to the relations of bodies that produce it; to our 
relational onto-epistemological condition and, therein, to our becomings-
nonhuman; immersing us in the strangeness that is Life and our self 
(Oppermann, 2016). In this context, I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) aesthetic model of smooth(ing) space is useful for developing a 
concept of literary practices that cultivate ecological sense. Roffe (2005c) 
explains that:  
 
Smooth space is the type of space in which there are no fixed 
points or boundaries, and in which movement is uninhibited. In 
smooth space movement is therefore continuous variation. In 
contrast, striated space is structured and organised, creating fixed 
points and limits between what movements can be undertaken. As 
a result, there is a sense […] that the nature and construction of 
certain spaces forms one of the primary concerns of politics, since 
smooth space is by definition the space of freedom. On a more 
fundamental level, nature itself for Deleuze is continuous variation. 
Even animal species must be understood in terms of a movement 
of life which has been structured into localised patterns of stability. 
(p. 295-296)  
                                                          
112 Probyn (p. 104) also notes “Annemarie Mol’s (2013) directions for researching ‘relational 
materialities’ – not questions of agency”. 
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Literary productions, and smoothings, of space might operate to transform 
our perceptions of surfaces, linkages, and orientations; from the optical (at a 
distance, dominated by the eyes) to the haptic (touch and sensuous 
movement) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 479). Literary smoothings immerse 
us in new ecologies: of flow not stasis; of singular becomings not pre-
existing things; of intensive not extensive bodies; of relational, dynamic, 
transforming matter not fixed material forms; and of nomadic creatures not 
fixed in what they are, nor in what they can do. In writing smooth space, the 
writer pursues or tries to tap into an ecology of pure connection, hybridity, 
and imbrication.  
Writing smooth space might throw into relief the extent to which the 
identity and stability of striated ideas—Human, Nature, Animal—and things 
depend upon the expulsion of that which does not comply with conventional 
expectations of how Life should be: strange encounters, difficult and non-
compliant animals—non-cute endangered creatures (Rose & van Dooren, 
2011)—indiscernible life-forms, and unfamiliar phenomena. In a novel that 
striates space, we might only see the habitual and predictable: already 
closed off as to what it does and can do. In the Australian context, this might 
involve representations of a seemingly featureless, alien, impenetrable bush 
or desert, and of its renaming and fencing off. In a novel that smooths 
space, we might encounter a desert, plain, salt flat, bush, space that is 
produced and productive as we move through it. Such writing might, for 
example, draw us into a vibrant space that we do not recognize; that we 
cannot observe from a distance; that swarms with life; that is indifferent 
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toward the Human; and that leaves us disoriented and subject to strange 
connections with strange creatures that defy any attempt at organic 
representation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 499).  
Literature might map new posthuman cartographies amid Crises of 
Ecologies, attuning us to unbounded material agency and to the qualities 
and the implications of our permeability and interconnectedness. Indeed, we 
might consider, after Morton (2013a) and Zapf (2016), that material agency 
is—and always has been—a force shaping humans and human writing and 
that, consequently, we might usefully conceive of literary practices as 
relational: inescapably transmitting the expressions of the material agents of 
Crises of Ecologies and transforming bodies in encounters.113 It might, for 
example, express the unimaginable scope of the agency of hyperobjects 
like global warming (Morton 2013), shaped by and re-shaping us; or track 
the paths of discarded waste products back to and through humans (Wilcox, 
2002); or reconnect us to abject matter (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3) (excrement, 
bodily fluids, animal byproducts for example); or story the entangled and 
transversal matter-discursive flows that constitute assemblages, including 
subjectivity assemblages (Iovino & Oppermann, 2012a, pp. 81, 83). 
Literature that maps these cartographies also offers a critical engagement 
with consumerism and its entanglements in the material-discursive 
assemblages of Crises of Ecologies: born of human behaviours and 
returning to reshape human and other bodies. 
There appear to be some affirmative resonances between Australian 
                                                          
113 See, also, Kearnes (2016, p. 56). 
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Indigenous practices/philosophies of Life114 and Deleuzo-Guattarian New 
Materialist notions of the posthuman, of the agency of matter, and of their 
implications for ecology. I noted earlier that Kwaymullina et al (2013, p. 4) 
outline Indigenous relational onto-epistemologies that collapse distinctions 
and suggest interdependencies between time (past-present-future), space, 
matter, discourse, culture, nature, Human, and non-and-more-than-human: 
“everything is alive, everything is related, and everything is participatory”. 
Irene Watson (2015) refers to “a world of which we as humans are a part of 
the whole and not the whole itself” (p. 12). Land and people traverse each 
other so as to become irreducible into separable entities (p. 100). 
Consequently, Watson warns, because “Our ruwe is an extension of 
ourselves [and vice versa]; to take the land from us, and to develop and 
damage the ruwe is also to damage our relationship to country” (p. 20) and 
Indigenous peoples. She proffers “nakedness” as a way of conveying the 
inherent, unthought exteriority of being informing Indigenous living prior to 
colonisation, that has since been oppressed—though not extinguished—by 
the powers of colonisation, and which remains anathema to the 
colonial/Western mind: “There are no words that I have come across in our 
First Nations languages which describe nakedness” (p. 55). For Irene 
Watson, Indigenous onto-epistemologies carry “a relational approach to the 
natural world” (p. 146). John Law’s (2004) analyses respond to Helen 
Verran’s work on similar ideas and gesture toward resonances between 
                                                          
114 As Indigenous people express them (see Graham (2008); Grieves (2009); Neidjie (1989); I. 
Watson (2015); Wright (2011a)) and as non-indigenous scholars understand them (see Law (2004); 
Muecke (2004, 2009); Plumwood (1999, 2002a, 2002b); Potter (2015); Rose (1992, 1996, 2004, 
2005, 2012b); Verran (1998; 2011); Ravenscroft (2014)). 
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Indigenous and Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist onto-epistemologies. 
For Law, Aboriginal onto-epistemologies posit no independent, separate 
and singular reality from the subject: “patterns of dualist separation are 
almost entirely absent from Aboriginal method assemblages” (p. 133). Irene 
Watson’s explications of Indigenous philosophies, and Law’s arguments 
suggest potentially enriching ways in which Indigenous and Deleuzo-
Guattarian New Materialist onto-epistemologies might interact. These 
interactions involve privileging Indigenous thought and literary practices as 
possessing potentials to cultivate ecological sense and augment powers of 
living, rather than subsuming them under foreign conceptualisations of 
literary efficacies, as well as attending to the ways in which Indigenous 
writing enriches those foreign conceptualisations. I explore these 
opportunities in Chapter 5.  
 
Writing affect and becomings  
 
Art mobilizes ecological thinking with sensations and 
compositions—artistic bodies—that affect our sense of being and 
becoming as cohabitants of affected territories. (Chisholm, 2011, p. 
585) 
[C]limate pedagogy might be cast as learning to be affected by 
climatic and environmental change. (Kearnes, 2016, p. 56) 
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For Deleuze (1993, p. xiv), literature is not separated from Life; it carries 
and is involved with Life’s capacities for perpetual movement, 
metamorphosis, and emigration “from one condition to another”. Itself 
machinic and relational, literature can produce movement and 
transformation via the senses,115 rather than functioning as a mirror for 
some fixed concept (Deleuze, 1997, p. 78). Literature carries expression. 
For Deleuze, “expression” amounts to the open expression of forces and 
intensities or affects: the nonhuman. Literature possesses the capacity to 
change unpredictably the intensive state of a body through encounters with 
it, which, importantly, suggests something immanent to matter and to 
experience (O'Sullivan, 2006, p. 39). More specifically, Bourassa (2009) 
notes that, for Deleuze and Guattari (1994, p. 182), writing carries 
expressions of the material qualities and forces of the world absent the 
human (percepts),116 along with the forces of becoming that run between 
and are expressed by collisions of bodies (affects). These qualities and 
forces are pre-personal, of the body, and, thereby, not easy to articulate or 
represent: they are “a language which speaks before words” (Deleuze, 
1994, p. 10). Representation and emotions—conscious, reduced, lifeless, 
terminal versions of what became of those collisions—do not capture affects 
(Bourassa 2009, p. 19). Within a fictional narrative, affects can be the 
sensations one body provokes in another: the text operating as a conductor 
                                                          
115 See J. Bennett (2010); Braidotti (2002); Deleuze (1997); Deleuze and Guattari (1994); Iovino 
(2012); Iovino and Oppermann (2012a, 2012b); Massumi (2002a, 2011). 
116 Daly and Dowd (2003)  write that “A ‘percept’ differs from a perception in so far as it is a mode of 
capture of the sensible world which lies either below or beyond a certain threshold (which would mark 
the moment of closure required for perceptions to form)” and that it is via the percept that “literature 
succeeds in attaining the very limit of perception” (p. 165). 
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of the intensities transmitted and the associated transformations—or 
becomings—in bodies’ capacities to affect others. In addition, that text is a 
vehicle for intensities (affects) (Deleuze & Guattari 1994) that, in collision 
with other bodies (readers), always produce something entirely new.117 
Words and syntax, for example, can pass into sensation; they vibrate, and 
these bare sensations connect with and embrace another body (the reader), 
resonate with that body’s sensations, before pulling away and leaving the 
two bodies joined by the space that forms in-between them: a bloc of 
sensation or a becoming in a “zone of proximity or indiscernibility” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987, p. 305).  
An affective engagement with writing attunes us to other registers across 
which Life moves and transforms, and offers access to affects other than 
those that have become sanctioned and contracted human habits. Hickey-
Moody (2013) explains that, 
 
art has the aptitude to change a body’s limits. Art can readjust what 
a person is or is not able to feel, understand, produce and connect. 
[…] This is, then, primarily a corporeal reconfiguration and secondly 
an emergent cultural geography of human feelings. (p. 88) 
 
An affective engagement also enhances perceptions of the affects of 
                                                          
117 See Roelvink and Zolkos (2015) on affect, posthumanism, and the relationships between affect 
and sensation.  
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ecological crises (Houser, 2014); of the intimate interconnection of these 
affects with us; and of their still-traumatic effects now and to-come 
(Lorraine, 2011). Literature can be a political instrument, a writing machine 
(Bogue, 2003, p. 59): improving our apprehension of the infantilising, 
stratifying, facialising, and contractive affects employed to nourish 
capitalism; and operating upon capitalism’s power apparatus (R.G. Smith 
2015).118 Literature gets affect moving: producing new machines whose own 
productions and enunciations remain indecipherable, unencodable, creative 
and liberatory. If capitalist subjects’ attunements, and capacities, to affect 
have been diminished and contracted,119 then literary encounters can deliver 
an expansionary kick-start.  
Movements of affect constitute becomings: breaks in habit; the drawing of 
bodies into compounds of sensation that did not exist prior to their 
encounter with each other, and with the art work (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, 
p. 175). We might, then, expect literature not just to train the passions120 but 
to articulate and transmit wholly new affects (Connolly, 2011, p. 795). Via 
Collings’ (2014) demands that we “embrace [unthinkable/unrepresentable 
future] trauma and grief themselves without reserve” (pp. 154-155) amid 
Crises of Ecologies, we might arrive at a literature that explores the affects 
and ethics of a worst that is still to come (Collings, 2014, pp. 153-154). Via 
Lorraine’s (2011) proposal for a literature of “limit cases”—what cannot be 
                                                          
118 See Anderson (2012); Aryal and Massumi (2012); Clough (2008b); Deleuze and Guattari (2007, 
1983, 1987); Negishi (2012); Reber (2012); Stiegler (2014); Wendling (2012). 
119 Albeit, not their vulnerability (Abel, 2008). 
120 See Carroll (1999, pp. 58-106); Eldridge (2003, p. 54); Wertz (1998). 
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represented—we might access a “truth” of experience, found in intensities 
and through the potential connections of those intensities to as-yet 
unactualised modes of being, rather than in representations/judgements of 
the good and bad of what happened/still happens (p. 131). The intensive 
qualities and the embodied experience of encounters with literature might, 
then, augment our capacity to know and to cope with Crises of Ecologies, 
and, perhaps, offer some amelioration—or accommodation—of pain: 
helping us find what Collings (2014) calls “not a new hope, but the capacity 
to affirm and endure the worst” (p. 154): to live differently than our History 
might wish.  
With literature as vehicle of agency and affect, we are not in the world of 
the Human. Indeed, literature is inherently affirmative where it expresses 
nonhuman forces and the world of continuous variation beneath perception, 
or “difference in itself” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 28). As Bourassa (2009) 
observes, after Deleuze (1994, p. 35), the nonhuman is one way by which 
we come to know subjectivity “in terms of what surpasses it, undermines it, 
fragments it, but also in terms of what simultaneously supports its, 
energizes it, and holds it together” (p. 26). Affects constitute an exit from 
fixed subjectivities: we become molecular, non-unitary subjects open to the 
world’s flows. Literature becomes more than the conveyance of human 
emotions, qualities or feelings: as art, it becomes transhuman (O'Sullivan, 
2006, p. 50) or, again as Braidotti (2013) might put it, posthuman. Of 
course, non-and-more-than-human bodies can affect and be affected. They 
can participate in becomings. The nonhuman, then, opens us out to a 
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collectivity spanning all living entities, by virtue of our exposure to affect121—
a notion that suggests other registers across which human and non-and-
more-than-human relate—and, consequently, our common (though never 
the same) exposure to the material traumas of Crises of Ecologies.  
Literary affects are ruptures in the sensible and therefore important to 
thought: they drive becomings and they offer nodes of access to worlds to 
which we are de-sensitised, which are not sanctioned, and which have not 
yet been created. Writing becomings suggests constructive transformations 
and encounters amid Crises of Ecologies rather than negation.122 Writing 
becomings opens Life out to the virtual123 and the new, while, as posthuman 
writing, it folds us intimately back into the non-and-more-than-human world. 
Writing becomings does not entail a deletion of the subject but a 
reconfiguration of subjectivity. Becomings are incorporeal events 
possessing material agency because they transform our perceptions of 
Life—to the extent that it is ever ours (Braidotti, 2006a)—and our affective 
capacities; in turn transforming how we can relate. In writing becomings 
(indeed, in writing as becoming), the creatures, subjects, and bodies that we 
                                                          
121 Roelvink and Zolkos (2015) note the intersections between Cary Wolfe’s work and contemporary 
affect theory (p. 2). LeMenager (2013, p. 409) also argues that “resilience, adaptation, and the future 
of humans in relation to nonhuman others and to ourselves depends upon cultivating communal 
affects”. 
122 There exists a wealth of artistic production, theory, and criticism that engages with becomings 
(Bogue, 2010a; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), becomings-woman (Bogue, 2010a; Colebrook, 2013b; 
Griggers, 1997; Jarraway, 2012), -animal (Bruns, 2007; Danta, 2007; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; 
Dillon, 2011; Patton, 2004; Vint, 2005), -insect (Braidotti, 2002, p. 149; Knighton, 2013), -other 
(Grosz, 1999), and -imperceptible (Lorraine, 2000; MacCormack, 2010; Žukauskaite, 2012). 
123 Broadly speaking, for Deleuze—see, for example, Bergsonism (1988a)—one quality of the virtual 
is as an immanent plane of existence from which actual existence (difference in itself) is drawn, and 
which enables that actualisation to vary, though it is never separated from the actual. The virtual 
plane also varies as the actual is actualised.  
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create/encounter may move in the direction of familiar and classical 
identities but their life occurs molecularly, through blocs of 
sensation/becoming formed through their relations. Literary bodies undergo 
sensuous entries into “new levels, [and] zones of liberated intensities where 
contents free themselves from their forms as well as from their expressions, 
from the signifier that formalized them” (Deleuze & Guattari 1986, p. 13). 
Real Life is lived in-between the dominating categories of subjectivity—Man, 
Woman, Child, Animal, Other—and is produced by transversal encounters 
with the always other.  
Amid Crises of Ecologies, it matters how literature engages with the 
Animal. Braidotti (2002) argues for different engagements with these beings 
that have been othered, treated as discursive and material, psychical and 
social resources, and used to (pre)serve humans and Capital. Iovino (2016) 
suggests that literature might allow us to “transcend the category of the 
“human” and enter into a posthuman age that is more in tune with the hybrid 
and porous natures of our species” (p. 18). Morton (2010b, 2010d) and 
Derrida (2008) foreground problems with our capacity to know other 
creatures at all—given their irreducible strange strangeness, their 
unavoidable (matter-discursive) entanglements with the Human, and our 
historical denial of/blindness toward them—and assert our ethical 
accountabilities to them. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), becomings-
animal offer paths of sensuous reconfigurations of subjectivities and every 
becoming is singular, even those that are imaginary (p. 238). Becomings-
animal are not to do with resemblance or imitation, copying or physical 
transformation, though the writer is not denied such things. Nor are they to 
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do with representing in language the animal’s pain at the hands of the 
Human. Rather, literary becomings-animal constitute incorporeal 
transformations (no doubt, transforming our material capacities). They are 
attempts to pursue an encounter and to draw writer/reader/animal into the 
production of a zone of proximity within which categories, subjectivities, 
difference as negation, human-animal dialectics, and anthropocentric 
perceptions are lost or exceeded (Bruns, 2007, p. 703). Literary becomings-
animal cultivate sense beyond the Human. They are encounters during 
which other affects, other sensibilities are made available. Such encounters 
also have the potential to reorient writers’ and readers’ ethical frames: 
cultivating our sensitivity to our “interspecies junction points” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994, p. 185), to the interdependencies of our flourishing with the 
flourishing of non-and-more-than-human bodies, and to the movements of 
traumatized bodies amid Crises of Ecologies.  
I note that literary becomings might—indeed, must—go well beyond the 
already damaging category of Animal, and embrace becomings-non-and-
more-than-human in all their variations. Deleuze and Guattari would, 
perhaps, characterise these movements as becomings-minor as they would 
be oriented away from the dominant forms of subjectivity implicated in 
Crises of Ecologies. Literary becomings-imperceptible go further, entailing 
fallings-back into the molecular flows of Life (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 
248); albeit, Braidotti’s (2006a) note that “Becoming-imperceptible is the 
event for which there is no immediate representation” (p. 28) raises the 
question of how to write it. Perhaps, to return to writing the posthuman, a 
story might express the affective intensities of the lines of dissolution of the 
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subject into matter-energy flows, a becoming-molecular. A writer’s challenge 
involves setting readers adrift from our moorings (temporal, spatial, and 
perceptual); exploring the percept or the world absent the Human; and 
assuring us of Life’s/life’s potential to be different.  
 
Minor Literature  
 
Minor literature is a work of the dominated,124 using the socio-material 
context of their oppression to transform (deterritorialise) it: to pursue 
becomings-minor. Minor literature resists and renews through expression 
and fabulation. Language and style are critical to this work (Deleuze, 1994, 
p. 170). As Bogue (2003) explains, minor literature is, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, a material pursuit. Its language is a-signifying and intensive—
‘nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative’ (Deleuze 2003a, p. 100)—
and it integrates catastrophe into its affective capacities. Not least, it 
catastrophises with the dominant (Major) language. Words operate 
physically (Bogue, 2003, p. 27). Their traits are sensations, through which 
the writer breaks codes that are “inevitably cerebral”, and acts upon the 
nervous system (Deleuze 2003a, p. 109). Bogue (2003) notes that art 
becomes a schizophrenic experience, offering both liberation and chaos; a 
sense of exteriority, vulnerability, and crisis. A Minorised language roams 
and breaches binaries, boundaries and sedimented habits, including 
                                                          
124 Albeit this should never suggest this is all they are; all they can do (Muecke, 1992). 
  
 
103 
 
monolingualisms (Braidotti, 2002, p. 94). It stutters, stammers, and screams 
its inadequacies amid the event; attends to and launches itself through its 
cracks; gesturing toward the cracks in Majoritarian thought. 
There is some sense to the notion that Crises of Ecologies—their 
derangements of scale, their transversality, and their nonhuman and non-
and-more-than-human qualities—cannot be encountered without some 
breaking (renewal) of language. Syntactically and affectively, then, minor 
literature might express the unassimilable qualities of these Crises. It might 
also disrupt, break, “bore holes in” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 173) Majoritarian 
concepts, language and figurations that serve to perpetuate and deepen 
Crises: Nature; the naturalisation of capitalism; the continuity and primacy of 
the Human; the subordinated, subsumed animal; sustainable development 
(LeMenager & Foote, 2012, p. 572); that consumption brings individualism; 
that value is only measured in terms of capital accumulation; that 
technology, governments, innovators, social movements, or God, will save 
us; and that there is, indeed, some way out.  
Deleuze’s adaptation of Bergson’s concept of fabulation125 involves 
literary practice in the prospective: offering access to worlds and futures 
beyond our rational capacities and expectations, and other to the 
“reassuring” worlds produced by capitalism’s material-discursive forces 
(Lazzarato, 2004, p. 187). The writer, Bogue (2007) explains, “diagrams” the 
                                                          
125 Simplistically put, for Bergson (1977), fabulation is a practice of social control to preserve 
stability. Not unlike, perhaps, our human tendency to anthropomorphise the weather, or to make 
freakish or refuse to make connections between our acts and catastrophic events that are 
increasingly found by scientific study to arise from forces associated with global warming, mass 
extinction and planetary degradation.  
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forces shaping states of affairs, destabilises them and points to cracks in the 
existing world; and catalyses new sense events, thoughts and visions in the 
reader (pp. 98-99). The writer produces worlds rather than critiques the 
world as it is. At a minimum, the writer “displaces the struggle” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 500). Their visions might be “intolerable” (Bogue, 2003, p. 
105) but they are also a productive critique of received wisdoms—the true 
as well as the false (2010a, pp. 32, 226)—and a disruption to the sanctioned 
flow of History (2007, p. 105). As with fabulation in cinematic science fiction 
(Braidotti 2002, p.182), literary practices might enable us to cope and come 
to terms with Crises of Ecologies, and renew our capacities to imagine 
pathways for relations (Bogue, 2007, pp. 98-99) and worlds beyond those 
sanctioned by the current state of affairs: even beyond—though not 
redeemed from—the most dire prognoses (Braidotti, 2013, p. 83; Collings, 
2014).  
A minor literature also operates as a future-oriented, intensive gesture 
away from structures of power and towards a collective that did not exist 
beforehand or that, perhaps, is threatened with annihilations (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1987, p. 345): 
 
The individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, 
indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating 
within it […] everything takes on a collective value. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1986, p. 17) 
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From within systems of control—parasitically, Tynan (2012, p. 167) 
suggests—the writer issues “a call to attunement […] an invitation to a 
mutual inclusion” (Massumi, 2015, p. 105), although it is not instructive, and 
it cannot lead or impose a program or an imperative. Its principle becomes 
through performance or enactment, and can be as broad as desiring 
something counter to current conditions, the freeing up of expression, and 
the augmentation of our powers of affirmative existence (Massumi, 2015, 
pp. 105-106; Tynan, 2012, p. 155). Literary fabulations involve 
hallucinations of history—perhaps, oxymoronically, a future history—of such 
intensity that the writer’s literary expression “contributes to the formation of 
a group-subject, a self-determining, fluid and open collectivity” (Bogue, 
2007, p. 106). New myths are offered for those who do not recognise 
themselves in the ones that exist, and these are transformative: 
“apocalyptic”, O’Sullivan (2006, p. 203) suggests. Tynan (2012) 
acknowledges the potential for the writer to invoke peoples to come and 
resist the forces—including biopolitics and affective capitalism—that 
engender crises of agency. The writer’s expressions of other/new “norms of 
life” invoke “communities and peoples not reproducible or maintainable” (p. 
166) by those in power. 
Aaltola’s (2008) definition of ‘person’—recognising the transversality of 
Life and incorporating all beings that can experience, not just humans—
might also enable another, more expansive (albeit speculative) invocation. 
We might speculate that the excluded—those most affected by, and 
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disempowered (O'Sullivan 2006, p.78) amid, Crises of Ecologies—will at 
least include the poor, the non-westerner, the colonised, those most 
exposed to the material forces of Crises, dependants, and those still to be 
born: “A people […] created in abominable sufferings […]They have 
resistance in common – their resistance to death, to servitude, to the 
intolerable, to shame, to the present” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p. 110). 
When it comes to the non-and-more-than-human, we might intuitively 
dismiss the prospects for animals, insects, plants, fungi, bacteria and single-
celled organisms to be called into the collective. After all, they cannot 
directly—or at least humanly—access and interpret the symbols and affects 
carried by literature, and our capacity to access how the non-and-more-
than-human stories itself, on its own terms, is at best limited. Nevertheless, 
perhaps a literary practice can still call forth the non-and-more-than-human, 
precisely through humans becoming-posthuman. Tynan (2012) writes that, 
for Deleuze, “The author is in touch with the illiteracy – conceived non-
pejoratively – of such virtual collectivities, and literature in this way causes a 
type of non-language to merge with language” (p.156). Furthermore, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994, p. 169) explain that minor literary practices 
express the “nonhuman landscapes of nature” and the nonhuman 
becomings of the Human. Where minor literature cultivates “transversality 
and mutations” (Braidotti, 2002, p. 94), might an affirmatively mutant 
collective become: open to anyone and everyone, not only through the 
stuttering, stammering, breaking and failing of human language but also 
through its material, incorporeal, transversal, species-less registers of 
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relation and expression?126 As Tynan (2012) observes, the “pathos of 
something alien and inarticulate is ultimately the source of the power of 
articulation itself” (p. 154): forces expressed intensively through the writer’s 
work but not the writer’s forces. To some, the thought of such a literary 
practice might well seem like an invitation to delirium or madness, but it 
might, to others, seem like the way to cultivate ecological sense.  
In the next part of this chapter, I argue that there are opportunities to 
expand the current state of literary studies at the nexus between these 
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist conceptualisations of literary practices, 
Crises of Ecologies, and contemporary Australian novels.  
 
 
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialism and the Australian critical 
field(s)  
 
As Chapters 1 and 2 suggested, scholarship on Australian literature and 
aspects of Crises of Ecologies flourishes: addressing, not least, poetry, 
nature writing, life writing, travel writing, novels, fictocriticism, theatre, and 
cinema; concerned with contemporary and earlier Australian writers; and 
published in journals concerned with Crises of Ecologies—including 
Environmental Humanities, and The Australasian Journal of Ecocriticism 
and Cultural Ecology—and in numerous doctoral theses, monographs, and 
                                                          
126 See Deleuze (1997, p. 60) and Haraway (2015, p. 162) on this. 
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edited collections.127 However, writing the posthuman, writing affect and 
becomings, and minor literature have been the subject of only a modest 
number of explorations in relation to contemporary Australian novels and 
Crises of Ecologies.  
Only a few studies exist combining literary affect—not always utilising 
Deleuzian concepts of affect—with contemporary Australian novels, and 
Crises of Ecologies.128 There is, though, a more substantive body of studies 
of literary becomings-, becomings-animal, and human-animal relationality in 
this context. These studies of becomings engage with the novels of 
Coetzee,129 Faber,130 Flanagan,131 Leigh,132 and Malouf.133 While studies 
occasionally gesture toward affective modes of writing relationality, they 
more commonly characterise themselves as focused upon Indigenous,134 
and posthuman135 approaches to conveying matter agency, relationality and 
                                                          
127 See, for example, Ben-Messahel (2006); Birns (2015); Carter (1996, 2010); Crane (2012); 
Cranston and Zeller (2007); Davies (2000b); Herman (2016); Jordan (2014); Muecke (2005); O’Reilly 
(2010b); Pollak and MacNabb (2000); Potter (2003); Ravenscroft (2012); Rawlings (2009); Rigby 
(2015); Rossiter and Jacobs (1993); Ryan and Wallace-Crabbe (2004); Sarwal and Sarwal (2009, 
2008); Simpson-Housley and Scott (2001); Volkmann (2010); Weaver (2007); Westling (2014b).  
128 I note Drichel (2011) on affect and animal/human relations, Klein (2016) and L. A. White (2012), 
and Farrell (2013) who focuses on non-indigenous transcriptions of the expressions of Aboriginal 
elder, Bill Neidjie, rather than novels. I also note Hughes-d’Aeth (2008) on affect and Barbara York 
Main’s work earlier this century. 
129 Drichel’s study of Coetzee’s novel Disgrace, notes more than ten contributions on these matters. 
Other recent studies include Barrett (2014); Danta (2007); Deyo (2013); Ley (2010); McDonell (2013); 
Paula (2012). 
130 See Dillon (2011). 
131 See Bogue (2010a); Deyo (2013); L. A. White (2012); Wiese (2014). 
132 See Bartosch (2016); Brewer (2009); Crane (2010); Hughes-d'Aeth (2002); Kerridge (2002); S. S. 
Turner (2007). 
133 See Mikkonen (2004); G. J. Murphy (2010). 
134 See Armellino (2007); Barras (2015a, 2015b); Campbell (2014); Devlin-Glass (2008b); Emmett 
(2007); Gleeson-White (2013); Mead (2012); Morrissey (2015); Slater (2005). 
135 See Archer-Lean (2014); Boehmer (2012); Callahan (1997); Cummins (2015); Davies (2000a); 
Farnell (2000); Grogan (2014); Harris (2015); Hayles (2015); Hughes-d'Aeth (2009); Kimberley 
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subjectivity. Contemporary novels studied with these foci include those of 
Bail, Egan, Flanagan, Hospital, Leigh, Malouf, Mears, Scott, and Wright. 
Beyond the employment of notions of becoming already mentioned, these 
studies contain few substantive and explicit engagements with Deleuzo-
Guattarian thought.136  
It does not seem unreasonable to expect to find applications of concepts 
of minor literature to contemporary Australian novels where scholars bring 
together postcolonial and ecocritical issues. However, only a few studies 
engage with these ideas of the resistant and creative work of the novel(ist) 
amid colonial capitalist oppression: referencing Indigenous peoples 
(Emmett, 2007; Mikkonen, 2004; Slater, 2006), and also queer culture 
(Davidson, 2004), settlers (Mikkonen, 2004) and others resisting European 
cultural hegemony (Boehmer, Ng, & Sheehan, 2016). They rarely, however, 
attend directly to the potential work of minor literary practices amid 
ecological crises in (post)colonial contexts: particularly with regard to 
climate change, mass extinction, and planetary degradation.137  
There is, then, substantial scope to complement existing studies of 
contemporary Australian novels and the posthuman, materiality, 
relationality, and expressions of collective resistance. Employing 
conceptualisations of writing the posthuman, writing affect and becomings, 
                                                          
(2016); Mallan (2011); (Maufort, 2015); Neimneh and Muhaidat (2012); Nyman (2014); Potter 
(2005a); Weaver (2011).  
136 Exceptions include Campbell (2014); Emmett (2007); Farnell (2000); Davies (2000a); Armellino 
(2007).  
137 Daley (2016a) provides an exception.  
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and minor literature will also contribute new knowledge, particularly with 
respect to the potential(s) for contemporary Australian novels to cultivate 
ecological sense amid Crises of Ecologies. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present 
studies of three such novels: Tim Winton’s Eyrie (2013); Alexis Wright’s The 
Swan Book (2013); and Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster (1996). These 
novels were produced during a period of increasing social, political, 
scientific, artistic, technological, and commercial engagement with aspects 
of Crises of Ecologies. Each writer’s interests in and engagements with 
Crises of Ecologies are well known. Furthermore, as I discuss below, the 
research in this thesis complements and expands upon extant literary 
studies of these writers and these three novels. 
Winton literary studies attend to his concerns with environmental damage 
and to his activism (Ben-Messahel, 2006; Pollak & MacNabb, 2000; 
Rooney, 2009; Taylor, 1996); to his writing of landscape, space, place, 
Australian natural particularities and culture-nature interfaces (Anandavalli, 
2008; Crane, 2006; Galvin, 2000; Kuhlenbeck, 2007; Liu, 2013; Tyas, 1995; 
Winton, 2015); and to his concerns with Human/non-and-more-than-human 
relations, including violence to the animal (Huggan, 2015b; J. P. Turner, 
1993). With respect to cultural and political concerns, Winton studies attend 
to his writing of the violence of capitalism and neoliberalism (Ben-Messahel, 
2006; Birns, 2014, 2015); to threats to Australian culture, community, 
civilisation, citizenship and multiculturalism in his works (B. Bennett, 1994; 
Helff, 2014; Hubbell & Ryan, 2016; McCredden, 2016; McCredden & 
O'Reilly, 2014a, p. 3; Winton & Watts, 2015); and to his attention to faith, 
spirituality, religion, the sacred and their limits (McCredden, 2010, 2016). 
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Attention to these aspects of Winton’s writing often accompanies 
consideration of subjectivity and relationality. Studies engage with trauma 
and violence (Arizti Martin, 2011; Baelo-Allué & Herrero, 2011; Conrad, 
2013); with postcolonial and still-colonial challenges to peoples and country 
(Crane, 2006; Kuttainen, 2012; McCredden, 2016); with language, the 
vernacular, idiom, their limits, and their importance to identity; with making, 
and being unable to make, meaning (McCredden, 2014, 2016); with families 
(conventional, broken and unconventional) (McCredden, 2016); with 
subjective movement, transformation, transience, and transcendence 
(Ashcroft, 2014; McCredden, 2010; Schuerholz, 2012c); with childhood, and 
growing up (Dalziell, 2014; Laigle, 1997; Matthews, 1993); with women 
(Alarcos, 2010; McCredden, 2016; McGloin, 2012; Schuerholz, 2012a, 
2012b); and with masculinity (McCredden, 2016; Thomas, 2010; Zapata, 
2008). Studies of Winton’s literary concerns with transversality—material 
and otherwise—attend to water and transformation, materiality, death and 
renewal (Ashcroft, 2014; Huggan, 2015a); to Indigenous culture, non-and-
more-than-human relationality and non-indigenous Australians (Harris, 
2015; McGloin, 2012; O'Reilly, 2010a); and to liminality, marginality, 
extremes, and the outsider (Crane, 2007; Fei, 2014; Hopkins, 1993).  
While a substantial body of scholarship engages with Winton’s 
environmental literary practices, a more modest body of work undertakes 
Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist studies of his writing and its potential 
efficacies amid Crises of Ecologies. Boehmer (2012) raises posthuman 
concerns, arguing that “understanding ‘real life’ through the medium of the 
body” is important to Winton’s writing, with humans often reduced to “pre-
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verbal” states of being. Harris (2015) explores relationality and sound in Dirt 
Music, suggesting that “To ‘sound’ the land […] encourages the potential for 
new understandings of the human relationship to the natural environment, 
and thus a more complete way of being in place” (p. 1). Ashcroft (2014) 
finds water to be a medium of transformation in Winton’s works: cultivating 
corporeal, psychical and spiritual becomings. Huggan (2015a) suggests 
Winton’s novel Breath has the potential, in the context of climate change, to 
cultivate our sense of material agencies, and to enable new ethical 
responses. “[C]ontemporary risk narratives” (p. 89) like Breath, Huggan 
argues, increase reader awareness of: 
 
what it means to ‘dwell in crisis’ at a time of full-blown ecological 
emergency in which risks of all kinds – and all degrees of 
magnitude, proliferation, and intensity – register within and across a 
dizzying variety of spatial and temporal sites. (p. 100) 
 
There are, though, no published studies of Eyrie attending to Crises of 
Ecologies and writing the posthuman, writing affect and becoming, or minor 
literature.  
Critical attention has been given to Alexis Wright’s fiction and the 
questions of human and non-and-more-than-human relationality. Studies of 
Wright’s Carpentaria (Brewster, 2010; Devlin-Glass, 2007, 2008b; Gleeson-
White, 2013; Ravenscroft, 2010; C. E. Rigby, 2013) are concerned with the 
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transversal, vibrant, non-and-more-than-human world and Indigenous 
cosmologies/onto-epistemologies, although less attention is given to the 
animal and to becomings. Literary studies also attend to Wright’s political 
focus upon other ways of perceiving and conceiving of Life (philosophy) and 
lives (Indigenous states of affairs) in contemporary (and future) Australia.138  
Critics attend sparingly to potential resonances between Wright’s fiction 
and Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptualisations of literary practices.139 However, 
Barras’, Skeat’s, Gleeson-White’s, and Daley’s studies signal trajectories for 
scholarship with which the ideas in this thesis are consistent. Barras (2015b) 
explores the materiality of writing in The Swan Book, and its potential to 
shape ecological thinking and sense. The novel, he contends, is a cultural 
vehicle for unsettling and reconstituting “still colonial” perceptions and 
conceptions of indigeneity, non-indigeneity, relationality, and our Australian 
state of affairs. Barras (2015c), Skeat (2016), and Gleeson-White (2016) 
attend to Wright’s writing of the agency of the non-and-more-than-human, 
and of the human as imbricated with/an extension of country. Barras argues 
that Wright produces a sense of the unbounded posthuman and of an 
enmeshed relationality that is singularly Indigenous but has potential to 
sensuously reshape readers’ sense of ecology more generally. He focuses 
particularly on the potential for story (language) to reshape subjectivity amid 
Crises of Ecologies. While he notes the sensory force of story and writing, 
                                                          
138 See Brewster (2010); Devlin-Glass (2007, 2008b); Gleeson-White (2013); Ravenscroft (2010, 
2012); White (2014). 
139 Ravenscroft (2012, p. 40) discusses the potential affective force of Indigenous literature, positing 
a kind of affective blindness in non-indigenous readers.  
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his analyses do not employ notions of affect. Focusing on climate change, 
and not privileging Indigenous philosophy vis-a-vis Wright’s literary 
practices, Skeat embraces thing theory (J. Bennett, 2010; Brown, 2003), 
ideas of networked ecological crises (Heise, 2008; Nixon, 2011) and 
Baradian intra-activity (2007). Skeat argues that The Swan Book, including 
Wright’s “bewildering” (p. 6) style, contributes to “re-imaginings of ecological 
realities” (p. 1), reorients conceptualisations of our relationships with non-
and-more-than-human Life and the forces of ecological crises to encompass 
transversality or transcorporeality (Niemanis & Walker, 2014), and cultivates 
a more expansionary environmental ethics. Gleeson-White (2016) offers an 
initially pessimistic reading of The Swan Book focusing upon the extent to 
which ecological crises (climate change) puts country and hope at risk, and 
exploring Wright’s novel as a literary response to these risks. In this context, 
Gleeson-White reads Wright’s literary practices as seeking to find new 
stories, and new ways of telling stories—particularly via Oblivia as dynamic 
embodiment of country—that resist damaging coloniser representations of 
country, and that contribute to the revitalisation of its agency and that of 
Indigenous peoples. Daley (2016b) employs Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts of 
event, becomings, fabulation, and minor literature explicitly in her reading of 
The Swan Book. The notion of event is used to support a reading of 
Indigenous crises and the violence of colonisation as unfinished and not 
consigned to a past (p. 310-311). Daley points out the becomings-swan that 
“express openness between human and non-human life forms” (p. 305) and 
enable new life trajectories amid Crises. She argues that the work of the 
impossible image of the black swan “out of place” (p. 313) in country is 
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expressive, in its anomaly, of the earth’s imperceptible non-and-more-than-
human forces. She also contends that Wright writes intensively: disrupting 
language and style to evoke a non-and-more-than-human collective 
assemblage of enunciation or people to come, to resist oppression (not least 
discursive), to express Human/non-and-more-than-human transversality, 
and to gesture towards “other possibilities for living and speaking […] than 
are currently available” (p. 306). The ideas I pursue in Chapter 5 resonate 
strongly with Daley’s work, albeit I attempt to reorient the critical approach to 
begin with Indigenous onto-epistemologies, considering how Wright’s work 
informs conceptualisations of literary practices and enriches Deleuzo-
Guattarian New Materialist thought on them. I also deal more expansively 
with Wright’s re-conceiving of the symptoms of Indigenous ecological crises, 
with non-and-more-than-human agency in the text, with becomings, with the 
contributions of style to the vitality of Indigenous expression, and with how 
these qualities of Wright’s literary practice cultivate ecological sense. 
Studies of Hospital’s writing and Oyster have been modest, though 
generative, insofar as they concern themselves with Crises of Ecologies, the 
posthuman, affect and becoming, minor literature, and the literary cultivation 
of ecological sense. Scholars have, in particular, engaged with Hospital’s 
writing of Indigenous Crises of Ecologies: violence to peoples and country; 
coloniser-Indigenous relations; the repression and survival of alternative 
modes of spatiality and temporality; the incommensurability of Indigenous 
histories and coloniser History; and the repression—and survival—of non-
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western notions of ecologies.140 Studies also deal with language and 
discourse as forces of embodiment and subjectivity in Hospital’s works.141 
Certain of these studies gesture toward the materiality of subjectivity and 
the non-discursive material forces at work in Hospital’s writing.142 However, 
Hospital’s writing of the unavoidable, mutual entailment of the material and 
the discursive in the world’s becomings, to use Barad’s (2003) ideas, 
remains little considered. Davies’ (2000a) study, via Deleuze and Cixous, of 
Hospital’s writing and Oyster, gestures toward the transversal production of 
subjectivities via material relations. Attending to what language cannot 
represent—through absences, silences, gaps, and expressions “without 
words” (p. 190)—Davies raises the matter of language carrying sensation; 
producing movement, flow, and change. At the very least, Davies’ critique 
suggests that Hospital’s writing in Oyster could move readers into the 
realms of affect, transversality, permeability and the agency of the non-and-
more-than-human. There are, in Davies’ words, material oppressions and 
liberatory trajectories to be explored via certain re-attunements: first, to our 
“embodiment in landscape” (p. 195); second, to the nature of the 
“oppressive and controlling [and, I suggest, material-discursive] forces” at 
                                                          
140 See Dunlop (2010); Fraile (2011); Muller (2000). 
141 For Brennan (2004) and Davies (2000a) the very discursive order that contracts subjective potential 
paradoxically becomes a source of resistance and liberation in Oyster. Callahan (2009), Coyle (2001), 
Davies (2000a), and Greiner (2007) attend to Hospital and the inadequacies of language to capture Life: 
they note the desire for order and the indeterminacy and slipperiness of words in Oyster, as well as the 
intrusion of other orders of existence, and dimensions of relations: that there are things not easily seen, 
touched, spoken, written, and expressed. There exists an unavoidable permeability and flux which means 
that words and things refuse to settle (Callahan, 2009, pp. 6-7).  
142 See Callahan (2001, 2009); Davies (2000a). 
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work; and, third, via the pursuit of variations in relations or “‘different 
linkages or new alignments’ (Grosz 1995, p126)” (p. 196).  
While Oyster is not her focus, Potter (2005a) discerns a “literary poetics” 
in Hospital’s writing, with capacities to convey the “material unfolding” of life, 
expand ecological discourse, decentre the Human, and unflatten “the 
heterogeneous life-world” (p. 4). Potter suggests that Hospital’s writing 
works to convey “enchanted matter” and to impress interconnectedness, 
indeterminacy, flow and flux upon the reader, rather than the stability and 
unity of things.143 Potter considers metaphor to be a mode with positive 
potentials to convey ecological complexity, relations and flows, and human 
and non-and-more-than-human entanglements. Potter’s focus does not 
exclude the possibility that “Language, though headstrong, is not simply in 
opposition to intensity” (Massumi, 2002a, p. 25) and that metaphor can—
indeed, must necessarily—operate intensively as well as representationally. 
The studies of Eyrie, The Swan Book, and Oyster that comprise Chapters 
4, 5, and 6 respond to the research trajectories and lacunae outlined here.  
                                                          
143 Callahan (2001) and Coyle (2001) study Chaos and Complexity in Hospital’s writing, and appear 
to be implicitly concerned with literature’s potential to cultivate a sense of Life beyond human 
perceptual limitations.  
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Chapter 4 - Tim Winton’s Eyrie 
 
Why do we think that the deepest ecological experience would be 
full of love and light? (Morton, 2007b, p. 198) 
 
Pulsating with the ruined Life of a decidedly post-apocalyptic-feeling 
Fremantle, in a country ravaged by capitalism, Eyrie follows Tom Keely's 
also ruined life, his crises and his conflicts. Keely wants to discard his 
identity and forge a meaningful subjectivity; to stand alone from family and 
community and protect those who fall into his sphere of concern; to wallow 
in his ruins and find ways back to vitality; and to blame everyone else and 
excoriate himself. Recently, Keely lost his job as an environmental lobbyist, 
became estranged from his wife, sister and mother (he lost his father as a 
boy), and took refuge in his shabby tower block apartment (The Mirador). 
His health has deteriorated and he self-medicates with alcohol and 
pharmaceuticals. He finds himself pulled, half-willingly, into a relationship 
with two other tower-dwellers: a woman he knew as a child, Gemma, and 
her grandson, the “strange kid” (p. 146), Kai. As they face extortion and 
threats of violence by Kai’s father, Stewie, and his side-kick, Clappy, Keely 
tries to help; eventually falling back down to street level where Life, 
“chance”, and “destiny” (p. 375) await.  
A study of Eyrie as a pain-full novel might not immediately appear to be 
uplifting amid Crises of Ecologies. Nevertheless, uplift may not be what is 
needed. I propose to eschew the search for meaning, salvation, redemption, 
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and affirming moralities in Winton’s story: each of which might represent a 
pathway to fictitious comfort or false closure. I also propose that we need 
not be disappointed by an absence of salvationary light at the end of the 
literary tunnel. Rather, I explore how encounters with Eyrie can affect 
readers in at least two ways: negating some paths for Life and living and 
affirming others. Indeed, the literary practices that express such variety 
suggest something of literature’s potential to cultivate ecological sense. 
Although these two types of encounter with Eyrie are irreducibly 
entangled, I engage, first, with violent negations: the bleak, the dark, and 
the unredemptive. Winton ruins what Braidotti (2002) describes as the 
“normative vision of [the] embodied[, coherent, sustainable, Human] subject” 
(p. 124). He breaks down, suspends, and holds indeterminate the promises 
of signification as a path to meaning and rational sense-making. An axe is 
taken to language and a brutalist style employed. Religion, family, and 
community are withdrawn as ways through Crises, and capitalism is 
installed as the ground and limit for subjectivity, Life and meaning. In 
addition, the non-and-more-than-human world’s vitality and nurturing 
qualities are withdrawn: particularly those of birds and water.144  
While reading only for negation and loss confirms Eyrie’s stark 
impressions of the tragic and unsustainable paths down which Life is 
moving, it risks leaving readers with an unassimilable traumatic burden of 
destruction, absence, and isolation. Consequently, in this chapter’s second 
half, I argue that by moving further into the Eyrie’s darkness and 
                                                          
144 Water is so often a powerful, material-spiritual field in Winton’s writing (Ashcroft, 2014). 
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brokenness, and by pursuing relations across other registers (material, 
affective, and discursive), we can find Life and strange affirmations amid 
ruination. Winton’s literary practices in Eyrie carry potentials to cultivate 
ecological sense, specifically: immersing readers in a dark ecology (Morton, 
2007b); producing intensive cartographies of the vulnerable posthuman 
(Braidotti, 2013), and of the agentic non-and-more-than-human, such as 
global warming as hyperobject (Morton, 2013a); writing traumatic affect and 
becomings-child and -bird (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987); and employing an 
intensive, contagious, and resistant (a minor) writing style.  
 
 
Violent negations 
 
[M]an is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its 
end (Foucault, 2004, p. 422) 
 
[Y]ou told your sister you were already dead (Winton, 2013, p. 213) 
 
While the aporias, constraints and violence associated with the idea of 
the Human have been long debated,145 Keely has come late and hard to the 
                                                          
145 For Braidotti (2013), Althusser, Blanchot, Foucault, and Lacan are contributors to the debate.  
  
 
121 
 
fall of Man. Through Keely, Winton writes microcosmic crises of organism, 
subject and signification (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 134) and a line of 
flight towards dissolution and oblivion. A dominant version of the Human—
male; coherent identity; audible speaking voice; recognisable form, purpose, 
and influence; defined family role; able to protect; in control—has fallen. We 
are witnessing, Winton suggests, a “burnt figure” (Steger, 2013). Keely is a 
walking ruin:146 a “ruined carcase” (Winton, 2013, p. 28) and a “remnant self” 
(p. 18); a fragmented form with uncontrollable limbs and unreliable 
senses;147 intoxicated and toxic;148 “peeled” (p. 18) and an “empty thing” (p. 
325). He exists in apocalyptic suffering and pain: “beyond anything the 
booze could induce. Here it came, the smoke and thunder, the welling 
percussion in his skull. Like hoofbeats. Two riders approaching. And the 
wind set to howl” (p. 6). He experiences something only approximating 
“waking consciousness” as “bad weather and shapeless mortification” (p. 4). 
The best he can say for himself is that “he hadn’t died in the night” (p. 8). He 
is without stable form in the world. In the Mirador elevator, Keely’s “dim 
outline in the mirror moved in sympathy. Not really in sync. An 
approximation” (p. 48). His body and his mind seem to have been rendered 
fluid, mobile and uncontrolled (p. 23). 
                                                          
146 Gemma is also a ‘ruin’—“Inside I was rubbish” (p. 136)—as are Keely’s ex-wife (p. 181), Harriet, 
Conan the vagrant (pp. 172-175), Keely’s father, Nev (p. 130), the cook, Gypsy (p. 389), and the 
thug, Clappy (p. 421). 
147 He experiences fugue states (“fugue-walk” (2013, p. 145)), blackouts (p. 115-116), his “right leg 
twitching waywardly” (p. 70) and “One arm flapped independent of him” (p. 114).  
148 His body poisoned by Barossa shiraz (2013, p. 4). He overmedicates: numbs himself to sleep (p. 
52) and numbs his thoughts/pain with “worthy analgesics” (p. 240). 
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Deleuze and Guattari (1987) conceptualise faciality as a social mode of 
controlling and contracting subjectivity and signifiance: a face marks and 
limits what you can do (p. 167) and enables you to cohere and fit in 
(Lorraine, 2011, p. 66). In Eyrie, Winton’s teratological narration finds Keely 
“asignifying, asubjective, and faceless” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 167): 
sporting “the face of a Monster” (Winton, 2013, p. 161). Keely has lost the 
face that fitted and cohered physically, psychically and socially. It has 
become the “ruins of a scorched earth retreat”; a “battlefield” from which his 
eyes have “retreated”; with a “Wildman beard” and “wine-blackened teeth”; 
all “gullies and flaky shale”; a “Badlands” (p. 4). Socially, he believes himself 
no longer “necessary” (p. 236). He has been cuckolded (p. 148), maritally 
estranged, suffered his wife’s abortion as though losing his own child (p. 
195), and lost his job, house, reputation, boat and friends. He wallows in 
separation in the Mirador tower. Keely is strange even to himself: “When you 
felt as abstracted from yourself as he did these days, why not feel strange in 
your own face?” (p. 188). He tries to resist habits of his old self—“He 
reached for the radio. Checked himself” (p. 6)—and the connections to 
others that shaped it. He closes his email account: “fried everything while he 
had the will” (p. 52). When Gemma recognises Keely, he avoids 
recognition—“It was nasty, hearing his own name uttered” (p. 27)—
eventually “regretting admitting who he was” (p. 28). 
Keely has lost his “armour” and his “enviable […] social capital” (2013, p. 
112). Although he doubts the loss of his moral bearings (p. 119), the media 
marks him as a “traitor to progress” (p. 117). Keely does not miss the irony 
that his employment in resisting capitalist excesses depended upon 
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capitalism’s existence. He was marketised and drawn into the system. His 
public “catastrophic brain-snap” (p. 41) led to his banishment and now he 
can no longer “make a living” (pp. 116-117). Keely has lost “the will to count” 
(p. 3) and to place himself at history’s centre: it is, he thinks, “Someone 
else’s fight now” (p. 116). A short list of ascetic habits—a walk, a swim, and 
a coffee—give Keely’s “standard wasted” days “a certain functional 
coherence” (pp. 17,18); although “Some days he struggled to even form an 
intention” (p. 42).  
With regard to language, Winton’s acknowledgement that he writes “odd, 
eccentric, lonely and marginal characters who strive to find meaning amidst 
a symbolic environment” (Ben-Messahel, 2012, p. 9) seems appropriate to 
Keely. While my engagement with Eyrie focuses upon Winton’s intensive 
use of language rather than the search for meaning, I acknowledge 
McCredden and O’Reilly’s (2014b) reading of Eyrie as “a novel about 
language and the limits of the linguistic to carry the full burden of meaning 
with which humans often seek to imbue it” (p. 9). McCredden (2014) 
suggests that Eyrie conveys a condition traversing author, character and 
reader: “intolerable insignificance, the loss of faith in meaning-making and 
ontological power” (p. 308). Until recently a spokesperson, Keely’s words 
now lack sense. He finds himself to be “pure bullshit and noise, just another 
flannel-tongued Jeremiah” (Winton, 2013, p. 6). At times, he can hardly 
speak—“Well, he croaked […] he rasped [...] muttered […] slurring” (pp. 27, 
42, 48, 80)—and speaking truth doesn't help because, “We’re meant to 
lose” (p. 74). He finds words uncontrollable: talking to himself (p. 42); 
speaking and not knowing it (pp. 80, 176). For Keely, language offers no 
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safety, and meaning repeatedly eludes him (pp. 25, 66, 72, 249 & 265). He 
finds himself drawn to, and drawn into, silence: “they bounced in his head, 
the words. Clotted his jaw. Ground it shut. Till his teeth went into his soft 
glowing brain” (p. 337). 
Keely is not alone. Kai distrusts words (Winton, 2013, pp. 232-233), 
mutates them (pp. 23, 135), and obsesses over their materiality (p. 232). His 
emotional inscrutability and gnomic utterances could, of course, be as 
profoundly meaningful as they are inaccessible. However, in the search for 
interpretative stability, we should not presume that Winton has provided a 
scaffold by which we can ascend to meaning. Mostly, Kai emits an 
impregnable “Diamond drill-bit silence” (p. 151) and a blank, “impassive, 
unreachable” (p. 235) unresponsiveness: “The boy said nothing” (p. 251). 
His rare utterances are often perplexing: “I was stuck, said Kai […] No 
words, said the boy in a strange, flat tone. Things didn’t work. I wasn’t 
feeling right. Something had to take me” (p. 132).  
Winton’s writing appears unwell, pained, and pain-full: both producing 
and produced by Keely. It is arid, unpredictable; often gasping and winking 
out to nothing; at other times grinding and banging almost unsustainably; 
enduring only through an arrhythmic, alliterative, consonant and assonant 
heartbeat. Winton’s syntactical and lexical choices express a purposive 
suffering from inadequacy; a breaking-down; an atomisation; and a failing 
reminiscent of Deleuze’s (1997) characterisation of Beckett’s “atomic, 
disjunctive, cut and chopped language” (p. 156). Winton’s short, fragmented 
sentences seem to function in sympathy with the sense we get elsewhere of 
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Keely’s ruined and fragmented body, mind and self. Because Keely is the 
novel’s focaliser, we might also gauge that these broken-down utterances 
are the products of Keely’s ruined powers of living. Winton’s writing conveys 
and yields “freeze-framing jerks of consciousness” (Winton, 2013, p. 281), 
suggesting broken, disordered perceptions, movements, relations and 
thoughts, and itself jerking, broken, and disordered. Words often seem to be 
lost or omitted. Clipped dialogue and full stops produce a halting, broken 
down rhythm, and incompleteness in the narrative and in Keely’s 
focalisation, again resonant of Deleuze’s (1997) Beckett: “riddled with dots 
[…] in order to ceaselessly reduce the surface of the words” (p. 174). 
Longer sentences, broken by commas, disrupt the narrative flow, as when 
Keely describes himself as “maudlin, grievous, fitful, lacking proper 
administration, useless for anything other than goading the pain […]” 
(Winton, 2013, p. 6). This is the stunted, partial language of the broken, 
shambling and cast adrift subject: lacking the vitality to produce anything 
more fulsome. Consider the rattling rhythm of ten short sentences early in 
the novel:  
 
In the kitchen he scrabbled for ammunition, pre-emptive relief. Any 
bottle or packet would do. Said the joker to the thief. Lucky dip and 
rattle them blind from the knife drawer. Gurn them down like bullets. 
And reload. Or at least stand to. Sprawled against the countertop. 
Sweating through his soapy freshness in a few seconds. Think of 
something else. (p. 6)  
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The passage expresses an unravelling. The syntax is interruptive, 
fragmentary, and contracted. The rhythm is jerky. The language suggests 
monstrosity, grotesquery: “scrabbled […] Gurn […] Sprawled […] Sweating”. 
We need hardly attend to what Keely is doing (desperately seeking 
chemical solace for his pain) to participate in the painful and ruinous 
process: style draws us in. Albeit, the writing retains the faintest, enduring 
heartbeat: rhyming “relief” and “thief”, “would do” and “stand to”. Later in the 
novel, as Keely washes dishes at Bub’s cafe, linguistic, corporeal and 
incorporeal connections and sense appear to be breaking down: “Time was 
choppy. Fitful. Endlessly interrupted. Like a broken signal. Dirty coronas 
hung over every passing object. He worked, aping his own movements, 
head fluffy as the suds rising in his face” (p. 388). Albeit, again, within this 
literary arrhythmia, the barest hints of a consistent pulse persist: “choppy 
[…] Endlessly […] interrupted […] passing […] fluffy”, and the repetition of 
“o”.   
As Keely experiences a fugue state, inexplicably finding himself at the 
ocean’s edge, Winton’s spare, halting prose expresses the sense of an 
incapacitating void by entering its own: 
 
Furious blank. 
A Kind of. 
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Kind of. 
Kind of turbulence. 
Suddenly down by the marina. Standing, walking. Sleepwalking, 
really. With gulls like empty thought bubbles overhead. How many 
minutes had he lost? Ten? Twenty? Closer to forty. Jesus! 
Okay. 
Tamp down the panic. 
Okay. 
Nothing you can do about it. Well, nothing you’ll let yourself do. 
Being what and who you are. 
Alright. Whatever. (Winton, 2013, p. 115) 
 
At times, as with Keely’s withdrawn existence, Winton’s writing is drawn 
back almost to erasure or abbreviated to no more than the absolutely 
necessary: “Dawn. Morning. Day. // Didn’t take the bike out. Didn’t swim. 
Eyes like hot pea gravel” (p. 51). Chapters too, become almost insubstantial 
textual materials: one of eighteen lines; another of nine, in which Keely tries 
to ready himself to help Gemma and Kai escape the city: 
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Didn’t know how long it was before he stirred again, still connected. 
Climbed up. Took the mobile into the next room. Blinked at the 
suitcase on the bed. He knew Doris would come if he called. But he 
was too blurry just now to get going and stay going. Needed to be 
competent. 
Felt the mattress subside beneath him. Clutched the phone close. 
Sound of the living boy. Just for a moment, until he was clear. 
Then they’d go south. To forest, white coves, granite boulders like 
beasts resting before the silver sea. (p. 419) 
 
This chapter, and its equally truncated fantasy of salvation, are spectral: 
corporeally insubstantial, though not deprived of force by being so. Floating 
without subject, some of Winton’s sentences almost lose the Human. As 
focaliser, Keely’s consciousness hovers, his thoughts a fading pulse. 
Escape impulses are anaesthetised by the ethereal, exhausted prose and 
we lose Keely to the folds of his bed.  
The disparate sensory flashes and flares of the novel’s final lines render 
events incoherent and withdraw access to a reliable version of what has 
happened: 
 
The veiled faces retracted uncertainly and Keely understood. He’d 
fallen. He saw the tower beyond and the tiny figure of the boy safe 
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on the balcony. He smelt salt and concrete and urine. Saw lovely 
brown thumbs pressing numbers, cheeping digits, reaching down. 
The edit was choppy. The boy’s face a flash – or was that a gull? 
Sir, there is bleeding. Are you well? 
Yes, he said with all the clarity left to him. Thankyou. I am well. 
(Winton, 2013, p. 424) 
 
We can, of course, scrabble for sense here. We might deduce that Keely 
has been injured but we cannot close off his story; nor Kai’s and Gemma’s 
(however safe we might hope they are). Given Keely’s dissolution of late, 
his definition of being “well” seems far from clear. His body, thoughts and 
voice seem to map a fragmentation and thinning out of connections. He too 
is “A pale facsimile […] Very pale” (Winton, 2013, p. 198). Whether we find 
ourselves outside Keely looking in, or inside looking out, Winton writes us 
into a void. 
Just as broken humans and broken language inhabit Eyrie, so do broken 
communities. For Winton, as capitalism’s “prosperous individuation” 
continues (Steger, 2013), lives are ruined, and collectivity fragmented. He 
bemoans the decline of “the old communal ethos of previous generations 
[…] replaced by the citizen as consumer” and observes that “links between 
people have hardly been fainter” (Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 109). Keely’s 
“good neighbours” in the Mirador emit “the stench of strangers” and remain 
“alien to him in the most satisfying way imaginable, anonymous and 
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reassuringly disconnected”, while the multiplicity of beings at ground level 
are, for him, a “spreading mob” (Winton, 2013, pp. 3-4). Kai also exists in 
“wary isolation” (p. 28). Keely finds Kai a “strange” (p. 132), unconventional 
child. The boy exhibits precision, graveness, “hermitic concentration” (p. 
134), loneliness (“an island of self-possession”), and melancholy (p. 134). 
He is “toneless” (p. 138) and “expressionless” (p. 151): offering “not a 
flicker” (p. 155). He is “Solitary, oblivious, preoccupied” (p. 206); avoiding 
eye contact. He is almost corporeally insubstantial: “just pale mist in the 
narrow gap” (p. 151), and “no more substantial than a blur” (p. 131). It 
seems that Kai shuts himself off from others, including Keely, rather than 
make sociable overtures towards them, interacting only on his own terms.149  
McCredden notes that Eyrie engages with “questions […] about family as 
cradle of identity and values; the redemptive or tragic possibilities of family; 
and family as the primary crucible of language formation and signification” 
(2014, p. 308). This said, families in Eyrie are, at best, rent asunder by their 
failings and, more often, entirely broken. Keely’s marriage is over. He avoids 
family members (Doris and Faith) as much as he craves and feels obliged to 
connect. The familial relationship Keely develops with Gemma and Kai is an 
always-qualified, melancholically rendered, “faded marriage” in which “he 
yearned for more” (Winton, 2013, p. 233). Gemma’s family is also broken: 
her daughter imprisoned and estranged, and her grandson threatened by 
his father. There are no functional Oedipal triangles in Eyrie, only the 
                                                          
149 Albeit, as I discuss later, Keely and Kai are drawn to each other. 
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realities of broken lives, failed connections, failed role models, violence, and 
loss. 
Winton’s well-recorded literary engagements with faith, religion, and the 
sacred (McCredden, 2010, 2014, 2016; McCredden & O'Reilly, 2014a) recur 
in Eyrie. Winton wraps his story in faith’s empty promise. When Harriet 
suggests to Keely, “Bad faith. It bends you out of shape”, he responds “Faith 
of any sort, I’d have thought” (Winton, 2013, p. 181). Faith, it seems, works 
to divide people, like Nev and his good friend, Wal: “You could sense 
something solid between them. Despite Jesus. And all the lost Sundays” (p. 
122). Others, like Nev, are lost to faith: “Keely remembered him in a cane 
chair beneath the almond tree, praying, weeping […] Soon afterwards the 
heart attack carted him off” (p. 130). As far as Keely is concerned, religion 
entails trauma, failure and unrewarded faith.  
The promise of salvation and transcendent grace are continuously 
withdrawn in Eyrie; not least for Keely, the figure who desires these most. 
Too often, exhortations to save are accompanied by awareness of its 
impossibility, and of an incapacity to make any substantive difference: “I 
have redeemed a bicycle, he whispered […] That is what I have saved” (p. 
195). Rather than offer salvation, Eyrie engages with Keely’s, Kai’s, and 
Gemma’s search for a sense of safety and how it can be found and felt 
differently: for Gemma, through sex with a trusted other (p. 102); and for 
Keely, through hiding away in the flat (p. 11). It is not clear that Kai ever 
feels safe, or knows what safe is, except, perhaps, when he erroneously 
believes that he has been saved from his father, Stewie, by Keely. A 
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reading of the final passages of Eyrie might suggest that Keely’s (and 
Gemma’s) acts have made Kai safe, or that Keely’s wounded condition 
represents an act of sacrifice to secure that safety. However, such a reading 
would be to read more than the text provides. At best, the fates of Keely, Kai 
and Gemma are unresolved or suspended. Humans—among others—
remain endangered and vulnerable. 
Winton notes that “The real challenge [for the writer] is finding language 
that still carries something to people in an era when religion is counter-
cultural, even anti-social – an affront to the mainstream” (Winton & Watts, 
2015, p. 112). And, indeed, scriptural “high language” (Winton & Watts, 
2015, p. 155) pervades Eyrie, with “God”, “Jesus” and “Christ” peppering the 
vernacular (Goddard, 2014). However, the “high language”, symbols, 
mythology, tropes, figurations and indexes of religion, do not enable Eyrie to 
be read unproblematically as a story about finding salvation or redemption, 
and they are scarcely used to evoke matters of faith or spirituality. More 
often, they express and underpin irony, cynicism, sarcasm, and 
exclamatory, reactive remarks (Goddard, 2014). The first few pages offer 
up: “Gospel gasp […] revival […] mercifully […] pillar of dust […] ‘Beelzebub’ 
[…] philistine-giant […] Leviathan […] pentecostal […] By God […] Jeremiah 
[…] mission [and] prophecy” (Winton, 2013, pp. 3-6). This language, though, 
is trammelled by the vehicle of capitalism and emptied of its Christian 
religious meanings. It is the Western Australian mining boom150 that 
                                                          
150 Growth in demand for Australian ore, beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, 
dominating economic growth and shaping coloniser and Indigenous cultures (Measham, Haslam 
Mckenzie, Moffat, & Franks, 2013; Trigger, 1997). 
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expresses a “pentecostal ecstasy” to which resistance is “heresy” (p. 6). 
Western Australia is the “philistine giant” and “Leviathan” (p. 5). The only 
“angelic logic” is that of the “trickle down economy” (p. 60).  
Capitalism rises up as the dominant faith in Eyrie: shaping bodies and 
colonising meaning. I noted in Chapter 1 that the orientation and control of 
affect is one way in which capitalism shapes and operates through bodies, 
producing subjectivities aligned with the drive for ongoing capital 
accumulation without significant resistance. In Eyrie, we find Keely brought 
to the brink of a particular kind of oblivion by affect. He escapes the chaos 
of Fremantle’s streets by entering a retail environment but this escape 
entails an affective immersion and transformation (almost dissolution) of his 
already faltering sense of self. The body and subject as consumer colonises 
the void of self. Keely enters the store and we read: “Coles. Safe harbour. 
Obedient glass doors, airconditioning, muzak” (p. 16).151 In these short 
sentences, Winton brings together the separation of the subject from the 
chaos of the world, the notion of control, and a sense of the forces that will 
affectively (re)shape the subject. Winton’s poetics immerse Keely in a 
sensual arrest and emptying out;152 in an almost cryogenic suspension of 
those qualities that we might, so far, have deemed to be ‘Keely’. The 
alliterative, consonant, and assonant form in the lines that follow these first 
few short sentences, including the repetition of “c” and “k”, enacts a halting 
or choking, a sense of arrested movement: 
                                                          
151 Coles is an Australian grocery chain. 
152 Though it is also a saturation, with other affects. 
  
 
134 
 
 
cool […] cooler […] Christ’s […] clement […] colour […] colonnade 
[…] cool […] Celt […] kind […] calm […] caught […] cabinets […] 
Karen Carpenter […] clean […] crates […] Cleen […] clung (p. 16) 
 
Sense impressions evoke order and hygiene: “uniform lines […] serried 
ranks […] unpeopled order […] clean pine crates” (p. 16). Keely is lulled into 
sensory suspension: auditory (“muzak […] special kind of quiet […] silent” 
(p. 16)); visual (“fluorescent […] pale green […] pastel colour […] misty 
sheen […] unending blur” (p. 16)); tactile (“cool air […] his cheek was cool 
against the floor” (p. 16)); and olfactory (“the last faint odour” (p. 16)). To be 
immersed here is to be “unpeopled”: to undergo a kind of contraction of 
subjective scope (p. 16). Keely’s body is calmed, cooled, slowed down; his 
mind put to sleep, drawn into a reverie, blurred, quietened, silenced; his 
condition transformed into “stunned mullethood” (p. 17). Vitality is sucked 
from him (he is “shriven” (p. 16)) and his powers of acting are diminished by 
the retail encounter’s affective force. At the same time, he loses the anxiety 
that he expressed on the street moments before. He is now “Becalmed. 
Adrift”: a wraith “ghost[ing…] through the aisles accompanied” by the dead 
(p. 16). Keely reflects that “he really could be losing his mind’ (p. 17), 
although, if he is, the body and the senses are driving the evacuation. For 
Keely to “feel in charge of himself”, he need only consume: and consume 
anything. He becomes an automaton: “Going through the motions at the 
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checkout” (p. 17), as does the checkout girl sporting a “limp smile of 
boredom” (p. 17). 
Winton expresses the belief that human relationships with the non-and-
more-than-human are critical to our well-being (Ben-Messahel, 2012; 
Winton, 1996, 1998, 2009, 2012, 2015). In Chapters 1 and 3, I surveyed his 
engagements in Eyrie, and elsewhere, with these relationships. In Eyrie, 
capitalism, planetary degradation, and violence toward the non-and-more-
than-human, entail and engender crises of agency. Animals (as well as 
humans) are unhomed, endangered, estranged, and killed. In what follows, I 
chiefly address the violent negations of birds and the debasement of water’s 
vitality in Eyrie. 
Eyrie attests to the subsumption of animals and water to capitalism’s 
requirements, to human damage inflicted upon them, and to the withdrawal 
of their vitalities. Birds and marine life are evasive, absent, and often dead. 
Water has become lifeless, uninviting, and, to use Winton’s words on water, 
“as disturbing as it is reassuring” (1998, p. 45). Eyrie’s birds and humans, it 
seems, carry un-releasable burdens of doom. Birds are not only subsumed 
as resource, they have become disposable, material obstacles to progress. 
They are cast out, unmeasured externalities of modernity’s march. Keely 
mentions Carnaby’s black cockatoos (Winton, 2013, p. 64) and Mallee fowl 
(p. 190) unhomed and endangered by agriculture and urbanisation. Forests 
have been stripped—once “teeming woodland half the size of Poland”—and 
habitat is transformed into “the wheatbelt and the salt ravaged Badlands” (p. 
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83).153 Reading the newspaper, Kai and Keely’s exchange gestures toward 
crises traversing animal and human: “Habitat, said the boy, quoting from the 
headline. // That’s the big problem. // For birds. // For all of us” (p. 339). Bird 
and human experiences become analogous, although birds do not violate 
humans. Birds too are Eyrie’s burnt figures. They are violated and 
deterritorialised: “wheeling’ (p. 193); without “habitat” (p. 339); and aflame, 
“Just flames flyin and screamin” (p. 109). Industrial pollution has poisoned 
them in their thousands (p. 141), and children (Gemma, as a child, after 
being sexually assaulted) pass on the violence done to them by burning 
domesticated birds (p. 108).  
Although occasionally animated as dancing cockatoos, as drawings, as 
memories, and as symbols, real birds are largely elusive, silent, or absent 
from Winton’s narrative.154 The Osprey/Eagle remains aloof and 
indeterminate; not least by virtue of Keely’s inability to name it (Winton, 
2013, p. 162). Its precariousness is more than just another failure of human 
signifiance. When Keely takes Gemma and Kai to see the bird, it remains 
remote, producing a momentary, energising “flash” or “flare” (pp. 87-88). 
Bird song comes once in the novel, from unseen Wattlebirds amid traffic 
noise, and beyond that we are left with the “plaintive and querulous call” of 
the “eagle”, with its “whingeing” (p. 61), and with silence. Only “sea-goals” 
(gulls) proliferate. They spread like waste, becoming indiscernible from it: 
                                                          
153 Hughes-d’Aeth (2007, p. 56) writes on this “ecological annihilation”. 
154 There are, along with the Osprey/Eagle, numerous sea gulls; crows (p. 312); a dove (p. 372); “A 
pelican alighted on a jetty pile” (p. 61); cockatoos/galahs frolicking (p. 31); and wattlebirds sounding 
out of view (p. 131).  
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“nothing moving but blown trash and gulls that looked like blown trash” (p. 
323).   
Ashcroft (2014) reads water as a medium of transformation in Winton’s 
writing, offering a corporeal experience of the sacred; a sense of “the 
holiness of the world” (p. 28); and access to the eternal (p. 30) and to God 
(p. 33). In water we find rebirth (p. 18), home and hope (p. 41), or Heimat 
(pp.17-18). For Winton, water also possesses a dangerous and 
transformational, material agency that we find, for example, in his novels 
Breath (2009) and Dirt Music (2012). Given this context, readers might 
reasonably anticipate vibrant, agentic, redemptive water flowing through 
Eyrie. After all, what could be more ecologically oriented than a focus upon 
water’s non-and-more-than-human, transformational force? And while there 
are moments of immersion offering possibilities of transformation (Winton, 
2013, pp. 210, 247), these moments are ephemeral, compromised and 
comparatively rare. To enter water, in Eyrie, physically or imaginatively, is to 
struggle through wounded/wounding sea, to be overburdened, and to be 
enveloped in the darkness, uncontrollable fecundity, and debilitating mud, of 
the swamp. 
Eyrie begins with water’s compromised agency: “the shining sea, [and its] 
cruel, wince-making sheen in the dregs of morning” (Winton, 2013, p. 5). 
We read that “The sea beyond the breakwater was flat” and that a pilot boat 
cuts a “whitening wound on […its] skin” (p. 8). The sea is “invisible”, or it is 
welling up with junk and waste (pp. 119, 120), and emptied of marine life. 
Keely’s moments of elevation from immersions in the sea are few (pp. 247-
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248), short-lived (interrupted immediately upon him surfacing by the theft of 
his bicycle (p. 158)), and inadequately refreshing (p. 174). To access these 
momentary spiritual, sensory and cognitive uplifts, Keely has to “pick […] his 
way through the eternal dogshit to the water” (p. 157). The sea cannot help 
him as he hopes. His dreams of swimming are dark, with him “fleeing 
shadows, making himself tiny with fear” (p. 238). There are traumatic 
immersions when:  
 
every turn of his head sent his brain spilling like unsecured cargo 
and it crashed against the bulwarks of his skull until he could take 
no more. He rested a moment, floating on a sudden pulse of 
nausea. His hand stung. Starbursts went off behind his eyes. He 
sculled back gingerly. The whole ocean curving away beneath him. 
Shining hard and horrible. (p. 335) 
 
Although the river glitters “in the afternoon sun” (p. 315), its “pleasant 
clamminess” (p. 210) and “briny scent” (p. 70) carrying a nurturing promise, 
it shines only “for a moment” (p. 68). The riverbank is bounded, for Keely, by 
abject, mushroom-like jellyfish, and the dead, white skeleton of the Marri 
tree. While Keely imagines that an immersion in the river’s soupy, uninviting 
water might still offer a kind of “reprieve” (p. 303), human bodies do not 
enter it in the narrative. Close up, river water becomes murky, squalid, and 
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smelly: “sloughy” (p. 302); “flat, shallow, brown” (p. 177); a “shithole” (p. 
334).  
Having considered the violent negations of Eyrie, I turn now to its strange 
affirmations. While Winton writes compromised bodies—the Human, family, 
language, religion, community, nature, the non-and-more-than-human—
from which some might still, hopelessly, seek transformation and 
redemption, he also writes other modes of relation. This writing, while not 
necessarily salvationary, carries affirmative potentials: to cultivate ecological 
sense and to enable our embrace of our entanglements in Crises of 
Ecologies.  
 
 
Strange affirmations 
 
So while we campaign to make our world "cleaner" and less toxic, 
less harmful to sentient beings, our philosophical adventure should 
in some ways be quite the reverse. We should be finding ways to 
stick around with the sticky mess that we're in and that we are, 
making thinking dirtier, identifying with ugliness, practicing 
"hauntology" (Derrida's phrase) rather than ontology. (Morton, 
2007b, p. 188) 
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[A] man hauling his own corpse through a swamp. (Winton, 2013, p. 
388) 
 
There is little “trite ecological sentimentality” (Morton, 2010a, p. 200) 
accompanying Eyrie’s human and non-and-more-than-human falls. What we 
encounter instead resonates with Morton’s (2010d) notion of “‘humiliating’ 
descent[s], towards what is rather abstractly called ‘the earth’” (p. 265), with 
humility as an affirmative condition. Keely’s pain and nihilistic grief are 
entangled with his loss of identity, and all, in turn, are entangled with the 
denuded world in which he “limped in ruins” (Winton, 2013, p. 371). He 
expresses the loss of the human as coherent concept as well as the painful, 
material entanglements of Life that go so far as to break down the 
conventional notion of there being boundaries between the subject and the 
object. Winton dissolves the human and recuperates the non-and-more-
than-human by immersing Keely and the reader in a non-identitarian, 
entangled, ugly, strange, abject, collective condition from which he/we 
cannot achieve a distance and in which he/we must linger. Morton (2007b, 
p. 142) calls such writing practices “dark ecology” and Winton’s dark 
ecology is no celebratory revelation of the posthuman but, rather, a descent 
into intimate155 melancholy.  
Morton (2007b) writes: 
                                                          
155 An imbrication, entanglement and irreducible proximity to; a strange inseparability from that 
which we might have deemed other and separate. Not, Morton clarifies, a “predictable, warm 
fuzziness” (2010c, p. 31). 
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For Freud, melancholy is a refusal to digest the object, a sticking in 
the throat, an introjection […] Unable fully to introject or digest the 
idea of the other, we are caught in its headlights, suspended in the 
possibility of acting without being able to act. (p. 186) 
 
While Winton’s dark ecology is not comforting, its entanglements offer a 
kind of coherence. It allows writer and readers to “‘linger longer’ […] in the 
darkness of a dying world” (Morton, 2010a, p. 269): to remain stuck in the 
waste, the ruins, the swamp, and upon the “ravaged plain” (Winton, 2013, p. 
23). Keely is always-already enmeshed and, as such, there has been no 
loss of Nature, but rather damage done to Life, of which he is an entangled 
part. While he mourns Life’s losses, Keely cannot shake his melancholy nor 
pass off his grief to some separate, absorbent Nature that can soak it up: 
the grief remains with him/us. Further, the very indeterminacy of Winton’s 
narrative—namely, the perplexing end to Keely’s trajectory, on the street 
beneath the Mirador—is suggestive of one form that dark ecology might find 
in fiction: a form that can “undermine a sense of closure” (p. 253) and refuse 
any path by which we work through mourning to some other side: salvation 
or redemption. The desire Keely expresses, and readers might have, for 
escape, is unrequited. We remain with the clogging waste and the damage.  
Morton (2010a) proposes “progressive ecological elegy”, by which a 
writer mobilises “some kind of choke or shudder in the reader that causes 
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the environmental loss to stick in her throat, undigested” (p. 256). Indeed, 
Keely’s sister, Faith, an investment banker entangled in the global financial 
crisis, tells him that the “world as we know it is choking on a bone” (Winton, 
2013, p. 37). Keely, too, finds himself in impotent suspension, with “no idea 
what he was doing. This aimless driving about” (p. 321). He sinks into the 
awful, fecund intimacy of the ruined world, like Morton’s (2007b) “wasp 
which sinks into the jam and drowns in it” (p. 158). And, worse, not only is 
he drowning in the mess, he is implicated in it, akin to Morton’s eco-noir 
detective implicated in the crimes they investigate (2010b, p. 111). Keely’s 
belief that he can save something—this time Kai, previously the 
environment—transforms into complicity in damage. His actions to avert an 
attack precipitate rather than put off Clappy and Stewie’s violence. 
Although Keely basks in the awareness of having “let yourself go to this 
extent” (Winton, 2013, p. 5), and, in his elevated apartment, seeks some 
distance from the world, he has not been let go at all. He is not only ruined, 
he is stuck in the ruins. Winton draws his characters and the reader down 
among the unavoidable junk, waste, chaos, ordure, and multiplicity. As we 
find with Wright’s swamp in The Swan Book (2013), the world of Eyrie is 
filled with junk and everything has become so much junk: “washing against 
the sea wall” (Winton, 2013, p. 119); “in the shade where it looked as if 
someone had backed a truck and dumped a load of garbage” (p. 173); 
“strewn” across the verandah at Stewie’s house (p. 329); “Disposable cups, 
newspapers in gyres against graffiti walls” (p. 322); and “nothing moving but 
blown trash” (p. 323). Even Keely and Gemma are rubbish (pp. 29, 136). 
Poison flows unconstrained through human and non-and-more-than-human 
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lives—“An entire town contaminated. Vegetable gardens, watertanks, 
clothing, food. Kids poisoned” (p. 141). The cement works plunders the 
ocean bed before, “a few hundred metres inland their stack rained 
particulates on the roofs of five thousand homes” (p. 207). Keely tries “not to 
think of all the toxic crap washing into the sea” (p. 120). 
I noted in Chapter 3 Morton’s (2007b) argument that embracing the 
mess, the strange and the monstrous cultivates ecological sense (what he 
calls “ecological thought”). In this regard, a return of the abject to intimate 
sensibility, paradoxically, carries affirmation. There is, in Eyrie, a “collapse 
of distance” (Morton, 2007b, p. 160) between the world’s filth, its waste, its 
corpses, and Keely: a dissolution of “barriers” (p. 267). It is not, though, just 
their unhealthy, unclean qualities that are important; the revelation of our 
interconnectedness disturbs identity, systems and order: notions of a 
divided Human/Nature, for example. Muecke and Hawkins (2002) write that: 
 
waste can touch the most visceral registers of the self—it can 
trigger responses and affects that remind us of the body’s intensities 
and multiplicities [….] all those things that break in from the outside, 
that surprise, that disturb, that introduce unpredictability. (p. xiv) 
 
The non-and-more-than-human in Eyrie is not pristine Nature but entangled 
and ugly; “a monumental jumble” in which Keely imagines an immersion: 
“hauling himself through it, all those slick domes sliding down his chest and 
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thighs. Not pretty” (Winton, 2013, p. 303). The separation of Keely, as 
subject, from the detritus of the world, is lost. Subject, object and abject blur 
together (Morton, 2010a, p. 267). Winton (2013) writes of “snarled” things, 
as in blocked, muddled, confused, and knotted: cars (pp. 56, 408, 355); the 
mind (p. 101); thoughts (p. 116); bikes (p. 156); colours (p. 351); plants (p. 
353); body parts (p. 373). Keely can “carry disaster with him” (p. 104) and 
he carries it close.   
In Eyrie, Winton employs a dark, abject aesthetic which muddies the 
breaks we might assume between human and world. The swamp recurs 
throughout the narrative,156 as metaphor and as material assemblage: low 
lying; saturated; fecund but uncultivable; vaguely abject to some; a thing in 
which we can become—are already—stuck, sunk, and overwhelmed. It is a 
thing, for Keely, “both strange and familiar” (Winton, 2013, p. 222). He 
experiences a melancholic dissolution into the swamp of abjection: 
“Darkness sucking at him” (p. 42). It is a psychical and corporeal immersion: 
not a reconnection but an unavoidable interconnection with the 
discomforting other. In Eyrie, Winton could be accused of admiring, or 
“appreciating what in us is most objectified, the ‘thousand, thousand slimy 
things’” (Morton, 2007b, p. 196). He breaches the borderline between 
waste, slime and shit, and the Human. Shit—dove shit (p. 10), a good shit 
(p. 52), dog shit (pp. 58, 362), eternal dog shit (p. 157), batshit (p. 172), 
human shit (p. 176), people as shit (p. 393)—and other unavoidable, abject 
matter infuse the world. We find Keely observing “the balcony with its 
                                                          
156 Eleven times. 
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coralline aggregations of dove shit” (p. 10); standing at the rail track fence 
“festooned” with bags of dog excrement, becoming a stinking “wall of 
ordure” (p. 159); and on the “rank” smelling river, amid the jellyfish corralled 
“against the bank […and the] water […] brown and chunky” (p. 302), with its 
“estuarine miasma of algae, cypress and invertebrate slime” (p. 86). It is all, 
as Gemma opines about the river, a “Fuckin shithole” (p. 334).  
As much as we might acknowledge his physically elevated location, 
Keely has been brought down to earth and his apartment does little to 
separate him from the world. The Mirador is a “porous […] birdcage” 
(Winton, 2013, p. 219). Keely cannot avoid the ruins at his doorstep, prevent 
intrusions, or maintain a distance from other tower “folks” (p. 137): the air of 
his flat is already “Thick and heady with the fags and showers and fry-ups 
and dish-suds of others” (p. 3). Like the closed raptor’s claws he describes 
to Kai, Keely is “locked-on” (p. 140), entangled, unable to extricate his self 
or wash his hands of the chaos and the damage: the “bloody tangle” (p. 
365). While Keely might wish himself to be the Beautiful Soul, passing 
judgement upon the world from a distance and without implication in the 
Crises,157 Winton does what Morton (2010a) hopes the artist can amid 
Crises of Ecologies: “not assuming an ideological distance towards this 
disgusting, incessant enjoyment object [the ruined Western Australia] but 
stepping [us] into it” (p. 267). Furthermore, Morton (2007b, p. 201) flags a 
paradox which, I suggest, is true also of Keely: it can be “the very feelings of 
loneliness and separation, rather than fantasies of interconnectedness, 
                                                          
157 See Milne (2002, p. 65) on the Beautiful Soul, and Morton (2010d) on the problematics of false 
distancing for ecological thought. 
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[that] put us in touch with a surrounding environment”. Keely’s expressions 
of isolation, his continuous, splenetic critiques of long lists of others, his 
memories of all that he feels has been lost, and his views of the ostensibly 
distant chaos below the Mirador, multiply his and readers’ entanglements in 
that surrounding environment. While it might be uncomfortable (pain-full), 
we find ourselves alive down with the squalid, wasted earth, not up on the 
balcony. 
Although Eyrie might serve to ruin normative visions of the Human, I 
contend that the novel also offers an encounter with Pickering’s (1995) 
“posthumanist space […] in which the human actors are still there but now 
inextricably entangled with the nonhuman, no longer at the centre of the 
action and calling the shots” (p. 26). Readers could still choose to filter their 
encounter with Eyrie through ideas of the Human, and infer unspoken 
medical conditions from the narration of Keely’s symptoms: loss of vision, 
intense neurological pain, loss of consciousness, vertigo, loss of limb 
control, aphasia, agnosia, and so on. However, Winton’s writing frequently 
returns to the exteriority of the body and to the forces that penetrate, fold it 
and fold into it. Keely offers, I suggest, something akin to Braidotti’s (2013, 
p. 26) “more complex and relational subject framed by embodiment, 
sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities”. Winton’s writing 
can orient readers away from conceptions of the Human as unitary, internal, 
central, stable, and cut-off from the non-and-more-than-human world, and 
towards subjectivity as a collective, matter-discursive, dynamic, intensive 
production. Like the Mirador, Winton’s Human is porous. Winton’s 
diagramming (Deleuze, 2003, p. 66) of Keely—writing him not as a stable, 
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interior figure but via the forces that produce him—involves a material 
opening out: something akin to the ancient Greek apocalypse, or lifting of 
the veil of the Human. We encounter the subject ecologically: as a porous, 
fluid, permeable body; its flourishing (what it can do) dependent upon its 
capacity to sustain the affective charges of relations with other bodies; and 
accountable to those other bodies for its affects upon them (Braidotti, 
2005/6). 
Iovino and Oppermann (2012a, pp. 84-85) cite Wheeler’s 
conceptualisation of the body that “‘reveals the reciprocal interferences of 
organisms, ecosystems and humanly made substances…It is, therefore, a 
‘collective’ of agencies and a material palimpsest in which ecological and 
existential relations are inscribed ‘in terms of flourishing or…illness’ 
(Wheeler, 12)”. This notion of flourishing or being well (or not) recurs 
through Eyrie and, admittedly, some non-and-more-than-human agents are 
accorded regenerative qualities. Material phenomena—some welcome, 
some not—surround, penetrate and assault Keely; shaping his body and 
mind. Reaching the coast, Keely’s “bewilderment and disgust [are] gradually 
softened by the smells of limey sand, ocean air and saltbush” (Winton, 
2013, pp. 219-220) and later we find the ocean water, on a rare occasion, 
“delicious and silky, stalking him pore to shivery pore before the numbing 
warmth sank in and clumsiness took hold” (p. 335). These regenerative 
forces are, however, overwhelmed by those carried by bodies that diminish 
the subject’s capacities. The desert wind carries violently penetrative 
bodies: “grit sharp enough to flay a baby-boomer to the bone” (p. 8). 
Industrial waste (p. 141), additives and poisons (p. 207) pull Keely up short 
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and inflict violence upon Life. Sugary snacks are sensed as dangerous: 
“Keely glanced into the snarl of bright colours. Recoiled at the cloying whiff 
of industrial additives” (p. 351). Working in Bub’s cafe, Keely feels “the 
grease settling on his skin and he drew it into his lungs with every breath” 
(p. 388). I note that Winton’s writing of non-and-more-than-human (what he 
refers to as “land”) agency resonates with sentiments expressed in his 
memoir, Island Home (2015), that: “The material facts of life, the organic 
and concrete forces that fashion us, are overlooked as if they are irrelevant 
or even mildly embarrassing” (p. 10) and that “Climate change has 
intensified what we’ve always felt” (p. 26). In this vein, I explore a 
speculation that by attending to Winton’s writing of the porous body in Eyrie, 
and its penetration and (trans)formation by non-and-more-than-human 
bodies, we cultivate our sense or the ecological-literary force of global 
warming. 
I have argued that endangerment, extinction and planetary degradation 
comprise substantive strands of Eyrie’s narrative and that the novel’s bodies 
are exposed to, penetrated by, and express the forces of these crises. And 
yet, climate change is mentioned just three times briefly: twice, with a sense 
of helpless resignation (pp. 7, 341), and, perhaps, once obliquely (p. 18). 
This apparent absence might seem curious, given Winton’s well 
documented environmental concerns. Shouldn’t Eyrie be Winton’s global 
warming novel?  
I contend, in response to this apparent omission, that Eyrie is saturated 
with the intensities of global warming; that Winton’s narrative pulses with the 
  
 
149 
 
force and agency of the non-and-more-than-human hyperobject (Morton, 
2013a). The sun (its light and heat) carries apocalyptic force in Eyrie: 
unrelentingly assaulting and invading bodies and illuminating the posthuman 
condition. Readers could, of course, conclude that Keely’s parlous 
physiological and psychological condition leaves him unbearably sensitive 
to the sun, or that his condition influences his experience (and 
representations) of the qualities of the world around him,158 returning the 
human to the centre of our concerns. However, the sheer repetitiveness of 
the sun’s violence in Eyrie should at least open up tentative possibilities for 
an intensive reading: that the felt force of the non-and-more-than-human is 
“beyond anything that the booze could induce” (Winton, 2013, p. 6). I will go 
so far as to entertain the idea that global warming has a hand in writing 
Eyrie: that “nonhumans are dictating the script” (Morton, 2013a, p. 175).  
Morton (2013a) argues that hyperobjects, including global warming, are 
representationally and perceptually disruptive, and compel us to think 
ecologically. As hyperobject, global warming is unrepresentable but 
nonetheless materially real. It is massively distributed in time and space and 
always withdraws its entirety from our perceptions. On the other hand, 
global warming is viscous, sticky, intimate, penetrative and inescapable (pp. 
27-37). It is both nonlocal (pp.38-54), in that we do not perceive the 
manifesting object directly or in totality, and intimate and local in its affects. 
It is also temporally undulating in that its massively extended duration forces 
temporal reconceptualisations, reconstitutions and reorientations (pp.55-68). 
                                                          
158 See Ball (2014) on Ruskin’s pathetic fallacy.  
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Also, bodies encounter global warming as material phasing (pp. 69-80): 
becoming perceivable selectively, in patches that sensuously index its 
existence but are not it. Global warming also discloses, or gives us “the 
most vivid glimpse” (p. 85) of, interobjectivity: of the “shared sensual space” 
(p. 86) of objects or bodies in which becomings of those objects or bodies 
occur. These becomings are “inscription events” (p. 77) producing 
transformations and phenomena such as, Morton suggests, the mind (p. 
84). The human and the non-and-more-than-human become “living 
textbooks on global warming” (p. 88). Knowledge, in this way, becomes 
onto-epistemological and material-discursive: sensed by and written into 
bodies. Indeed, referencing the inescapability of the hyperobject, Morton 
(2013a, p. 175) conjectures, “You have to wonder whether your poem about 
global warming is really a hyperobject’s way of distributing itself into human 
ears and libraries”.  
Morton (2013a, p. 109) suggests that “Art and architecture in the time of 
hyperobjects must (automatically) directly include hyperobjects, even when 
they try to ignore them”. Global warming, hardly the object of explicit 
discourse and representation in Eyrie, still pervades it: intensively 
unavoidable; massively distributed; unrepresentable in its totality; and 
violently and indifferently permeating pages and bodies. Indeed, if we accept 
that hyperobjects are unrepresentable in their totality (that “our discourse and 
maps and plans regarding those things are not those things” (p. 133)), then 
an intensive/affective approach to the sense of such things is truer to their 
persistent deceit; namely, that we can never perceive them whole nor without 
their interobjective affects. How, then, does Eyrie bring readers (to) a sense 
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of the hyperobject, global warming? How do things become, as Kai refers to 
his own condition, “hot in the temperature” (Winton, 2013, p. 23), even though 
global warming, to adapt Morton (2013a, p. 146), is present and never to 
hand: “always disappearing behind the […] sunburn”?  
Sun, light, and heat impinge upon Eyrie’s bodies and these impingements 
are aesthetic events that materially index the “invisible presence of the 
hyperobject itself, which looms around us constantly” (Morton, 2013a, p. 76); 
which inhabits and shapes us. The sun, its light and its heat are inescapable, 
viscous, penetrating, and violently transformational. By turns, the sun scalds 
(Winton, 2013, pp. 4, 374), sears (pp. 8, 420), scorches (p. 145), burns (p. 
131), kills (p. 14), roasts (p. 26), fucks us (p. 158), beats us (p. 57), bakes (p. 
36), cooks (p. 245), blasts (p. 264), staves heads in (p. 387), parches (p. 
223), drills (p. 302), damages (p. 400), brands and blinds (p. 15), digs into 
eyes (p. 242), overwhelms, and leaves bodies cowering (p. 11). Heat, too, is 
ever-present and moves with its own agency. We read that “heat rolled down 
from the ranges in waves” (p. 239); and that “[t]here was no relief from the 
heat, his [Keely’s] sense of entrapment” (p. 362). The heat is thick and 
viscous and cloaks the body: “the hot, clothy air” (p. 154); “He swam the hot 
air” (p. 423). Heat denudes bodies: it blotches (p. 10), smothers (p. 14), 
withers (p. 241), entraps (p. 362), bakes (p. 304), superheats (p. 201), 
deforms (p. 203) and makes them fester (p. 159). Keely feels heat “shrink his 
throat and cause flares at the edge of his vision” (p. 241). Heat powers a 
flesh-stripping (p. 8), land ravaging (p. 239) “desert wind” (p. 6). Eyrie’s light is 
“vicious” (p. 6), “hideous” (p. 14), “acid” (p. 15), “blinding” (p. 196), “hot” (p. 
396), “searing” (p. 420), and “impossible” (p. 423). It is not an affirmative force 
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of illumination, revelation, or clarity. Rather, it bathes and penetrates bodies 
in ways suggestive of Morton’s (2013a, p. 49) characterisation of Hiroshima’s 
atomic energy flare: “so intense that they couldn’t quite see”. It is, to adapt 
Morton, “the most viscous thing of all, since nothing can surpass its speed” 
(p. 32), and Keely cannot escape its zone of influence when he ventures out 
of his apartment.  
The “pitiless” sun (Winton, 2013, p. 197), “brutal” heat (p. 408), and 
“blinding” light (pp. 15, 196, 260) contract Keely’s powers of living. They slow 
him down, reduce his energy, leave him wounded, disoriented, and 
dehumanised. One alliterative, assonant and consonant passage, narrating 
Keely’s collision with these forces outside the Mirador tower, carries the 
sensations of the porous body, swamped, and diminished in what it can do: 
 
the street branding, blinding, breath-sucking. Acid light plashed white 
underfoot, swashing wall to wall, window upon window, and he 
waded in it a moment, tilting spastic and helpless, so suddenly 
porous and chalky it was all behind his eyes in an instant, fizzing 
within his skull until it rendered everything outside him in flashes and 
flickers. No gentling tones out here, only abyssal shadows or colours 
so saturated they looked carcinogenic. Keely glimpsed, gasped, 
fought off the dread and gimped on gamely [.] (2013, p. 15) 
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The language pulses, sizzles, flows, breaks, swirls, contracting Keely’s and 
readers’ capacities, as we stumble, with him, through the passage. Together, 
sun, light and heat’s corporeal affects deterritorialise the body and contract 
“the conditions of possibility for the human mind” (Morton, 2013a, p. 85).159 
We find Keely walking out “like a halfwit into a bushfire” (Winton, 2013, p. 14), 
and, later, his body and mind in ruins: “addled, livid, dizzy, butting his head 
and turning circles” (p. 120). Navigating the paragraph’s convoluted syntax, 
the reader risks becoming swamped too; albeit, the repetition of “s” and “sh” 
might just pull us on and through.  
The hyperobject is an “insupportable” (Winton, 2013, p. 13) machine 
driving (trans)formations in Eyrie. It is malignant, to the extent that a virus or 
contagion is, and agentic in a non-and-more-than-human sense. Sun, heat 
and light’s transformative incursions are indexes of the hyperobject finding 
ways to “strafe and penetrate the physical body at every opportunity” (Morton, 
2013a, p. 85). The object “leave[s its] traces in your flesh, traces that alter 
your DNA” (p. 51) and involve a material not a discursive or linguistic 
experience of pain and trauma. Morton suggests that “lifeforms themselves 
are poems about nonlife, in particular highly dangerous entities that could 
destroy life” (p. 52) and Keely, I suggest, is a weathered matter-poem of the 
hyperobject. 
Nor do sun, heat and light affect and contract the matter-discursive 
capacities of the human subject alone; they participate in the manifestation of 
                                                          
159 Albeit, encounters with the hyperobject also expand our conception of how mind is produced 
(Morton, 2013a, p. 85). 
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global warming in water scarcity, in drought, and in land conditions. Sun, heat 
and light are neither background nor foreground in Eyrie. Rather, they are 
violently enmeshed with other bodies: Keely, Gemma, Fremantle, birds, cars, 
fish, water, gravel. Morton (2013a) writes that, “In the mesh of 
interconnectivity, the sieve through which hyperobjects pass, smaller things 
become indexes of the hyperobjects inside which they exist” (p. 77). Dust, 
gravel, injurious winds—“More hellish updraught, than pastoral uplift” (Winton, 
2013, p. 8)—parched land, ravaged plains, and bushfire haze are indexes of 
global warming, lurking and phasing into the narrative as (trans)former of 
bodies. And yet, global warming, the hyperobject that encompasses these 
objects, phenomena or becomings, remains withdrawn. Its reach (its 
“horrifyingly complex tentacles” (Morton, 2013a, p. 71)) is expressed in 
patches: drought-deadened land, reeking rivers, superheated cars, sunburnt 
faces. These literary bodies express global warming’s boot-print. They are 
“crisscrossed with interobjective calligraphy” (Morton, 2013a, p. 88): at once 
the body/ies and the material memories of the hyperobject.  
Morton’s (2013a) perspectives on hyperobjects gesture toward the 
qualities of the onto-epistemological transformations we find in Eyrie. 
Hyperobjects, Morton argues, “force us into an intimacy with our own death 
(because they are toxic), with others (because everyone [every body] is 
affected by them), and with the future (because they are massively 
distributed)” (p. 139), but we cannot become intimate with the hyperobject in 
its totality. While I accept Morton’s (2013a) assertion that global warming is 
something that humans can never fully acquire as an “object of knowledge” 
(p. 172), I suggest that Winton’s writing also encourages what Morton calls a 
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“tuning to the object” (p. 174): “an attunement to the demonic force coming 
from the nonhuman and permeating us” (p. 175). Eyrie exposes readers to 
material, intensive transformations: of literary bodies, of our perceptual 
registers, and of ourselves. The novel also expresses the transformational 
force of the non-and-more-than-human objects with which we are irreducibly 
interconnected. With regard to the writer, I propose that Eyrie expresses what 
Morton (2013a) refers to as a “collaboration between humans and 
nonhumans” (p. 174). While Winton need not necessarily have tried to write 
the forces of global warming through Eyrie, a reading for the intensities the 
novel carries does fuel a sense that writing, amid Crises of Ecologies, may be 
unable to avoid what surpasses, permeates and transforms it. For readers 
and writers, such exposures can still be affirmative while not necessarily 
pleasurable. Eyrie has the potential to change our sense of the world.  
The hyperobject ruins our sense, if we had one before Eyrie, of a 
delineable, controllable, perceivable, secure, and stable world. We cannot 
represent it and envelop it into our common sense understanding of the way 
things are. This transformative, sickening, deadly thing, upon which we 
cannot close the cognitive gap but with which we are intimately enmeshed 
and within which we always exist, is beyond our control. It is a “genuine 
nonhuman entit[y…] that [is…] not simply a product […] of a human gaze” 
(Morton, 2013a, p. 199). As a material-discursive production of Humanity, 
with a terrifying attachment to its creators, global warming expresses itself 
through bodies, and the horror in this is that the variability to its expressions—
what it can do—is never closed. While I acknowledge Clark’s (2015, p. 189) 
broad concerns that the affects of writing the hyperobject might well be 
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negative—engendering fear, nihilism, passivity, for instance—there is also 
humility to be found in an attunement to this imbricated state of affairs. This 
humility is a power of living that Winton’s writing cultivates: afforded by our 
sense that, like Keely, we cannot avoid such entanglements. Winton (2015) 
offers an allied sentiment: “I’m part of a thin and porous human culture 
through which the land slants in, seen or felt at every angle” (p. 18). 
 
The banishments, endangerments, estrangements, and intimate 
violations that seem to characterise human and non-and-more-than-human 
(trans)formations in Eyrie do not preclude the writing of affirmative 
intimacies, relationships, and (trans)formative entanglements. Nor does 
“wary isolation” (p. 28)—not least Kai’s, Keely’s and birds’—preclude 
permeability, connection, and the production of involved blocs of sensation. 
By attending to writing affect and becomings we find that it is not necessarily 
the case in Eyrie that “links between people [and between people and 
animals] have hardly been fainter” (Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 109). Winton 
writes sensuous, intensive, bodily encounters that expand our sense of the 
registers across which Life can still find expression. These encounters 
convey relational intimacy and involve the production of the new: neither the 
search for a place in some larger conventional construct—Humanity, Nature, 
Society, Nation, or Community—nor an entity’s dissolution within it. For 
Braidotti (2002, p. 145), becomings cultivate an ethics of connection and 
transformation. They intersect with posthuman notions of the exteriority of 
subjectivity, they withdraw humans (and separable concepts of the Human) 
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from the centre of Life and ontology (and also epistemology), and they 
reorient our sense of sustainability.160 More particularly, becomings involve 
us with pain, and with limits: ours, and those of the irreducibly entangled 
strangers with whom we collide. While Eyrie’s becomings are not 
necessarily trajectories towards salvation or redemption, they still affirm the 
potential for variation to be found in connections. They express resistance in 
that they “reinscribe subversion at the heart of subjectivity and […] make it 
operational” (Braidotti, 2002, p. 145). They confirm Keely’s impression that 
Life is “chance” not “destiny” (Winton, 2013, p. 375): immanent and 
unpredictable, rather than predetermined and teleological; and full of 
desiring machines connecting.  
To explore these aspects of writing affect and becomings in Eyrie, I begin 
with the relations that (trans)form Keely and Kai: “the kid. Who set 
something off in him each time they met” (Winton, 2013, p. 120). Keely, it 
appears, does not like people. His recurring, bitterly cynical, condemnatory 
lists leave few collectives untouched and estranged. However, Kai’s 
affective charge sensuously jolts Keely161 and, to appropriate Braidotti’s 
(2002, p. 8) words, the two are drawn into relations of “emphatic proximity 
and intensive interconnectedness”. Considering Keely’s attempts to retreat 
                                                          
160 Braidotti (2006a, p. 4) writes: “Sustainability is about how much […becoming] a subject can take 
and ethics is accordingly redefined as the geometry of how much [becoming] bodies are capable of”. 
161 Winton employs an electromagnetic register to express relations: the charges (p. 131), circuits 
(pp. 32, 116, 146), currents (pp. 35, 158, 303), sparks (pp. 21, 114, 146, 220, 324, 329), flashes (pp. 
11, 15, 368), shorts (p. 146), shocks (p. 247), and jolts (p. 416) that course through and transform 
Keely’s body. 
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from others, Kai’s transformational force upon him seems all the more 
remarkable. 
To assume Kai’s lack of emotion equates to a lack of affective capacity, 
or to try and articulate his impacts as to do with the mind, is to miss his 
(trans)formative potentials. Deemed “affectless” (Winton, 2013, pp. 90, 165, 
214) and “removed” (p. 24), Kai is also “intense” (p. 24), often confusingly 
so for Keely. Encounters with Kai leave Keely in turmoil: reeling, disoriented, 
and charged with inexplicable, unassimilable sensations. Kai un-keels 
Keely: folding into him, opening him out and leaving him “suspended” (p. 
24). Like Kai, Keely is disconnected and connected. We find Kai’s silence 
“Boring into [Keely]” (p. 151), something indefinable making Keely’s 
“stomach flip” (p. 24) and “his heart jump” (p. 161). Keely feels that Kai is 
“looking straight through him” and experiences “A tiny jet of panic. Sudden 
irrational fear” (p. 132). The boy’s gaze leaves Keely feeling “hotter than he 
had with the sun beating on his skull” (p. 57). While Kai is almost 
insubstantial, standing in Keely’s apartment doorway, we read of him “filling 
the space with his peculiar static energy” (p. 131), emitting a charge that 
Keely feels on the skin. However, when Keely thinks of Kai’s expressions 
“he didn’t know what they signified” (p. 235): “[h]e had no idea what the boy 
was thinking” (p. 400). His responses to Kai come from something difficult to 
articulate flowing between them. He cannot easily name Kai’s affects: only, 
that he is “peculiar. Compelling in a way” (p. 134).  
Paradoxically, the turmoils and suspensions into which Kai draws Keely 
are also flush with potential. They differ from Keely’s evacuated standstill in 
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the “unpeopled” (Winton, 2013, p. 16) Coles store. Finding Kai perched on a 
high balustrade of the Mirador tower, Keely feels “strangely self-conscious, 
anxious that something about his being out here wasn’t quite right” (p. 90). It 
is, for Keely, “unnerving […] this harried feeling” (p. 90). He hesitates. He is 
suspended, as if connected to Kai such that his own movement could 
endanger the boy: “reluctant to move for fear of startling him” (p. 90). In his 
unusual stillness, hanging over the balustrade in the updraught, Kai is a 
vehicle for intensities well beyond him: “hair ripped back like the tail of a 
comet. As if he were speeding, hurtling, falling already” (p. 26).  
Kai and Keely fold into each other, becoming, at times, indiscernible. 
Winton’s narratives of stilted conversations and miscommunications are 
accompanied by his writing of an intensive intimacy and knowing. Indeed, 
Kai’s preoccupied evasion of physical contact becomes an expression of 
intimacy: “Kai could find space where there seemed to be none; he could 
sidestep any well-meaning pat or squeeze, as if his body anticipated yours, 
as if he were monitoring your every movement” (Winton, 2013, p. 235). At 
Kai’s bedtime, Keely reflects on the “potent, dreamy calm between the pair 
of them, the intimacy of the whispered story and the long silences that 
ensued” (p. 235). They float together. Winton writes that “Kai drifted 
beside…[Keely] in the shafted gloom, unmoored from the day and his 
defended self” (p. 235). The possibility of an elision here—concerning which 
of the two is the “defended self”—assists in conveying the zone of 
indeterminacy they construct together. Winton’s language softens 
measurably, to: “whispered […] ensued […] drifted […] shafted gloom […] 
unmoored […] he murmured” (pp. 235-236). Consonants soften to “m”s and 
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“f”s, and vowels to “o”s and “u”s. Such selections might lull readers into the 
intimacy of Kai and Keely: into a sense of shared perceptions.  
Late in the novel, exchanges that appear to be beyond interpretation are 
filled with a sense of transversal relations. At Kai’s bedtime, his fingers trace 
Keely’s hands and he recalls dreams and waking:  
 
I wake up and I’m the same as you, said Kai. Like, I’m dreamin. 
Then I am you.  
See? That’s imagining. You’re seeing in your head what it’s like in 
the future, to be a grownup, to get old. 
No, said the boy, giving Keely back his own hand. That’s not it. (p. 
400) 
 
The passage ends there. Although we achieve no clarity on what becoming-
Keely is for the boy, we know what it isn’t. There is intimacy but no 
salvation.  
In the novel’s final pages, Keely and Kai have their most intimate 
interaction. Gemma, it appears, has told Kai that Keely has saved them (p. 
418) and Kai is more conversationally fulsome and responsive than at any 
other point in the narrative. The boy believes he is safe. He tells Keely: “I’ll 
get old, Tom. Like Doris” (p. 418). Then Kai and Keely’s bodies interlace: 
“Kai’s breath was in his ear, right in his head. Something sweet and benign 
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finally inside him, like a bulwark” (p. 418). Is it the boy’s breath that is sweet 
and benign inside Keely, or is there a sense of safety, sweet and benign, 
inside Kai, or is it both? Although the words of the last sentence make more 
than one reading available, they also have the potential to leave readers 
suspended, with “him” being both child and man: the two participating in a 
singular perceptual intimacy and subjective flight. 
As another of Winton’s “odd, eccentric, lonely, marginal characters” (Ben-
Messahel, 2012, p. 9), Kai lives as Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
“exceptional [literary] individual” (p. 243). He expresses the qualities of the 
anomalous (p. 243): in his “strangeness” (Winton, 2013, pp. 132, 146, 168, 
215); in his resistance to fitting the shape of the “Australian child” (p. 139); 
and in his affective impacts on Keely. He is, to adapt Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), “neither an individual nor a species; […he] has only affects,[…he] 
has neither familiar or subjectified feelings, nor specific or significant 
characteristics. Human tenderness is as foreign to […him] as human 
classifications” (pp. 244-245). Kai is, in certain respects, a loner: skirting the 
sidelines; hanging over the extremities; navigating the cracks in the 
pavement (Winton, 2013, p. 57); living on the fringe; bringing exception to 
the world. However, in these respects, Kai is also open to the infinity of 
assemblages into which he can enter “to solve a problem” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 260), including becomings-bird. Winton’s writing of these 
involutions offers one response to what might be viewed as the problematic 
appropriations of birds—as metaphors and resources—by humans in Eyrie; 
appropriations that deny the non-and-more-than-human its potentials and 
vitalities. 
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While they are absent or estranged in critical, material respects from 
Keely’s world, birds still constitute a discursive—metaphoric and 
metonymic—foundation for Eyrie, particularly with respect to Keely’s point of 
view as he navigates the social. They are also, for Kai, objects to be 
represented; although, like Keely, readers might find those representations 
to be strange.162 I noted in Chapter 2 that such discursive (and other 
material) uses attest to the intractable problem of Human’s habitual 
responses toward the animal, the violence those responses entail, and the 
risk that they reinscribe anthropocentrisms. Keely often figures himself and 
others (and, by implication, birds) by attributing bird “qualities”. He shaves 
his beard—an “itching nest” (Winton, 2013, p. 188)—and becomes a 
“veritable boobook owl”, finds himself “chortling like a loon” (p. 188), and 
admits “I was a goose” (p. 80) and that he is “the chief wounded bird in 
[Doris’] life” (p. 71). For Keely, Doris is “a shrewd old bird” (p. 41), “owl-
eyed” (p. 281) and “a lovely, impressive old duck” (p. 72). Faith is “Bold as a 
mudlark” (p. 92), while Gemma and her sister are Doris’ “lame ducks” (p. 
71). In the novel’s final passage, Keely perceives birdlike people 
surrounding him: “Surging in, a gathering flock of heads and legs” (p. 423). 
Birds are also appropriated as resources for human memory. The 
Osprey/Eagle—a being beyond, and beyond definition by, the human—is 
diminished when Keely nostalgically renders it subservient to his own life: 
“The bird of his married years” (p. 87). As the novel’s most prominent 
image, the nest or eyrie becomes a human territory, reminiscent of 
                                                          
162 Bird representations proliferate. Kai draws herons, owls, kites, hawks, mudlarks, and countless 
unnamed, damaged, birdlike beings. 
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Bachelard’s precarious place of safety (1994, pp. 102-104). As a “seedy 
little eyrie” (Winton, 2013, p. 9), in which “All he wanted. Was to be safe” (p. 
11) but in which Keely never is, it offers little value. Keely also uses birds to 
hint at human life-lessons: telling Kai the cautionary tale of the raptor’s 
claws that once closed cannot open, leaving it “trying to fly up against the 
ocean” (p. 141), burdened by something it can neither bear nor release (p. 
148). How then, with Keely apparently locked on to his Humanisms, does 
Winton write affirmative encounters with birds in Eyrie, beyond “simple 
wordplay” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 22) and their co-option as mirrors 
and resources exploited to solve human-centred problems? One response 
is that there are becomings-bird in Eyrie that involve Kai and Keely and 
through which, as Braidotti (2002, p. 126) suggests, we might find the 
animal’s “radical immanence as a field of forces, a quantity of speed and 
intensity” beyond any limits or forms within which we might seek to contain 
it. Such becomings also express a creative, immanent ontology that resists 
privileging the Human.  
To attend to Winton’s writing of Bird-Kai-Keely relations, we might adapt 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) thoughts on rats: 
 
The […bird] and the man[/boy] are in no way the same thing, but 
Being expresses them both in a single meaning in a language that 
is no longer that of words, in a matter that is no longer that of forms, 
in an affectability that is no longer that of subjects. Unnatural 
participation. (p. 258) 
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Although I accept that we can, we need not focus upon and interpret Kai’s 
birdlike poses and movements as imitations of a bird, as symbol or 
metaphor, or as only resemblance. We can, instead, entertain the idea that 
Kai exhibits “room for becomings”: something Deleuze and Guattari observe 
as particular to children (p. 274). This is not to say that Kai must transform 
into a bird to enter into becomings; such a requirement would be no more 
than an attempt to uphold the “irreducibility of the Human” (p. 273) and of 
separable forms, rather than to attend to the flows of intensity. Rather, we 
might remain open to Kai’s affective expressions being shaped by his 
“involutions” (p. 238) or “inhuman connivance[s]” (p. 274) with birds: actual 
birds (present, sentient bodies), and virtual birds (drawn, imagined, not yet, 
and no longer here), albeit always real birds. Winton’s writing of birds and 
boy (and man) amounts to more than the production of metaphorical 
relations. Rather, things are shared and new trajectories of subjectivity 
produced. 
Kai becomes obsessed with actual and imaginary birds and intensities 
that birds carry trigger unusual, sensuously expressive responses in him. 
His drawings of birds, birdlike creatures, and other bodies proliferate: “It 
seemed that every page had a different bird on it, sketches and doodles […] 
Many of them bore no resemblance to any bird he [Keely] knew, but the kid 
had given all his creatures wings” (Winton, 2013, pp. 143-144). We read of 
Kai’s fingers twitching (p. 61), his face suddenly open (p. 87) in the vicinity 
of birds. Guzzling greasy fish and chips, we find him “absorbing the word” 
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Heron (p. 61); the writing blurring the boundaries between corporeal and 
incorporeal ingestions. Later, on the river, he becomes uncharacteristically 
animated and vocal having seen the Osprey/Eagle and the sense of his 
connection with birds goes beyond the purely visual and cognitive. The word 
“Osprey” seems to suspend him as he repeats it (p. 87).   
Kai and birds share intensities beyond Keely’s discursive reductions of 
birds and humans into a “symbolic community” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 
p. 274). They enter into “objective zone[s] of indetermination or uncertainty”, 
in which there is “something shared or indiscernible” (p. 273). There is a 
proximity “‘that makes it impossible to say where the boundary between the 
human and animal lies’” (p. 273). As Keely sits by Kai’s bed, the boy is 
absorbed into a bird image on the front of a raptor book:  
 
He tilted the thing up on his chest and surveyed the cover. It was a 
close-up image of an eagle’s eye – black-rimmed, stark, the iris a 
web of yellow-bronze – and Kai wasn’t merely glancing at it but 
peering deeply, chewing his lips, wheezing in fervent concentration. 
The kid seemed to mesmerize himself, sink into the interlacing 
layers of the bird’s irises. (Winton, 2013, p. 226)   
 
While becoming-bird might offer escapes for Kai, they are not necessarily 
freedoms: they are both a flowing-away from forces shaping his own life and 
a flowing into the vicinity of forces damaging birds. Kai flies in his dreams, 
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though he also dies (pp. 152-154): “I crash” (p. 152). As doves “fluttered 
onto the balcony [of the Mirador tower]. Kai flinched” (p. 165). Sensing 
trauma, he stops “as if arrested by a thought or a sensation” (p. 166). He 
expresses an awareness of endangerment and death: “Birds are first, said 
the boy […]. // First at what? // First to die” (p. 165). Keely asks himself 
“How did it get straight to death from a pair of doves?” (p. 165). One 
answer, perhaps, is that Kai conducts the trauma of birds (albeit, he tells 
Keely later that he has seen pictures). He seems caught in a loop, 
foretelling the death of all birds. Kai’s words, as Keely puts him to bed, 
produce a sobering rhythm or, to return to the electromagnetic resonances 
in Winton’s writing, follow a circuit. They read like a mantra, or perhaps an 
invocation: “die […] die […] dead […] die […] extinct […] extinct […] bones 
[…] bones […] extinct […] extinct” (pp. 141-142). We might find the force of 
the words in their repetition and in their proximity, not necessarily in their 
meaning. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) write on this intensive force: 
“Children are well skilled in the exercise of repeating a word, the sense of 
which is only vaguely felt, in order to make it vibrate around itself” (p. 21). At 
the same time as emitting them, Kai absorbs words, as if embodying (being 
incorporeally transformed by) them: “Extinct, he whispered, as if tasting the 
word, trying it on for size” (p. 142). He expresses the collectivity of these 
traumatic affects—“Extinct, he said through another yawn. Like us” (p. 
142)—and, via him, Winton connects readers to the violent finitude of Crises 
of Ecologies. Keely senses other intensities to which Kai is exposed, fearing 
“that the kid was enchanted by something obscure and awful, some terrible 
certainty” (p. 311). Indeed, as Winton’s narrative focaliser and a perceptual 
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vehicle entangled in these becomings, Keely’s becomings-child are 
becomings-bird.  
Kai carries non-and-more-than-human intensities to Keely: “The boy took 
the book in one hand and raised his arms from his sides. Keely’s first 
thought was of a bird, that he was stretching his wings, but then he thought, 
Underpits” (Winton, 2013, pp. 161-162). Keely watches Kai use a computer, 
taking “cautious pecks at the keys” (p. 232). He finds Kai perched on the 
Mirador’s balustrades, a bird ready to take flight, and a human ready to fall. 
Keely’s sense of the boy moves between the two. Waking at his mother’s 
house, after collapsing at the beach, Keely finds Kai standing next to him, 
“Shirtless, pigeon-chested, his arms pitifully thin” (p. 338). At the dinner 
table, Keely observes the “hunched wings” of Kai’s shoulders (p. 134), and 
at the end of the novel, Keely thinks he sees the boy on the tower balcony: 
“The boy’s face a flash – or was that a gull?” (p. 424). For Keely, Kai and 
birds become discursively and intensively indiscernible.  
Keely is not simply co-opting avian symbols to represent Kai. He is 
expressing an intensive openness to Kai and birds. Via his sense of the 
flows of traumatic affect and his becomings-Kai, Keely also becomes 
sensuously involved with the unhomed and the endangered: feeling and 
expressing deterritorialisations, elevations, precipitous descents, fallings-
prey, and takings-flight. Outside his apartment, overlooking the vertiginous 
facade of the Mirador tower, Keely speaks to Kai: “Isn’t it weird, the way you 
look out there and you feel yourself going out at the same moment?” 
(Winton, 2013, p. 166). For Keely, there is more than a cognitive quality to 
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the “going out”; there is a bodily, sensuous aspect to it. Keely also recalls 
the sensation of the violence inflicted upon birds viscerally transforming him 
and producing the outburst for which he lost his job: “When I saw those 
trees falling I didn’t even feel anything. But that little black cloud of birds […] 
and the poor bird-boffin with his specs broken […] I just lit up. Like a flare” 
(p. 75). He feels endangered: he gets that “hunted feeling” when he goes to 
bed and has to medicate to “ease past” it (p. 81). Sensations of damage to 
birds come to him when he is in pain. Drunk, arguing with Gemma, and 
having scared Kai, Keely is left reflecting on his inability to be a defender, 
even when the issues are “Small beans”. His thoughts return to bird 
deterritorialisation: to “[r]ipped earth as far as the eye could see, and 
homeless birds, black and wheeling” (p. 193).  
For Keely, Kai hovers in a realm not quite human and not quite bird: a 
realm of intensities to which all bodies are open:  
 
Bare arms aloft in benediction or flight. He was calm, those 
moments he lingered; the boy was calm and solemn and terrible 
[…]. The child was three balconies distant. He was bare chested, 
squatting on a milk crate, breasting the rail and dipping his head to 
it. His pale hair shone in the dark as he perched and bobbed, 
lapping dew off the iron like a thirsty dove. (Winton, 2013, p. 49) 
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Moreover, this indeterminate, unnatural creature seems to dwell somewhere 
between Keely’s dreams and his waking. Keely’s sense of Kai’s 
indiscernibility from birds is accompanied by affects we might call fear, 
fragility and precarity: “he could feel the glow of the boy there, waiting. In the 
swamp of his ungoverned country. Perched, pigeon-chested. Too high. 
Unguarded. Only a straightened leg away from toppling” (p. 49). Glimpsed 
again—or envisioned—on the balcony, “Perched atop the rail […] While the 
building swayed and rustled like a tuart tree”, Kai is “startled by the sudden 
movement”, before falling, or taking off, and disappearing (p. 53), leaving 
Keely “rattled” (p. 53). For Keely, Kai perches at the threshold across which 
trauma flows, bringing with it “something awful” (p. 48). In dreams and 
waking, the intensities Kai carries are, for Keely, “what could not be borne” 
(p. 49). When Kai recites his bed-time mantra/invocation of extinction (pp. 
141-142), Keely senses his own existential coherence to be at stake: “trying 
to keep himself in order […] his mind had already run ahead, flashing on it, 
drawing him in […] tamping the tremor in his hands […] broken into a sweat 
[…] his hands trembling” (pp. 141-142) and “bringing him to the boil […] He 
needed to break off, cut the frigging circuit before he shorted out” (p. 146). 
The traumatic affects Kai undergoes are hardly imaginable to Keely. Keely 
senses them and turns to the body to articulate them. Winton turns to 
intensities. Keely’s expression of an inability to “imagine the life the boy had 
endured” (p. 138) is at the same time an entry into affective proximity with 
Kai, in which Keely senses “[e]ndless uncertainty. Disorder. Probably worse” 
(p. 138). 
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I return, in this context, to Lorraine’s (2011) conceptualisation of writing 
trauma affectively.163 Trauma is expressed affectively in Eyrie, not 
repressed. Winton writes trauma impinging upon and, over time, continuing 
to shape physical, psychical, social and environmental bodies: Kai’s, Keely’s 
and others. Tracking these impingements or affects, we sense the violations 
of bodies amid capitalism; the damage of returning ecological violence; and 
the degradations of the non-and-more-than-human. Keely’s life as part of 
the capitalist machine was a traumatic parade: the body diminished by “toxic 
adrenaline […] ceaseless performance […] Sucking in trouble […] shaking 
with rage, caffeine and fatigue […] one long fighting retreat” (Winton, 2013, 
p. 7). Fremantle is left “cowering” after a century of capitalism (p. 6). 
Industry wields “flaring […] hectic […] savage […s]earing” (p. 8) weapons 
against Life. Development and agriculture pillage, dig up, empty out, and 
devastate the landscape; wound the seas; leave the Marri tree a skeleton; 
rip up Tuart trees and sea grasses; and “drill, strip, fill, blast” whatever is of 
economic value (p. 6). Damage to the non-and-more-than-human returns as 
flaying red-plain wind (p. 8), the poisoning of food and children, industrial 
particulates raining on houses, and a warming environment that penetrates 
and violates bodies and minds. Abuse (physical and psychical) shape 
Gemma, Kai, Stewie and, eventually, Keely. Keely’s sense of Gemma’s 
pain—as it seeps and flares out of her—comes not only from her horrifying 
narration of the persistent force of her being assaulted as a child, but also 
from her non-linguistic, asignifying, affective expressions: “She hunched 
                                                          
163 See Chapter 3. 
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forward suddenly. She beat a fist against her brow in a ghastly, silent sob” 
(p. 245).   
With Lorraine’s approach to traumatic affect in mind, I respectfully amend 
Conrad’s (2013) assessment of Eyrie as relatively lacking in horror: trauma 
and “ecological upsets in Eyrie [do not] remain marginal” (para. 13). Rather, 
our sense of trauma depends upon how we read for it. Trauma is pervasive, 
connective and often overwhelming in Eyrie. No body is immune and no 
body is innocent: entanglement is unavoidable. When Keely senses that 
Gemma “really did carry with her a kind of desolation” and we read that he 
“had a hole that size in him too; sometimes it was the size of him entire” 
(Winton, 2013, p. 205), he gestures toward bodies inhabiting a shared bloc 
of traumatic sensation. Winton’s writing carries the desolation that finds 
expression through Gemma and Keely and Kai but is not theirs alone. It 
conveys the unrepresentable and that which could not be given greater 
verisimilitude through simply expanding the frequency of traumatic images. I 
differ from Conrad’s (2013) claim that Winton allows readers to “blithely 
launder our sins in the ocean” (para. 23) in Eyrie.164 Rather, Winton’s 
withdrawal of water as salvationary medium, and his writing of trauma carry 
potentials to affectively cultivate an ethics of vulnerability—without moral 
judgement or closure—in a world where trauma does not cease to move 
purely because it was encountered in the past or has been literarily 
captured.  
                                                          
164 Albeit, oceans are certainly not protected from human damage. 
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Winton contends that “the physical world is the prime means by which we 
encounter the sacred” (Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 113), which I presume to 
involve the religious sacred that may be set apart from, but is manifest in, 
the becomings of the material world. However, might it not also follow that to 
write affects and becomings is to express secular sacred processes: to 
express, paradoxically, the strange transcendence of non-and-more-than-
human continuous variation, immanence, and irreducible relationality, 
without reference to some transcendent source? To find processes always 
and already dissolving the profane or the sacred by virtue of their ongoing 
differentiation. Indeed, for Braidotti (2002, p. 127), becomings entail a 
“secular form of spiritual inter-connectedness” and I suggest that, in Eyrie, 
we find such intimacy in secular-material involutions; not in transcendence, 
redemption or salvation.165 We find bodies transmitting and receiving 
intensities, entering into compositions, producing new, shared perceptual 
zones, and undergoing transformations: albeit, what moves is often 
traumatic, and the involutions entered can diminish as well as augment the 
involved bodies’ powers of living. Nor are movements of affect and 
becomings in Eyrie to do with progress or regress (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 239). They are to do with interactions, difference and 
heterogeneity. They convey Life’s capacities to move along trajectories 
unfettered by conventional/habitual forms of identity. If, for example, we are 
looking for Life in Keely’s grasping crusade to emulate the Vitruvian Man—
                                                          
165 See Chung (2015) on Bateson’s sacred ecology of immanence and Deleuze. 
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to live in his father, Nev’s, image—then we are looking in the wrong place. 
Indeed, the desire to become the great Man limits and endangers 
becomings and risks turning them towards abolition. To find Life in Eyrie, we 
are better advised to attend to what moves between bodies and to their 
strange sensations and perceptions. We might find Keely entirely 
inadequate as subject. We might find Kai hard to understand. However, 
rather than look for subjective stability or essence, we might instead accept 
that subjectivity flows not from one essential form to another (Australian 
child to Man, girl to woman, mother to grandmother, son to father and so on) 
but is a function of affective productions involving desiring machines and 
bodies. This approach to the subject does not, though, absolve Keely and 
ourselves of accountability for the becomings into which we enter. Rather, 
this approach embraces the potential in Being to be something different—a 
haecceity—unbound by preconceived notions of the human and, as 
Braidotti (2006a) puts it, immanent to the world we make.  
Becomings cultivate a sense of ecology as non-and-more-than-human; of 
what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call “the true Nature spanning the 
kingdoms of nature” (p. 249). Eyrie’s becomings have the potential to 
cultivate an attunement to the open-ended, relational, trans-species 
qualities of subjectivity, and to subjectivity dynamically structured by affect. 
Eyrie’s becomings-bird also offer encounters with animals outside of the 
“Oedipal cage of consumption and otherness in which they have been 
historically caught” (Braidotti, 2002, p. 121), although these encounters do 
not/cannot ignore the violence that continues. Indeed, becomings in Eyrie 
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also reinforce what Braidotti (2002, p. 50) defines as shared human and 
non-and-more-than-human vulnerability. 
My contention that writing affect and becomings can cultivate ecological 
sense does not entail an expectation that literature can resolve Crises. Nor 
do I suggest that a literary practice for Crises of Ecologies can (or must) 
depose itself of its Humanisms and representations. To fall back upon 
dualistic conceptions of literary practices would involve abnegating the 
philosophical underpinnings of this thesis, and ignoring the obvious avenues 
of representational, metaphorical, symbolic and moral interpretation open to 
critical engagements with Eyrie; few of which this chapter touches upon. I 
do, however, argue for literature’s capacities to cultivate our openness to 
affirmative relations and to strange, new assemblages of bodies and the 
subjective trajectories potentialised by those assemblages. What is 
proposed, and what this engagement with Eyrie highlights, is that 
becomings are one response to a question that arises when we find 
ourselves un-keeled amid the flows of loss, diminishment, violence, trauma, 
and ruin of Crises of Ecologies: how can Life—a life—keep going? With 
Keely and Kai and birds and Winton, we might, for a moment, sense 
literature’s potential to uproot readers from our humanity and to leave us 
“truffling” (Winton, 2013, p. 11), “perching” (p. 139), “wheeling” (p. 193), 
“crying” (p. 87), “flaring” (p. 88), “chortling” (p. 188), “flocking” (p. 423), 
feeling “hunted” (p. 81) or unhomed (p. 75), or “burning” (pp. 108-109): living 
not exactly as a Human might, or, rather, exactly as a posthuman might. 
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Earlier in this chapter, I noted McCredden’s (2014) concerns with the 
ways in which Eyrie entails disruptions of language and meaning for writer, 
reader and literary figures alike. I also explored the brokenness and 
ruinations of Winton’s writing. In the final part of this chapter, I return to style 
and argue, pace McCredden, that writing can carry transformational force 
precisely via its disruptions and ruin: that style gives language intensive 
force even where, and, indeed, often precisely when, meaning is lost. For 
Deleuze and Guattari (1983):  
 
The artist is the master of objects; he puts before us shattered, 
burned, broken-down objects, converting them to the regime of 
desiring-machines, breaking down is part of the very functioning of 
desiring-machines […]. Even more important, the work of art is itself 
a desiring-machine. The artist stores up his treasures so as to 
create an immediate explosion, and that is why, to his way of 
thinking, destructions can never take place as rapidly as they ought 
to. (p. 32)  
 
With this notion of broken objects in mind, what I represented earlier as 
linguistic losses, might be perceived differently: namely, as Winton’s literary 
practices to employ other powers of language, in particular its capacities to 
vary and resist. Winton’s stressing, exhaustion, peeling back, making-
foreign, and breaking of language become productive and material 
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expressions of resistance to, and paths out of, the sanctioned notions of the 
current state of affairs that affect bodies (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986). The 
very impoverishment of language in Eyrie (its diminished, broken, jolting and 
stumbling syntax) and the “making-foreign” of language (its idiomatic style) 
can constitute Winton’s expressive interventions in the world (Braidotti, 
2002), not escapes from it. 
What of the stain on Keely’s carpet; the ‘M’ on Kai’s palms; Kai’s dreams; 
Keely’s fugue states; the Osprey that might be an Eagle? We can 
conjecture what these indeterminate phenomena might mean. However, 
assigning meanings risks closing off their potential, as does privileging their 
lack of meaning as our focus of study. We can, instead attend to the 
intensive force of their indeterminacy: “As it happens, the exemplary 
expression signifies nothing. Which is not to say it expresses nothing” 
(Massumi, 2002b, p. xxviii). The withdrawal of meaning—we cannot alight 
upon a stable interpretation—is deterritorialising. We lose common sense 
and we apprehend our unfulfilled desire for resolution. Something is 
happening “in excess of” any signification we might crave (p. xxviii). Such 
irresolution unnerves Keely and has the capacity to unnerve readers. The 
stain on his carpet carries a sensation that brings him low. He becomes-
animal; “truffling about on all fours, date in the air, tackle adrift, whiffing out 
his own spoor like a lost mutt” (Winton, 2013, p. 11); not becoming a dog 
but emitting the molecular intensities we associate with dogs and to which 
humans are also open (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 275). Kai’s enigmatic 
utterances, on his hands and on his dreams, leave Keely and readers in the 
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mud: wanting to reach for interpretation but suspended and disoriented. Kai 
looks at the lines on his palms that map out a letter: 
 
But what’s it for? He asked. M for what? 
Well, M for whatever you like, I spose. They’re your hands, sport. 
But what does it mean? 
I don’t think it means anything, mate. It’s just a…just…just crease. 
(p. 284). 
 
Readers might interpret one of Kai’s dreams as presaging the final 
passage of the novel. In the dream, Kai sees Keely surrounded by people in 
burkas, their eyes visible only through slits, “With only eyes showin […] All 
black. And just eyes” (Winton, 2013, p. 152). Keely notes later: “or was it [, 
the dream,] more an intimation?” (p. 158). While hard to recall, as dreams 
often are, it seems that Kai’s difficulties are with articulation and not with 
memory. I also note that while Kai’s descriptions of his dream make 
meaning less accessible, they are intensive: 
 
All black. And just eyes. Behind them it’s…fire […] Fast. Shooting 
[…] They talk, said Kai, eyes clouded with awe. But, not proper 
words […] They’re kind, I think […] Everything goes away, he said. 
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Soft […] Like, no battery […] Like, I die […] I’m laying there and I 
die […] Sometimes it’s not me. (p. 153) 
 
Kai’s perplexing recollection expresses sensations of violence, fear, loss, 
and a winding down, and Keely finds himself asking question after question. 
He fumbles desperately for meaning, gaining none, before trying to calm 
Kai’s intensive experience (and his own distress) by suggesting it is only “a 
dream” (p. 153). While Kai remains impassive and expressionless, the 
dialogue, and the relations between Kai and Keely, carry an energy that is 
not represented in the boy’s body language, and that Kai cannot represent 
or articulate as an emotion: these are flows of affect. His final words—
“Sometimes it’s not me” (p. 153)—carry a different intensity and expand the 
scope of the trauma to who knows who else.  
Eyrie’s broken, thinned, stumbling language also carries intensities. 
Indeed, “[t]o bring language slowly and progressively to the desert” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 26) is not to negate its force. Rather, a writer 
can go:  
 
always farther in the direction of deterritorialization, to the point of 
sobriety. Since the language is arid, make it vibrate with a new 
intensity. Oppose a purely intensive usage of language to all 
symbolic or even significant or simply signifying usages of it. Arrive 
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at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense 
expression. (p. 19) 
 
Winton’s writing carries, at least, the potential to function as a material, 
intensive expression of a new way of living—in fits and starts, in vulnerability 
and fragility, without recourse to coherence, unity or resolution—and not 
only as a linguistically denotative, connotative or symbolic text. As Deleuze 
notes more generally, so, I suggest, in Eyrie, are the desertification and 
failings of language expressions of a breaking, fragile Life: not only Keely’s 
but the non-and-more-than-human world in which he, the novel, the writer, 
and readers persist. Readers must endure the violence of Winton’s 
language and the violence done to it: “Language stops being 
representational in order to now move toward its extremities or its limits” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 23). We find in Eyrie a style that achieves 
something akin to Deleuze’s (1997) description of writing that dries up the 
flow of language (p. 156) and of voices (p. 161). At times it seems an 
immense effort is being made to pulse out even the shortest of sentences. 
We are sensitised as much to the stopping as to the movement. Passages 
progress as litany, in multiple short, sharp jabs. While Keely’s capacity to 
speak is diminished and his sentences are often cut short or break off 
without completion, it need not be a matter of seeking out longer sentences 
to gain more meaning: it is this inadequacy that carries a force. Eyrie’s 
exhausting and exhausted prose might be felt as a writing of the pain of the 
drained vital body; a language in ruins but utterly intensive nonetheless.  
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When Winton pushes language toward its extremes in Eyrie, “nothing 
remains but intensities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 19). The passage that 
takes up Keely’s bad turn at the beach, for example, is a sensuous 
expression of linguistic, corporeal and psychical breakdown and 
disorientation:  
 
Rippling steps. Leaning Trees. Hot tar. The horizon lurching, 
oceanic. The car. The ground turning as he fell into the roasting 
interior. Round in circles, tighter loops and whirls. Gemma drove 
fast, spinning him into the roof, his lap, the green furze of golf links, 
screaming, slapping his belly through the cowling of his head. 
(Winton, 2013, p. 337) 
 
Winton alienates language’s parts, making it discordant (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1986, p. 23), and withdrawing sense (as in interpretable meaning), 
though not sensation. These seeming impoverishments are not losses. We 
might appreciate them as Deleuze and Guattari (1986) did Kafka: as “a 
creative utilisation for the purposes of a new sobriety, a new expressivity, a 
new flexibility, a new intensity” (p. 23). The syntax is clipped, its flow broken 
and potentially unpredictable and disorienting for the reader. One thing does 
not follow naturally to the next, however short the sentence. Keely loses the 
capacity to speak. The last sentence confounds as vertigo takes hold. While 
it is difficult to visualise the scene, the writing is sensuously disruptive. It is 
  
 
181 
 
not difficult to sense (even to participate in) the disorientation via: “Rippling 
[…] lurching […] turning […] circles […] loops […] whirls [and] spinning” (p. 
337). The world becomes fluid rather than solid; mobile and unpredictable; 
and difficult to hold onto, rather than offering some grounding.  
Eyrie’s idiomatic style also carries potentials to produce convulsions and 
ruptures to sense. The host of distinctive and arresting phrases used by 
Winton’s narrator include: “a real swine-choker” (Winton, 2013, p. 4); “the 
full gorgonzola” (p. 5); “a judicious bit of biffo” (p. 33); “in his cock-jocks” (p. 
53); “eat like pokie machines” (p. 69); “a couple of beefy brufens” (p. 89); 
“Rupert-rag” (p. 111); “the Kombi lay down beside the beemer” (p. 157); “a 
minute’s skin-peeling banter” (p. 177); “huffle his nuts” (p. 199); “surfin a 
Torana” (p. 220); “the good sammies’ (p. 229); “Pig and bumnuts do you?” 
(p. 257); and “a malarial dishpig” (p. 369). Often humorous, idiom can also 
be disorienting and can elude interpretation. While Winton suggests he 
employs such styles “automatically or for sheer pleasure” (Winton & Watts, 
2015, p. 157), we should not infer an unthinking indulgence. Indeed, I 
suggest that it is precisely the humour and strangeness of Winton’s writing 
that contribute to Eyrie’s potential political force. 
I outlined in Chapter 3 that writing as a becoming-minor is an unavoidably 
collective act. Winton’s comment, that the use of idiom is to do with his “love 
[of] the ordinary language of the people I grew up with and who I still mostly 
associate with” (Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 157), suggests a line along which 
to explore how literary style might enact and call forth collective resistance. 
Winton sees himself as part of a fraying community, persevering under 
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assault. Moreover, his desire to convey collectivity—“the sense that we are 
a social-cultural ecosystem, a chain of interdependent communities” 
(Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 146)—goes well beyond conventional Western 
notions of society or family, and entertains other registers of relationality. He 
writes of artistic production particular to (and drawn from the particularities 
of) a people (Ben-Messahel, 2012, p. 12)). For Winton, writing involves 
resistance to the “imperial influence of Britain and the US”: the production of 
“work on our own terms in our own dialect” (Ben-Messahel, 2012, p. 12). In 
Eyrie, I suggest that idiom carries the capacity to revitalise links between 
some of those who have become isolated, producer-consumers amid 
globalised capitalism. 
Such is the prevalence of idiomatic language in Eyrie that it becomes a 
purposeful body: a collective assemblage of enunciation with the capacity to 
make a difference, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s idea (1986, pp. 17-18). 
Arising from within the dominant (or Major) language (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1986, p. 16)—Australian English—Winton’s use of idiom works to express 
resistance to sanctioned ways of speaking and writing, and to the forces—
local and international—that standardise, atomise, and contract expression. 
However, while many of the phrases Winton uses might be translatable or 
interpretable in an indicative, proximate, general sense, accessing their 
force does not require unlocking their meaning. Take, for example, the 
phrases “off his chops on the fruit of the Barossa” (p. 11) and “stunned 
mullethood” (p. 17). This language is not entirely alien but the phrases are 
strange and transversal, not least because the conventional meanings of 
the words used are traversed by other unconventional meanings when 
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brought together as these phrases. They suspend and disorient the reader’s 
search for meaning: remaining within the dominant language while 
expressing what Winton refers to as a baffling “particularity” (p. 157). Winton 
writes such that he becomes, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest of Kafka, “a 
sort of stranger within his own language” (1986, p. 26): though not to those 
people who apprehend the idiomatic gestures. I also note that while some of 
these phrases might be characterised as earthy or base, and perhaps 
discomforting to read for some—for example, “face like a spanked arse” (p. 
86)—these qualities also carry their own potentials. Colebrook (2004) 
observes that humour “descends to the depths of life” (p. 136) and a scan of 
the phrases above brings to life the notion that humour deterritorialises 
standards (the Major), not least through showing “subjects to be collections 
of sounds, gestures, body parts and signs devoid of any real sense” (p. 
137). The phrase, “twitchy as a numbat” (Winton, 2013, p. 56) offers a good 
example of this deterritorialising capacity. Winton’s idiom resonates with 
Colebrook’s (2004) Deleuzian conceptualisation of humour as anti-
subjective; making the Self appear less organised. Humour, she argues, 
produces a “destruction of subjective positions” (p. 136) by making readers 
aware of the nonhuman forces that produce and run well beyond us. It 
“recognises the lowly animal being, behind all our ideas of self-creation” (p. 
139). We lose what makes sense: “logic, […] moral categories [,…] the body 
[which dissolves] into parts without any governing intention” (p. 134): not 
unlike Keely’s own uncooperative body. 
Winton’s idiomatic language enacts and invokes a vibrant resistance to 
commodification and standardisation, and to what he calls the “pressure […] 
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to submit to some kind of standard, placeless, cosmopolitan [language] 
usage” (Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 114). However, this style is not just an act 
of resistance to the force of the generic: it is also creative. Idiom, Winton 
notes, enables readers to “feel in the language the gravity of the specific” 
(Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 114): this involves operating in “transversals that 
continually escape from the coordinates or punctual systems” of Major 
language (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 299). Albeit, the proliferation of 
idiom in Eyrie suggests the creative energy needed to maintain that “gravity 
of the specific”, and to continue to outpace capitalism in its chase (Bell, 
2009) to co-opt phrases and words and turn them into marketable 
commodities or sterilise them altogether.  
Winton exists both inside and outside the collective his language invokes 
(Winton & Watts, 2015): a remotely located writer (geographically); with a 
strong sense of connection to the non-and-more-than-human (Winton, 
2015); who values what might be termed solitary pursuits; and who has 
sought to traverse the realms of popular and literary fiction (McCredden, 
2016; McGirr, 1999, p. 13). There is, though, a power to being “in the 
margins or completely outside his or her fragile community [because] this 
situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another 
possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and 
another sensibility” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 17). Winton’s language 
pushes at the edges of the Major from the inside; it exposes readers to the 
language’s outside; and Winton hopes it functions to enable a holding-out 
“against the centre, the imperium” (Winton & Watts, 2015, p. 157). Style 
also connects Winton (and Keely) to that “tribe” beyond family (2013, p. 6), 
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with which he feels an alliance. Winton contends that “A really good novel 
makes you a citizen – it claims you” (p. 158), and I suggest that his style in 
Eyrie enacts such a claiming. Idiom functions as connective tissue and it 
lays claim to those it affects and who sense, in encountering it, the 
expression of a collective to whom they might belong. 
 
Eyrie can be mined for Iovino and Oppermann’s (2012a) “posthumanist 
vision” which “questions the givenness of the split between the human and 
the nonhuman, and emphasizes their hybridizations, their cooperative 
configurations, and their intra-actions” (p. 86); including, I suggest, in the 
production of literary works. Additionally, to focus upon flows of affect and 
becomings in Eyrie is to explore writing’s capacities to cultivate an embrace 
of collectivity and of subjectivity not too distant from Winton’s expansive 
notions of community. Furthermore, Winton’s writing of affect and 
becomings, and his affective writing, embrace and enact resistance: to 
standardisation; to living only along what Whitehead (1926, p. 197) referred 
to as mental grooves; to borders; and to separation. While Winton’s writing 
exposes (and is exposed to) our obdurate Humanisms and essentialisms, it 
also attunes readers to the “inhumanities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
190) composing us.  
Winton’s work in Eyrie is not solely intensive (nor need it be) and, 
consequently, it carries with it powers to reterritorialise and constrain 
thought, bodies, and subjectivities: not least, the ways in which the animal 
remains the object of the Human, and the persistence of (no doubt, 
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problematised) ideas of the Human as a source of redemption. However, to 
engage with Eyrie is also to confront intensively the question of whether we 
can close ourselves off from Crises, trauma, and pain, and to find that we 
cannot. To engage with Eyrie, regardless of our initial sense of our 
psychical, physical and social locations and conditions, is to explore and 
sense how materially open and vulnerable we are. Winton’s literary 
practices go to the heart of interconnectedness and offer up a material 
sense of the interdependencies, and the traumas of Crises of Ecologies, 
that traverse human and non-and-more-than-human, and bind them: “from 
our genetic neighbours the animals, to the earth as bio-sphere as a whole” 
(Braidotti, 2005/6, p. np) and beyond. In Eyrie, Winton produces this shared 
habitat; not romantically or from a height or distance, but materially, 
intensively, viscerally and intimately. 
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Chapter 5 – Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book 
 
 
On ethics 
 
Before engaging critically with The Swan Book, I consider the ethics of 
non-indigenous research into Indigenous cultural production, in particular 
the dangers of appropriation,166 misrepresentation,167 subjectification,168 
silencing, and crowding out (Kwaymullina, 2016; I. Watson, 2015).169 These 
dangers lurk in the Eurocentric, anthropocentric, “colonial mindsets” (I. 
Watson, 2015, p. 8) at the heart of Indigenous Crises of Ecologies. They 
manifest in erroneous assumptions, including: presumptions of 
homogeneous Indigeneity and style; attractions to deficit/oppression-led 
models when engaging with and interpreting Indigenous art (Muecke, 2005, 
p. 204); confidence that we can definitively know a culture (or what that 
culture knows (Ravenscroft, 2012)) through its art; expectations that we 
share common conceptualisations of art’s functions and efficacies and of the 
artist; and beliefs that we can entirely mitigate the influence of our “colonial 
mindset” upon our engagements with artists and their works. These dangers 
can be actualised through interpretation and assessment: for example, 
                                                          
166 Kwaymullina (2016, p. 441) notes: “Aboriginal (Tanganekald and Meintangk) legal academic 
Irene Watson (2009) has written of her reluctance to “provide specific examples of Aboriginal 
relationships to ruwi [country, homeland] … because of the dangers of mistranslation, appropriation 
and commodification” (p. 38)”. See also, Rose (1999, p. 182). 
167 See Langton (1994) and Wright (2004) on Australia, and Pualani Louis (2007, p. 132) on North 
American and internationally relevant concerns. 
168 See Heiss (2003, Ch. 2), and Spivak (1988). 
169 See Heiss (2003, p. 36); Kwaymullina (2016, p. 440); Spivak (1988); I. Watson (2007, p. 5). 
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where we claim a work as fitting a Western philosophical frame for artistic 
practice, such as writing the posthuman, or minor literature. 
With these concerns in mind, this study of The Swan Book makes certain 
acknowledgements and follows a number of principles. I reiterate my earlier 
acknowledgement of the still-colonial state of affairs affecting Indigenous 
peoples and country, its associated material-discursive violence—overtly 
physical, covertly structural, and psycho-social (Kwaymullina, 2016, p. 
440)—and its historical and ongoing genocidal results (I. Watson, 2015). As 
a coloniser, I acknowledge my own complicity in, and that I benefit from, the 
continuation of this violence.  
I also acknowledge the risks of perpetuating a “failure to hear” 
(Kwaymullina, 2016, p. 440). Kwaymullina writes that “Indigenous voices are 
not heard equally; nor do Indigenous voices have an equal opportunity to be 
heard” (p. 441), and that “the task of the non-Indigenous scholar is not 
necessarily to add to the commentary but to highlight and support 
Indigenous voices” (p. 441). Bignall and Patton (2010) note that how we 
listen is as important as how we speak or write:  
 
it is not enough for Western intellectuals to resist the imperial 
temptation to speak for the colonised other, since this response 
carries with it the danger that the other will remain inarticulate, 
having already been silenced within colonial history. If she is to 
speak ‘for herself’ in ways that are not fully captured by Western 
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forms of discourse and structures of representation, then alternative 
forms of ‘listening’ are also required so that the particular sound of 
her ‘voice’ and the heterogeneous and irreducible ‘sense’ she 
conveys is able to be adequately heard and properly acknowledged 
on its own terms. (p. 5)  
  
Accordingly, my analysis attempts to begin with, and respect the sovereignty 
of, Indigenous voices because “an acknowledgement of Indigenous 
sovereignty (humanity) is a necessary element of both respectful 
engagement and decolonization dialogues” (Kwaymullina, 2016, p. 442).170  
While I attend to significant connections between Indigenous oppression 
and Alexis Wright’s literary practices, I avoid conclusions that 
oppression/resistance is the lens through which to analyse Indigenous 
literature. The Swan Book is also a vehicle for the production of new futures 
immanent to always already vibrant Indigenous philosophies, to still living 
pasts, and to sovereign bodies and minds: human and non-and-more-than-
human. I acknowledge, also, after Kwaymullina et al. (2013), that literary 
works need not meet the requirements of Western research paradigms, and 
that art is not best served when de-humanised into/by theory (p. 7). This 
study is not, therefore, an attempt to claim Wright’s work for Deleuzo-
Guattarian New Materialism. It is an exploration of ways in which Wright’s 
                                                          
170 Essays in Moreton-Robinson (2007), and I. Watson (2015), provide introductions to Indigenous 
approaches to sovereignty. Prokhovnik (2015) provides a summary of recent Indigenous voices on 
sovereignty’s relational, juridical, and political qualities. 
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literary practices inform and enrich conceptualisations of literary practices 
for Crises of Ecologies in the Australian context; cultivate ecological sense; 
and enable resistance and renewal. I associate many qualities of Wright’s 
novel with aspects of writing the posthuman, affect and becomings, and 
minor literature, but I do not suggest that Wright is attempting to respond to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s hopes for writers. I also recognise Louis’ (2007) 
concern, after Rundstrom and Duer, that “all research is appropriation” (p. 
133), albeit, I hope that bringing Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist thought 
together with The Swan Book might, at its best, approximate a collaboration 
or mutual gifting. This mutual gifting could serve to illuminate the capacities 
in Wright’s novel and in my thesis, and avoid binding Wright’s ideas and 
work in a theoretical straitjacket or barricading my thesis against affirmative 
encounters with other knowledges.  
My engagement with The Swan Book involves an embrace of Indigenous 
onto-epistemologies. Admittedly, this is a partial embrace given that it 
encompasses an encounter with Waanyi cultural production and, although 
there are strong resonances between the ontologies and epistemologies of 
Australia’s Indigenous peoples (Kwaymullina, 2016; Louis, 2007), no 
homogeneous Indigenous culture-philosophy exists.171 Furthermore, I 
possess an outsider’s limited apprehension of Indigenous knowledges and 
relational living. In this regard, I am conscious of my personal, European, 
colonising cartography and therefore of my particular and partial standpoint 
(Kwaymullina, 2016). I also acknowledge that my arguments on the efficacy 
                                                          
171 See, on this, Foley on Rigney (2003, p. 48), Grieves (2009), and Muecke (2011).  
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of Wright’s literature vis-à-vis Indigenous readers are entirely speculative 
and that, as Kwaymullina puts it, “An individual’s knowledge is at once 
informed and limited by position, and no one can ‘know’ what it is to 
experience the web of relationships that is the world from a position they do 
not hold” (p. 441), including literature’s work within that web. It is with these 
substantial caveats that I attempt an opening out to, and advocacy for, the 
efficacies of Indigenous onto-epistemologies, as Louis (2007) characterises 
the opportunity for non-indigenous researchers (p. 134). I accept that 
Indigenous readers might find the value of my research, at best, limited. 
Nevertheless, I offer this work with the expectation that “Sharing knowledge 
has to go both ways” (Louis, 2007, p. 136) and that it will, at least, be 
indirectly productive. I hope that my attempt to argue the opportunities that 
Wright’s work offers—for “becoming, dissemination, and exchange” 
(Muecke, 2005, p. 204) amid Crises of Ecologies—at least carries the 
capacity to engender among readers—as it has for me—an enhanced 
respect for other philosophies and knowledges, and to inform the 
approaches of non-indigenous readers to their relations (Bignall et al., 2016, 
p. 474). As Rose (1999, p. 175) observes: “[o]penness produces reflexivity, 
so that one’s own ground becomes destabilized. In open dialogue one holds 
one’s self available to be surprised, to be challenged, and to be changed.” 
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The Swan Book 
 
[A] really deadly love story (A. Wright, 2013, p. 334) 
 
Alexis Wright is a member of the Gulf of Carpentaria’s Waanyi nation. 
Her 2013 novel, The Swan Book, is set in a contemporarily resonant future 
Australia experiencing the devastations of global climate change, and it tells 
Oblivion Ethyl(ene)’s (Oblivia’s) stories. Gang raped as a child, Oblivia 
resurfaces as an invisible outcast among the also outcast “swamp people” 
(A. Wright, 2013, p. 13). Bella Donna, a refugee/coloniser/invader, takes 
Oblivia in. After Bella’s death, Oblivia is married against her wishes to 
Warren Finch: Indigenous politician and soon-to-be Australian president and 
international “saviour” (p. 185). Removed to desert country, then to a 
climate-besieged city, travelling through civilisation’s ruins, then witnessing 
and possibly committing Warren’s execution, Oblivia is eventually guided by 
(and guides) climate-change-exiled black swans back to their newly adopted 
country and Oblivia’s home: the swamp. Indeed, Wright’s novel is as much 
the story of country and black swans as it is Oblivia’s, so richly entwined are 
the three in the telling. Wright’s work is devilishly satirical, deep with irony, 
dazzlingly transversal in its cultural references and its imagery, dizzyingly 
complex in its scope and language, and disruptive, imaginative, and vibrant 
in its prose. Notions of nation, country, history, people, capital, 
consumerism, colonialism, human, animal, past, present and future, are 
critiqued and complicated, resisted and reinvented; not least by the novel’s 
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driving force: an Indigenous onto-epistemology or relational philosophy 
which irreducibly entangles human and non-and-more-than-human.   
In this chapter, I argue that The Swan Book carries potentials to cultivate 
ecological sense, and to enable resistance and renewal amid Crises of 
Ecologies. These potentials resonate with Wright’s (2008b) expectations for 
the political work of writing and are to do primarily, though not only, with her 
employment of Indigenous onto-epistemologies in her literary practices. I 
also identify where these literary practices and potentials traverse and 
enrich Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist conceptualisations of literary 
practices. First, how Wright renews our understanding of the forces shaping 
the health of Indigenous peoples and country, and writes Life moving 
beyond and through the Human: what Deleuze (2005) calls fabulation, or 
story-telling. And second, how Wright tends to (nurtures) the health of 
expression and, thereby, the collectivity and health of Indigenous peoples 
and country.  
 
Into the hornet’s nest: a future-present-past symptomatology 
 
[W]riters […] use their pen as a sword (A. Wright, 2008b, p. 20) 
 
‘It may be that I am fleeing, but throughout my flight, I am searching 
for a weapon.’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. 36) 
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If we conceive of weapons as instruments of “projection”, enabling “free-
action” or self-propulsion (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 395, 397), then we 
might find resonances between Wright’s, and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptions of literature as a weapon. Wright’s weapon incorporates a 
critical diagnosis of Australian conditions, what might become from those 
conditions, and how they provide resources for resistance and renewal. She 
explains that: 
 
it is the work of the writer to try to imagine this, to imagine what the 
world might look like. It’s not a simple thing like going out into the 
backyard and seeing a hornet’s nest – it’s describing the hornet’s 
nest of the world. (Zable & Wright, 2013, p. 28, Italics in original)  
 
This idea of describing the hornet’s nest—Wright’s literary diagnosis—sheds 
light on the efficacies of what Deleuze calls a writer’s “symptomatology” 
(1989, p. 133; 1995, pp. 132-133,142-133). Responding, in part, to 
conditions of oppression, The Swan Book renews the diagnosis of the forces 
that afflict particular civilisations, rather than attributing pre-existing, innate 
qualities to Indigenous peoples as the causes of their conditions 
(syndromes). Wright (2002) argues that “fiction penetrates more than the 
surface layers and probes deeper into the inner workings of reality” (p. 13). 
Wright also imagines ways by which the suffering colonised—the Minority—
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might revitalise their collectivity and find ways to “live the opposite of being 
shackled” (A. Wright, 2011c, p. 42). Writing fiction, then, is an immersion 
into, and a drawing upon, the forces shaping the Indigenous and Australian 
states of affairs. In A Weapon of Poetry (2008b), Wright expresses 
admiration for Oodgeroo Noonuccal’s “diagnostic” writing practice (p. 22): 
her “cold eye” (p. 22); her recording of the “heartbeat” (p. 20); her letting “the 
world see” (p. 20); her accessing the “cultural interior monologue of her 
people” (p. 21); and her describing “the troubled interior world” (p. 22). 
Wright writes diagnostically too: of “taboos” (1998); of viruses; of pain; of 
fear; of physical and psychical wounds to human and non-and-more-than-
human. She writes of the forces perpetuating “the living hell of the lives of 
many Aboriginal people” (A. Wright, 2002, p. 13).  
Wright (2007a, p. 8) concerns herself deeply with truth: to affirm on one’s 
own terms “what has been unwritten”; to keep alive the knowledge of the 
trauma of colonisation or to keep “the wound” open (2002, p. 18);172 to 
correct prevailing and repeated misrepresentations of Indigenous people 
(Vernay & Wright, 2004, p. np); and to make discernible the truths that 
Australians hide (A. Wright, 2002, p. 20). To tell stories, to write fiction, is, 
for Wright, to release particular expressions of truth: “to try and create a 
truer replica of reality” (2002, p. 13). She points out that it is not her priority 
to write history, as this would never get close to the truth she seeks to 
release. Rather, she believes in the work of stories as “not the real truth but 
                                                          
172 My focus here is on materiality, agency, affect and minor writing, though I concur with 
Takolander’s (2016) assertion that “trauma is not the ‘cause’ of Wright’s magical realist narrative […] 
its ultimate agenda is ironising traumatic colonial histories to imagine a sovereign future” (p. 117). 
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more of a truth than non-fiction” (p. 13). Kwaymullina et al. (2013) argue that 
stories are creative vehicles for knowledge, expressing endurance and 
uncontainability, and resisting, in form and content, dominating ideas of truth 
(pp. 8-9). Graham (2009) concurs and notes that, for Indigenous peoples, 
stories are expressions of place, are ontologically genetic, and offer ways to 
nurture the relational self (p. 72). These ideas resonate with Deleuzian 
conceptualisations of fabulation as “story-telling”,173 which involves using the 
forces shaping our historico-material state of affairs as resources for 
collective escape: “diagnos[ing] the impasses of the present and their 
historical causes and then instigat[ing] disruptive becomings and lines of 
flight toward a people to come” (Bogue, 2010a, p. 46). Story-telling, Bogue 
(2010b, p. 99) argues, has strong connections with both history and the 
present state of affairs. Drawing forth “aspects of the past that have not 
been actualised” (Bogue, 2010a, pp. 45-46), story-telling is a critique of 
acquiescence to sanctioned, common sense, habitual histories, and a 
response to powers of forgetting, denial, silence and fear. Deleuze writes of 
the storying of the false: 
 
What is opposed to fiction is not the real; it is not the truth which is 
always that of the masters or colonizers; it is the story-telling 
function of the poor, in so far as it gives the false the power which 
makes it into a memory, a legend, a monster. (2005, p. 150) 
                                                          
173 See Chapter 3. 
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Quoting Richard Flanagan, Bogue (2010a, p. 192) notes that story-telling 
responds to the power of wrong history that could leave bodies, collectives, 
and Life “condemned to an eternity of imprisonment”. One power of story-
telling’s unlikely truths—the false or the absurd—is to disrupt dominant 
truths and dominant falsehoods: exposing their constructed and not 
necessarily superior qualities; making mad what is taken as natural; offering 
wild words; projecting exaggerated visions—hallucinations—of the 
historically familiar; telling stories outside of orthodox colonial Australian 
narratives (A. Wright, 2007a, p. 10), though always with foundations in 
versions of History. Story-telling disrupts: problematising common sense 
structures rather than reinforcing them; unsettling linear, progressive, and 
incremental notions of time—Chronos; and rendering truth and falsity 
indeterminate and transversal rather than finally separable or independent. 
As The Swan Book’s narrator tells us, “The girl convinced herself that only 
the mad people in the world would tell you the truth when madness was the 
truth, when the truth itself was mad” (p. 73).  
To story, then, is to experiment on the real: which is to “open new 
possibilities for life by ironically or humorously warping and transforming its 
structures” (Bogue, 2012, p. 21) and by redirecting and changing the 
intensities of what flows materially and discursively. Wright’s notion of a 
disruptive and creative imagination, I suggest, resonates with Deleuze’s 
“hallucinatory perception” (1997, p. 115) as a story-telling practice. Literary 
deviations—via the historical field and into realms of the phantasmatic 
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(Bogue, 2010a, p. 174)—force “images on reality and counteract[…] 
operations of reason and intelligence” (Bogue, 2007, p. 104). These 
hallucinations and visions are productive rather than evasive: the writing 
transcends “empirical circumstances by engaging their virtual components in 
new actualisations” (Bogue, 2010a, p. 46). Specifically, Wright’s 
experiments in The Swan Book involve producing new ways of knowing 
Indigenous Crises of Ecologies, and co-opting the forces driving Crises as 
resources for sovereignty. 
Just as The Swan Book finds global warming “flipping” the northern 
Australian weather—“this unique event of unrolling the climate upside down" 
(A. Wright, 2013, p. 18)—so Wright flips diagnoses of Indigenous and 
Australian civilisational afflictions and offers “the new figure of a disorder or 
illness” (Deleuze, 1990b, p. 273). Her symptomatology gestures toward 
other truths: namely, that Indigenous conditions are not innate to Indigenous 
peoples or country, but are an infection. Wright writes against the grain. She 
injects complexity and multiplicity to disrupt and contest tacit assumptions, 
routine habits, unquestioned concepts, and zones of constructed and 
regulated memory and amnesia: literary practices that Bogue (2010a, p. 
223) finds in fabulation. Wright also reveals the material and discursive 
forces brought to bear in the service of power relations and oppression: 
characteristics that Bryant (2013) suggests are particular to materialist 
critiques of power. To tell new truths about the Indigenous condition(s) in 
these ways is to give the lie to a capitalist-colonial “false grouping” of 
symptoms into an Indigenous “false syndrome” (Bogue, 2012, p. 17). 
Oblivia’s “cut snake virus” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 1) is a production of 
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compositional forces and not an essential and unalterable Indigenous 
condition.  
The Swan Book’s colonisers host the virus and, via material and 
discursive relations with Indigenous peoples and country, its damaging 
affects are expressed: acquisitive possessiveness; civilisational hubris and a 
desire for omnipresence; ignorance and deafness; a desire to remake and to 
save; fear and rejection of difference, and a desire to control, hide or erase 
it; twisted and empty care; violence; and amnesia. These expressions infect 
Indigenous peoples and country, producing dead, violated bodies, and 
“exiled psyche[s]” (A. Wright, 2008a, p. 137). Indigenous relational 
capacities are skewed towards the production of what Wright describes as 
“self-inflicted wounds” (p. 133): fear, shame, disconnection, compliance, 
self-silencing and the negation of self. Sovereign Indigenous bodies and 
minds disappear to each other and to themselves. 
The novel begins amid a viral colonisation and a casting out. Oblivia tells 
us that “Upstairs in my brain, there lives this kind of cut snake virus in its 
doll’s house” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 1). The Indigenous mind has been 
“sucked” in (p. 1) and the virus “etched” (p. 3) into the brain. But this is not 
an essentially Indigenous condition, it is an occupation by “poor lost 
assimilated spirits that thought about things that had originated somewhere 
else on the planet and got bogged in my brain” (p. 3). At the same time, 
Indigenous people are cast out—psychically and physically—and become 
“gypsies” (p. 15); a condition in which Wright finds affinities with the 
globalisation of gypsies produced by other colonisations and by 
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anthropogenic climate change. These globalised traumas are expressions of 
the virus’ interest, as Oblivia puts it, in “belonging everywhere” (p. 4).  
The virus operates materially and discursively and it puts at risk the 
sovereign Indigenous mind. It is ingrained, entrenched in people and 
country, “stitched in the brain” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 109), and “like a lice 
infestation” (p. 95). It enacts violence and brings on a “madness” (p. 334). 
An ongoing history of occupation, intervention, internment, exclusion and 
control sees the virus achieve “full traction over what these people believed 
and permeance over their ability to win back their souls and even to define 
what it meant to be human, without somebody else making that decision for 
them” (p. 48). The virus damages Indigenous collectivity and produces 
islands of isolation. It has “stuffed up […Oblivia’s] relationships with her own 
people, and made her unsociable” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 334). It only allows 
certain kinds of discourse and “won’t talk about anything in level terms” (p. 
2). It encourages a “nostalgie de la boue” (p. 3): attraction to that which 
makes us sick.  
Wright’s “ignis fatuus” (p. 7)—foolish/false fire, Will-o’-the-wisp—suggests 
a power to mislead and to draw people on to their ruin. Indigenous minds 
become filled with bad ideas—“vomiting bad history” (p. 1)—and the virus 
leaves no fertile ground to support stories other than its own. The country of 
the mind is emptied of variation to become “flat, space, field” (p. 1); barren 
such that “truths” (p. 1), like drought-affected crops, risk failure. What the 
coloniser sees as good for people and country, and for itself, entails the 
creation of a wasteland not the filling of a void. The nurturing of this 
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“moonscape garden” (p. 1)—a physical, psychical, social, material terra 
nullius—threatens the very nullification of peoples and country that 
colonisers perceive(d) to be the case on their arrivals: “Anyone there? 
[…Bella Donna] called” as she set foot on country (p. 32).  
The virus expresses itself through an obsession with homogeneity. A 
coloniser fear of difference prompts the flow of the civilising material-
discursive forces of categorisation, demonisation, and exclusion. Instincts to 
categorise and to control—“white government social engineering 
intervention” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 82)—run forward and backward across 
capitalist-colonial time, encompassing eugenics, assimilation, protectorates, 
and contemporary and future imagined policy frameworks that continue to 
classify Indigenous people against deficit models: “just another moment in a 
repetitious black and white history repeated one more time for Aboriginal 
people […] after having their lives classified and reassigned yet again?” (p. 
49). White people relentlessly try to make something of the Indigenous. 
Those in power position themselves as the “designer of black people’s lives” 
(p. 96). We read of the norms to which Indigenous people are expected to 
aspire. Bella Donna wants “to get the girl [Oblivia] to act normal” which is to:  
 
behave and sit up straight at the table and use a knife and fork 
properly, learn table manners, talk nicely, walk as a butterfly flies, 
dress like a normal person, learn something marvellous on a daily 
basis, and show some resilience. (p. 21) 
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Warren’s colleague, Red, also wants to remove variation from the field of 
being: to physically clean/transform Oblivia, and “to get into […her] brain, as 
though this was where one removed grime, salt, vegetation, blood of dead 
animals, lice, and whatever thoughts about having different origins she had 
brought into the house” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 221). Oblivia is named and 
renamed. Her given-name is bastardised and fragmented (pp. 158, 159, 
182, 276, 290, 297). She is pulled from identity to identity: lost girl (p. 86); 
“No name” (p. 2); terrorist (p. 54); promised wife (p. 148); trophy wife (p. 
227); animal (p. 36); First Lady (p. 226); widow (p. 290); killer (p. 290); 
nothing (p. 211); and spirit (p. 334). Her condition is, in part, one of being 
told that she is known without ever being known; the force of that known 
subjectivity burning its way through the mind such that she is at risk of 
becoming only what is sanctioned by others: both something and nothing. 
The media-machine supports the shaping of subjectivities that serve the 
virus and secure its hold. Ultimately, it is not what we stand for but the 
“propaganda” of it that matters (p. 302). Warren Finch, his subjectivity 
emptied out and repopulated with a media-shaped cult of personality—“He 
was post-racial. Possibly even post-Indigenous” (p. 122)—is left with only 
the orbital and hollow-sounding “unique quality of his extraordinariness” (p. 
302).   
Imposed aspirations to be normal—we read that being so minimises the 
threat of violence upon Indigenous people (A. Wright, 2013, p. 97)—produce 
“yes people” (p. 96). For Warren Finch’s people, a desire to please—to 
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avoid suffering additional harm—generates a long list of what they are “anti”, 
capped off by being “anti-anyone not living like a white person […and] about 
whatever there was to be anti about if white people say so” (p. 97). 
Proliferating conformist modes of living—a “universe of viruses” (p. 3) for 
Oblivia—draw Indigenous subjectivities into states of almost total negation. 
This is the future, terrifyingly familiar version of self-determination born of a 
capitalist-coloniser deficit model of Indigenous subjectivity and the threat of 
violence against variation.  
Deafness and silence prevail. Indigenous people are to have no 
meaningful voice in the Australian world of the living. They are encouraged 
to speak only about things that colonisers believe will divert their attention 
from their oppression and parlous life conditions and let the real talking—
and everything else—be done for them. As a response to the swamp 
people’s feelings of trauma about the lost girl (Oblivia), the government 
builds a sports stadium. It is felt that, now: “The swamp people would not 
need to talk about anything else really except football […] So let the 
Government do all the talking, all the planning, and the thinking and the 
controlling” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 84). Oblivia finds herself spoken for, her 
silence prolonged, and her isolation from others deepened. She also 
chooses silence over the seemingly impossible alternative of finding a voice 
that adequately conveys the truth of her suffering. At the same time, 
Oblivia’s silence is also an expression of trauma:  
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She would rather be silent since the last word she had spoken 
when scared out of her wits, the day when her tongue had 
screeched to a halt with dust flying everywhere, and she was left 
screaming Ahhhhhh! throughout the bushland, when she fell down 
the hollow of the tree. (p. 19)  
 
In The Swan Book, fear and shame pervade cultures, bodies, and country 
under continuous siege. Colonisers’ fear of difference shapes colonial 
violence which, in turn, over centuries, tightens the boundaries around 
Indigenous subjectivities. Indigenous people become loci of fear. Refugee, 
terrorist and racial stereotypes are conflated to produce threats: “brown- and 
black-coloured criminals, un-assimilables, illegal immigrants, terrorists – all 
the undesirables; those kinds of people” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 55). Bella 
warns Oblivia not to leave the swamp, fearing that she will be accused of 
being “one of those faces kept in the Federal Government’s Book of 
Suspects” (p. 54). Like black swans, Indigenous people appear to be 
“marooned in flight, unable to break apart from their fear” (pp. 158-159). 
Indigenous fear in The Swan Book entails fear of self, or of the expressions 
of self that lead to violent reprisals: “We still live in punitive raid times” (p. 
150). Trauma and fear engender secretiveness and a preference to hide 
self, whether psychically, physically or socially: as with Oblivia’s retreats 
“down the tree” (p. 172) when she feels threatened. Indigenous people also 
fear the shame of failure, of facing accusations of delinquency in their care 
for self and for their children, and of losing their children. Searchers for the 
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lost girl (Oblivia) are asked to “give up hope” rather than keep searching and 
unearthing the shame that inhabits the country surrounding the swamp and 
attaches itself to a parent “failing to take notice of his child” (p. 85). Swamp 
people’s sense of culpability is cultivated by their being continuously blamed 
for their predicament by distant others.  
As we might expect of a writer steeped in Indigenous onto-
epistemologies, Wright’s symptomatology traverses and entangles human 
and non-and-more-than-human, as well as coloniser and Indigenous 
peoples. The globalisation of the virus has produced degradation of country, 
mass extinction, and climate catastrophe, with human and non-and-more-
than-human life unhomed and much of it drought-stricken (A. Wright, 2013, 
p. 46), frozen (p. 17), and annihilated (p. 16). Climate change—itself an 
expression of the forces of capitalist-colonial violence174—unites Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous people, and human and non-and-more-than-human, via 
their collective diminished existences amid unceasing ruin. Globally, millions 
of refugees and “poverty people” (p. 17) are displaced, and forced to wander 
to avoid climate wars, land wars and the curtailments of civilisation 
occasioned by weather pattern changes. Climate change refugees and 
Indigenous peoples also share names: gypsy; unwanted; unhomed. The 
virus, it appears, is a great leveller. Its qualities extend the colonial 
encounter to encompass the violent encounters of human with non-and-
more-than-human, and ecological crises also draw together all peoples in 
bequeathing us a “dilapidated country” and “world” (p. 266). 
                                                          
174 See Nixon (2011, p. 3) on this. 
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Adam (2006) proposes that Western concepts of time enable the 
imposition of human demands upon other humans and the non-and-more-
than-human, and are entangled with the associated damage (p. 123). 
Furthermore, Western concepts of time involve a discounting of the future 
and, consequently, the impacts of human acts now on future ecological 
health (p. 125). By setting The Swan Book in a future-present-past,175 
Wright offers a projection of the diabolical worlds immanent to Australia’s 
present state of affairs. The colonial virus appears to have overcome history 
and time; it symptoms recurring ceaselessly: an “overload of historical 
repetitiveness” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 110). The virus thrives upon a continuity 
of violence. The very notion of care, embraced by white Australians in 
relation to Indigenous people and country in The Swan Book, is, to adapt 
Bogue’s words (2010a, p. 45), bound up with a “continuing process of 
wounding that has become habitual in its own right”.176 Capitalist-colonial 
Australia is always at war with Indigenous peoples and country, and 
homogeneity and invisibility are violently enforced “truth[s]” (A. Wright, 2013, 
p. 228). Law and public policy—“the adjudication of harm” (van Rijswijk, 
2015, p. 214) and the proliferation of control—repeat old failings and are 
executed martially.177 The Army administers Indigenous security at the 
swamp: transporting “unwanted people” (p. 50) to this “asylum” or detention 
camp; destroying ancestral bodies—the eucalypt tree—deemed to pose a 
threat to the progression of civilising Indigenous thought; stopping parents 
                                                          
175 Van Rijswijk (2015) calls it “a dystopic history of our future” (p. 237). 
176 See, also, Muecke (2007, p. 136) on this idea more generally. 
177 See I. Watson (2007) on contemporary public policy martialisation in the Northern Territory. 
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harming their children (Army as “welfare people” (p. 86)); incarcerating 
people behind the ironically described “security fence of government 
transparency” (p. 32); controlling the flow of information, including to “those 
approved by the army to watch television” (p. 124); surveilling any “sign of 
Aboriginal strength” (p. 38); working to “control the will, mind and soul of the 
Aboriginal people” (p. 47); owning “every centimetre of their traditional land” 
(p. 334); and, eventually, blowing up the place (p. 230). And yet, the virus 
suggests to Indigenous minds that they should be grateful for the care by 
which they are smothered because they are “little pets owned by the 
Mothers of Government who claimed to love them more than their own 
“‘inhumane’ families” (p. 50). However, to be so loved is to be lost.   
Viral symptoms repeat and sediment over time and space, cementing a 
“limbo world” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 82). Bella Donna repeats an invasion: “this 
old woman invaded Australia” (p. 31). Conflict is continuous: “all those who 
had fallen in the long Indigenous war against colonisation with the State of 
Australia – And continue to fall” (p. 116). Intervention is interminable: “by 
tweaking it ever so little this way and that, the intervention of the Army never 
ended for the swamp people” (p. 47). Detention defines a way of life for all: 
“a fast-growing population […] settling, living the detention lifestyle right 
around the swamp” (p. 52). Intolerance and racism recur infinitely: “So inter-
racially intolerant Australia was still the same old, same old” (p. 50). These 
violent and intensive repetitions traverse existential registers and work to 
stop Life moving. Bella describes Oblivia’s experience of “the haphazard 
way sanity and madness were reaped from her having been gang-raped 
physically, emotionally, psychologically, statistically, randomly, historically, 
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so fully in fact: Your time stands still” (p. 82). Oblivia is “petrified” (p. 83), it 
seems. Swamp-like, the future-present-past immobilises and suffocates 
bodies. History congeals into habits, common sense and limited 
expectations that retain their potency and are repeated into the future by 
colonisers and Indigenous peoples. Oblivia—“the girl has never recovered 
from being raped” (p. 19)—and countless others enact endless cycles of 
trauma and mourning: “They were mourning here. And tomorrow, they 
would mourn somewhere else” (p. 319). Scars remain unhealed and 
unavoidable, and history continues to surge into the future present: 
“contemplation of the wound […] contracts all the instants which separate us 
from it into a living present” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 77).178  
The Swan Book’s colonial virus also finds spatio-temporal expression in 
the Australian “mainstream” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 52) seeking to hide and 
reject things from the body, and to deny truths/reiterate falsehoods. 
Attempts to forget or empty out “bad history” expand and proliferate: 
“genocide, a horrendous crime against humanity that was unheard of. It 
never happened. Not in this country” (p. 309). Some Indigenous people in 
the novel—“overwhelmed swamp people who had always been told to forget 
the past by anyone thinking they were born conquerors” (p. 26)—believe 
that forgetting avoids the retribution that comes when old atrocities 
resurface, and helps them elude the horrific forces those events still carry (p. 
85). This ejecting of unwanted bodies, veiling of truths, privileging of 
                                                          
178 I note, also, that Van Rijswijk’s (2015) analysis of The Swan Book as anti-elegy (holding wounds 
open rather than closing them off) (p. 240) resonates with my use of Morton’s dark ecology of elegy to 
explore Winton’s writing of Eyrie. 
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coloniser knowledge, forgetting and excising out of histories, and attachment 
to only looking forward (A. Wright, 2013, p. 232), doom white Australian 
governments to increasingly damaging repetitions (policy and otherwise). 
The physical relocation, imprisonment, and banishment of Indigenous—and 
other—peoples, and the overwriting and erasure of country continue 
unabated. Even the fecund promise, complexity and variation of the city’s 
newly burgeoning—climate change revitalised—Botanical gardens is locked 
away when it threatens to exceed the control of the same government which 
had previously tried to save it from drought (p. 269). Past castings out—
becomings invisible (p. 9)179—continue into the future and extend to already 
outcast, Indigenous people banishing each other. Locals render Oblivia 
invisible after the shame of her rape: acting “as though she never existed, 
was too unimaginable, unable to be recognised and named” (p. 60). Lured 
by wealth and influence (p. 118), Warren Finch’s people split apart from 
other members of their nation, while Warren orders an explosive casting out 
in the name of progress: blowing up the swamp. In The Swan Book—and in 
contemporary Australia—affirmative trajectories for Indigenous peoples and 
country are threatened where sanctioned futures and pasts are products of 
the dominant colonial mind. However, while Wright acknowledges 
attachments to Western notions of time as one of the forces shaping 
civilisational ill-health, she also echoes Gunter Grass in proposing that 
“writing against the currents of time” (A. Wright, 2002, p. 14) can be a 
pathway to health.  
                                                          
179 Though, we find later that invisibility can also be a resource for sovereignty (p. 69). 
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In Chapter 1, I acknowledged that Indigenous and Deleuzian philosophies 
(1994) complicate common sense, Western ideas of temporality: of time as 
“projectile” (A. Wright, 2007a, p. 5), as Chronos or linear, incremental, 
progressive, and measured as it passes away (consigning things to some 
separable past), and as independent of matter and space; of the past as a 
separable, retrievable, though fixed, realm held in memory; and of the future 
as determined by the past and somehow predictable from, bounded by, and 
reconcilable to it. Irene Watson (2015) explains that, for Indigenous peoples 
and country, “A relationship that links us to the past is a connection that is 
lived in the present and to be recreated in the future” (p. 14). For Wright 
(2007a, p. 5), time is multiple—“mingling centuries”—and history is 
something, quoting James Baldwin, that we “carry […] within us”. For 
Deleuze, similarly, we exist in worlds for which “the past never stops having 
running effects” (Lampert, 2006, p. 5), albeit, as Wright notes, while events 
in time are not consigned to the past, neither are they fixed in their qualities 
(2002, p. 20). Time, for Indigenous cultures, is embodied and marked—
materially, in peoples and country—by events and practices of living (Potter, 
2015). Unlike Western “clock time” (Adam, 2006), it is not solely a human 
production. Time entails an immersion in, rather than a separation from, 
what Adam refers to as the “rhythmicity of the physical environment” (p. 
119). For Indigenous cultures, the inseparability of time, space, material 
productions, and cultural practices implicates the human in the health of the 
non-and-more-than-human and empowers people to make a difference: past 
matters—including their traumas—are not closed and performances can 
bring other worlds into existence. Indeed, because performances—
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movement, story, singing, dancing, painting, and writing—function as Life-
productions, they cannot be approached (interpreted) as static, 
representations of the world: they are enlivening. First, what happened can 
be contested, as the writer draws out new memories, new histories, and new 
events from the still vital past. Second, the seeming coherence of the 
present might be fragmented by the writer’s exploration of its temporal and 
spatial—and material-discursive—multiplicity: there is more than “one 
Australia”, as Wright points out (2002, p. 15), and her symptomatology 
suggests other ways of conceiving of the forces producing Indigenous states 
of affairs. And third, the writer might also envision (new) futures: diabolical 
trajectories along which current forces might flow, as well as lines of flight or 
escape. These are the transformed sites of future history, if you will; the 
truths, perhaps, of imagined future worlds (A. Wright, 2007a, p. 6), “specific 
to but not specified by the colonial past [or present] that engendered them” 
(Burns & Kaiser, 2012, p. 13).  
For Wright (2007a, p. 5), imagining a “‘fugitive’ future” involves grappling 
with our agency over the truth in its past, present and future forms. 
Consequently, to write the memories or the history of a different future, as 
Wright does in The Swan Book, is to claim a right to participate in making 
the truth of the future; to record its emancipatory possibilities rather than let 
them be excluded; to release words as “time bombs” (A. Wright, 2002, p. 
20). The violations of the past are not as forgettable as the virus hopes. 
Indigenous silence does not indicate acquiescence or amnesia. Nor can 
colonial Australians hold off the Life and events that they have sought to 
lock out. The “unwanted” bodies proliferate. Trauma continues to flow and 
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the colony and country are bogged and swamped, materially and 
discursively, by the liveliness and variation that the virus so fears: rising 
flood waters (p. 235); resurgent flora and fauna (p. 209); proliferating ghosts 
and bones; unavoidable suffering animals; disruptive language; different 
ways of knowing; and deadly stories of enlivening relations. I turn next to 
these lively variations and Wright’s deadly stories of enlivening relations.  
The Swan Book is not only a symptomatology of civilisational conditions, 
transforming how we understand the forces shaping those conditions, it is 
also a machine with the potential to transform readers’ perceptions of their 
capacities to respond. In the sections that follow, I argue that Wright’s story-
telling involves the reader in the carrying, preserving and sharing of deep 
knowledge (A. Wright, 2011a, p. 81) and in encounters with transformative 
relations (Kwaymullina et al., 2013, p. 5) extending beyond and traversing 
the Human. These literary practices envision fugitive futures (Wright, 2007a, 
p. 5) and carry potentials: to (re)generate knowing and being, or to cultivate 
ecological sense; to confound and reconstitute assumptions about 
boundaries between humans and the non-and-more-than-human, between 
past, present, and future, and between individual and collective; and to 
revitalise attunement to too often (un)storied capacities of peoples and 
country to relate and transform amid annihilations.  
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Stories/fabulation 
  
I believe in the transforming power of stories, and that once these 
stories are heard there is an opportunity to see this other way of 
knowing, and the sensitivity to acknowledge the legitimacy of beliefs 
that have held this land together for thousands of years. (A. Wright, 
2011a, p. 80) 
 
Indigenous philosophies do not view tradition as a force opposed to 
progress, a hangover of the ancients, and a dead-weight to be carried as a 
burden. Tradition is a vital force, enabling knowledge practices via which 
Life is given healthy continuance across multiple registers, and from which 
different futures can be fashioned (A. Wright, 2011c, p. 41). Alexis Wright 
(2011a, p. 78) notes that stories have the potential to open us up to “other 
ways of knowing, of understanding, of feeling the land and sea, environment 
and its climate”. Her stories are richly fed by Waanyi Dreamings, and 
nourish their continuity. In their re-telling, these Dreamings sustain 
Indigenous culture and capacity to care for country and self in a world 
seemingly “petrified” (2013, p. 83). Wright (2011a, p. 80) believes that 
stories can dissolve what seems fixed in stone, including our conceptions 
and perceptions of the world. She embraces imagination, experimentation, 
and the exploration of the outside as critical to writing stories: a “taking flight” 
(J. Sullivan, 2013, p. np). For Wright, it is important: “to write with the 
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freedom of my own imagination” (A. Wright, 2011c, p. 40); to express truths 
through incredible, though not supernatural or fantastic stories (A. Wright, 
2007a, p. 10);180 “to reimagine a larger space” (p. 4); and to give truth to 
imagined worlds (p. 6).  
These notions of “the hope of writing. Believing the unbelievable” (A. 
Wright, 2002, p. 20) resonate with the Deleuzian conceptualisation of 
fabulation (story-telling) as a transformative force of art. Indeed, Deleuze 
(2005, p. 243) characterises such “story-telling”—or “the flagrant offence of 
making up legends”—as the collective revitalising of connections to ancient 
stories through which different futures can be imagined (and catalysed): 
futures unimaginable without the non-and-more-than-human bodies and 
nonhuman forces drawn upon through such repotentialising acts. Stories, 
not least, are vehicles for Life’s expressions and transformational 
capacities—“the many voices of country”—over time and space 
(Kwaymullina et al., 2013, p. 5).  
 
[L]and screaming with all of its life (A. Wright, 2013, p. 327) 
 
Wright is interested in “how we might start to think about the country by 
knowing the power of the land through its stories” (2011a, p. 81). She 
explains that “Land”, in her novel Carpentaria, “is, I suppose, one of or even 
                                                          
180 I acknowledge that, historically, readings of Indigenous writing as magical realism were common, 
that these approaches are problematic, and that Wright’s magical realist tropes can be read ironically 
and, therefore, politically (Takolander, 2016). 
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the central character […] being alive and having meaning” (Vernay & Wright, 
2004, p. 121), and she describes her attempts to “inhabit in my writing” 
(2002, p. 20) the bodies that exceed, enfold and entwine with human and 
animal and other expressions of Life across time. She implies, also, that her 
writing is temporally, spatially, materially and discursively transversal: “like 
looking at the ancestral tracks spanning our traditional country which, if I 
look at the land, combines all stories, all realities from the ancient to the 
new, and makes it one—like all the strands in a long rope” (2002, p. 20). 
Graham (2009) proposes that “Place also determines the logic of Indigenous 
people” and that it is intrinsic to existence where there is no border between 
mind and an outside: “no ‘external world’ to inhabit” (p. 76). Indeed, physical 
and spiritual, human and non-and-more-than-human, “continually 
interpenetrate each other” (p. 76). To “fashion giants”, as Bogue (2010a) 
reads Deleuze, is to fill a work of art “with a non-personal life” (p. 17): a Life 
that flows through, but is not only, human. Iovino and Oppermann (2014, p. 
3) note that Jane Bennett, in a resonant context, refers to the “nonhuman 
powers circulating around and within human [though not only human] 
bodies”. One effect of this fashioning of giants is an entry into the 
“nonhuman landscapes of nature” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 169), the 
realm of the percept and the non-and-more-than-human. We encounter a 
novel’s figures, in their becomings, as more than Human, more than pre-
defined subject, and more than pre-conceived thing. I observe also, in these 
respects, strong resonances between Wright’s literary practices and Material 
Ecocritics’ embrace of certain onto-epistemological premises, including: 
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a distributive vision of agency, the emergent nature of the world’s 
phenomena, the awareness that we inhabit a dimension 
crisscrossed by vibrant forces that hybridize human and nonhuman 
matters; and […] that matter and meaning constitute the fabric of 
our storied world. (Iovino & Oppermann, 2014, p. 5) 
 
“What is [continuously] possible”, Graham (2009) explains, “is the 
transformative dynamic of growth” (p. 76). 
As writing of “the fabric of our storied world” (Iovino & Oppermann, 2014, 
p. 5), The Swan Book draws readers into, and pulses with the vitality of, a 
landscape without the Human. It is not flat landscape. Nor is it Abram’s 
“pure exterior” (Iovino & Oppermann, 2014, p. 1), or the Australian 
coloniser’s landscape, with open horizon, emptied of Indigenous peoples, 
appropriated and overwritten by European form (Muecke, 2003b; K. Myers, 
2013). There is a democracy to Wright’s narration of Life such that bodies 
exist in a non-and-more-than-human perceptual realm and possess agency. 
Attempts to write non-and-more-than-human perceptions abound: “The 
swan could not take its eyes away from the little girl far down on the red 
earth” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 18); “Talk like this grieved the swan” (p. 332). The 
narration focalises via a black swan on its journey through to the swamp. 
Wright writes the swan’s perceptual relationships with the non-and-more-
than-human: 
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Its journey took the black swan over the place where hungry warrki 
dingos, foxes and dara kurrijbi buju wild dogs had dug out shelters 
away from the dust, and lay in over-crowded burrows in the soil; 
and in the grasses, up in the rooftops, in the forests of dead trees, 
all the fine and fancy birds that had once lived in stories of marsh 
country, migrating swallows and plains-dancing brolgas, were busy 
shelving the passing years into a lacy webbed labyrinth of mud 
caked stickling nests brimmed by knick-knacks, and waves of flimsy 
old plastic threads dancing the wind’s crazy dance with their faded 
partners of silvery-white lolly cellophane, that crowded the shores of 
the overused swamp. (p. 18)  
 
While the detritus is human-made and the swamp remains a home for, not 
least, a multitude of humans, the narrative expresses the landscape lived by 
the non-and-more-than-human: even to the extent that birds appropriate 
human waste to enable their living.181 
Later, as black swans and Oblivia are “heading north, on the way home” 
(A. Wright, 2013, p. 303), we read that “Somewhere in this landscape, 
swans were stirring”. We human readers are not privy to where, and “the 
swans made no sound” (p. 303). Wright draws readers into swan 
perceptions: into the entangling pack, and into their bodies: 
                                                          
181 See Muecke (2003a, p. 125) on Indigenous philosophy, waste, and “overlapping [modes of 
classification…] where something may be useful to humans or birds, or both, in different ways”. 
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As the entire flock awakened, great hordes wove in and out of the 
tight pack with necks stretched high. These birds anticipated the 
movement of wind in the atmosphere. They gauged the speed of 
northerly flowing breezes caught in their neck feathers and across 
their red beaks and legs. The swans made no sound, but stood still 
while the wind intensified through the ruffling feathers on their 
breasts. (p. 303)  
 
As Oblivia and the swans finish their journey home, Wright, again, draws 
readers into the landscape without the Human: 
 
Then the winds grow warmer and disappear in the atmosphere 
laden with dust. Without a breeze, the land becomes so still and 
lonely in the silence, you know that the spirits have left the skies. It 
does not rain anymore. The land dries. Every living thing leaves in 
the seemingly never-ending journeys that migrating creatures take 
[…]. (p. 327) 
 
Soon after, Wright removes the reader further from the landscape. Having 
described the swans stranded in country, the narrator tells us that “If you 
were there you would have seen them everywhere” (p. 327). This is “land 
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screaming with all of its life”, with and “to the swans” as much as with and 
“to the girl” (p. 327), but not for us humans. 
In a world of burgeoning non-and-more-than-human agency, I read Bella 
Donna ironically when she opines that, “The sand got no mind himself. 
Nothing to do with it” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 63). Wright maintains that country 
expresses agencies that are not directly explainable via Western 
approaches to knowledge. In Deep Weather (2011a), she raises questions 
of knowledge amid ecological crises alongside notions of non-and-more-
than-human agency:   
 
For years many of those people living on the land have given the 
forces of nature the name Mother Nature. When you live with the 
land and regularly see things happen that are often beyond rational 
or logical explanation, then where do you turn for an answer? (p. 
75) 
 
In The Swan Book, country is affective: “It fills you up with life” (A. Wright, 
2013, p. 169). Country possesses sentience and power and warrants 
respect: “The genies walked off into the bush. They spoke to the country. 
Let the country know they had come” (p. 166). While country is sickened by 
the virus in it (p. 1), it also welcomes (p. 327); it breathes (p. 200); it issues 
forth music (p. 187); it sees; it rejects, kills, nurtures, protects, releases, 
enfolds (p. 29); and it teaches (p. 102). Country gathers stories to it and 
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functions as their custodian. Bodies live in and are the stories of country (p. 
18). 
Dust, wind, and drought are material-linguistic forces in The Swan Book. 
Dust is not only a metaphor for the renunciation of care and the atomisation 
of connection: “They could see that Warren Finch’s feelings were nothing 
more than weightless dust, particles of responsibility from their own Brolga 
plains he had scattered across the world” (2013, p. 134). Nor is dust solely a 
function of the material effects of global warming on climate and soils. Dust 
is the matter of drought and drought has possessed agency for “time 
immemorial” (p. 79). Wright’s visions of the force of dust—“dust had a way 
of displacing destiny” (p. 13)—suggests a familiarity with it as a corporeal 
and incorporeal assemblage with agency: “the dust spirit’s mind” (p. 14); 
“the storming almighty red dust spirit relation” (p. 14); and “dust given to 
them by their ancestors” (p. 54). Bodies are covered by dust: “entire 
continents covered” (p. 18), “shrouded” (p. 18), “dust-covered” (p. 16), 
“clouds of dust” (p. 166), “films of dust” (p. 66), “never-ending dust storms” 
(p. 17), “spreading over the land” (p. 332). Dust also transformationally 
enfolds the human—“permeated with the dust of our plains” (p. 134) —and 
becomes coextensive with other entities: “the dust in the breeze laden with 
the aroma of over-ripe mangoes, gidgee kadawala woodlands and 
bloodwood corymbia capricornia” (pp. 31-32). Dust carries voices: “the old 
black swans had heard her voice running along streams of dust floating in 
the breezes” (p. 65). Dust covers roads and cuts off bodies from bodies, 
queering notions of location (p. 54). It moves mountains. It folds country and 
bodies together:  
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Dust rose with each step, filled the air with each breath of wind, and 
fell to settle in their hair, over their skin, and in their clothes. They 
looked as though they had crawled in it, but they had blended into 
the country, and were indistinguishable from it. (p. 178) 
 
In Deep Weather, Wright (2011a) notes her own learning: the “stories I 
heard about how cyclones could chase a wrongdoer inland, that there was 
no escaping a cyclone if it was after you” (p. 75). In The Swan Book, 
cyclones assault cities, peoples and country. Immediately following Warren’s 
assassination, we might read a reaction by the wind in the narrative: the city 
experiences the storm “like a brick wall had been thrown at it” (p. 304) that 
“carried everything in its path” (p. 277). Wind, as material body and spiritual 
expression—“the wind running along the ground like a spirit” (2013, p. 326); 
“the old wind people” (p. 327)—also drives bodies to movement and gives 
direction to journeys. Wind encourages healed swans to fly again: “the wind 
off the changing tide pushed it along […] grew in intensity and soon picked 
up the running swan and pushed it into flight” (p. 263).  
The non-and-more-than-human invades and resurfaces the climate-
besieged city. Buildings and infrastructure have deteriorated and 
civilisational palimpsests have thinned and fractured: “the city had cracked; 
the city was breaking up” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 208). Prompted by the wind, 
Oblivia notices hidden bodies resurfacing: “the natural landscape was 
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quietly returning and reclaiming its original habitat […]. Through the cracks 
in the footpaths small trees sprouted, and ferns and grasses became 
obstacles, through which people were struggling to steer a clear path” (pp. 
208-209). Although we might find here a metaphor for new life growing 
through the cracks of an oppressive state of affairs, there is also a 
demonstrably material growth of bodies and an expression of non-and-
more-than-human agency.  
Wright’s work resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) idea that “we 
are not in the world, we become with the world” (p. 169). Her prose 
navigates and produces an unbounded cosmos where being and agency 
slip from body to body, and the focus of the narrative is on what occurs in 
relations between bodies rather than what resides in separate bodies. 
Wright joins and smears bodies, making separable subjectivities less 
determinate and multiple, and only meaningful when perceived in 
assemblage. Although there are many examples, I offer two here. First, the 
kaleidoscopic passage in which Oblivia encounters her first black swan: 
 
The black swan continued travelling low, then flew upwards with its 
long neck stretched taut, as though it was being pulled away by 
invisible strings as fine as a spider’s web held in its beak. She saw 
a troupe of frost-face monkeys holding the strings at the other end 
of the world. They were riding on a herd of reindeer crushing 
through ice particles in those faraway skies. Those taut strands of 
string twanged the chords of swan music called Hansdhwani that 
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the old gypsy woman Bella Donna would play […] while you could 
watch the blood flowing to the pulse of the music through the old 
lady’s white translucent skin […] the music of migratory travelling 
cycles, of unravelling and intensifying, of flying over the highest 
snow-capped mountains, along the rivers of Gods and Goddesses, 
crossing seas with spanned wings pulsing to the rhythm of relaxed 
heartbeats. (A. Wright, 2013, p. 15) 
 
Energy flows along globally connected tissues and bodies, all in movement; 
conjoining human and non-and-more-than-human, corporeal and 
incorporeal, music and flight, spirits and earth, and folding Oblivia into a 
dynamic, translucent assemblage. Second, as the black swans make their 
way back to swamp country, their energy is drawn from country and they 
interpenetrate with weather, seasons, air, bodies and spirits of the land, all 
of which are in motion:  
 
swans flew hillock over hillock along a rolling landscape […] the 
swans flew high, sailing through winds […] wing flapping and slow 
glide through floating ashes that flickered with fire and dazzle-
danced the sky in the full-throated blizzard of heat flying over the 
hills, before falling on the country beneath […] surrendering to the 
air, plummeting thousands of metres down […] flapping slower […] 
descending […] flying through seasons and changes in the weather 
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[…] as if the ancestors had pulled the swans across the skies, 
passing them on to the spirits of gibber plains, ironstone flats, 
claypans, salt lakes and drifts, towards a sacred rendezvous – a 
tabula rasa place – where all of the world’s winds come eventually 
and curl in ceremony. (pp. 323-324) 
 
Rose (2012b) writes on ecological transversality and the ways in which 
writing can nurture ethical sensibilities, leaving us with “no way to determine 
where connectivity and responsibility stop” (p. 138). Dynamic enfoldings in 
The Swan Book—things always moving and traversing other things—can be 
transformational. Wright’s stories bind the translucent world together as 
multiplicity. They carry potential to enhance readers’ apprehension of 
country’s—of non-and-more-than-human—capacities to adapt and continue 
to story itself even amid such ruinous transformations as the ecological 
crises brought on by The Swan Book’s capitalist-coloniser virus.  
Kwaymullina (2016) explains that in philosophies of animate realities: 
“where everything lives and therefore is in a constant state of movement, the 
process of knowing inevitably involves locating the self within the networks 
of relationships that comprise the world, and that also comprise the self” (p. 
441). I propose that in The Swan Book, Wright enacts and cultivates such a 
“locating [of] the self within” and enriches the conceptualisation of a literary 
practice of smoothing space outlined in Chapter 3. In the chapter Owls in the 
Grass, Warren’s bodyguards, the “genies” (p. 162), Hart, Doom and Mail, 
take Warren and Oblivia away from the swamp and deep into desert 
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country. They intend to keep Warren safe from assassination threats, and to 
undertake their custodial and scientific duties. Forced to travel with them, 
Oblivia’s inability to share the sense of the health of the genies’ country 
contrasts starkly with the Life that bursts forth, traverses and enfolds bodies 
as they move. We read Oblivia’s experience of desert country as one might 
a stranger’s removed apprehension of foreign landscapes. In the morning 
light, the country is “grey and solemn […] silent […] mostly grass and 
sparsely scattered scrub” (p. 173). She sees “a vista of sameness in every 
direction” (p. 173) in which “nothing much grew more than a metre off the 
ground” (p. 175). It seems, for her, to be a “bushland so vast in its 
sameness, that only the traditional owner could read the subtle stories of its 
contours” (p. 186). Oblivia sees “an endless journey ahead in an unchanging 
landscape that they would continue walking forever” (p. 192). It appears 
unwelcoming and its qualities already fixed. However, there is more to be 
discerned than “sameness”: more to be sensed in country.  
Oblivia initially resists entering into the multiplicity of country. However, 
as the group moves, other bodies come close up, and country begins to 
pullulate with the non-and-more-than-human, folding with and enfolding 
humans. Movement produces lively space. To use Daniel Smith’s words on 
the writing of percepts in his introduction to Deleuze’s Essays Critical and 
Clinical (1997, p. xxxiv), “The landscape is no longer an external reality, but 
has become the very element of a "passage of Life". The space produced is 
colonised or plagued: rats, owls, snakes, insects, and locusts shape the 
desert country’s qualities as it shapes their futures. The “ground [is] thick 
with rats” (p. 166); in “strands of millions” (p. 176). Oblivia registers that the 
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“earth move[s] with their footsteps” (p. 166). They “scattered in rolling 
waves at every movement” (p. 166), “rushing through the bush whining for 
food” (p. 170). Wright attends in the novel to the processes of bodies 
multiplying. Owls arrive in “large flocks”, each brood quadrupling their 
numbers (p. 176). Country thickens, becoming increasingly intimate as 
bodies move. The country spirit—scrub devil—draws Oblivia “into the 
foliage” (p. 168). Spider webs link power lines to mulga trees (pp. 172-173) 
and Oblivia fears encasement in “thicker and thicker” woven webs (p. 173). 
They travel among owl nests: circling between, delving in. Owl tunnelling 
has produced new space in the “thick kinkarra spinifex grasslands” (p. 178). 
Country’s thick, agentic intimacy is sensed on the body but this is not 
necessarily to know it as others do, or to relate affirmatively to it. The genies 
marvel at the singularity of each nest’s construction, each egg, while 
“Oblivia thought all the nests were the same” (p. 180) and the Harbour 
Master sees vibrant spinifex as desert: “kinkarra nayi” (p. 181). These 
becomings of/in space are not solely corporeal; they are also spectral, and 
temporally transversal. As Oblivia moves, country repopulates with ghosts, 
and with signs of violence and death: “bones were scattered around the 
ground throughout the spinifex” (p. 181). Country becomes omnivorous: 
devouring Indigenous women—lost in spinifex waves (p. 173)—and 
foreigners. Country also devours the visitors, or rather, its “grey dust” (p. 
176) coats and enfolds, and genie and dust bodies become 
“indistinguishable” (p. 178).  
We are, it seems, in the realms of the percept as the narration calls up 
salt lake country. Country, to borrow Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) words 
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on smooth space, is “occupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, and 
sonorous and tactile qualities” (p. 479). Although country is introduced 
sparingly, as “white sea” with small jutting crags as its “landmarks” (p. 190), 
multiplicities live beyond this removed human perception. As the group walk, 
the “white sea” pulses with life, and readers are drawn into serpent 
perceptions: of “an insect perching on its skin, come there to recite its song. 
The landing of butterflies. The feet of a lizard pounding on crystals of salt” 
(p. 190). There is, here, a filigreed delicacy of existence and activity—a 
molecularity—beyond common powers of perception, made accessible via 
the deep listening of “a resting serpent spirit fellow” (p. 190). Wright’s 
narration, I suggest, qualitatively expands our encounters with what Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) define as an artist’s “close-range” vision (p. 493). 
Hovering somewhere between Oblivia’s, the group’s, the narrator’s, and no 
human’s point of view, we are drawn further into vibrant non-and-more-than-
human territories where, paradoxically, the “quietness” and “solitude” (A. 
Wright, 2013, p. 190) and multiplicity increase: 
  
There were battalions of stink beetles crawling over each other and 
the salt. Plague grasshoppers jumped away at the coming of 
strangers. Moth storms swept across the lake. Crimson and orange 
chats whistled from the heath of spinifex, pittosporums, mulga and 
eremophila scrubs growing along the lake. The girl saw twisting 
clouds of budgerigars crossing their paths at various times 
throughout the day. Up high, harriers and kites cried out as they 
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glided in the thermals. To look back was to see fine salt crystals 
dusting over their tracks as little storms of salty filaments gurgled 
about in the desert air. (p. 190)  
 
This is not just/one space. Rather, we traverse lively, heterogeneous, 
entangled, fluxing, moving territories: vibrant inhabitations of salt, lake, 
heath, scrub, clouds, thermals, and tracks. These territories enrich our 
sense of Deleuzian notions of territories as dynamic, “malleable” sites of 
passage (Message, 2010, p. 275), always in a state of process and 
transformation, though not without qualities of internal organisation. 
Night draws us deeper into country, beneath the visible surface, and into 
a richly populated “spirit sea” of:  
 
salt-encrusted bodies of millions of grasshoppers, shoals of tiny 
bone fish, brine shrimps, larval fish like splinters of glass, colourless 
moths, seeds and stalks; grotesque bloated grunters, bony 
herrings, frogs, tadpoles and water birds that had perished in the 
increasingly saline waters [.] (A. Wright, 2013, pp. 190-191) 
 
The seemingly featureless and dead are full of the pulse of Life and closer 
to us than we might be able to perceive, precisely because we humans have 
disappeared from, or into, country. Wright’s narrator rouses country that 
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stories itself beyond any human writing; although, as humans connect with 
those stories they also are drawn into an entangled existence: as much 
products of country as producers of it: as Muecke (2003b) writes on 
landscape and variability, “things and people are mutually transformative” (p. 
287).  
The rapid narrative rhythm of The Swan Book, the proliferation and 
overlapping of images of bodies, the continuous variation of perspective, 
and the novel’s thickening of the space produced by the movements and 
relations between bodies, generate a sense of multiplicity, transversality, 
vitality, and agency. In Owls in the Grass and elsewhere in the novel, it is 
difficult to pin any body down: words to meanings; humans to names, even 
to corporeal and incorporeal existence; time to direction; narrative to point of 
view;182 stories to truth or falsity; landscapes or space to their lack and 
wealth of vitality and agency; humans as distinct from non-and-more-than-
human. The potential in bodies—their capacity to express Life—seems to be 
a primary result of Wright’s keeping the things narrated in continuous 
relation and variation rather than fixing them with description. She expresses 
an ecology in which dynamic matrices of representation and relations 
connect and entangle humans, animals, country, spirits, space and time. 
Wright, as Virginia Woolf spoke of writing, seems to “put everything into it”, 
to “saturate every atom” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 280), and the text 
pulsates with moving bodies, interconnection and difference. Wright’s 
representational and narrative democracy privileges neither human nor non-
                                                          
182 See Daley (2016b, p. 308) on proliferating and imbricated narration and points of view, 
expressing/producing collective, more-than-human, enunciation. 
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and-more-than-human—sentient or seemingly otherwise—as things cannot 
be separated and their separation would be to diminish their living. There is 
little opportunity to steady ourselves upon a familiar image before it flows 
into another: “Anyone daring to look back into the lake’s echoes heard 
voices like dogs barking out of the mouths of fish skimming across the 
surface as they chased after the hordes of mosquitoes – around four 
o’clock” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 8). One effect of Wright’s imagery is to swamp 
the reader with dynamic multiplicity. Beginning with the “massive sand 
storms that cursed the place after the arrival of the strangers from the sea” 
(p. 8), the narration goes on to weave more threads into the rope: 
 
voices were heard arching across the heavy waves in the middle of 
the night. All their shouting ended up on ribbons of salt mist that 
went idling from the sea along an ancient breezeway - travelling 
with sand flies and tumbling bats through kilometres of inlet, along a 
serpentine track, dumped where it could dig into the resting place of 
the old story that lived inside the ancestral people of the lake. (p. 8)  
 
The Swan Book’s attention to the movements of dynamic bodies, not only 
as metaphors but as material forces, resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) conceptualisation of the spiral—a movement that traverses points 
and straight lines—as a mode of escape: as “the vortex that overspills the 
striation” (p. 489). We encounter the work of the gyre (A. Wright, 2013, p. 
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244), the cycle (pp. 6, 108), the vortex (p. 300), cyclones (pp. 16, 334, 341, 
324, 279, 277), whorls (p. 12.98), things zigzagging (p. 2), circling (which 
occurs twenty-two times), spinning (p. 3) and spiralling (pp. 110, 246).183 
Wright’s vision is full of bodies overspilling their constraints—including 
language, as I discuss later—and becoming uncontainable despite efforts to 
control and contain their existential lines of flight. The Swan Book enriches 
our sense of what might be involved in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
exhortation for us to pursue a “streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, 
feverish line of variation, [that] liberates a power of life that human beings 
had rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses 
as the trait, or impulse traversing it” (p. 499). It exemplifies Muecke’s 
(2003b) observation that Indigenous cosmologies offer “an unexpected 
version of the posthumanism some have been looking for in contemporary 
philosophical thought” (p. 297) and more. 
Manning (2009), in her studies of Indigenous art, also writes spatially of 
the creation involved in Indigenous story-telling: “A Dreaming is not an 
entity, not a place. It is a movement, a song and a dance, a practice of 
mark-making that does not represent a space-time but creates it, again and 
again” (p. 163). As story-telling, Wright’s narration infuses Life into those 
bodies she calls up. The narrative focus is invariably on how bodies move 
and relate rather than on the production of lists of plants, animals, geology, 
and geography that set (indeed, fix) or set apart a scene. Wright draws upon 
these vital relations, producing what Manning calls liveliness rather than 
                                                          
183 Wright (2007a) has previously made reference to ‘a spinning multi-stranded helix of stories [… 
as] the condition of Indigenous storytelling […]’ (p. 6). 
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representation (p. 155). Desert country in The Swan Book is anything but 
extended sameness, stasis, and separateness: it is in process, full of 
potential and affect. Such enlivened space expresses the transformative 
capacities of bodies: their work of story-telling beyond words. Indeed, we 
encounter non-and-more-than-human capacities to affect as Oblivia finds 
herself, after days of hatred and fear in desert country, unexpectedly 
thinking, “But I like it here now” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 193). Wright’s literary 
productions of space carry the potential to unsettle—at least, non-
indigenous—common sense and to enliven readers: to the degree to which 
some human perceptions have been diminished or are inadequate to the 
complexities and registers of Life beyond the Human; to what Potter (2009) 
calls the world’s “composing complexity” (p. 77); to the expanded perceptual 
capacities—or the different modes of attention—to which we might aspire in 
order to apprehend the movements, agencies and relations of non-and-
more-than-human bodies that co-compose; and to the always already 
intimate entanglement of such bodies and humans. I discuss Wright’s writing 
of intimate entanglements and becomings further in the next section, with 
particular attention to Oblivia and swans. 
 
[B]eing a survivor swan (A. Wright, 2013, p. 332) 
 
The story about what had happened to the girl who was found in a 
tree became common knowledge through this large tribal nation. 
The story became a wild story. Everyone had an idea of what really 
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happened. Some people were saying firstly that the girl was taken, 
kidnapped by the tree from her people as punishment. Others said 
that she was really the tree itself. She had become the tree's 
knowledge. Or, possibly she was related to the tree through Law, 
and the tree took her away from her people. (A. Wright, 2013, p. 95) 
 
Oblivia, people, a sacred tree, Law, knowledge, and stories.184 As well as 
storying the “nonhuman landscapes of nature” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 
169), Wright also fills her writing with the nonhuman becomings of the 
human (p. 169). Figures in The Swan Book are intensively enfolded with the 
non-and-more-than-human.185 Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) notion of 
literary figures resonates with Wright’s writing: some “can only exist, and the 
author can only create them, because they do not perceive but have passed 
into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations” 
(p. 169). Wright’s writing of Oblivia is an expression of Life beyond the 
Human, beyond the Majoritarian words that speak her, and beyond the 
images of her that others produce. Oblivia carries, enacts and augments 
stories that precede and follow her. As material-discursive subject, she is 
                                                          
184 While I do not directly explore and reconcile Indigenous and non-Indigenous conceptualisations 
of the sacred in this thesis, I note that Rose (1996) provides valuable insights into the importance to 
Indigenous cultures, philosophies and living of Life-grounded and Life-nourishing sacred “origins […] 
places […] sites […] sources of life […] rituals” and beings (pp. 8, 9, 44, 9, 10, 23). Foley (2003) 
writes of Indigenous commitments to the irreducible enmeshment of peoples and earth and the 
sacred: “The sacred world is not based entirely in the metaphysical, as some would believe. Its 
foundation is in healing (both the spiritual and physical well being of all creatures), the lore (the 
retention and re-enforcement of oral history), care of country, the laws and their maintenance” (pp.46-
47). 
185 I acknowledge Barras’ (2015b), Daley’s (2016b), Gleeson-White’s (2016), and Skeat’s (2016) 
work on this approach to reading The Swan Book. 
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open to nonhuman intensities and relations with non-and-more-than human 
bodies; immersed in “encounters outside of the ordered conception of 
existence” (Roffe, 2005b, p. 186). Her becomings express capacities for 
taking-flight beyond the reach of capitalist-colonialism.186 She expresses 
futurity amid ecological crises: finding—not unlike Tom Keely in Eyrie 
(Winton, 2013)—Life amid ruin.  
Wright explains that, for the novel Carpentaria, she worked on “the 
creation of Indigenous heroes, as a way of understanding through fiction the 
significance of the lives of the characters, and as lived with or through the 
ancestral land and sea spiritual creation heroes that I also created” (2011c, 
p. 39). The Swan Book’s story-telling of heroes, Oblivia and black swans 
among them, conveys “becoming with the world” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 
p. 169), metamorphosis, re-emergence, resistance to annihilation, and 
endurance. Oblivia’s and the swans’ stories resonate with what Bogue 
(2010a) calls writing’s capacities to express “immanent possibilities of 
transformation” (p. 180).  
Wright’s writing of Oblivia is at times allegorical, metaphorical, and 
metonymical.187 Bogue (2010a) observes that Jameson noted art’s potential 
for “national allegory” (p. 227), and much of Wright’s writing could be 
                                                          
186 Daley (2016b) refers to “Oblivia-swan relationships […as] enabling of movement and 
transformations” (p. 305) 
187 We read Oblivia as literary figuration of all Indigenous girls and women: the lost; the murdered; 
the abandoned (A. Wright, 2013, p. 319). Takolander (2016, p. 116) calls Oblivia “a synecdoche of 
the postcolonial nation” (p. 116). 
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characterised as purposeful, though hardly subtle, allegory.188 We might 
discern parallels in The Swan Book between black swans’ stories and the 
histories of Indigenous peoples: the novelty of discovery and the denial of 
existence; displacement and movement; coloniser curiosity with the Other. It 
is also tempting—and possible—to enter the symbolic field that Wright 
constructs in The Swan Book, and concern ourselves with fairy-tale 
transformation as a way of telling Oblivia’s story: from ugly duckling, 
nameless girl to First Lady swan.189 Oblivia, in more than name, expresses 
collective memories of abandonment and killing; the perpetual trauma of 
violence and of being cast out by white Australians and by her own people; 
and the shame and fear among those same people who the Majoritarian 
stories hold accountable. However, Oblivia and swans are more-than-
symbolic figurations, many of which Wright critiques in their very use. They 
are also affective bodies. Their becomings draw us out and into something 
as large as Life. Oblivia’s seeks sovereignty of mind via thoroughly 
uncolonial modes of becoming: via silence rather than voice; via movement, 
journey and return; and via affirmative relations and entanglements with the 
non-and-more-than-human (swans, country, and spirits). Oblivia’s story (her 
legend) folds (her) into and floats (her) across country: her own and beyond. 
She becomes story, though no story we humans might conventionally—or 
adequately—commit to mind or words.  
                                                          
188 I acknowledge Law’s (2004, pp. 97-98) proposition that allegory can convey the complexities of a 
world that are too often repressed. 
189 And, perhaps, in employing these figurations of Oblivia, Wright is foregrounding the problems 
with romanticising and overlaying foreign narratives upon always singular lives. 
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Oblivia resists, and seeks escape—to get out, to return (A. Wright, 2013, 
p. 4), to fly (p. 69)—even amid the swamp’s diabolically extreme detention. 
To briefly return to my earlier discussion of smoothing space, it is, perhaps, 
Oblivia’s holding to her vision of escape, flight and return—even after 
Warren’s destruction of her home country’s (p. 318)—that performs what 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 482) call smoothing space without moving. 
She smooths, faces striation, smooths again; not least via her connections 
with black swans: “She wanted to fly. Dreams of stick wings attached to her 
arms that possibly grew feathers […] the lightness of being airborne […] to 
dream about all those invisible places she had heard about, that lay outside 
the swamp” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 69). In her mind, Oblivia cultivates a space 
for movement, and resists being storied by the Majoritarian and becoming 
just another, or an Other. She rejects the demands made of her to be 
“normal” (p. 21), to fit proliferating imposed identities and roles (wife, child, 
First Lady, dependant, animal), to forget (p. 221),190 to change colour (p. 
221), not to be the one to ask, and not to have her own thoughts. Instead, 
she remains open: to the abnormal; to the non-and-more-than-human; to not 
playing a role; to remembering her wounds in her own way despite the 
trauma of those memories; to keeping her colour; to wondering/wandering 
and searching for what is missing; to relating to others; and to becoming-
other.  
An expansive sensuality, as we find in Oblivia, is a quality Bogue (2010a, 
p. 228) also calls “heroic and life affirming”. Oblivia stories herself, not with 
                                                          
190 Takolander (2016, p. 114) reads historical forgetting in Oblivia’s name.  
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spoken words but via movement, sensation, intensities, relations and 
connections to others, including ancestral bodies. Amid the ruins of the city, 
Oblivia exhibits an uncommon sensibility and finds Life in the endurance 
and, perhaps, return of the non-and-more-than-human. While Warren is 
“running” on about the city life of consumption, belongings, and plotting, 
Oblivia attends to the movement and sound of air (A. Wright, 2013, p. 209). 
The swamped “catastrophic city” (p. 252) crumbles and, as it does so, 
Oblivia glimpses different lives growing through the cracks in the state of 
affairs. Her attention is caught by “orange fungi” (p. 209), “moss and black 
lichen” (p. 239), “frogs croaking in the drains” (p. 209), the wind (pp. 209, 
210), bird calls (pp. 212, 215), the fragrances of trees (p. 210), and the 
possibilities for Life amid/beyond urban ruin. We become aware of other 
agencies inhabiting the earth and of different notions of time to those 
espoused by mainstream Western cultures. To Oblivia and the narrator, 
cycles of overwriting, decline, return and reclamation occur over much 
longer timeframes and some forces—“the droning of ancestor country” (p. 
264) beneath the ruinous city—will not be denied/silenced by human 
constructions. 
Oblivia is quiet, but this is not to deny her intensities. Twice we read of 
her silent expression possessing the force of bushfires. She emits a 
message, or the sense of a message, via a most singular “screaming” (A. 
Wright, 2013, pp. 19, 78, 334). This screaming is, in part, an exhortation for 
a return to a care for human and non-and-more-than-human and 
Dreamings. Indeed, it is more than a human expression: “like listening to a 
sigh of a moth extending out over the landscape, or a whisper from a scrub 
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ancestor catching a little stick falling from a dead tree, although nothing that 
could be truly heard” (p. 334). We might also find, in this narration of 
Oblivia’s emissions, a force operating beyond the colonisers’ scope of 
control and their perceptual range:  
 
[sounds] of such low frequency that the old woman [Bella] strained 
to distinguish what usually fell within a range of bushland humming, 
such as leaves caught up in gusts of wind, or the rustling of the 
wiyarr spinifex grasses in the surrounding landscape as the wind 
blew over them, or sometimes the flattened whine of distant bird 
song, or a raging bush-fire-crackling and hissing from juju jungku 
bayungu, a long way off, which the old woman heard coming out of 
Oblivia’s angry mouth. (p. 20) 
 
We can also explore Oblivia’s expansive sensuality via her 
corporeal/incorporeal foldings with the non-and-more-than-human. Oblivia’s 
relations with swans entail expressions of alternative perceptual modes to 
those of the human and of capacities to resist and renew. Literary 
becomings-swan are visions of potential, or, as Bogue (2010a) writes of 
fabulation, “of real possibilities, human gods inhabiting a dimension 
immanent within a world of coercion and violence but capable of 
engendering something new” (p. 106). Oblivia becomes-more-than-human 
and swans more-than-birds. In such “involutions”, as Deleuze and Guattari 
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(1987, p. 238) describe becomings, untapped potentials are catalysed: 
escapes and returns become possible. Life expresses its capacity to 
outpace capitalist-colonialism.  
Writing about Oblivia’s becomings-swan, as I mentioned with regard to 
Kai in chapter 4, is not to suggest an imitation, a turning into, or a coming to 
look like an animal. Nor are these becomings only human experiences: they 
are akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s mutual, “unnatural nuptials” (1987, p. 
240). Swans are as central to Wright’s centre-less narrative as humans. 
Belonging and vitality are available beyond the Human. This is something 
Oblivia gestures toward in her repeated evocations of ascent as a trajectory 
towards belonging—“I must continue on, to reach that one last place in a 
tinder-dry nimbus where I once felt a sense of belonging” (A. Wright, 2013, 
pp. 209, 205)—and in her sense of where “peace” can be found: “in these 
grasslands where swans had preened themselves and slept in waves with 
long necks curled s-shaped over their backs, that life seemed the cleanest, 
and where the air filled her with a sense of peace” (p. 273). Oblivia’s 
becomings express trajectories: actual and virtual, in thought and action, 
corporeal and incorporeal. What primarily occur are moments of 
transformation in which swan and girl perceptions traverse each other and 
the two separate subjectivities enter into zones of indiscernibility: joint 
perceptions produced amid intimate relations. Oblivia becomes-other and 
finds trajectories of being, along which she can express care. Swans 
become-country via their relations with Oblivia. Their being spreads wider 
and deeper than the conceptualisations of black swans that we find in the 
minds of other characters in the novel and in the cosmopolitan, reductive 
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subjectivisations of black swans that Wright threads through her narrative. 
The becoming larger-than-life of Oblivia and swans takes place as they 
enter into transformative relations with each other. True to Indigenous onto-
epistemologies, these are relations in which being and knowing overlap, 
traverse existential registers and flow between categories. They are also 
more than incorporeal/corporeal involutions between flesh and blood bodies; 
they are also incorporeal-spiritual, becoming-Dreamings.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 243-244) suggest that we are drawn to 
the animal by anomaly and, in The Swan Book, the black swans’ arrival in 
the north of the continent seems to be one such event. Black swans 
deterritorialise Oblivia’s notions of self and revitalise her affective capacities. 
She senses connections. As she is, so they are for her: “exiles” (A. Wright, 
2013, p. 14), “gypsies” (p. 15), and “nomads” (p. 16). She is unsettled when 
black swans first arrive, because she senses that they know her differently, 
and more intimately than others claim. There is a meeting of eyes between 
Oblivia and swan during their first encounter, but the affect of the encounter 
is more than can be captured by vision: it is intensive and transformative. 
Oblivia becomes cold, confused, and stops breathing. She feels opened out: 
“exposed, hunted and found” (p. 14). There is also a perceptual opening out: 
of her “narrow prism of viewing something strange and unfamiliar” (p. 15). 
She is connected via the swan to bodies “at the other end of the world” (p. 
15) and Wright’s passage is flush with a sense of travel and flight. The 
sensual connection occurring appears so highly attuned as to be beyond 
conventional understandings of the capacities of human senses. Oblivia’s 
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auditions and visions become attuned to swan thoughts, bodies, heartbeats 
and souls: 
 
This was when the girl realised that she could hear the winnowing 
wings from other swans coming from far away. Their murmurings to 
one another were like angels whispering from the heavens. She 
wondered where they were coming from as they entered her 
dreams in this country. (p. 15) 
 
Oblivia’s perceptions become timeless swan perceptions:  
 
Oblivia thought she was in the sky, flying, and could not remember 
the journey. She and the swans were caught in the winds of a ghost 
net dragged forward by the spirits of the country. The long strands 
of hair flying among the swans, holding them together, and those 
long strands capturing her, made her fly too, close to the ground, 
across the country. (p. 326)  
 
Country bears them forth and all are entangled. Oblivia and swans enter into 
visual, auditory, haptic, affective, and spiritual zones of indiscernibility. 
Oblivia “saw in their erratic and chaotic struggle their desperation to flee, 
and understood the very same nervousness running through her body” (p. 
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159). The swans’ sound comes “from the air of her breath. The air was 
wrapping breath with breath” (p. 244). Oblivia is able to “feel the presence of 
their bodies, of beating wings from lean-chested birds, lightened from the 
long journey, with necks stretched in flight” (p. 244). The swans and Oblivia 
become part of each other’s story; each carrying that story. 
Swans’ and Oblivia’s foldings into each other enable lines of flight. 
Fleeing the collapsing city, the girl and the hovering “cloud” of swans fold 
together, and Oblivia, rendered invisible, escapes from the ill-fated refugees 
travelling north: 
 
she disappeared quietly, in the moments when the black swan 
cloud flew across the line of travelling people, covering the moonlit 
water. She closed her ears to the sounds of the collapsing world 
behind her, and kept walking under the cloud of swans moving 
slowly just above the water, their loud beating wings creating a mad 
turbulence in the water that kept her camouflaged. (A. Wright, 2013, 
p. 310) 
 
Wright’s narrative dwells upon folding, entanglement, and transversal, 
affective relations between corporeal (and incorporeal) bodies. A passage 
begins with a vibrant collective of swans (they “wove in and out of the tight 
pack” (p. 303)), rather than humans, connecting with Oblivia, and rising up: 
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They had found each other’s heartbeat, the pulse humming through 
the land from one to the other, like the sound of distant clap sticks 
beating through ceremony, connecting together the spirits, people 
and place of all times into one. (p. 303) 
 
Forces flow, traversing wind-swan-Human, and are sensed on the body, or, 
perhaps, all bodies are co-constructed/coextensive: such that there can be 
no swan or human without wind, no wind without swan and Human, and so 
on. Although, it is not only swans, wind and humans, but also time, spirits, 
and place folding into complex, vibrant, and dynamic assemblage. These 
affirmative relations suggest a powerful collectivity that is more-than-human: 
a cohering of complexity, with a capacity for and an orientation towards 
renewal. In assemblage, Oblivia finds a resolve, or the augmentation of her 
affective capacities, and she is able to keep moving: “There was no going 
back. She would follow them. They were heading north, on the way home” 
(p. 303). 
To return to Deleuze and Guattari’s “feverish line of variation” (1987, p. 
499), the corporeal/incorporeal folding of swans, Oblivia, and country is 
expressed as gyric, cyclic, spiral, vortex-like, and whorl-like: “together in 
mass blackness, they swam in circles […] the white tipped wings that beat 
quicker, faster, as more circles are made” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 325). Swans 
are “welcomed into the country’s song” (p. 325) and they dance its “yellow 
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dust song cycles of drought” (p. 329) and perform water ceremony (p. 325). 
They communicate with each other: swans and swans; swans and Oblivia. 
In alliance, Oblivia gains knowledge from the swans—“how she must read 
the country now as they do to follow them home” (p. 325)—while the swans 
cannot move without Oblivia, nor without the assistance of country: “the old 
wind people” (p. 327). Swans compete with the capitalist-colonial virus for 
space in Oblivia’s mind, but they do so affectively, via the body; via their 
deportment and movement. Swans and Oblivia participate in vibrant acts of 
creation, commitment, collectivity and connection. These acts carry a 
“pulse”; have “body”; have “mass”; and make “music” (p. 325). This is a 
singular music and it occurs alongside the rebirth or renewal of Oblivia: “as 
though she is a newly hatched cygnet” (p. 326). Wright restores mind, or 
certain notions of mind, in telling these stories. Mind is not an engine of 
progress, separate from the world, superior in certain beings rather than 
others, subject to hierarchies across races, perfectible, infallible, and of an 
Other “nation”. Rather, mind is connected, embodied, in continuous 
variation, collective, open, and full of possibilities.  
Swans also become-other via their relations with country and Oblivia. 
Black swans’ stories involve reconnections to, and renewal of, ancestral 
spirits and stories. Their arrival at the swamp, unknown to country, contains 
a physical descent and Wright’s narrator notes that “Maybe, it was in those 
moments of falling, that the big bird placed itself within the stories of this 
country” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 19). As swans move, they lay down stories “in 
the earth” and these relations overcome their having “no story for 
  
 
245 
 
themselves” in that country (p. 59).191 Allied with Oblivia, they become 
custodians and are “welcomed into the country’s song” (p. 325). They 
become both carers for Oblivia and in her care: “cooing to be pacified by 
her” (p. 161); healed of their wounds in the city apartment; carried by her on 
the dangerous journey north; protecting her; entangling their bodies with 
hers; each guiding the other (pp. 247-248, 296). Oblivia is transformed too: 
from useless “thing” (p. 36) to carer; from fatalistic thoughts of the difficulty 
of return to country, to acting to return (p. 196). Thought of swans, we read, 
“soothes her, instructs her in endurance and perseverance” (p. 240). 
Becomings-other are Oblivia’s escape from, and her overcoming of, the 
force of the virus to isolate and dissociate bodies. Where there have so far 
appeared to be only the narrow realms of fear, occupation and control, her 
relations with swans produce perceptions of “great space” (p. 69); 
sensations of flight amid detention; the return of omitted memories (p. 248); 
and transformations in thought. In The Swan Book we find that the 
sovereign Indigenous mind is a function of a relational existence, not 
isolation, and can be nurtured via becomings-other.  
Oblivia’s and swans’ capacities to affect each other affirmatively are 
embodied in story. Wright’s narrator calls it “a really deadly love story” 
(2013, p. 334). Nurtured by her relationships with swans, and having 
returned to country, Oblivia becomes a timeless force for care and love, and 
for resistance to the virus of the colonised mind: the “mind of the nation” (p. 
165). She endures and seems impervious to time: “she always stayed like a 
                                                          
191 Although, Wright’s narrator acknowledges that “perhaps […] their ancestors of long ago […] had 
travelled their law stories over the land” (p. 16). 
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wulumbarra, teenage girl” (p. 334). As legend, her story becomes temporally 
transversal: operable outside of chronological time that might cut it off and 
make it past. We read that it “might be the same story about some important 
person carrying a swan centuries ago and it might be the same story in 
centuries to come” (p. 333). This story’s capacity to be retold and affect 
others resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) conceptualisation of art 
as an affective vehicle. Story-telling enables the novel to become 
“monumental” (p. 168): enduring over time and space, and capable of 
entering into affective encounters with other bodies. For the visitors to 
swamp country mentioned in the novel’s final passages, Oblivia’s non-and-
more-than-human call is a call to the imagination, and to certain of the 
qualities of Indigenous culture—not least care, collectivity, and continuity 
with country—underpinning practices of endurance that are more affirmative 
than silence, separation and shame: “kayi, kayi kala-wurru nganyi, your 
country is calling out for you” (p. 334). On these matters of care, calling out, 
and collectivity, I argue in what remains of this chapter that Wright’s literary 
practice in The Swan Book—her care for the vitality of expression—
constitutes a calling out to a people to come and, thereby, an expression of 
resistance and renewal amid Crises of Ecologies. Wright’s style cultivates 
(tends to) the health of expression and Indigenous sovereignty precisely via 
what the coloniser virus might sense as its madness. 
 
 
Tending to expression and peoples to come 
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Was it possible for her voice to be heard by imaginary people too? 
(A. Wright, 2013, p. 23, italics in original)  
 
To tend to the stretch of expression, to foster and inflect it rather 
than trying to own it, is to enter the stream, contributing to its 
probings. (Massumi, 2002b, p. xxii) 
 
For Wright (2002), literature helps answer Galleano’s question: “what 
makes a people” (p. 12); although she acknowledges in her critical writing 
that the question of who Indigenous writers write for is “vexed” (A. Wright, 
2008b, p. 24). One of her responses to this challenge is to concern herself 
and her writing with the violence that began with colonisation (p. 24) and 
which continues to be experienced by Indigenous communities: as “political 
domination; theft of land; widespread suffering” (2006b, p. 105); and 
oppression and silencing (A. Wright, 2008a, p. 136) by the “forces of 
homogenisation” (2007b, p. np). Those suffering, Wright notes, include not 
only the living but the unsung lost: the “voice that is silent or elusive” (2002, 
p. 20).  
Wright (2007a, p. 17) explains, also, that she works for the emancipation 
of the collective Indigenous sovereign mind and imagination. Resonating 
with the symptomatology of the “cut snake virus” (p. 1) we find in The Swan 
Book, Wright refers, elsewhere, to “besieged principles that matter most to 
Indigenous peoples” (2011b, p. np); to popularised perceptions of 
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Indigenous people’s inability to govern themselves (2007a, p. 7) that also 
infect bodies and minds; to the material/bodily impact of the climate of fear 
that pervades Australian and Indigenous societies (2008a, pp. 149-150); 
and to mind as the “last frontier of colonisation” (2011c, p. 5). She argues 
that her work as writer entails enunciating the aspirations of that collectivity, 
and rehabilitating and reclaiming “existence” (2002, p. 18). She aspires, 
then, to make a contribution to consciousness raising and to enhancing 
capacities to reconceptualise Indigenous rights outside of colonial binds put 
upon bodies and thought (2007a, p. 6; 2008a, p. 15).  
Wright also comments on the demands upon artists to invoke a collective 
attunement—beyond Indigenous peoples—to ecological crises, and to fear 
as a weapon of social and material domination (2008a). She asserts that “it 
will be artists […] who must imagine the future, to explain what science is 
telling us in cold, hard language: that we will all become the earth’s 
refugees” (2008a, p. 155). In her discussion of psychically, physically and 
socially pervasive fear—“trying to understand Australia’s phobias” (p. 166)—
Wright offers a widened conceptualisation of both the scope of the 
community of the suffering and of how Indigenous communities suffer. Fear, 
Wright argues, is a quality of not only the silenced and self-silencing 
Indigenous mind but also of “countless others globally” (2008a, p. 160). She 
expresses interest in writers—Darwish, for example—who seek to express 
the “experience of ‘every exiled psyche’” (2008a, p. 137) and she suspects 
that the exiled people to come will be all of us (p. 155), not just the human 
us. Rather than becoming islands of imprisonment (Bogue, 2010a, p. 195), 
disconnection (A. Wright, 2007a, p. 16), exile (2008a, p. 137), and 
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inhumanity (2011c, p. 42), that do “not seem to gel” (2002, p. 12), Wright 
evokes the capacity for connection, vitality and renewal in even the most 
ruined body and mind (2008a, p. 137) and between islands of exile (2008b, 
p. 22). She writes that “An island can easily destroy and remake itself from 
its own debris” (2007a, p. 16) and “A person could always be something 
else” (p. 9).  
There is little doubt that Wright’s words are expressions of, and calls to, 
Indigenous resistance and renewal. She asserts that writing is a collective 
act (2008a, p. 161) and that there exist pathways, including literature, along 
which differences can be imbued with affirmative potentials (p. 138). Writing 
is a practice of resistance against assimilation and annihilation (1997, p. 74; 
2002, p. 15): nourishing the mind (2011c), preserving “integrity” (p. 38), and 
revitalising “lost symbols of culture” (2008b, p. 22). In these ways, Deleuze’s 
and Wright’s hopes for literature resonate: namely, with regard to its 
potential to energise “a will to form and create, to enhance affectivity, to 
induce and undergo metamorphosis and transformation” (Bogue, 2012, p. 
12). Wright’s focus, through writing, on engendering a quality of 
consciousness, and different ways of relating and thinking, constitute efforts 
to instantiate a people to come.  
For Wright, the people to come are: carriers of possibility; stretchers of 
imagination; full of agency, creativity and authenticity; revitalisers of country, 
story and language; and active custodians of past, present and future. 
Having begun this chapter exploring Wright’s symptomatology and 
characterisations of this people to come as a collective of the oppressed, I 
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return, here, to the contention that Wright’s literary practice draws energy for 
such renewals from the forces shaping the Indigenous state of affairs in The 
Swan Book and nurtures the forces of expression that always already 
outpace oppression. In this regard, Wright’s literary practice resonates with 
and enriches Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist ideas on how the writer 
might tend to the health of expression. Specifically, Wright “repotentialise[s]” 
expression (Massumi, 2002b, p. xxxi) that others attempt to capture, stratify, 
violate, oppress, and diminish amid capitalist-colonialism, and she employs 
what might prima facie be perceived as the symptoms of Indigenous Crises 
to pursue variation: in particular, the condition of not being known. 
A Deleuzo-Guattarian onto-epistemology that gives primacy to relation 
and transformation, rather than pre-existing “composed forms” (Massumi, 
2002a, p. xvii), embraces the flow of the “extra-linguistic […] impersonal” (p. 
xvi) forces of expression. For Massumi (2002a), expression is not a 
reference to the propositional model of language, to communication or to the 
representation of any thing, feeling, structure, process, or system. Nor 
should we attend to the expression of ideological structures. Rather, 
expression consists of all the nonhuman forces of difference that move and 
relate, that differ, are captured, and that continue to move—or at least are 
capable of moving on—and produce the world.192 Expression is, in this 
                                                          
192 Human language operates as one vehicle for the furtherance—and sometimes, though not 
always, the capture or curtailment—of these forces.  
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respect, autonomous, and bodies and subjects are “conduits through which 
a movement of expression streams” (p. xxi):  
 
Expression is not in a language-using mind, or in a speaking 
subject vis a vis its objects. Nor is it rooted in an individual body. It 
is not even in a particular institution […] Expression is abroad in the 
world – where the potential is for what may become. (p. xxi) 
 
To expand on the potentials in Life, and to forestall their closing down, 
Massumi suggests we keep expression “abroad in the world” (p. xxi), saving 
it from capture and the negation of its force. To tend to expression’s flow is 
“to save change” and difference from stratification, from being constrained to 
“Half Life, [or] No Life” (p. xvii). One way to tend to expression’s charge is to 
proliferate creative processes that engage with, prolong and invigorate it: to 
cultivate “heterogenesis” (p. xxvi). Literary practices, including, I propose, 
those we find in The Swan Book, can keep expression going.  
The Swan Book is an act of resistance to annihilation of the forces of 
expression to which Indigenous people attend when in country, and of the 
diversity of subjective pathways available to Indigenous people. The novel is 
also a work of tending:193 (re)making connections along which expression 
                                                          
193 I noted earlier that Indigenous people relate custodially to country and to the nonhuman 
expressions that flow through/produce country. They tend to the vitality of Dreamings through land 
management, story, dance, song, movement, painting and writing.   
  
 
252 
 
can flow; energising stories and Dreamings that contribute to the health of 
peoples and country; and fostering and revitalising the sovereignty—
autonomy—of expression that contributes to the Indigenous mind. As 
Wright’s narrator puts it, “encroach[ing] on and destroy[ing] the wide-open 
vista of the virus’s real estate” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 4). This is the work of 
reenergising “imagination” as Wright puts it (2011c, p. 40), and tending to 
“sovereignty over my own brain” (2013, p. 4), as Oblivia puts it. 
Repeated performances—singing, dancing, painting, calling, telling, 
walking, and writing—constitute responses to the question of “how to keep 
emplaced life flourishing” (Rose, 2005, para. 6). Rose (2005) recorded 
Indigenous elder, Mussolini Harvey’s words on this tending to expression: 
 
In our ceremonies we wear marks on our bodies, they come from 
the Dreaming too, we carry the design that the Dreamings gave to 
us. When we wear that Dreaming mark we are carrying the country, 
we are keeping the Dreaming held up, we are keeping the country 
and the Dreaming alive. That is the most important thing, we have 
to keep up the country, the Dreamings, our Law, our people, it can't 
change. Our Law has been handed on from generation to 
generation and it is our job to keep it going, to keep it safe. (para. 3)  
 
Wright’s writing in The Swan Book is performative just as Harvey, here, 
acknowledges the performative (onto-episto-genetic) function of Indigenous 
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ceremony. Writing—telling stories to the ancestors as Wright phrases it 
(2008b, p. 24)—is a practice of custodianship. The Swan Book stories 
preserve, enliven and re-energise expressive particles that Dreamings carry: 
keeping them alive, creative and productive. 
Wright’s work of story-telling, re-storying the world, and revitalising the 
Dreaming, and her openness to the efficacies of other, non-indigenous, 
cultural expression, also suggests a conception of cultural preservation that 
involves renewal.194 Custodianship is adaptable and mobile in The Swan 
Book, perhaps not out of choice but certainly in necessity. Wright’s drawing 
of the reader into literary spirals of repetition of difference, rather than 
repetition of the same, resonates with Massumi’s (2002b) warning that “if 
production is reproduction, then life is trapped in a vicious circle; that of the 
systemic repetition of its own formation” (p. xvii). Wright’s stories are a 
looking back to move forward: what Massumi, discussing expression, calls 
“a recursive futurity” (p. xxiii) that finds new pathways by drawing on the 
energies of the present and past. Wright’s symptomatology re-boots 
conceptualisations of Indigenous crises, and her writings of the continuously 
varying, nonhuman landscapes of nature, and the nonhuman becomings of 
the Human, project pathways along which Indigenous peoples and country 
might move, persevere and renew amid drastic psychical, social and 
environmental transformations. The possibilities for people and country are 
no longer—never were—“locked up” (A. Wright, 2013, p. 40). Wright finds 
capacities for movement by attending to what flows rather than to 
                                                          
194 Christie (2015) refers to it as a pragmatism. 
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“composed forms” (Massumi, 2002a, p. xvii): by working upon the virus as 
the production of compositional forces rather than as an innate, irrevocable 
presence. One way by which Wright does this is to set her story in the 
future, allowing the seemingly stable institutions of today to vary, while still 
immersing readers in the horrifying repetitions produced by forces that have 
moved over hundreds of years: fear, hubris, violence and so on. Wright’s 
setting works to relax readers’ attachments to assumptions about states of 
affairs being fixed, and mitigates the risk, as Massumi describes it, that “Any 
potential the process may have had of tending to a significantly different 
product [or future] is lost in the overlay of what already is” (p. xviii). While 
institutions have transformed to some degree—including government 
structures, cities, infrastructure, the media, Treaties of recognition—we find 
that the forces damaging psyches, bodies and relations are continuous. 
Consequently, the future setting of The Swan Book helps highlight the 
opportunities to tend to these forces and to find ways in which they might 
produce other ways of living. 
Oblivia’s and swans’ becomings-other are also productive tendings to 
expression. Massumi (2002b) writes that “The highest operation of thought 
is not to choose, but to harbour and convey that felt force, repotentialized” 
(p. xxxi). Although Oblivia exhibits resolve in other ways, she is often unable 
to make choices: to move, to stay, to give up, to return, to live, to die. Nor 
does she reject or brush off the forces carried by the black swans, despite 
their being foreign to her. Rather, she becomes with them. We are given a 
sense of a swan’s intensive impingements upon Oblivia’s body—something 
akin to Massumi’s “expressive turbulence” (p. xxxi)—when black swans 
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arrive at the swamp (A. Wright, 2013, p. 14). The changing of Oblivia’s skin 
colour, her difficulty breathing, and her coldness, enrich our sense of what 
Massumi, writing on expression, calls “The wrackings of the thinking body 
[that] mimic the excess of potential it hosts” (p. xxxii). Oblivia cannot 
assimilate the affective force of the black swan, though she must choose to 
participate or not in the stretching and continuance or closing down of that 
affect (or expression). She is unable to “contain […] potential with 
resemblance” by relying upon a concept or a pre-existing known thing (p. 
xxxi): this is neither a white swan nor an animal of her country. We find the 
body attempting to rely on habit as a “defence against shocks of expression” 
(p. xxxi) but we also find attunements between bodies. Oblivia does not 
recognise the black swan’s difference as inferior, or dismiss its anomaly, but 
experiences it as charged with transformative potential. While the swan’s 
affect has not been “integrated as a functional life content” (p. xxxi) before, 
Oblivia embraces it, or is unable to avoid its transformational force, and thus 
the expression the swan carries is kept going. Oblivia is forced to thought 
and this thought, arriving from the non-and-more-than-human, is a flight 
from her “assigned class or type – the subject-position from which [she…] 
conventionally speaks [or doesn’t speak] or acts” (p. xxxii). She finds 
movement and return through the black swan and it through her. She 
participates, through involvement in transformation, in continuing the 
sovereignty of expression.  
I have argued that The Swan Book works to decolonise the bodies and 
minds or, at least, to make space for something truer, and to get things 
moving again. I have also noted the recurrence of cyclic/spiral tropes, 
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symbols and style in the novel. Always in movement, Wright’s prose defies 
genre and withdraws the resolution of meaning. However, not knowing can 
be engaged with as an affirmative experience: the multiplicity and 
unknowability of The Swan Book being important functions. Not to be known 
must be a strange way to live. Nevertheless, this is a quality of Oblivia’s 
story, and of Wright’s unknowable novel. It is also a quality that resonates 
with the continuous variation that Deleuze and Guattari envisage among 
truly nomadic and free peoples to come. By remaining difficult to nail down, 
a novel and a people avoid being defined out of existence, being limited as 
to what they can do and might become, and being prevented from 
reinventing, renewing and repotentialising their collective subjectivities. 
Wright’s novel operates as a repotentialising machine in this regard, offering 
resources to people, particularly Indigenous people, to assist the work of a 
collective to remain affirmatively unknown, rather than stratified, subjectified 
and organised amid capitalist-colonialism.  
It is in the madness of The Swan Book that the practices of—capacities 
for—resistance to the contraction of Life and subjective pathways resonate 
with Massumi’s (2002b) writings on expression, namely: insisting on defining 
one’s own traits; capturing and working with one’s own anomaly; retaining a 
shade of the unclassifiable to the Majority; inhabiting a margin of 
unpredictability; existing as a multiplicity in flux, in movement, always under 
formation and in assemblage; and shedding traits as confidently as 
cultivating them (p. xxviii). Oblivia and black swans resist “pick-up by an 
established stratum” (p. xxviii). If we oppose Oblivia’s becomings-other to 
Warren Finch’s subjective contractions—he, paradoxically and ever 
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ironically, becomes global—we find that Oblivia embraces her 
difference/differing and the anomaly of the black swans: “insisting on 
defining […her] own traits, in a self-capture of […her] own anomaly” (p. 
xxviii). Being “mad” (A. Wright, 2013, pp. 14, 100, 227, 262) is part of 
Oblivia’s line of flight: not only crazy from the virus but crazy to the virus. 
There is, as I have discussed, a repeated difficulty with nomenclature when 
it comes to this girl and nobody can quite pin her down via a name. Her 
behaviours exasperate all those who attempt and fail to (re)shape her to 
their desires. Her story remains in a state of flux, varying from teller to teller 
and telling to telling. She does not lose her past; although she progressively 
sheds aspects of it: to make space for new becomings rather than fall victim 
to memory, to trauma, and to retreats into the tree’s bowels. Eventually, she 
takes on “Will-o’-the-wisp” qualities (p. 334), moving beyond identity as 
multiplicity and toward becoming-imperceptible: almost indistinguishable 
from the non-and-more-than-human. She becomes collective, as the 
“country calling out for you” (p. 334).  
In its own ways, and without wishing to suggest its separateness from 
Oblivia and swans, country in The Swan Book exhibits the endurance and 
repotentialisation of expression. While anthropogenic climate change’s 
violent affects traverse human and non-and-more-than-human bodies 
democratically, country—including weather spirits—still continues to move. 
Country accommodates the transformations, and flips its weather patterns 
(A. Wright, 2013, p. 18). Dreamings persevere despite the ruination and 
plagued state of desert and bush, and animals and plant-life find new 
rhythms and assemblages as climate change affects habitats: for example, 
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owl-rat-snake-spinifex-moth assemblages (pp. 165-194), as we find in the 
genies’ country. Cities are unable to excise/subsume country and the non-
and-more-than-human resurfaces. 
Wright’s style also exhibits un-catchable capacities: making itself mad. To 
employ a loaded colonial word, Wright’s writing refuses to settle: stylistically, 
linguistically, geographically, bodily, historically, temporally, perceptually, 
plotwise, ontologically, and culturally. Wright (2013) intensifies language: 
bringing it closer to “windstorms and wind gusts” (p. 21), producing what 
Massumi (2002b), writing on expression, refers to as “atypical expressions” 
(p. xxii): unconventional grammar; changes in tense; circuitous and rolling 
sentences traversing and folding together existential registers; Waanyi 
language and disruptions to Australia’s dominant language;195 lost 
prepositions; bodily movements as vehicles for expression (the swans or the 
brolgas dancing up country, for example); Oblivia’s charged silence; floating 
meanings energising the irony and satire of Wright’s narration; and gestures 
toward a music which, we read, cannot be heard but which nonetheless 
possesses a force. “[A]typical expressions”, Massumi suggests, “cause 
language to tend toward the limit of its elements, forms, or notions, toward a 
near side or beyond of language” (p. xxii). The complexity, slipperiness, 
multiplicity and kaleidoscopic imagery and prose in The Swan Book do more 
than withdraw meaning. Words and sentences, bodies, spaces, ideas, 
knowledge, relations, truth, and so on, become unresolvable and continue to 
play upon us or resonate differently with different readers: they are flushed 
                                                          
195 See Daley (2016b, p. 315) on Aboriginal English and pop song lyrics as among Wright’s 
disruptions. 
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with “futurity” (p. xxii) or potential to be different. As Wright’s narrator asks, 
“Who knows what madness will be calling them in the end?” (2013, p. 334). 
A passage in which Warren remembers his childhood offers just one of 
many instances of Wright’s prose rendering time, location, sound and sense 
multiple and indeterminate: 
 
There was another time Warren Finch remembers from when he 
was still a boy learning how to be a man. He had stopped 
somewhere along the fisherman’s track above the high reddish grey 
earth bank of the river, and was listening to the silence of the 
middle of the day. He reflected on the pleasure of his thoughts 
about what the future held, where one day in another place and 
time, he would recall this time. And he wondered what he would feel 
then. (p. 108) 
 
We can revisit these words, re-read them, and still find ourselves wound up 
or refolded with them: caught in another orbital trajectory or vortex from 
which we cannot escape to confirm “this is what is meant”, or “this is what 
that was”, or “this is when we are”.  
Wright’s writing frees up of the forces of emergence. Albeit, such 
liberations are not without discomfort, given that they involve “stretching and 
twisting” (Massumi, 2002b, p. xxiii): of knowledge of the symptoms of 
current states of affairs; of histories, and of the form and trajectories of time; 
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of existential boundaries; of capacities to pursue other potential futures; and 
of language. Wright’s spiralling, gyric, cyclical style sets bodies, images and 
forces in motion and in relation but does not close them down. It releases 
them and encourages their variation: infusing them with the past but also 
with the potential to differ. The repetitive, unending story-telling of peoples 
and country and history and futures, keeps expression moving. Wright’s 
narrator’s suggestion that “it might be the same story in centuries to come” 
(2013, p. 333) can be read in more ways than one: as an expectation of 
both the endurance of the same and of the endurance of the capacity to 
differ; and as a gesture toward the capacities of Wright’s novel to tend to the 
health of difference. 
 
The Swan Book does more than tend to expression because of 
oppression. It also calls-forth and repotentialises non-and-more-than-human 
Life which nurtures, is celebrated by, and is under the custodial care of 
Indigenous peoples. It is both an expression of the preservation of 
sovereignty and a preservation of the sovereignty of expression. It is writing 
of—and from—the “maelstrom” (Law, 2004, p. 7) of processes of 
connection, multiplicity, difference, liveliness, relationality, and care; 
processes which occur amid ecological crises. Indeed, we might argue that 
such writing starves Crises of things upon which they flourish: flawed 
conceptualisations/representations of disconnection, individuality, 
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sameness, lifelessness, independence, and progress.196 Wright produces a 
vital literary work which embodies the capacities, as Kwaymullina et al. 
describe them, for: “Aboriginal voices and stories [to] continue to connect to 
country and hold power even when translated into text, told outside of the 
contexts of the country where the knowledge is lived, and potentially 
circumscribed by Western understandings” (2013, p. 6). The Swan Book 
informs and enriches our sense of literary practices, as Deleuze (1997) 
describes them, that are “always a style of life too, not anything at all 
personal, but inventing a possibility of life, a way of existing" (p. xv).  
  
                                                          
196 After Latour, Muecke (2009, p. 405) points out that “concepts like objectivity, efficiency, and 
profitability” also drive “the colonising concept of progress, and [drive…] its material consequences to 
their planetary limits”. 
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Chapter 6 – Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster 
 
What you can do, your potential, is ultimately defined by your 
connectedness, the way you’re connected and how intensely, not 
your ability to separate off and decide by yourself. (Massumi, 2015, 
p. 40) 
 
‘They thought that they were off the maps and off the edge of the 
world’. (Hospital, 1997, p. 265) 
 
In Oyster, Janette Turner Hospital (Hospital) removes readers to Outer 
Maroo: a fictional, disconcertingly familiar, Australian outback, mining and 
grazier town; off the map and intentionally so. Inhabitants try to make sense 
of the forces at work in the world and their entanglements in calamitous 
events: the arrival and influence of the man, Oyster; the enslavement of 
people to his opal mining/religious cult; the cult’s violent end; and, one year 
later, Outer Maroo’s fiery destruction. Mercy Given, a teenager pursued and 
raped by Oyster, enters into transformative relations with “foreigners” 
(Hospital, 1997, p. 3): an iconoclastic schoolteacher (Susannah Rover); cult 
members desperate to escape; and parents seeking children lost to Oyster’s 
lure (Sarah seeking her stepdaughter, Amy, and Nick seeking his son, 
Angelo). The violence done to Mercy and her family, and these relations, 
fracture her belief that there is only one way-of-the-world. They fuel her 
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resistance to the extreme and oppressive forces of religion and greed, and 
her desire for escape. “Old Silence” (p. 25), Jess Hyde, is another Outer 
Maroovian wishing to be lost. She is drawn out of her silence and into 
resistance against Oyster and those driving Outer Maroo toward its end. 
Surviving the destruction, Jess reflects upon her inability to make sense of 
events, and her complicity in them. Oyster traverses numerous matters, 
among them: problems of maps and words and difficulties with finding and 
fixing meanings;197 hiding and becoming lost; cult and colonial violence, 
oppression and survival; fear and the desire for something other; hope and 
how far it can stretch; chaos, complexity, and indeterminacy; conflations of 
separation and unavoidable connection; repetitions of events over deep 
time; and forces exceeding the human and the social.  
Morton (2007b) suggests that a piece of art need not be “environmental” 
in any explicit way for it to engender “ecological thought” (p. 12, 79).198 In 
keeping with this suggestion, I expand upon existing Hospital and Oyster 
scholarship and offer a fuller engagement with the materiality of/in Hospital’s 
writing: to give “matter its due” (Barad, 2003, p. 803). Oyster employs a 
passionate, porous poetics of the material: albeit one through which the 
material and what is conventionally deemed the discursive are irreducibly 
entailed. To again employ Barad’s (2003) ideas in a literary context, 
Hospital’s writing enacts “a contestation of the excessive power granted to 
                                                          
197 See Bowen (noted in Callahan (2009)), Callahan (2009, p. 10), Greiner (2007, p. 387), Muller 
(2000), and Steacy (1996). 
198 In Oyster, Hospital references violence towards animals, though not mass extinction, and writes 
extensively of planetary degradation. The novel does not directly reference climate change.  
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language to determine what is real” (p. 802) and expands the realms of 
what “matters” in the world’s becomings (p. 803) to encompass matter and 
the nonhuman, as well as the material qualities of discourse. Hospital’s 
poetics is a politics. Her expansionary and intensive poetics are to do as 
much with entanglement, breach, and permeation as separation, 
breakaways and escapes. In Oyster, transversal encounters constitute 
modes of liberation. Hospital writes Life and the productions of subjectivities 
across other registers: not only as processes involving minds, discourse, or 
language, but also as processes involving non-and-more-than-human 
agencies, and impersonal, nonhuman intensities. These are agencies and 
intensities that we try to excise from the map of the human though we 
cannot help sensing the continuation of their movement through, and their 
renewal of, that map. Language can gesture toward these agencies and 
intensities but cannot contain or fix them. Oyster expresses the intimate 
agency of the non-and-more-than-human: strange and familiar, foreign 
bodies—the Fuckatoo (1997, p. 3), opals, and heat—that traverse, 
permeate and shape subjectivities. The novel also attunes readers to flows 
of affect permeating bodies, shaping their trajectories and capacities: affect 
that is joyful and augmentative and traumatic and contractive. Hospital’s 
poetics also carries potentials to affect readers by making variation 
continuous, conveying other registers of perception and their limits, and 
informing an ecological ethics. In Oyster, there are other channels along 
which Life is distributed. There are other stories, conventionally almost 
inarticulable stories, interwoven with the novel’s unfinished and unfinishable 
narrations.  
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In what follows, I first undertake an analysis of how Hospital writes a 
dynamic, permeable, posthuman ecology. I then argue for the affective 
attributes and potentials of the novel. In each case, and in my concluding 
comments, I return to Oyster’s potentials to produce difference and cultivate 
ecological sense.  
 
 
Movement and permeability 
 
Things never pass where you think, nor along the paths you think. 
(Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. 4)  
 
[N]othing is supposed to move (Hospital, 1997, p. 298) 
 
Attention to permeability—social, temporal, spatial, material, discursive—
is not unexpected in Hospital’s writing, and it has been given some scholarly 
attention, particularly with respect to Oyster.199 A material-discursive 
attendance to permeability reveals, and attunes readers to, the paradox of 
Outer Maroo’s openness, despite attempts to disconnect from unwanted 
                                                          
199 Hospital comments on porosity and mobility in Greiner (2007); Davies (2000a); and Muller 
(2000). Callahan (2001), Coyle (2001), Davies (2000a, 2000b; 2006), Fraile (2011), and Potter 
(2005a) attend to permeability in Hospital’s writing. 
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intrusions, to ensure nobody leaves, to hide and protect what they value and 
what they have done, and to control movement, discourse and thought. 
Attempts to take Outer Maroo “off the map”, and to arrest movement that 
jeopardises sanctioned states of affairs, merely pull a veil over continuous, 
unsanctioned, permeations and flows. It proves impossible to “impose order 
on the ungovernable” (Hospital, 1997, pp. 154-155).  
Permeability concerns Outer Maroovians: what gets in and out; what 
relations can occur; what is concealed and exposed. Storeowner, Ma 
Beresford and landowner, Andrew Godwin are among those trying to render 
Outer Maroo “nowhere to be found” (Hospital, 1997, p. 56), “outside time”, 
“lost” (p. 82), and “not […] on maps” (p. 56). The ungodly and the godly are 
united in their distrust of “all the people out there who are not in the little 
crucible of pastoral us” (p. 315). Heat and drought warp, smother, and deny 
Life, as do the material-discursive forces wielded by Godwin, Beresford, cult 
leader Oyster, preacher Dukke Prophet, and others. These “life-denying” 
forces (Greiner, 2007, p. 388)—what, after Bryant (2013), I characterise as 
“power structuring social relations” (p. 18)—include the material control of 
access to water, to transport, to fuel, and to flows of communication and 
sources of knowledge both inside and outside the town. The militarily armed 
Godwin, the predatory Oyster, and the men of the town use violence, its 
threat, and its return as trauma, to control thought, discourse and people’s 
capacities to act, to move, and to resist. The repetition of a narrowly framed 
religious, capitalist-colonial, and otherwise tightly bounded, discourse also 
limits and directs relations. Moreover, Hospital offers, at best, only 
unreliable narratives of deliverance from Outer Maroo’s oppressions and 
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repressions. Even the final vision of Mercy, Sarah and Nick fleeing to 
Brisbane in a truck is a product of Jess’ hopeful imagination (p. 431). And 
yet, amid all these constraints, an unavoidable permeability thrives in Oyster 
and Life continues to break through, relate and differ.  
Despite the rhetoric, and the discursive and material practices of 
exclusion, excision and enclosure, it seems that quite a lot of people come 
and go. While, in the short-term, Murri’s have been separated from their 
land,200 the coloniser locals cannot control Indigenous movements and 
returns. For Jess, the dead still play on Country’s surfaces: “Absences in 
their ghostly thousands thrum against the skin of red clay like a pulse” 
(Hospital, 1997, p. 151). Ethel senses the continuing pulse of change and 
expresses the continuity of Murri presence as she tends to country, and 
communes with “Her mob” who, although they may be gone, are “still with 
us, all around us, and was, and ever shall be” (p. 152). She patiently 
anticipates returns amid the ruins of the lost township of Inner Maroo and 
the ultimately ephemeral Outer Maroo: “‘They been waiting…’. […] She is 
waiting […]. She is waiting […]. She is waiting […]. She is waiting […]. She 
waits” (p. 44) the narrative repeats.  
While locals make foreigners disappear “without a trace” (Hospital, 1997, 
p. 13), this does not stop others arriving. Jess recalls Oyster’s arrival in 
Outer Maroo and the “palpable sense of shock that it was possible for 
someone unknown to be out there, just beyond the verandah railing, without 
                                                          
200 Mercy contextualises the period since colonisation as a ‘hiccup in time” (Hospital, 1997, p. 44) 
compared to Indigenous inhabitation. 
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having given any advance warning whatsoever” (p. 298). His “manifestation” 
(p. 309) punctures townspeople’s belief that their vigilance for intruders is 
effective. Locals watch the east, the direction from which they believe 
foreigners will arrive, but Oyster walks into town from the west, out of the 
“broiling heart of the country” (p. 298), at a time of day “when nothing is 
supposed to move” (p. 298). His arrival precedes a flood of acolytes and 
“young seekers” (p. 327) to his Reef on Outer Maroo’s outskirts, further 
disrupting the community’s solitude. Jess observes that “we had more 
strangers in town than we’d had in the previous ten years” (p. 327). The 
Reef’s destruction leads to further arrivals, including Sarah and Nick, 
“looking for the missing” (p. 25). Andrew Godwin works to keep out the 
government, the “Abos”, the “greenies”, the unions, the communists (p. 
265)—all foreigners—and preserve grazier ways of working the land. 
Nevertheless, we read that global capital has permeated community and 
country: “nobody comments that some American bank practically owns 
Andrew Godwin, hook, line, and ding-dong” (p. 81).  
Ma Beresford systematically controls Outer Maroo’s mail flow. She 
consumes outbound letters and postcards, leaving the outside world 
unaware of events: “‘Foreigners mean trouble,’ […], ‘Better for everyone 
concerned,’ she said, patting the mailroom door in her sage and proprietary 
way, ‘if this lot stays in Pandora’s Box’” (Hospital, 1997, p. 10). However, we 
read that “occasionally, in spite of everyone’s best efforts, mail gets through” 
(p. 8). Words and images escape “Pandora’s Box”. Mercy and Jess secretly 
preserve letters and photographs that, in some cases, find their intended 
recipients or at least find a reader. Jess holds on to a photograph of Amy 
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and gives it to Sarah. Susannah challenges Outer Maroovians’ ability to 
disappear and put “a lid on” things because “sooner or later, they are going 
to leach their way out through this frangible soil and leave their mark” (p. 
66). Shortly before her murder, Susannah warns the locals that her words, 
revealing the town’s horrific taboos and secrets, will find their way out 
because she has entrusted certain letters with Murri people: “‘[…] you won’t 
shut me up so easily. I think that you don’t realise just how many messages 
are getting out.’” (p. 70).  
The control of discursive processes—determining what can and cannot 
be said, by whom, where and how, and what counts as knowledge—is 
critical to efforts to separate Outer Maroo and to shape and control 
meaning, bodies, subjectivities, material relations and country. Inhabitants 
tell themselves that outside voices are not countenanced. Their willed 
ignorance and amnesia, and their fear of intruding authorities and 
foreigners, cultivate a susceptibility to millennial religious and oppositional 
language (and vice versa).201 A blunt though flexible moral logic is used to 
support the status quo: all foreigners are hated and all are foreigners, 
except we who are allowed to designate what is foreign. Books are burned 
(Hospital, 1997, p. 145). Dissent is put down to madness: “‘She’s off her 
rocker,’” (p. 71) Pete declares as Susannah continues to voice taboos. He 
warns her “jokily” that “‘Words’ll get you into trouble, luv,’”(p. 71). There is, 
though, no jokiness to the lethal violence that is eventually inflicted upon 
Susannah to silence her challenge to the silences that are preserved by—
                                                          
201 See Steacy (1996) on Dukke Prophet and the biblical discourse of control. 
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and preserve—the town. Nevertheless, these imposed discursive 
boundaries are porous. As with the permeations of mail messages, so 
“Outer Maroo is thick with coded testaments” (p. 6).202 Although they court 
danger, some are able to resist, transgress and escape these constraints. 
Mercy is flooded with anxieties as she attempts to assimilate the other ways 
of speaking, writing, thinking, and knowing she encounters in her 
interactions with Susannah, Sarah, Nick, and others. Mercy is sensitive to 
what can be known and said in other “worlds” (p. 37) and we find these 
discursive variations leaching into her relations inside Outer Maroo. 
Susannah, like Jess, has a radio. Susannah’s transgressive words—diaries 
and other writing—remain alive and active in the events that transpire, 
although they remain hidden down a mineshaft, and only accessible to 
Mercy: a book “smoulders away” down there (p. 205). They open Mercy to 
other ways of knowing and being, and augment her capacity to resist. For 
each Outer Maroovian sermonising on the need to cast out difference, there 
is a “deviant” (p. 151) embodying the continuity of variation, and the 
vibrancy of dissent. Ethel remains seated by a sacred tree, nurturing country 
and anticipating returns, and offering portentous wisdom to Outer 
Maroovians who want to silence stories of transformation: violent and 
otherwise. She exceeds dominant discourses; singing in “tones from an 
unknown scale” (p. 153). Nick’s son, Angelo, revolts against Oyster’s 
oppression, and Susannah knowingly places herself in harm’s way to voice 
taboos. Junior Godwin embraces Indigenous agricultural practices in 
                                                          
202 Though not explored in detail in this thesis, I acknowledge Hospital’s attendance to the 
‘testaments’ to colonial violence against Indigenous peoples and country. 
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contrast to coloniser graziers’ “raping” (pp. 268, 377) the land. Bugger 
Harvey traverses the estranged Murri and coloniser communities and 
espouses Indigenous relational philosophies. Major Miner, we read, “can 
well imagine Bugger Harvey making his way through the gaps” (p. 348).  
Hospital also writes—and writes us into—ecologies of spatial, temporal, 
and sensory transversality and permeability. Early in Oyster, we are warned 
of the folly of attempts to control space and time: “Time is a trickster and so 
is space” (Hospital, 1997, p. 7). The two are dynamic and co-constitutive, 
and co-constituted with other non-and-more-than-human agencies: the air 
(pp. 4, 7); and silence. We read, in this respect, that Jess perceives the 
interpenetration and co-constitution of time, space and sound—or 
soundlessness—and: 
 
[finds] it difficult, out here among the breakaways [a local rock 
formation], out here in the country of mirages and salt pans and lost 
languages, to separate the notions of time and space and sound. 
They seem interchangeable. […] time and space and sound are 
merely functions of one another […] they are related as solid and 
liquid and gas […]. They sneak across their own boundary lines 
[…]. (p. 150)  
 
For Hospital, Australia’s silent spaces also carry sensuous force. Jess 
attempts to articulate the qualities of the experience sensed: 
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in the inner ear and under conscious memory and along the arteries 
and lymph glands and on the skin, a sound like a heartbeat, like a 
drumbeat, like the feet of dancers in the corroboree, like time 
passing, like the wind blowing across thousands of miles of bare 
rock[…]. (p. 150) 
 
The sentence traverses sensuous registers experiencing dynamic, rhythmic 
phenomena, and the conjunctive repetition of “and” and “like” convey a 
sense of continuity and heterogeneity. The recurrence of “like” also 
suggests something multiple and ultimately inarticulable. Space is likely to 
deceive us and evade our attempts at control. We cannot, Jess tells us, 
stabilise, or “get a foothold” (p. 154) on space; neither with words nor 
images (map-making) (pp. 154-155).  
The substantiation of the gaps—rather than the non-gaps—that constitute 
bodies in Oyster also gestures toward conceptualisations of permeable 
spatiality and materiality.203 We find such gestures in Mercy’s meditation on 
the “pointillist” wounds (Hospital, 1997, p. 201) she sustains by jumping 
from a speeding car. She thinks that “People are full of flashbulb spots and 
blank spaces” (p. 205). Major Miner too recounts ideas of Taoist notions of 
bodies made of gaps (p. 233) and memories of Bugger Harvey accessing 
almost imperceptible openings in the breakaways when opal mining (p. 
                                                          
203 See Fraile (2011) on Oyster, notions of inside/outside, and non-western onto-epistemologies.  
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337). The material that ostensibly constitutes a thing is no more important to 
that constitution, or more vibrant, than “the spaces in between” (p. 206) the 
material. Albeit, what moves through these spaces is often less easily 
perceptible. We read of sound “waves of a frequency far too high for the 
human ear” (p. 236), and “void spaces between the silica particles [in opal] 
that cause the light to be diffracted” (p. 386).  
Hospital’s disruptions to the temporal structure, plot, and narrative of 
Oyster produce a sense of inhabiting an enduring, inescapable present 
folding with an unavoidable and still-vibrant past. The novel’s chapter order 
delivers events out of temporal sequence, and narration within chapters 
often spans past and present: sometimes collapsing them into each other. 
While the storied events stretch back four years to Oyster’s arrival,204 the 
novel’s opening passages occur one week prior to the fiery destruction of 
Outer Maroo: the end-point of the novel’s timeline. The narrative then 
moves on to “Last Week”. Jess asks of beginnings and endings: “How can 
we tell one from the other, since they inevitably swallow their own tails, their 
own tales?” (p. 43). Oyster’s narration is often in the present tense. Where 
narration uses the past tense, retellings conjure the persistent force (the 
virtuality) of past events. Vivid memories surge up and fold into the narrative 
and become lived present. These permeations incapacitate some bodies: 
including Mercy, Sarah, and Major Miner. Mercy is flooded by, and finds 
herself repeatedly drowning in, traumatic sensations that return from the 
loss of her brother (pp. 138-143), attacks upon her father (pp. 145-146), and 
                                                          
204 Alongside characters’ own histories prior to the narrated events at Outer Maroo and the Reef, the 
novel engages allusively with deep-histories of Indigenous peoples. 
  
 
274 
 
her rape by Oyster (p. 398). Hospital’s literary disruptions sensitise readers 
to time, as Mercy describes it: “not a line, not a circle, but a fog” (p. 83). It is 
a fog that seeps in through the pores; a fog that suggests our blind enfolding 
in a world upon which we can never truly impose order and clarity and in 
which past, present and future interweave.  
 
While, in Life, membranes protect and separate, they also exhibit 
particular capacities for connection: selective permeability; relative porosity. 
Membranes recur throughout Oyster as a material-discursive trope. As well 
as operating as a metaphor for permeability, Hospital’s membranes function 
as indexes for sensation and relation, reinforcing the sense of material, 
perceptual and ethical realms that are irreducibly multiple and inseparable. 
There are, in Outer Maroo, degrees of separation and degrees of relation. 
Sheltering at the Givens’ house, the exhausted Sarah sleeps fitfully. She 
floats amid dreams, memories, and the morning’s oppressive heat. She 
contemplates and senses permeability. Light filters through the curtain that 
“has become more or less invisible, has become a radiant membrane 
between what is Sarah’s side of the window and what is beyond” (Hospital, 
1997, p. 179). She senses her body’s permeability: “her flesh is translucent, 
and she sees through the luminous membrane, her body’s present 
anchorage” (the location of her dream/memory) at her husband’s cottage on 
a lake in Maine (pp. 183-184). Hospital writes of light, space and bodies 
relating through membranes and films, and of translucence. These relations 
emphasise sensations of touch, and material permeation, even though the 
  
 
275 
 
experience is conveyed, first, as words, and received optically. In Ma 
Beresford’s store, Mercy serves Dukke Prophet and confronts him about his 
complicity in her friend Donny Becker’s death, and in the attempt on Mercy’s 
family’s lives. Mercy and Prophet become captive to this confrontation until 
Ma Beresford intervenes. Broken from her “trance” (p. 228), Mercy 
contemplates the “strange” worlds existing on either side of a membrane, 
seeping through it, and traversing each other:  
 
There is just a membrane, she thinks, between one world and 
another. When you pass through that membrane, the meaning of 
everything changes. Gestures, words, thoughts, emotions: none of 
these things are translatable. On one side of the membrane, Mr 
Prophet is powerful and dangerous; on the other side, he is 
ridiculous; he is just a pathetic old man as frightened of the world as 
anyone else. But is it not possible, Mercy asks herself, that he is 
both these things at once? (pp. 228-229) 
 
Mercy’s thoughts suggest the multiplicity that is often veiled by assertions of 
identity. Our affective capacities are transformed by our different relations 
and there are different, co-existing ways of being-becoming in the world. To 
encounter a membrane is to apprehend the exteriority of Life and the 
contingency in conceptualisations of Life that consign things to sides of a 
boundary. It may be that we are always and already exposed to and 
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permeated by—brought to Life in—multiple worlds. While Mercy wonders if 
she is the only one in Outer Maroo “who moves back and forth across the 
membrane” (p. 229), we know she is not.  
It is not the case, though, that things only flow through permeable borders 
in Oyster. Perhaps, as Mercy senses, there are no borders and Life 
expresses a series of folds. Folds and folding proliferate in Oyster, and 
Deleuze’s (1993, p. 3) concept of the fold205 assists with articulating both 
relations in the novel, and Hospital’s poetics of material-discursive 
permeability, coexistence, co-constitution, complicity, and unavoidable 
responsibility: “The entire punctured web folds in on itself” (Hospital, 1997, 
p. 275). Conley (2005) summarises Deleuze’s four folds as: of the body 
(corporeal); of the social (“the fold of the relation of forces”); the “‘fold of 
knowledge, or the fold of truth insofar as it constitutes a relation of veracity 
with our being’ […] and vice versa”; and the ultimate “‘fold of the limits of life 
and death’” (p. 172). These folds do not occur mutually exclusively in 
Oyster. After Donny Becker’s death, Jess comforts Mercy, and bodies, 
ghosts, memories, and bed sheets fold and transform. Jess washes sheets 
in a large cauldron and tends to Mercy’s shock:  
 
she sees Jess folding sheets. ‘Jess,’ she says, ‘oh, Jess,’ and gets 
folded into Jess’ arms and the fitted corners of a double sheet. Jess 
folds and folds and for the first time Mercy weeps […]. Jess puts a 
                                                          
205 See Chapter 3. 
  
 
277 
 
finger against Mercy’s lips. She does not try to stop Mercy’s tears, 
but croons something deep in her throat […]. Weep on to the 
sheets, wrap them around Donny in your mind, and then you can 
brush his skin with your eyelashes while he sleeps. She sets Mercy 
to stirring the wet sheets […] until she is sweat and tears and 
steam. 
[…] 
Double, double, toil and trouble, Mercy thinks, seeing Donny 
Becker’s face folded into white and washing blue, seeing his eyes 
and his lips, seeing Jess’s reflection and her own in the spinning 
galaxies of the sheet […]. 
[…] 
The living float around Mercy like points of light, and so do the 
dead. She and Jess wrap them in sheets. (Hospital, 1997, pp. 213-
214) 
 
Folding, stirring, and wrapping are enacted linguistically, materially, 
metaphorically, psychologically, and spiritually. Dread-full sensations are 
enfolded (dissolved), perhaps to diminish the trauma they carry. The 
corporeal and the incorporeal, the folds of life and the ultimate fold of death, 
are inseparable.  
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Memories and bodies and knowing fold in Oyster, enriching Hospital’s 
spatio-temporal literary ecology. As Dorothy and Alice Godwin, and others 
in Ma Beresford’s store, become aware of foreigners arriving, the 
unexpected release of a bolt of blue cloth precipitates an enfolding, both of 
the senses of those present, and of the store physically. The cloth “gallops 
off the counter and over the floor. Blue billows east and west, soft masses of 
it puckering at tea-chests, frothing over booted feet, pleating up against 
saddlery and sorghum sacks and tubs of rice” (Hospital, 1997, p. 22). For 
Mercy, the folding cloth becomes a matter-memory of her thoughts of future 
release, and “She folds it away for safe keeping in those same dream 
niches where she stores the pinfire opal and the gem-seamed book-rich 
tunnels of Aladdin’s Rush” (p. 23). In Sarah’s dream of Amy, her body folds 
itself with sheets and netting, and enfolds sleep, dream, memory, and the 
features and forces of the waking world together. She finds Amy’s “face 
undulating in its [the dream’s] folds” (p. 174) before Amy’s body slips away. 
As Sarah loses the images and the memories of the images, the folding 
continues: “she can see fleetingly and intermittently backwards into the folds 
of the dream” (p. 174) where the words that she is seeking lie: “what was 
written” (p. 174) on a postcard sent to her by Amy but not received. She 
begins to fold into herself—waking-Sarah into dream-Sarah: “Sarah outside-
the-dream can almost touch her own outstretched hand” (p. 175).  
Hospital also conveys the “relations of forces” (Conley, 2005, p. 194) in 
Outer Maroo: the social foldings, unfoldings and refoldings. Jess narrates 
Oyster’s first manifestation as the event that the community hoped would 
“unfold itself out of the burning nothing to save us” (Hospital, 1997, p. 3). 
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Folds are also processes of social excision, exclusion and enclosure, as we 
find when Dukke Prophet “urged: the one hundred and forty-four thousand, 
figured symbolically, were already within the fold, and the gates of the city 
should now be closed” (p. 63). Bodies in Oyster explore and undergo the 
ultimate and eroticised folds of imperceptibility and death. Mining for opals, 
Major Miner disappears into the body of the breakaways. He seeks out 
“vaginal folds” in the rocks (p. 232), into which he plants explosives. Later in 
the novel, he “loses himself in a fold in the breakaways” (p. 361). The worn-
out bodies of followers at Oyster’s Reef—“the living dead” (p. 388)—are 
already enfolded by the earth. The mullock dust “shrouded” them. 
Collapsing, they fold into the least substantive of things: “Sometimes one or 
another of them drops soundlessly in the heat, folding neatly into itself like a 
silk scarf” (p. 389). 
In Oyster, Hospital brings readers (to) a permeable, membranous, folding 
world. Outer Maroo is never “off the map” (Hospital, 1997, p. 265). Hospital 
conveys Outer Maroo’s dynamic relationality, the resilience of its 
inseparability, and its co-constituted bodies, subjectivities, and socius. To 
utilise Massumi’s (2002a, p. 38) conceptualisation, Hospital’s writing 
conveys a sense of Life as “a continuum of existence differentiated into 
levels, or regions of potential, between which there are no boundaries or 
thresholds”. Hospital’s literary topology is one through which, as Conley 
describes the Deleuzian fold, “inner and outer spaces are in contact with 
each other” (2005, p. 196). Inner and outer become indiscernable in Oyster, 
though this is not the only quality of Life that is important to Hospital’s 
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writing. Also important are non-and-more-than-human things’ abilities to 
flow, to relate transversally, to transform, and to move on.  
 
On reading “‘It’s the Old Fuckatoo,’ […]. ‘It’s roosting again’” (Hospital, 
1997, p. 109), I am reminded of Barad’s (2007, p. 34) observations: that the 
forces at work in the materialisation of bodies are not only social; and that 
the bodies produced are not all Human. The non-and-more-than-human is a 
more-than-metaphorical presence in Oyster. Non-and-more-than-human 
bodies express agency and attest to Outer Maroo’s permeability: intruding 
into and shaping other bodies, lives and narratives. These intrusions are 
suggestive of Braidotti’s (2002, p. 133) conceptualisation of becomings as 
breaches of the boundaries—interferences—between reason and matter, 
and between control and chaos. They resonate with her notion of a Life that 
“makes me tick” but is beyond my will (p. 132). Whereas Wright’s The Swan 
Book incorporates the non-and-more-than-human as focalising figures, 
humans remain the primary narrative channel in Oyster. Nevertheless, 
Hospital’s privileging of human perception is not comprehensive, nor does it 
exclude the agencies of non-and-more-than-human bodies and forces. 
Hospital’s narrators and focalisers are evidently attuned to what Jane 
Bennett (2004) in her work on matter agency calls “the capacity of things to 
move, threaten, inspire, and animate the more obviously animated things 
called humans” (p. 357). Subjectivities in Oyster are assemblages: 
dynamically constituted in relations with thoroughly non-and-more-than-
human bodies—themselves also assemblages—including The Fuckatoo, 
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heated air, rocks, opals, books, letters, photographs, dust, odours, and 
carcasses. While not bound to the Human, these bodies are involved, not 
least, in the productions of Mercy, Major Miner, and Oyster. The non-and-
more-than-human in Oyster expresses the “radical liveliness” Oppermann 
(1997, p. 35) finds in the material world. As Barad describes matter, these 
non-and-more-than-human bodies “feel […] converse […] suffer […] desire 
[…] yearn […] and […] remember” (Iovino & Oppermann, 2014, p. 59).  
While Outer Maroovians often evoke the Fuckatoo metaphorically—as 
bird, or bird of prey: rapacious, roosting, brooding, nesting, with claws, 
wings, and breast feathers (Hospital, 1997, pp. 407, 352, 404, 238, 405, 
353, 415)—it is a more-than-metaphorical body. It relates across multiple 
existential registers: folding into, enfolding, and unfolding with, Outer 
Maroovian bodies. It is, as Jess assures us, “extremely present, that was 
certain” (1997, p. 14), and its multiplicity informs its affective force. The 
Fuckatoo is neither one thing, the same thing, nor nothing. People relate to, 
and become with, the Fuckatoo differently. For Major Miner, it is the smell of 
decay, destruction, imprisonment, death and fear (p. 236). For Susannah, it 
is a “ghastly and omnipresent smell of death” (p. 83). For Dorothy Godwin, it 
is a “moral stench” (p. 264). For Mercy, it is hate (p. 214). The Fuckatoo 
emanates from the human as an expression of guilt, and it is a separately 
emanative thing, accruing blame (p. 88). Junior Godwin complains: “‘It’s the 
drought that’s done this to people. The bloody Old Fuckatoo’” (p. 217). The 
Fuckatoo is tangible and intangible. It is animal, organic, and inorganic. 
While the Fuckatoo inhabits a physical body—a “toxic gas” (p. 264)—that 
assaults and haunts the town, it is also incorporeal and no less intensive. It 
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is an expression of the acts of the past—a well of memories and a store of 
bodily relations—and an embodiment of the force of those pasts to surge 
forth and shape futures. Drought, mining and murder produce bodies that 
participate in the constitution of the Fuckatoo: most arrestingly the odours of 
cattle and foreigner rotting flesh. As Dorothy Godwin says, “‘The whole town 
is smelling rotten’” (p. 270). This malevolent presence is intensified by and 
intensifies the fear, guilt, shame, hate, and secrets, and the social and 
psychological decay felt by Outer Maroo’s inhabitants. Its affective force 
diminishes what bodies can do. It constricts the breath and makes Mercy 
queasy. The Fuckatoo enfolds—“we hunched into the smelly breast 
feathers” (p. 15)—and it seems there is “no escaping it” (p. 4). In addition, 
the Fuckatoo’s multiplicity should also attune readers to the inarticulable 
registers of existence (those agentic somethings) that cannot be reduced to 
conventional representations. They might, though, be gestured toward via a 
language that varies, shifts, and works transversally to express their 
potentials. Jess attunes readers to these potentials when she explains that 
“On other days […] an altogether more disturbing trace prevailed, some 
terrible and indefinable emanation that suggested…but no one wished to 
think about what it suggested” (p. 4). We should be cautious not to conclude 
upon what the Fuckatoo is. We should, instead, be open to its becomings 
because “it has not been possible to predict what the Old Fuckatoo might 
do” (p. 172), though, do it does.  
Major Miner feels-hears rock and opal: on the skin and deep within his 
body. He senses expressive capacities in the inorganic: 
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If he feels the walls of his tunnel, he can tell immediately where its 
weaknesses run, he can press his ear against the rock and hear the 
soft hum of restive fault lines and feel them shifting and stretching 
and resettling themselves. (Hospital, 1997, p. 231)  
 
Indeed, conventional notions of separable Human/Nature do not constrain 
the expressive, relational, and agentic qualities of bodies in Hospital’s 
prose. Opals carry and express vitality as resonances that are felt via some 
indescribable, un-locatable sensory register. Opals are “never still” (p. 84); 
they mesmerise; they call out in alien tones; they foster addiction; and they 
participate—though this is not to blame them—in the production of material-
discursive assemblages that bring destruction to Indigenous peoples and 
Country, to foreigners, and to Inner and Outer Maroo. Rock and opal bodies 
hum, shift and stretch, pulse, vibrate, signal, and sing notes but not words: 
all expressions that can be written, and read, but which exceed meaning. 
The earth expresses itself in relation with Major Miner:  
 
he presses his whole body against the earth and his heartbeat 
sends out a signal and a signal comes back, and so it is that the 
opal and the Major commune like two fax machines whistling to 
each other, cooing in their upper electronic registers […] and then 
the capillaries of glittering, colour-jangled, water-spiked silica sing to 
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major Miner like choirs of angelic children, their plaintive voices 
descant, otherworldly, and pure. (pp. 232-233) 
 
Hospital’s narrator doesn’t work towards the clarification of a rational, 
interpretable meaning in this passage. Rather, she conveys a non-and-
more-than-human register of communication that remains substantive and 
transformative for Major Miner. Admittedly, with stones becoming “children”, 
Hospital’s writing exhibits anthropomorphism. However, they are not only 
children. They are equally machines, or simply stones and the lively 
elements that comprise stones. What these signals and voices mean are 
the sensations they produce; the becomings into which Major and the rocks 
enter; their communions. These communions are affirmative for Major 
Miner: they augment what his body can do.  
Major Miner’s Taoist learning also encourages and cultivates an 
attunement to the non-and-more-than-human (a knife, an ox, a mountain). 
This attunement suggests a perceptual sensitivity—an attunement to Life—
stretching beyond conventional notions of human capabilities, and the 
importance to materiality of what is not there: the gaps. In Major Miner’s 
recollection of a friend’s story of a Taoist approach to cutting meat, we 
encounter gestures toward these microperceptions:206 
 
                                                          
206 For Massumi (2015, p. 53) microperception is: “something that is felt without registering 
consciously. It registers only in its effects”. 
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I see nothing with my eye, but instead with my whole being, I give 
myself attentively to the mystery of the body of the ox. Then I let the 
blade follow its instinct. It finds the secret openings and the fine 
spaces between joints […] That is how it is with explosives […] It is 
a matter of listening to the rock with the body and the mind and the 
sixth intuitive sense, and then the mountainside parts itself in a slow 
and exquisite ballet. (Hospital, 1997, p. 234) 
 
Apprehending the agency of opal involves writing humans’ entries into 
almost inarticulable relations with non-and-more-than-human bodies. 
Perceptions are stretched, refined, and traverse not conventionally human 
registers: the opal’s song “could not be attached to any known scale” (p. 
331). Major Miner opens himself, or is unavoidably open, to the capacities of 
the non-and-more-than-human to transform. Hospital’s narrator’s description 
of Major Miner becoming “an opal man” (pp. 235-236) carries a sense of 
becomings rather than merely conveying Major’s rational interest in the 
stones. It is a matter of him becoming “scarcely [able] to tell where his own 
vein ended and a vein of opal began” (p. 235).  
As with Winton’s Fremantle (2013), hot air shapes what bodies can do in 
Outer Maroo. It participates in the Fuckatoo assemblage: harbouring and 
carrying the odours that so debilitate, distort, and diminish bodies (Hospital, 
1997, p. 57). Even though the heat seems not to move, bodies are “twisted 
and pulled into thin wavery shapes” (p. 29) by it. Through the heat, Mercy 
sees Sarah and Nick: 
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[…] pleated diagonally like Japanese dolls, rice-papered, their 
heads stretched out into points that slant away to the right of their 
feet. When they move the lines shift in slow motion, and new points 
form, new angles, new shapes. They rearrange themselves like 
coloured chips in a kaleidoscope. (p. 32)  
 
Sarah arrives in Outer Maroo and the heat defeats Mercy’s attempts to see 
her clearly: she “goes out of focus again” (p. 33). The heat drowns bodies 
and dulls perceptions. Nick feels this “lethargic sense of being under water” 
(p. 122) as he finds it hard to gauge the mood of the others who greet him 
warily in Bernie’s pub. Sarah, too, finds her energy sapped: “‘I feel,’ Sarah 
says, ‘as though I’m living on the moon […]’” (p. 247). Heat contributes to 
the stifling of Outer Maroo. It is Outer Maroo’s protective blanket, pressing 
down on the prospects for unwanted revelations, cultivating breathlessness 
(p. 57), blankness (p. 4), lassitude (p. 138), faintness (p. 294), dizziness (p. 
388), inarticulateness (p. 101), blindness (p. 4), and silence (pp. 149-165). 
Sarah senses it: “No doubt the fierce heat is responsible for this opaque film 
that covers everything, for the fuzziness, for the lack of clarity” (p. 184). The 
heat demands a ruthlessly parsimonious approach to movement. For some 
Reef acolytes it is deadly (p. 368).  
While Davies (2000a, p. 195) draws our attention to Hospital’s writing as 
engaged with an “embodiment in landscape” that is “beyond words”, 
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Hospital scholarship focuses predominantly upon the implications of this 
engagement for language. However, Hospital’s writing also explores and 
evokes the material relations of the non-and-more-than-human and the 
Human. While not losing the Human, Hospital relocates humans in a larger 
material-semiotic “collective” (Iovino & Oppermann, 2014, p. 6). The 
participation of the non-and-more-than-human in the becomings of Outer 
Maroo is not always directly and conventionally articulable, but it is 
undeniable. As with Eyrie and The Swan Book, Oyster inhabits what Abram 
(2011, p. 173), in his work on becoming, calls “an articulate landscape […] a 
community of expressive presences”. Writing the agency of the non-and-
more-than-human in Oyster gestures toward non-western ontologies, as 
Dunlop (2010) argues, though it is not directed explicitly at matters of 
ecological crises. To use Jane Bennett’s words on material agency (cited in 
Iovino & Oppermann (2014), Hospital offers up other “regimes of 
perception” that allow readers to “consult non-humans more closely, or to 
listen and respond more carefully to their outbreaks, objections, testimonies, 
and propositions” (p. 26); so few of which will be conveyed in the form of 
human language. Hospital’s almost enchanted evocations of bodies in 
productive communion, forces, at least, an ecological thought. It raises a 
question that Iovino and Oppermann (2014, p. 34) ask more broadly: what 
exactly is alive? Ethically, a fuller attunement to the non-and-more-than-
human agencies flowing around and through us—constituting us—may 
encourage greater attention to our human acts as they affect and effect the 
communities that enfold and stretch beyond us.  
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Hospital’s writing of permeability and material vitality in Oyster 
encourages what Braidotti (2002, p. 156) describes, more generally, as the 
actualisation of “an ethics based on the primacy of relation, of 
interdependence, [and] which values nonhuman or apersonal Life […] Zoe 
itself”. While Hospital does not directly address Braidotti’s notions of Zoe in 
Oyster, her writing reinforces a sense that our life is never entirely our own. 
However, this reading experience is not comfortable because such 
incessant breaching of presumed boundaries, along with our openness to 
forces and bodies we might commonly seek to avoid, attests to our 
vulnerability (Davies, 2000a, p. 190). As Alaimo (2010, p. 19) and others 
suggest, cultivating a sense of vulnerability is an important act amid Crises 
from which we might presume ourselves separated and protected.207 Albeit, 
when drawing readers into this other ecology, Hospital does more than 
immerse us in “mess” and “fuzz” (Callahan, 2009). She offers opportunities 
for the cultivation of readers’ attunement to other versions of subjective 
constitution, and other registers of relation and existence: opportunities with 
which I engage next.  
 
 
 
                                                          
207 Hughes-d’Aeth and Nabizadeh (2017, p. 441) suggest that “precariousness might operate as a 
basis for ethical action” (p. 441). 
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Affect 
 
[A]ffects […] are […] ways of connecting, to others and to other 
situations. They are our angle of participation in processes larger 
than ourselves. (Massumi, 2015, p. 6) 
 
The modest scholarly attention given to affect in Oyster belies the extent 
to which affect flows through the novel. Hospital’s writing inhabits and 
expresses intensive registers of relations and subjectivity. The novel is 
flooded with “threshold effects and reversals in polarity” as Genosko (1996, 
p. 158) characterises affect’s work: transformations of the affective 
capacities of those involved. These relations and variations—Mercy’s, Jess’, 
Sarah’s, Major Miner’s, Vi Given’s, Dorothy Godwin’s, Oyster’s, and others’ 
in Outer Maroo—tell stories other than those to be found on the surface of 
the novel’s narrative. They are conducted via permeable bodies, as much 
as, and often prior to, their being registered in the mind, or being put into 
words. Using Massumi’s (2002a) words on affect, I suggest that Hospital’s 
writing involves an attempt at a “vocabulary […] for that which is 
imperceptible but whose escape from perception cannot but be perceived” 
(p. 36). The stories of what becomes from these relations are often barely 
articulable—beyond what can be spoken or given adequate representation, 
and often beyond what the body can assimilate—but they are nonetheless 
real and worthy of attention. Further, Hospital’s writing attunes readers to 
affect as Bourassa (2009, p. 26) describes it: “what surpasses [the human 
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…], undermines it, fragments it, [and…] what simultaneously supports it, 
energizes it, and holds it together”. Hospital’s writing of affect is another way 
by which she explores the possible: a recurring idea in Oyster. It resonates 
with Deleuze’s hope for finding “possibility in even the most oppressive 
conditions” (Slack, 2005, p. 139) via an expanded attunement to sensation: 
offering “new ways to appreciate life and new ways to live” (p. 140).  
We can find affect at work in Oyster by attending to moments of 
suspension; to sensations felt first on the skin; to zones of indiscernibility 
produced by bodies in relation; and to the forces of transformation that flow 
between and impinge upon those bodies. Addressing suspension first, 
Massumi (2002a) notes that affective relations become perceivable because 
they are flush with potential. We find ourselves in: 
 
[…] a state of suspense, potentially of disruption. It is like a 
temporal sink, a hole in time, as we conceive of it and narrativize it. 
It is not exactly passivity, because it is filled with motion, vibratory 
motion, resonation. (p. 26) 
 
Suspensions recur in Oyster, though they are not signs of Life being shut 
down. Like the bodies in the novel, our reading is suspended. For a 
moment, the narrative hangs rather than moves linearly, and yet, this 
suspension carries what Bourassa (2009, p. 26), writing on affect, calls “the 
gift of possibility”. These moments are indexes to a Life that words cannot 
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adequately articulate or contain; moments during which bodies’ powers of 
living transform. Hospital writes Mercy and Sarah’s first encounter 
intensively. Mercy is sensuously charged by Sarah and the moment is one 
of suspension: 
 
Dust motes, gold in the afternoon sun, dance between them. Now 
Mercy is aware of the yeasty smell of the grain, of the sharp tight 
stink of saddles and boots, of the fragrance of cinnamon, of thyme, 
of rosemary, all of them reaching her singly and in concert from the 
spice shelves, as though all her senses are on tiptoe, waiting, and 
the blue rush of the spiled bolt of cloth is like surf in her ears, and 
each white thread of the dress of the woman opposite is as keen 
and fine as piano wire and cuts Mercy’s skin. (Hospital, 1997, p. 
103) 
 
While Mercy’s senses—smell, sight, hearing, touch—are stirred, readers 
might also orient themselves to the dust motes that “dance between them”, 
to those senses “waiting”, and to Sarah, “very still and observant” (p. 103). It 
is a moment flush with potential. We also read that Mercy’s “mother [Vi], 
committed to denial of the flesh, earnestly deaf to all private desire, 
nevertheless knows the language of the senses instinctively” (p. 134). 
Indeed, Vi seems to be almost permanently in suspension: continuously at 
the mercy of intensities—mostly traumatic—that draw her into reveries. 
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Readers are made aware that Vi and Sarah have something in common: 
both have lost a child. It is, not least, via an affective register that readers 
are attuned to this relation. At the dinner table, Vi recounts a memory of her 
son, Brian (p. 143)—also lost at the Reef—and Sarah responds to Vi, 
though she is unable to find words to articulate that response coherently. A 
moment of suspension and intensive relation ensues:  
 
Vi is suspended in sudden knowledge. ‘Your Amy…?’ 
‘I’m sorry,’ Sarah says. ‘I’m not myself. It was when you mentioned 
the moon.’ 
Vi reaches over and places her hand on Sarah’s wrist. Sarah stares 
at it. The two women seem to exchange information through the 
surfaces of their skin. They seem to discover all that they need to 
know about each other. (p. 143) 
 
When Mercy confronts Dukke Prophet about his complicity in Donny 
Becker’s death and the attack on her home, the question makes him “go 
still” and is felt like a slap “in the face” (p. 228). At the same time, Mercy’s 
affective capacities are amplified:  
 
Mercy can feel a sudden throbbing in her arms, she can feel her 
spirit of rebellion beating its wings, she can feel the same 
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dangerous thing that beat in her as she revved Tim Doolan’s car to 
one hundred and thirty and jumped. She understands, suddenly, 
what Miss Rover was drunk on that day on the verandah at 
Bernie’s, that day of her transfer, she understands what kept her so 
apparently lighthearted, what kept her so calm. It is an unnatural 
calm, Mercy knows that now. It is a dangerous calm. It is something 
one feels like a shimmer on the surface of one’s skin […] her eyes 
are glittering […] this is what was happening to Oyster when his 
blue eyes burned, when he mesmerised anyone who looked, and 
the thought that she and Miss Rover and Oyster might all have 
something in common brings on a such a shock of nausea that she 
tastes a thin bitter liquid in her mouth. (p. 227) 
 
Here, again, is a moment of “calm” suspension packed with transformational 
energy. A sensation begins in Mercy’s arms and she attempts to name it: “it 
pushes up inside her like a cyclone and she cannot resist” (p. 227). The 
sensation has a recurrent pulse. Although it remains difficult to articulate in 
words, it gains force; becoming, we read, unnatural, dangerous, “like a 
shimmer”. It is an impersonal force, permeating multiple bodies but not 
particular to or assimilable by any of them. Paradoxically, while it is an 
irresistible sensation—rendering bodies vulnerable, nauseated and 
disoriented—Mercy’s affection also involves the augmentation of her 
capacities to resist.  
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 Bodies, in relation, affect each other. As Massumi (2002a) notes more 
generally, and as we find in these passages, “[i]ntensity is embodied in 
purely autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the skin – at the 
surface of the body, at its interface with things” (p. 25). Again referring to 
suspension, Massumi expands upon this idea of an interface:  
 
the body, when impinged upon, is described by Spinoza as being in 
a state of passional suspension in which it exists more outside of 
itself, more in the abstracted action of the impinging thing and the 
abstracted context of that action, than within itself […]. (p. 31)  
 
Oyster is as much a novel of intensities inscribed on the skin (or the body) 
as it is of words written on pages, of words spoken or not spoken, and of 
thoughts. This materiality of experience proliferates, compounding a sense 
of permeability and expressing relations occurring across other registers. 
We encounter affect via the body, via sensations on the skin, rather than as 
an emotion articulated by/for a character in a novel. We also gain a sense of 
affect’s autonomy: sensible in part to bodies in the novel as shock, 
dislocation or disruption; not entirely assimilable; colonising them, but still 
flowing beyond them; not ownable, recognisable, or qualifiable. Mercy and 
Sarah are among those with sensitive, permeable skin. 
For Mercy, Life’s intensities are felt corporeally. We read that “From time 
to time, she can feel on her skin a possibility of change in the weather” 
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(Hospital, 1997, p. 171); that “She could feel Donny’s nervousness seeping 
into her” (p. 393); and, as she waits in the tunnel at the Reef for Oyster, that 
“The darkness is like something crawling on her skin” (p. 394). For Mercy, 
the possibility of alterity, of liberating her “real self”, is an intensive “hum” 
that “has always been smouldering and fizzing away somewhere under her 
skin” (p. 28). Aberrant thought, as far as Outer Maroo goes—of escape, of 
difference, or of “unlimited possibilities” (p. 28)—is felt by Mercy on and 
through the body. It makes her “dizzy” (p. 28). We read that “Anxiety drums 
against the underside of her skin […] there seems to be a low electric 
humming in her veins like pins and needles, like hope perhaps” (p. 28).  
When Sarah recalls seeing Amy for the last time at her husband’s 
lakeside cottage, there is a sense of suspension: “Around her the air is 
ominously still” (Hospital, 1997, p. 185). The narration signals bodily 
impingements, disruptions and deterritorialisations. We read of Sarah’s 
body being pulled (p. 185), not only her mind. Skin and body process the 
intensities of the memory and carry the knowledge of that which is yet to 
come. Sarah “can feel, with a certain amount of dread, the sticky future, the 
burrs of obligation, the rush of protectiveness spreading like a contusion 
beneath the skin” (p. 193). Fearing that Amy has drowned, the surrounding 
silence becomes “as loud as Sarah’s heartbeat and thuds against her skin” 
(p. 187). Hospital’s writing, of Sarah’s attempt to articulate the materiality of 
a Life that is felt on the body, disrupts common sense (and) notions of 
space and time and, again, evokes microperceptions:  
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There can be no doubt, Sarah thinks, that cataclysm sends out 
shock waves in advance of a strike, and that those who are about to 
be most closely affected can sense the vibrations just as surely as a 
delicate seismograph can detect earthquakes before they arrive. (p. 
191) 
 
To be affected is to become and to become is always collective. Bodies, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest, enter—fold—into and produce a 
shared “no-man’s-land, a nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two 
distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other […]” 
(p. 293). As with Oblivia and swans in The Swan Book, and Keely, birds and 
Kai in Eyrie, the perceptions of one and another come together to produce 
mutual, new perceptions: “something shared or indiscernible” that 
permeates and confounds boundaries (p. 273). In Oyster, we find the flow of 
affect in these shared deterritorialisations: in a sense of liberation and co-
existence and new possibilities. Sarah arrives in Outer Maroo and enters 
Ma Beresford’s store. Feeling faint from the heat, she collapses. Mercy’s 
tending to Sarah produces a joyous affective relation: an “involution” (p. 
238). Hoping to revive her, Mercy drops ice cubes down inside Sarah’s 
dress, and onto her skin. Mercy giggles “in spite of herself” (Hospital, 1997, 
p. 101) at Sarah’s shocked bodily response, which is filled with energy: “At 
the sight of the woman dancing, lifting her dress away from herself with 
thumbs and index fingers, lifting her sandalled feet in quick tempo” (p. 101). 
A force possesses them both, as they are drawn into relations that are 
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productive of something entirely new. This is an impersonal force, with “a 
life of its own”:  
 
The woman’s eyes widen with distress … and then, quite suddenly, 
with shared mirth. She begins to laugh, and Mercy laughs with her, 
sedately, but their twinned laughter takes on a life of its own, and it 
spins and spirals upwards and begins to twist faster and faster, like 
a thing separate from them, out of their control, and it skitters and 
dances and bends its funnel of hilarity toward them and sucks them 
into its vortex and they cling to each other, exhausted. (pp. 101-
102) 
 
There is a becoming-other; an intensive bonding of Sarah-Mercy. There is 
affection, enfolding and escape. Hospital articulates the perceptions of a 
nonhuman force that shapes, augments, and, perhaps itself augmented, 
moves on from the Human. Things move on to Sarah weeping, permeated 
by another affect: weeping, not “with mirth, but simply weeping” (p. 102). 
Hospital’s writing does not attempt to reduce these relations and the 
affective charge flowing from them to something humans can capture: 
something entirely resolvable into/by words. Instead, she gestures toward a 
force articulable via bodily responses and transformations: uncatchable, 
though no less real for its evanescence.  
  
 
298 
 
Later that day, Mercy and her parents dine with Sarah (Hospital, 1997, 
pp. 127-146). Ostensibly, the narration of the dialogue in these passages 
might suggest that silence, drowsiness, awkwardness, inarticulateness, 
talking at cross-purposes, and failings to connect are substantial qualities of 
the relations between the people around the table. Indeed, until her outburst 
of warning to Sarah at the end of the chapter, Mercy says very little. 
However, encountered across other registers, the scene teems with 
connections, affective relations, and transformations. Sarah is both alien 
and familiar. While the climate and cultural differences render her 
incoherent and distant (p. 130), there is an increasing awareness of a 
collectivity in almost inarticulable loss and grief. Again, Sarah and Mercy 
enter into a zone of indiscernibility. It is, we read, an “electrifying” 
experience (p. 129). Mercy feels, via the skin, “pins and needles of 
excitement along her arms” (p. 129). She is drawn to Sarah and into other 
perceptual realms. She wants to access the “vantage point from which she, 
Mercy, is foreign. She wants to look at the dining room, to look at her 
parents, to look at herself from Sarah’s eyes” (p. 129). Mercy’s perceptions 
increasingly become Sarah’s. A collective bloc of sensation is produced and 
moves through the world as Mercy imagines, intensively and sensuously, 
the journey of Sarah and Nick into Outer Maroo. There is no dialogue during 
this imagined journey. Instead, Mercy conjures sensuous relations and, as 
she folds into them, she senses that: 
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they are so aware of each other’s presence that Sarah can feel the 
kiss of his shirt […] like a brush of lips against her forearm, and he 
can smell the talcum powder between her breasts and can taste the 
skin of her shoulders. (p. 132) 
 
These are, undoubtedly, erotically charged moments of 
narration/imagination. However, this being “aware” seems more. Bodies 
mirror and map to each other. The plural (“They both”) is repeated 
extensively in the surrounding passage. There is a collective immersion; an 
imbrication; a traversing. Mercy folds herself into Sarah on the trip (p. 133) 
and in her family dining room, and it seems to be more than solely a distant 
observer’s imagination:  
 
She watches Sarah. She can feel the pressure of words rising in 
Sarah, can see them pushing against Sarah’s throat. Then she can 
see Sarah’s thoughts on a screen inside her own head. More and 
more often, lately, this has been happening […]. It is not a good 
sign. (p. 145) 
 
Hospital’s writing of Mercy, then, attunes readers to the nonhuman: to 
that which flows beneath or beyond what is easily articulable; to what Daniel 
Smith (2005) calls “the intensive reality of the body” (p. 190); and to the 
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literary constitution of characters as compounds of affects and percepts. 
While a reading of Oyster, and Mercy more particularly, could attest to the 
affective qualities of language—the intensities it carries and its capacities to 
transform what bodies can do—relationships in Outer Maroo do not begin or 
end with words alone. Language functions inadequately in articulating the 
inexpressible and we find Mercy all too frequently grasping for words; 
fearing to vary the dominant language; trailing off into ellipses; unable to say 
anything at all; or choosing to say nothing. For Mercy, Life is connective: 
relational and intensive beyond words. She is attuned to a world bursting 
with potential, and she is irredeemably exposed to (and pursues) multiplicity 
and difference. She is, we read, sensitive to: 
 
Insects on the walls of the Living Word [church building] and the 
patterns of nails in the floorboards and the play of light and the 
spinal knobs at the napes of necks bent in worship and the relative 
greasiness of one head of hair compared to another and the way 
some people rock and others shake and some roll on the floor in 
holy laughter and some are afflicted by weeping. (Hospital, 1997, p. 
280) 
 
Here, again, Hospital’s use of the conjunctive, “and”, enacts continuity and 
connectivity and multiplicity, both formally and expressively. As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) write of the “and”,  
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it is the connection, the “and” produced between elements, between 
sets, and which belongs to neither, which eludes them and 
constitutes a line of flight. [It…] conveys “fuzzy,” nondenumerable, 
nonaxiomizable sets, in short, “masses,” multiplicities of escape and 
flux. (p. 470) 
 
Mercy is overwhelmed by Life’s unstable fragility. Clarity of thought is 
difficult amid this turmoil: there is a play of instruments in her head that she 
describes as “discordant” (Hospital, 1997, p. 128). She is hyper-sensitive—
literally raw-skinned after her jump from a speeding car onto an outback 
road and into spinifex grass (p. 199)—and sensuously exposed to the 
world’s uncontainable flows and variation. She apprehends the chaos or 
disorder leaching through the orderly veneer that Outer Maroovians try to 
preserve. Via Mercy, Hospital explores microperceptions, in the Deleuzian 
(1994) sense that “Underneath the large noisy events lie the small events of 
silence" (p. 16): 
 
Everywhere Mercy directs her eye or her ear there are 
contradictions so great that she cannot understand how the fabric of 
the world contains them. If she were to hear the air turn boisterous 
with the sound of ripping, the sound of life tearing itself apart at the 
seams, she would not be surprised. (Hospital, 1997, pp. 134-135) 
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She feels herself to be continuously in flow and open to intensities carried 
by thought, words, and other corporeal and incorporeal bodies. Albeit, as 
the passage below conveys, while these intensities and continuities are 
sensed, they are not always made sense of and they can be traumatic. 
Standing outside her home in the morning heat: 
 
She feels lighter than air. She can hear a sort of merriment in the 
dust motes, scudding around her. […] She asks herself why so 
often lately it is as though her body runs away with her thoughts. 
[…]. She is flushed and excited, she wants to take the whole world 
into herself greedily, she wants to embrace trees, cows, sheep, the 
sun, Donny Becker, she could dance, she could fly, but then just as 
suddenly she is tormented with shame because that must have 
been what Oyster saw, what he knew about her, this greediness, 
this wet heat, and if that…if that is what…and then she feels ill and 
confused. (p. 170, Italics added)  
 
Although Mercy is open to and expresses the persistence of trauma, the 
affirmative affective encounters into which she and others enter also 
function as modes of resistance to it. Early in the novel’s narrated order, 
Mercy senses the potential of such relations when she experiences the blue 
bolt of cloth unravelling in Ma Beresford’s store: cloth that “gallops” and 
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“billows” and is “puckering […] frothing […] pleating” (Hospital, 1997, p. 22). 
The intensities—“the lovely rush of colour unspinning itself” (p. 22)—make 
Mercy “lightheaded” (p. 23) but in this disruption she finds the almost 
inarticulable resources to resist the damaging traumatic intensities to which 
she remains exposed: 
 
She feels that soon she will be able to build a fence with them, no, 
not a fence, a wall, that soon she will have enough pieces 
of…pieces of…?–what are they?–enough pieces of these things 
that cannot be turned into darkness, these pieces of light, enough of 
them to build a wall, four walls, and the walls will be high enough 
and potent enough to contain everything she knows about Oyster’s 
Reef […] with no possibility of leakage whatsoever, and then Mercy 
will be able to walk away […]. (p. 23) 
 
As I observed earlier with regard to her altercation with Dukke Prophet, here 
too is a material transgression—the bolt leaving its table—yielding a 
sensuous reweaving of Mercy’s sense of self: an augmentation in her 
affective capacities; an “unspinning” (p. 23) of what has been spun. The 
repetition of “will be” and “enough”, and the use of free indirect discourse, 
lend the moment an affirmative tenor, rhythm, and sense of mobility and 
collectivity. Hospital’s intensive mode of writing Mercy connects to the 
virtual—to “as-yet unactualized modes of being” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 131) 
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that nonetheless arise from a history with trauma in it—and thereby to 
potentially different futures than the one to which traumatic forces flowing 
through Mercy’s past and present could consign her.  
An affective study of Mercy offers an alternative register across which 
Hospital maps Life’s—and a life’s—movements. It is an alternative—though, 
of course, the two traverse each other—to the social-discursive terrain upon 
which Mercy’s life in Outer Maroo is oppressed, dominated and contracted 
by religion, muted by a discourse of fear, secrets and amnesia, and 
prevented from moving off the map. Mercy is permeable and non-unitary: 
her skin is penetrable; her mind the thought of the body;208 her subjectivity 
not inherently bounded and propertied but the production of open-ended, 
dynamic relations. Mercy is nomadic. Though stuck in place amid a 
repressive social system, she continues to travel and to relate. She cannot 
stop “at the station of Now” (Hospital, 1997, p. 282). Instead, she takes 
“tangents” (p. 282) and traverses, and is traversed by, other bodies. Mercy 
engages in continuous reaching-out or, as Davies’ (2000a, p. 196) refers to 
Hospital’s approach to relationality, she expresses an “eroticized desire to 
communicate”. Her foldings with others are collective participations in 
processes of sensuous discovery and revelation, and of resistance and 
renewal. As with all foldings (Conley, 2005, p. 171), they are acts of agency, 
expressing potentiality. They are also instructive in that they gesture toward 
the world’s more-than-cognitive intelligibility. In writing Mercy’s becomings, 
Hospital exceeds—and withholds, and reveals difficulties with—
                                                          
208 A Spinozan concept (2009, p. 96). 
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representation. There is an intensive intelligibility to these relations that is 
accessed through Hospital’s writing of bodies. This intelligibility exceeds or 
evades the conventional intellect that might try to rationalise or name 
becomings. It operates along a relational register that is not so easily 
accessible to those seeking to oppress through discourse, rationality, and 
the mind. For Mercy, the struggles of Outer Maroo are displaced or 
deterritorialised: given a new mobility. She enlivens a stultified community. 
While some are left feeling uncomfortable, assaulted, and exposed when 
they interact with her—including Sarah, Jess, Amy, and Pete—they also find 
truths and knowledge, or the hope of unearthing such truths and knowledge. 
Mercy’s affective capacities are explosive and they bring to the surface--
they mine—what “the fabric of the world [only just] contains” (p. 134). 
Massumi (2015, p. 3) writes that “‘affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope’ ” and, I 
propose that Hospital’s writing of affective openness suggests something 
affirmative, to do with ecological sense and possibilities for living: namely, a 
“lunatic hope” (p. 29) that we, as expressions of our relations, are not yet 
final.  
 
Hospital writes other moments of suspension and processes of affection 
in Oyster: 
 
No one moved. No one made a sound. We stared at him [Oyster], 
awed. There is a kind of excitement, you see, that gifted orators 
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have, and there can never be a full accounting for it outside the 
atmosphere that they themselves create. (1997, p. 324) 
 
Again, something inarticulable and nonhuman is at work. Affects move and 
shared affections are produced. The violent, manipulative figure Oyster 
reminds readers that affect is not solely an affirmative force—indeed it has 
no intent other than to continue—and that literary engagements with the 
nonhuman are not necessarily joyful. My contention is not made in order to 
reduce Oyster to pure affect, deny him his humanity, and thereby let 
humans off the hook for the horrifying violence of which he/we are capable. I 
make it, rather, to further assert that Hospital writes affect. Nor is my 
approach a denial of Hospital’s use of metaphorical, allegorical, and 
symbolic poetics in writing the figure of Oyster. Rather, I propose a more-
than-representational engagement with Hospital’s writing that does not only 
look to the human and to representation to make sense of Oyster. We might 
also attune ourselves to the not entirely Human forces that flow through 
bodies and are carried and given continuity by them: what Nick calls “this 
dangerous buzz of intensity” (p. 422). As Jess suggests, “it does not seem 
possible to think about Oyster in only one way at a time” (p. 310).  
Oyster functions as a present absence in Hospital’s narrative. Although, 
like the Fuckatoo, he ceaselessly broods over events, he does not appear in 
person until page 297. Not a conventionally narrated individual—detached 
from the collective, autonomous, asserting self, possessing interiority—
Oyster seems only to exist with an audience. Jess reflects that people like 
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Oyster “must have an audience to watch the flickering theatre of their lives. 
[…] What, after all, would be the substance of a shadow with no one to see 
it?” (Hospital, 1997, p. 301). Oyster’s words are drawn from books, his 
character a veiled repetition of cult leaders elsewhere. We are offered no 
interiority, no focalisation and no sensuous register via which Oyster lives in 
his own right. Instead, we are offered a “ghost” (p. 308). To Jess, he seems 
to be without substance—“He was like an apparition, insubstantial. He was 
like a mirage” (p. 298)—and between sexes: “hover[ing] in the androgynous 
border zones” (p. 298). He is “ageless young-old, old-young” (p. 303). Jess 
cannot find a coherent, stable explanation of Oyster: to unpack his influence 
and attribute it to identifiable techniques. She gets as close as “perhaps” (p. 
304) in her explanations, and “All I can vouch for is that we were 
mesmerised” (p. 319). She “saw him casting invisible lines, hooking people, 
winding them in” (p. 319); though she remains uncertain or is unable to 
articulate easily with words quite how. She reflects that “Perhaps because 
there was nothing at all at the core of Oyster (that is one of my theories) he 
had the fluid capacity of fitting the shape of everyone’s dreams” (p. 304).  
Readers might wish to conclude that Oyster works his influence via the 
mind and is intelligent enough to “orchestrate” (Hospital, 1997, p. 323) and 
manipulate others (p. 312), just as all consummate tricksters do: to use what 
little he already knows, and what he gleans, to tap into their desires; and to 
theatrically draw others into his sphere of influence; even the more resistant 
Jess, Major Miner and Andrew Godwin. Oyster’s homily on opals and his 
revealing of rare black gems are what Jess calls his opening 
choreographical (p. 320) triumph over the crowd. It is combined with 
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Oyster’s seemingly miraculous insight into Andrew Godwin’s son’s suicide, 
the revelation of which transforms Andrew. Of course, Oyster’s sensuous 
language seduces Outer Maroovians, as do his references to monetary 
riches, his religious, anti-government rhetoric, and his apocalyptic 
imaginary. There is more, though, than oratory-rhetorical power. There is 
something substantive which escapes a purely discursive, rational 
explanation for Oyster, and Jess makes great and troubled efforts to 
articulate this affective register. While she cannot explain his impact—“I 
don’t know, I don’t know” she repeats (p. 302)—she gestures toward her 
sense of him and towards the sensations and transformations he produces 
in others. Jess recalls Oyster’s affective assemblage—clothes, trajectory 
(coming out of the West), time of first arrival, blood on trousers, opals held 
out, eyes, a gun, and words—and how he mesmerises the crowd, speaking 
of oysters, water, and the intense blue of distant places: 
 
‘It’s extraordinary,’ he said dreamily, and everyone turned towards 
Broome, we all seemed to go under that blue sky like divers, the 
Indian Ocean lapping us; ‘so intense,’ Oyster said, ‘that blueness, 
that equatorial blueness, you can’t imagine…’ He made some 
graceful motion with his hand as though drawing back a curtain, 
parting the air – the magus, I remember thinking; or if I didn’t think it 
back then, I can see it now, the way he held the magician’s baton in 
his hand – and everyone swayed, we all leaned into his vision, we 
were stunned by the blue wave washing us, the tide coming in, 
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shussing back over lost sands, picking up fossilised shells it had 
dropped on an ancient ebb. […] we turned languid in the lush 
coastal humidity of Oyster’s words. (p. 321)  
 
Indeed, like his hand gesture, we might find Oyster’s greatest allure in 
inaudibility, in inarticulateness, and in the almost secretive, and the 
withdrawn, qualities of his oration: in what is “unspoken” (p. 322). It is, 
perhaps, in something altogether beyond speech or non-speech: 
 
Oyster said something, but very softly, as though he were giving 
Donny a private answer. Maybe he did no more than move his lips. 
Whatever he said, or didn’t say, no one heard it, and everyone 
leaned closer. There was a shuffling, a kind of swarming together, a 
hum of What? We didn’t hear you. What did you say? What did 
he…? We couldn’t hear… (p. 305) 
 
Here, Oyster’s affective capacities are suggestive of what Protevi (2014, p. 
329) describes more broadly as an ability to get a group to move “with the 
same pulse”: entrainment. Indeed, Oyster gets them to collectively not 
move, which is no less valid a form of affection.  
There is something obscure and distinct about Oyster’s seduction of 
others: Jess calls it “the impact on all of us […] by that indefinable but 
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calculated aura that held us in thrall” (Hospital, 1997, p. 300). Some sense 
that Oyster has “a certain kind of stink” (p. 301); he “changed the air” (p. 
302); he emits “a fizzing aura of compressed energy” (p. 304); he has “a 
way of gesturing with his hands, his eyes flashed opals […]” (p. 326); and a 
“sweet-smelling skin” (p. 251). Others dwell upon his “primitive”, “primal” 
intensities: how a connection with him produces unfamiliar transformations 
in what bodies can do. His gaze is potent; what Jess describes as “intense” 
(p. 311). It signals, arrests, voids thought, unsettles, envelops, and exposes. 
Jess senses that Oyster “saw all my selves”, though this “sensation of 
transparency” is also one of becoming, or entering into a common bloc of 
sensation with Oyster: what Jess calls a “momentary fusion” (p. 311).  
Jess admits “a stirring of primitive sexual excitement” (Hospital, 1997, p. 
313) in Oyster’s presence when, seemingly kissing her hand in thanks after 
she removes a splinter from his palm, he slips her fingertips into his mouth. 
Not exclusive to Jess, or Dorothy Godwin (pp. 256-257), it is a primitive 
sensation felt collectively: “We were dazed. Our breath fogging the hot air. 
Something steamy, something akin to desire slipped into all crevices: 
gaping mouths, wide eyes, minds reeling open” (p. 322). However, there are 
no words spoken and no clarity about this “Something”. The transformative 
force of the relations exceeds language. Nor do they need to be spoken to 
be expressed: “each person asked himself furtively, nervously, if such 
silences, such omissions, could possibly have been unspoken on the 
verandah of an outback pub” (p. 322). Mercy—sensuously attuned and 
affectively open—comes to know Oyster by more than what can be 
articulated as, or attributed confidently to, a human quality. Oyster 
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expresses an incipient violence. Mercy recalls his first sexual assault of her 
in the Beresford store, and taps into the forces running ahead of his body 
and diminishing her vitality. She stands on a ladder, facing shelves, sensing 
Oyster’s presence on her skin: 
 
Oyster is there. He is moving between hardware and rows of 
canned beans. She knows it is Oyster, though her face is pressed 
against boxes on the highest shelves […]. There is someone at the 
foot of the ladder. She knows it is Oyster. She presses her legs 
together […]. She knows it is Oyster […]. Perhaps, from the top of 
the ladder, she saw him at the edge of her eye in the street without 
realising it. Or perhaps there was something about the sound of the 
door […], or the sound of his footsteps […]. Perhaps it was a faint 
and particular body smell that caused Mercy to stiffen. In any case, 
she knows it is Oyster. […] she can feel a layer of air against her 
skin turn hard, like a carapace. (p. 387) 
 
Mercy reacts with “her mind and with her nerve ends” (p. 387). Again, it is 
the skin that responds, protectively it seems, anticipating the coming 
assault.  
Affect offers a compelling way of engaging with the Oyster’s ostensible 
paradoxes. While his words promise emancipation, freedom and wealth, the 
transformations that bodies and subjectivities undergo in relations with him 
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are negating, denuding, contractive, and, ultimately, deadly. His impact is 
energising and soporific. While it seems that encounters with Oyster are 
initially enlivening—“He changed the air. He put a spring in everyone’s step” 
(Hospital, 1997, p. 302)—people become slaves, concubines, acolytes and 
prey. Oyster’s sermons at the Reef run for hours but it is not their scriptural 
content that transforms the bodies of followers forced to stay awake and 
listen after their daily hard labours. It is the exhausting, interminable barrage 
of words and the requirement to be there:  
 
it seems to go on and on and Mercy realises that everyone is very 
tired, that everyone is exhausted, that the skin on everyone’s face is 
stretched very tight and shines as though a bulb was switched on 
under the bone, and they all just want to sleep to sleep to sleep. (p. 
400)  
 
For Oyster’s followers, to speak and to listen at the Reef is to be shorn of 
vitality, not to find freedom and Life. Their affective capacities are 
impoverished and their existential horizons contracted. Their bodies are 
violated. They lose their identities and are unable to think. They, too, 
become “ghosts, revenants, the living dead” (p. 388). The sensations 
characters have when encountering Oyster index the initial flush and then 
the drawing of Life and potential out of them; leaving them, at best, in an 
  
 
313 
 
empty state of the “still to come” (p. 302): a different kind of suspension 
forged by affect.  
Oyster folds himself into, enfolds, and re-folds Outer Maroo. He 
participates in the folds of bodies, of knowledge, of the social, and in the 
ultimate folds of death. Indeed, an intensive reading of Oyster suggests the 
ease of his entanglement with Outer Maroo is a function of his affective 
resonance with the community. Taken to violent and destructive extremes, 
the affects he expresses—to fear, to possess, to consume, and to escape—
are those prevalent in Outer Maroo before he arrives. He materially and 
discursively exploits—and, perhaps, is affirmed and strengthened by—the 
forces that shape Outer Maroo, revealing them to the collective who have 
cultivated them, while increasing their intensities. Major Miner gestures 
toward this symbiosis: “Oyster, he thinks, was like one of those bacterial 
forces that blindly and ruthlessly seek out the culture that will nourish them. 
[…] Outer Maroo was his petri dish […]” (p. 413). Oyster and Outer Maroo 
are mutually catalytic; both “consumed by intensity” (p. 379) and not only by 
the intensity of the fires that burn it to the ground. 
It is, no doubt, possible to read Oyster symbolically: as a human 
representing broader religious and capitalist extremist forces at work in the 
world; entangling the language of modern capitalism and religious 
fundamentalism; combining oppression and the expansion of capital wealth; 
conflating money and salvation and death. What Hospital’s writing of Oyster 
also offers, though, is an attunement to the affective modes of capitalism 
and religion; to the ways in which bodies are shaped to best meet the 
  
 
314 
 
objectives of wealth accumulation and the preservation of inequality; and to 
the violence inflicted upon resistance and unsanctioned difference. 
Massumi’s (2002a) work on affect and capitalism resonates here with this 
idea of cult-capitalism, extreme though it is in Oyster: where religion and 
rapacious wealth-seeking fuse. Massumi writes of “certain economic 
theorists who, when called upon to explain to a nonspecialist audience the 
ultimate foundation of the capitalist monetary system, answer ‘faith’” (p. 44). 
An attunement to the affective modes of capitalism/religion can also enable 
resistance against efforts to incorporeally and corporeally subjectify bodies. 
Massumi (2015) writes on this matter: “alternative political action does not 
have to fight against the idea that power has become more affective, but 
rather has to learn to function itself on that same level” (p. 34). Hospital 
works to expand the affective register beyond those sanctioned and utilised 
by capitalism and by religion. Mercy, for example, is open to and expresses 
affects which are not sanctioned by Outer Maroo’s cult-capitalism and, 
indeed, that counteract the trauma and damage done to bodies where 
consumption and greed and servitude are privileged. We find qualities of 
Hospitals literary practice in Greenwald-Smith’s (2015, p. Foreword) more 
general characterisation of resistant affective writing: as “concerned with 
impersonal feelings: feelings that challenge the neoliberal notion that 
emotions are the property of the self”. The ways in which bodies fold into 
each other in Oyster counteracts neoliberal affects associated with the 
separable individual: independent, self-defining and imbued with identity; a 
stand-alone project of subjectivity that is entirely self-reliant; only entering 
into arms-length transactional relations of mutual benefit with other subjects 
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where it decides. Hospital writes permeable subjectivities: “transindividual” 
living (Massumi, 2015, p. 94). They are open to the exterior and are 
collective productions. They are not in control of their trajectories, no matter 
how much they believe they are, and they are always reliant for their joy 
upon the affirmative qualities of their relations with other bodies. Hospital’s 
bodies are immersed, entangled, and irreducibly multiple; they live as 
Braidotti’s (2005/6, p. 16) subject: as “a cluster of complex and intensive 
forces”.  
In Oyster, readers encounter affects’ capacities to produce effects—of joy 
and of sadness/pain—without initial reference to logic, reasoning, or 
communication, and more rapidly and in excess of characters’ abilities to 
cope. While these nonhuman flows participate in the (re)constitution of 
bodies, subjectivities and Life, their intensive qualities and work remain 
difficult to articulate. Hospital’s writing orients readers beyond metaphors for 
and images of some corporeal and stable thing, and towards a sense of 
these intensive flows: we become “sensually eroticised” (Davies, 2000a, pp. 
187-188). Making these transformational flows and their elusiveness more 
intelligible to readers should, at least, instil a degree of humility in those who 
hope to capture the world, to know its entirety, to individualise it, or to bring 
it to a halt. To further explore flows in, and the flows of, Oyster, I turn, next, 
to Hospital’s extensive and intensive writing of water. 
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Water 
 
 
Following water is a great way to think in the Deleuzean manner. 
(Protevi, 2007, para. 4) 
Those are the seasons out here: drought or floods. (Hospital, 1997, 
p. 61) 
 
Water is an active and transformative material. Halsey (2006) observes 
that “[t]o think [and I suggest, to write] machinically is to view the world in 
terms of an incessant mutability or flux” (p. 61), and water, he suggests, is 
one way to pursue such practices. After Nietzsche, Halsey notes that water 
conveys “the preponderance of Dionysian forces (flux, flow, change, chaos) 
over Apollonian forms (stasis, structure, sameness, order)” (p. 64). Water is 
“always arriving or exiting whereas Man is characterised by becoming-Still” 
(p. 61). It is “composed of infinitely varied speeds” rather than being 
“constant, predictable and habitual” (p. 64). It resists containment, fixing, 
control, contraction and oppression via its capacities for expansion, 
transformation, relation and escape: for instance, via evaporation and 
osmosis (p. 64). For Outer Maroovians, though, water is a scarce and 
almost mythical substance: “there were children in Outer Maroo who had 
never seen rain” (Hospital, 1997, p. 3). I noted earlier that drought, heat, 
desert, dry riverbeds, and parched earth and air, affect bodies in Oyster: 
slowing them down; contracting their movements; drawing them into a state 
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of torpor and sleepiness; diminishing what they can do and where they can 
move; changing how they relate; and killing them. Nonetheless, a striking 
quality of Hospital’s writing is its capacity to sensuously—not only 
metaphorically—immerse readers in a liquid, folding world. Water—like the 
figure Oyster—is a demonstrably present-absence in the novel’s plot and it 
is with water that Hospital affirms Life amid desiccated stasis and 
oppression. While Oyster offers water as a metaphor for variation—a 
symbol for Life continuing to move amid contraction, seeping through 
porous bodies, and being ultimately uncontainable—water also inhabits the 
novel as a lively, varying and relational material. Hospital’s writing of water 
expresses a world always in flow; always differing; and lived intensively on 
the body. The sensuous poetics of Oyster express these transformations: as 
becomings-water. 
Chen, MacLeod and Neimenas (2013, p. 10) note that, for Bachelard, 
“our concepts always depend on material metaphors for their expression”, 
and I acknowledge that Hospital’s use of water in Oyster is extensively 
metaphorical. Water images substitute for, gesture toward, and assist 
readers to imagine folding, flowing, and fluid bodies; intimate relations; and 
open subjectivities. We find water tropes in their multitudes: from rivers, 
waves, swells, floods, flows and water itself, to floating, cresting, seeping, 
spilling, lapping, foaming and drowning. We find bodies of water, liquid 
flows, relations between liquid forms, water as catalyst, as threat, as vehicle 
or carrier, as destructive force, and as container. Non-liquid things are 
expressed via—and express—liquid qualities and potential: splashing light 
(Hospital, 1997, p. 128); seeping bravado (p. 107), messages (p. 300), 
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nervousness (p. 393) and defiance (p. 187); swimming thoughts (p. 189); 
liquid cloth (p. 22); time flowing into temporal seas in which we float (p. 22); 
and Amy carrying an “inner sea” (p. 175). Questions, laughter, spittle, air, 
and the world all “crest” (pp. 84, 102, 283, 433). Silence, laughter again, 
blood, and mouths “foam” (pp. 83, 102, 183, 279). Light, memories, desired 
things, and time “lap” against bodies and minds (pp. 128, 47, 13, 187). 
Human figures regularly find themselves, other human figures, and non-
and-more-than-human bodies, transformed into water and water vessels. An 
unnamed “someone” in Ma Beresford’s store “sees Digby’s truck float into 
view” (p. 21) and soon after it is “drifting toward anchor” (p. 22).  
Mercy, who Hospital commonly writes via water, and as water, also 
perceives a liquid world. She is taken by the manner in which Nick walks: 
“Fluid, she thinks. As horses move; as water moves” (Hospital, 1997, p. 99). 
Fluidity is a matter of concern too for Charles Given, Oyster, Pete, Jess, and 
Nick. Fluidity pervades bodies, silence, time, desert, images, and thought. 
Ways of living are considered via liquid flows. At dinner, Vi drips gravy on to 
the tablecloth and those present witness the “dark splash that is bleeding in 
filaments along the gingham threads” (p. 137). The spread adheres to the 
straight lines of the thread and we are given an insight into how Mercy’s 
father, Charles, experiences and tries to find order in the world. He explains 
that the bleeding “adheres to the principle of conduction. All fluids are 
conducted along the available structural channels of distribution” (p. 138). 
This version of the world and its flows and relations is far from the 
proliferating, transversal, multiple flows of matter-discourse to which Mercy 
is attuned. For Mercy, a quality of living is the absolute impossibility of pre-
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determining the directions, trajectories and flows of Life. In Oyster, there are 
those whose lives flow via other channels of distribution; whose lives flow 
transversally rather than true to common notions of order; and whose lives 
flow via collective blocs of sensation rather than down “structural channels”. 
Water populates the world of Oyster materially and as matter-memory. 
Water trapped inside opals becomes the past locked away in the gem, still 
producing movement and finding expression though it cannot speak to us in 
any conventional human way (Hospital, 1997, p. 76). Bore water coats 
bodies in its “alkaline slick” (p. 36), as well as giving them a sulphurous 
scent (p. 13): here, Outer Maroovian skin carries the residue of the damned. 
Dried-out watercourses and waterbodies are flush with memories of flood 
and high water (p. 4-5). Rivers continue to run. Sea creatures abound, 
though they are fossils. The empty “Sea of Null” persists in the imaginary (p. 
22). Hospital’s writing of water’s persistent, spatio-temporal transversality 
resonates with Deleuze’s (1994) words: 
 
We are made of contracted water, earth, light and air - not merely 
prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their 
being sensed. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual 
elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of 
retentions and expectations. At the level of this primary vital 
sensibility, the lived present constitutes a past and a future in time. 
(p. 73)  
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A liquid world, then, floods the prose in Oyster, but to stop at metaphor 
and matter-memory is to stem the flow prematurely. Hospital’s hydro-literary 
practice carries material, affective force. As Massumi (1995, p. 107) 
describes affect more generally, water in Oyster is not only infrastructural, it 
is transversal. Hospital writing of water’s intensities, qualities and 
movements function as indexes to the material and affective registers of 
relations and becomings. Water expresses transformations in the affective 
capacities of bodies produced via their relations with other bodies, even 
though (and, perhaps, especially where) the content and trajectory of those 
changes may not be easily articulable. As Massumi (2015, p. 54) puts it 
more generally: “in the instant of the affective hit, there is no content yet. All 
there is is the affective quality, coinciding with the feeling of the interruption, 
with the kind of felt transition […]”. Water also functions affectively because 
it works synesthetically, at least in literary terms: using one kind of sense 
impression to express sense impressions of other kinds.209 Davies (2000a) 
recalls Hospital’s words on Oyster and on finding a language that isn’t the 
language we have: on her “attempt to speak of a language that is sensually 
eroticized, quite profoundly communicative, but has to exist outside of 
established language forms because they’ve just not served the purpose of 
communicating” (pp. 187-188). In Oyster, we find Hospital’s affective, hydro-
                                                          
209 Massumi (2002a) writes: “affect is synesthetic, implying a participation of the senses in each 
other: the measure of a living thing's potential interactions is its ability to transform the effects of one 
sensory mode into those of another. […] Affects are virtual synesthetic perspectives anchored in 
(functionally limited by) the actually existing, particular things that embody them (p. 35). 
  
 
321 
 
literary attempt at such a vocabulary: a language of the sensible though 
barely articulable.  
Where Mercy focalises, water flows. Two years before Outer Maroo’s 
demise, Amy visits Ma Beresford’s store and asks Mercy for help to escape 
Oyster’s Reef. She catalyses in Mercy a sense of the trauma of her own 
time at the Reef and Hospital’s writing of water expresses the sensations of 
a shift—a diminution—in Mercy’s capacities: 
 
Mercy could feel a softness starting at her ankles, and then 
spreading, and she knew that in a second or so she would dwindle 
into nothing, she would simply leak away, she would disappear 
through the floor like the last waterhole in a creek bed seeping into 
sand. (Hospital, 1997, p. 89) 
 
Amy offers a direct, though unwitting prompt to Mercy’s sense of her own 
complicity in the town’s turning away from the violence out at the Reef. 
Mercy, we read, feels “as though the air were unsafe. It was heaving. It was 
curling her into waves. She felt seasickness, air sickness, coming on” (p. 
90). Mercy feels her body’s incapacitation: “she could feel herself turning 
blue” (p. 91) like the flowing bolt of cloth.  
Water is also critical to the expression of traumatic affect in Oyster. 
Lorraine’s (2011) observations on trauma are helpful for a reading of Mercy. 
  
 
322 
 
For Mercy, the violence inflicted upon her and her family members persists 
in the present and threatens a dark future for them. Trauma surges up 
repeatedly to render Mercy incapable. Hospital writes this trauma affectively 
and synesthetically, via water. Shifts in Mercy’s psychical and 
physiological—and her affective—capacity are conveyed through 
sensations associated with powerful liquid flows, acceleration, inundation, 
immersion, and drowning. As the Givens’ awkward, ostensibly muted dinner 
with Sarah progresses, Mercy senses the sorrow, the desperation, and the 
trauma enveloping the room and its inhabitants and we read that: 
 
She is awash in a familiar exhaustion. She experiences it as a 
lassitude of the body, but the sensation also presents itself visually: 
there are two currents of rushing water, black cold floodwater, 
sweeping down dry tributary arms of the Barcoo, hurtling towards a 
confluence at Cooper’s Creek. Mercy is flotsam. She is split in two. 
She is swept along both watercourses simultaneously. The speed 
of the rushing water is incredible. At the confluence, at the moment 
of collision, a great column of black water throws itself up like a tidal 
wall as though hitting concrete. There is nothing but darkness. All 
the water of the Barcoo flood plain explodes and annihilates itself in 
mist. (Hospital, 1997, pp. 138-139) 
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Though it is introduced as visual, the sensation, at least for Mercy, traverses 
the senses. Trauma enfolds Mercy as a liquid sensation that disrupts and 
deterritorialises the body. Beyond the visual, the water is cold and there are 
sensations of impact and fragmentation. Mercy feels-thinks in liquid folds 
and flows: in “currents”, in “cross-current”, “flood”, “confluence”, “tidal wave”, 
and “flow”; even in liquid transformations and annihilations in “mist” (p. 139). 
She becomes indiscernible from the sensed flows: she “is flotsam”. She is 
disoriented by this vision and she “hangs onto the edge of the dining-room 
table” and “cannot breathe” (p. 139). These intensities are unassimilable. 
She seeks out stable “details”—the “stitches in the tablecloth”—to try and 
reverse the potentially overwhelming sensory “flood” (p. 139). The liquid 
world that surges up and immerses Mercy indexes her inability to remain 
“absent”: to stay above or “anchor herself beyond the highwater line of flash 
floods” (p. 139). These floods signal the intensive surges felt on the body by 
Mercy, arising from her violation at the hands of Oyster, and from the 
experiences associated with her father’s assault, the disappearance and 
likely death of her brother, Brian, and the ostracising of the Given family by 
Outer Maroo’s religious community. But, for Hospital, such living traumas 
cannot be articulated directly, or in some “mainstream” way, as Lorraine 
(2011, p. 131) describes representational options open to writers, because 
they are “inadequate to the truths they want and need to tell” (p. 130). The 
traumas Mercy expresses still have life in them and they continue to 
participate in her becomings and those of others. Consequently, to attempt 
to close those off as past events would miss their intensive vitality in the 
present and the future. Furthermore, like water under pressure, these 
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intensities exceed a body’s capacity to contain, or assimilate them. Adapting 
Deleuze, water in Oyster might be read as sensation: as “that which 
exceeds intellectual control and works directly on and through the nervous 
system” (Deleuze, 1990b, p. 31). 
The ongoing vitality of the trauma of losing a child (and brother), that 
connects Sarah and Vi and Mercy, becomes palpable when Vi turns the 
conversation to Brian, her missing son. Again, Mercy tries to avoid the 
ensuing liquid surge of traumatic affect, but she cannot and she returns, via 
the kettle that she seeks out for its calming details, to the “roiling boiling 
water like a river in flood” (Hospital, 1997, p. 142). Although Mercy craves 
conversational silence—“it is better to say nothing” (p. 145)—it does not 
stem the intensive flow. Rather than distract the mind and protect us from 
the past, details can carry and express its affective force. They are, to use 
Deleuze’s (2000) words on Proust, “sensuous material signs” (p. 14) and 
Hospital uses liquid to convey their capacities. Indeed, Sarah explains these 
“sensuous material signs” to Vi: 
 
It’s the details, isn’t it? Details that get stuck in the mind, they’re so 
potent, they’re like concentrated essence of the past. One drop, and 
a whole era mushrooms out, all these sensations you’d forgotten. 
(p. 144) 
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Over and above the importance of water to readers’ sense of the continuity 
and permeability of bodies, and of the intensive flows of relations that produce 
bodies in Oyster, the variation of Hospital’s writing can produce an unmooring, 
or deterritorialisation of readers. After Deleuze, Rizzo (2012, p. 142) notes that 
cinematic repetitions of water images produce “molecular perception […] that 
de-emphasises human subjectivity”, and that water can be valuable as what 
Deleuze (1986, p. 43) calls a “liquid-image” that offers pure flow. Rizzo (2012, 
p. 142) quotes Deleuze: “movement can be extracted from the thing moved, or 
mobility from movement itself”. A rhythm or the sense of a rhythm is produced 
from the repetition of water: “vibration in its deepest sense” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 
78). We find these repetitions in Oyster. Although water is commonly written in 
connection with human relations and sensations, rather than written in itself 
(akin to cinematic water images without the Human), it is often the case that 
water images and water-sense overwhelm bodies and that characters become-
water. Mercy, in particular, repeatedly loses her sense of coherent self, and we 
lose her, amid “flash floods” or water sensations. There is also poetic intensity 
to Hospital’s prolific use of water metaphors in Oyster. As should be evident 
from my earlier analysis, Hospital’s water metaphors do not alight upon a single 
object, subject, sensation, emotion or relation. Rather, they proliferate with 
differences: the objects to which they relate and their connotations are in 
continuous variation. This variation has the capacity to produce a feeling of 
fluidity and continuity in the reader.  
Deleuze (1986) proposes that water perception is not tailored to the solid, 
or to the expectation of the solid. Water removes the solid “as object, as 
condition, as milieu” (p. 80), and as constraint on what a body can do. In 
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Oyster, Hospital establishes Outer Maroo’s conditions as tending towards 
earth, the narrow, and the solid: fixed, separable, static, and controlled. 
However, as I have discussed, movement—difference—denies stasis. 
Without transforming the plot, narratives of events, discourse or actions, 
Hospital’s hydro-literary practice releases language and becomings from the 
grip of the prima facie dominant conditions of drought, stasis, lassitude, and 
separation. Hospital proliferates water in Oyster, producing sensations of 
flow, and offering access to expansive modes of perception210 and 
becomings-liquid that enfold and exceed humans. In this way, Oyster offers 
a literary version of what Deleuze (1986, pp. 80-81) hoped we might gain 
from cinema: access to “the system of universal variation” not available to 
those without the eyes to see it: not available to the Human. Moreover, 
Hospital’s writing of water carries potentials to cultivate readers’ sensitivity 
to continuity or co-implication: something more than interconnectedness; 
something closer to Morton’s “mesh […] the entanglement of all strangers” 
(2010b, p. 47), and to the Deleuzian fold, expressing the continuity of 
difference. I conclude this chapter by attending to the ethical and political 
potentials to be found in Hospital’s writing of difference and relationality.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
210 For Deleuze (1986, p. 79), water expands—makes vaster—our perceptions: beyond what we can 
achieve on land. 
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Difference and hope-work  
 
 
Is the positivity of difference, ‘difference in itself’, thinkable with this 
capitalist monster breathing in our face? (Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015, 
p. 20) 
 
Hospital’s literary practice in Oyster does not only narrate difference 
(what occurs within the story); it carries the capacity to introduce difference 
into the world and, in doing so, to cultivate aspects of ecological sense amid 
Crises of Ecologies. Adapting Massumi’s words, we might read Hospital’s 
writing as “[a] rendering of the dimension of the virtual. The organization of 
multiple levels that have different logics and temporal organizations, but are 
locked in resonance with each other and recapitulate the same event in 
divergent ways […]” (2002a, p. 33). While the novel’s multi-level logics, and 
its continuous variation, might appear “disorderly” (Greiner, 2007), its 
complexity is purposeful and affirmative. The bedevilling of beginnings and 
endings—of meaning, space, time, and bodies—carries more than cognitive 
potential; it also carries sensuous force. A reader might well feel suspended 
amid the never to be completed narratives, and left to float among the 
novel’s fragmented parts that are always in never-to-be-finalised relations. 
One opportunity, insofar as it relates to the cultivation of ecological sense, is 
to embrace this indeterminate condition not only cognitively but affectively. 
For example, while, at the novel’s close, Jess can only imagine Mercy, 
Sarah, and Nick in a truck moving towards safety, readers need not merely 
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leave them as Schrodinger left his hypothetical cat: neither/both dead 
and/nor alive. Hospital affords readers the opportunity to be “present at the 
genesis of the contradiction[s]” (Deleuze, 1990b, p. 74) that her writing 
produces. A sense of indeterminacy and openness are productions of 
Oyster’s narratorial, temporal, spatial and material variation: things remain 
unsettled and, therefore, incipient. Hospital, to the end, evokes a sense of a 
multiple potentials and of return or cycling back.  
Hospital’s writing (of) irresolution into Oyster produces a capacity for 
continuous variation. Literary attempts to express matter-discursive 
permeability, folding, indeterminacy, flow and transformation, recur 
alongside, and resonate with, expressions of enclosure, separation, 
certainty, stasis and preservation; leaving readers suspended between the 
inarticulable and the unachievable. One potential effect of being drawn into 
this state of lively suspension is ethical. Hospital holds at bay habitual 
temptations: to close off, resolve, and territorialise an event, to judge it, and 
separate ourselves from it as an independent observer. Instead, readers 
remain entangled: unable to resolve the event, though still “response-able” 
to it (Abel, 2007, p. 186). Abel suggests that not to conclude and judge, to 
hold open how we respond, is an ethical mode of encountering events. 
Hospital’s writing in Oyster—formally and poetically, representationally and 
more-than-representationally—serves to “slow […] down the impetus to 
declare what an event is” (p. 217). Citing Don DeLillo on such literary 
practices, in particular where plot is rendered unable to “reduce the world”, 
Abel asks: “what else is judgment if not a world-reducing plot?” (p. 202). In 
Oyster, Hospital does not ask readers to mourn the failings of 
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representation, to reduce the world, or to judge events. She encourages 
readers to augment the world, and live with more of the chaos and 
complexity: to embrace difference as process. 
er writing attests to both the materiality of language/discourse and to the 
folly of seeking to use it to enforce order, or meaning, or control.  immerses 
readers in a non-and-more-than-human semiotics of bodies and attunes 
readers to other registers of existence and other agencies: agencies that 
images and words can gesture, or orient readers, towards but cannot 
articulate or capture adequately.  
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Conclusion 
 
I make three returns to conclude this thesis: first, summarising its 
contributions to knowledge; second, discussing the possible research 
pathways to which it might contribute; and third, acknowledging that 
intensive literary practices include reading and writing and that they can 
constitute their own research pathways. 
 
 
First return 
 
In Chapter 1, I surveyed contemporary Australian novels’ engagements 
with the bodies, forces, entanglements and (trans)formations of Crises of 
Ecologies: climate change; mass extinction; planetary degradation; the 
agencies of capitalism; crises of subjectivity; and Indigenous Crises of 
Ecologies. This survey constitutes a new contribution to Australian literary 
studies. In Chapter 3, I argued that novels, in encounters with writers and 
readers, possess potentials to cultivate ecological sense: carrying and 
repotentialising expression and sensation; enhancing our apprehension of 
our entangled relations with Life beyond the Human; attuning us to other 
registers of existence; and offering resources to resist the forces of Crises of 
Ecologies and to pursue new subjective trajectories. In this context, I 
conceptualised literary practices—writing the posthuman, writing affect and 
becomings, and minor literature—that carry potentials to cultivate ecological 
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sense and expand our powers of living amid Crises of Ecologies. These 
conceptualisations build upon and complement Deleuzo-Guattarian and 
New Materialist philosophy, theory, and literary theory, and they map out 
pathways for literary studies in addition to those problematised in Chapter 2. 
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I undertook intensive studies of these practices and 
their potentials in three contemporary Australian novels: Tim Winton’s Eyrie; 
Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book; and Janette Turner Hospital’s Oyster. 
While the studies in this thesis attend to published literary criticism on these 
writers, they offer new insights into what these novels can do.  
Eyrie, The Swan Book, and Oyster inform, affirm and enrich the 
conceptualisations of literary practices in this thesis. Each novel engages 
with Crises of Ecologies and Australia. Winton conveys the degradation 
associated with agriculture and mining, crises of the abject(ed) self amid 
capitalism, the trauma of violence toward the animal bound to capitalism’s 
urge for progress, and the annihilations of Indigenous peoples, country and 
cultures. Wright also touches upon many aspects of Crises, though I focus 
on her disruption of habitual perceptions of the nature of Indigenous Crises 
of Ecologies. Wright’s symptomatology renews readers’ understanding of 
the forces affecting Indigenous peoples and country (of the virus), and 
opens up new potentials for resistance and renewal. Hospital also maps the 
life-denying contractions of cult-capitalism, the environmental damage of 
colonial settlement, agriculture and mining, and the violence inflicted upon 
Indigenous peoples and country, and upon animals.  
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Each novel cultivates a sense of Life beyond and without the Human, and 
of the ways in which the irreducibly exterior, porous and dynamic subject is 
a production of, and irreducibly implicated with, non-and-more-than-human 
bodies. Each also expresses the (trans)formations of subjectivities in 
relations with these bodies and their forces. Winton’s Tom Keely is an open, 
vulnerable subjectivity, battered and reduced by what flows through and 
beyond him. Eyrie’s dark ecology immerses Keely and readers in non-and-
more-than-human vitality, and subjective dissolution and indeterminacy. 
Wright’s writing via Indigenous onto-epistemologies begins in the middle, 
dissolving nature/culture, Human/non-and-more-than-human distinctions. 
Winton’s and Wright’s fictional figures enter into transformative becomings-
animal. Hospital infuses Outer Maroo with lively non-and-more-than-human 
agencies: the Fuckatoo, rocks and opals, heat, and water.  
Each novel engages readers with microperceptions and apprehensions of 
Life beyond fixed and separable forms. Winton’s Keely indexes the intimate 
impingements of the hyperobject global warming (Morton, 2013a). Wright’s 
Oblivia draws us into smooth space and the becoming lively, mobile and 
transversal of what is, at first, dismissed as sameness. Hospital’s Mercy 
orients us towards registers of perception and relation at the edge of 
enforced norms. Thick with sensuous relationality, each novel invites 
readers to participate in an affective bootcamp. Winton, Wright and 
Hospital’s writing inhabits registers of encounter and (trans)formation that 
infuse and exceed the linguistic-discursive and, while immaterial and 
affective, carry material effects. They write us into relations that cannot be 
easily articulated in language. They attune readers to Life’s potential to be 
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shaped by the forces of affective capitalism and to other trajectories for 
living, beyond capitalism’s reach.  
Beyond conveying affect as part of Life within the novel’s narrative, each 
novel carries affect in its encounters with readers. Winton combines ruined 
writing and writing of the ruins to disrupt our sense of Life and world. His 
idiomatic persistence calls out to a collective and expresses resistance to 
forces of modernity stripping singularity from bodies. Wright’s style carries 
material force: it can be a weapon. It is an expression of resistance to 
capitalist-colonialism, and of the capacities for persistence and renewal of 
sovereign Indigenous bodies, minds and cultural practices. Her 
determinedly particular, gyric, Will-o’-the-wisp style tends to expression: 
drawing language off safe paths; keeping sense and bodies moving; 
repotentialising difference to exceed and outpace oppression. Hospital’s 
literary indeterminacy—formal, narrative, and poetic—functions intensively: 
suspending readers between the inarticulable and the unreachable. This 
suspension encourages a holding back of judgement and of the temptation 
readers might feel to reduce Life’s continuous variation to something 
controllable and predictable and lifeless.  
While critiquing violence, oppression and resistance, Winton’s, Wright’s 
and Hospital’s novels do not mandate a conception of literary practices 
where all creativity is immanent to deficit and crises. They cultivate more 
than our sense of ecological crises. Their writing also exhibits what 
O’Sullivan (2001, p. 130) describes as the “deterritorialising function” of art: 
whereby the writer switches the reader’s register of experience. They 
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express and draw the reader into other planes of reality; into sensations felt 
on the skin; into microperceptions; into nonhuman intensities shaping 
bodies and catalysing non-and-more-than-human perceptions; into 
uncommon foldings of bodies (corporeal and incorporeal); into qualitative, 
dynamic spatialities traversing multiple temporalities; and into the haptic via 
the optic. To borrow O’Sullivan’s (2001, p. 127) reference to Bataille, their 
writing “takes the participant out of mundane consciousness”, making Life 
sensible. Without resorting to the filters of subjection, identity, molarity 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 275), they “open […] us up to the nonhuman 
[and non-and-more-than-human] universe that we are part of […] if only for 
a moment” (p. 128). At their most potent, Eyrie, The Swan Book and Oyster 
produce in the reader a sensation of, as yet, uncompromised, un-surveilled, 
undefined, unsanctioned, un-axiomatised, unstratified relations (worlds) in 
which we are enfolded, that unfold, and into which we can fold, differently. 
At a minimum, these novels tell stories of worlds that disrupt habitual, 
conventional thought and prompt readers to question their senses. Either 
way, they are contagious. They are shaped by and carry potentials to infect 
readers with an appetite for other ways of knowing and relating. They can 
move thought past the idea of re-connection—which still implies 
separation—towards a sense of relationality, exteriority, and, therefore, 
inseparability as our initial condition: a sense of our unavoidable exposure 
to the contagions of others. 
 
 
  
 
335 
 
Second return 
 
We can speak then of an empiricism of sensation, not an 
empiricism of the senses, not the sense knowledge underpinning 
methodological positivism, but an empiricism of the ‘in-experience’ 
of affect and the very limit of the phenomenal. (Clough, 2009, p. 51) 
 
In this thesis, I conceptualise literary practices that possess subjective, 
social and political efficacies within a material-discursive context of Crises. I 
cite philosophy, theory, and, in particular, literary theory, and published 
literary studies attesting to these capacities. I identify these practices and 
capacities in encounters with three contemporary Australian novels. 
However, as I noted in my introduction, I have neither conducted the kinds 
of empirical research to be found in scientific and empirical studies of 
literary experience (SESLE), nor presented evidence from such research, to 
support my contentions. It might, then, be tempting to rush to research 
application at the completion of (or even in order to complete) such a thesis; 
to ask what research paths and methods might expand upon the studies of 
literature’s potentials in a world that Coleman and Ringrose (2013, p. 1) 
characterise as (socially, culturally, materially) “mobile, […] messy, […] 
creative, […] changing, […] open-ended, […] sensory and affective”? Albeit, 
it seems equally reasonable to interrogate the prospects for such real world 
research; particularly the ways in which research methods can intervene 
and make worlds (p. 1). 
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 It may be that the propositions and analyses in this thesis could make 
useful contributions to the conceptualisation of transdisciplinary methods211 
for SESLE and the cultivation of ecological sense. Also, the fluid academic 
niches (Caracciolo & Van Duuren, 2015, p. 519) associated with SESLE 
appear to offer some prospects for research pathways that might add real 
world evidence to the analyses in this thesis. Nevertheless, SESLE 
practitioners do not commonly position their work as having to do with 
responses to Crises of Ecologies, and only modest steps have been taken 
toward theorising posthuman research methodologies, and toward refined 
analyses of particular literary practices and their relationships with sensuous 
reader responses.212 More particularly, Deleuzo-Guattarian New Materialist 
onto-epistemologies and conceptualisations of literary practices serve to 
complicate and even confound matters of empirical/scientific research. 
Writing on the problematics of post-structural social science and humanities 
research practice, Elizabeth St Pierre (2016, p. 122) is candid: “The idea 
that one can design a study using Deleuzian concepts appears 
nonsensical”.  
Research problems include: defining which things and processes are 
present(ed)/absent(ed) to (and by) researchers; the (in)separability of the 
things studied; and the scope and qualities of the relations into which they 
enter and from which they arise. SESLE research, for example, privileges 
reading over writing practices (writer experience), and has, to date, given 
                                                          
211 Something Caracciolo (2016, p. 200) encourages. 
212 See Caracciolo (2016); Caracciolo and Van Duuren (2015); (2016); Jacobs (2017); Miall (2007); 
Popova (2014); Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall (2010). 
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little attention to the novel (Jacobs, 2015). Nor can researchers’ avoid 
interfering in the world (Clough, 2009, p. 49),213 not least with study-
participants’ subjectively when they are asked to engage in particular 
reading encounters. Further, without engaging with sensation as prior to 
mind, studies of literature, sense, and cognition will risk re-inscribing the 
separable human mind and closing pathways to ecological sense.214 
Researchers face other difficulties: understanding and anticipating relations; 
attributing and mapping causes;215 and specifying, observing and measuring 
a/effects.216 Repeating results consistently, over time, across readers, and 
at different scales217 is confounded by the continuous variation in the 
assemblages into which the research enters. Research design, execution 
and evaluation cannot account adequately for immanence, complexity, and 
relationality (St. Pierre, Jackson, & Mazzei, 2016). Indeed, the literary 
practices studied, while exemplary, do not provide a model. Rather, they 
exemplify the potentials for the singular. We cannot know all that a body can 
do (writer, reader, and novel) as it enters into new encounters with other 
bodies in what, if we pay enough attention, are always varying contexts.  
When conceiving of research into literary practices, we also need to 
reconceptualise value (Caracciolo & Van Duuren, 2015; Manning, 2017; St. 
Pierre, 2016). Not to define value in advance, nor to privilege quantitative 
                                                          
213 And vice versa (Muecke, 2009, p. 413). 
214 See Colebrook (2014b) on related matters of mind. 
215 See Caracciolo and Van Duuren (2015, p. 522) on Suzanne Keen’s work. 
216 See Manning (2017) and St. Pierre (2016).  
217 See also Chapter 2. 
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and financial conceptualisations, or the prospects for commoditisation, 
replication and mass dissemination of an idea. Rather, value might be 
experienced encounter by encounter, via rather than prior to each 
encounter. We can conceive of value as both in continuous variation and 
having precisely to do with encouraging continuous variation. Value might 
be conceived of as arising in relation and having to do with qualitative 
transformations in our powers of living and those of the bodies we 
encounter, the occurrences of which might be barely perceptible.218 Such 
questions of value return us to a less familiar empiricism of experiences, 
sensations, and transformations that are particular to each encounter 
(Deleuze, 1994, p. 57).  
The challenges for SESLE research and the approach to value, noted 
above, might orient us toward particular literary practices—namely, 
embarking upon our own praxis as writers and readers (Deleuze, 1997, p. 3; 
2004, p. 206)—that are, in themselves, not scholarship in any conventional 
sense but always and already singular, experiential acts of research into 
potentials. These would be acts of literary praxis as a technology of 
subjectivity (O'Sullivan, 2006, p. 17): writing and reading as processes of 
affirmative transformation, enabling shifts in registers of conception, 
perception, and powers of living amid Crises of Ecologies. Consequently, 
this thesis constitutes an aspirational call to action rather than a series of 
hypotheses to be scientifically/empirically tested. It is a call to investment in 
                                                          
218 See Manning (2017, p. 102) also on value.  
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creative work: to write and read differently, for difference, and differentially: 
to “expand the actual, inventively” (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 8).  
 
 
Third return 
 
This second way of reading’s intensive: something comes through 
or it doesn’t. There’s nothing to explain, nothing to understand, 
nothing to interpret. (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 7-8)  
 
Much has been said in this thesis about writers’ literary practices carrying 
potentials to cultivate ecological sense in readers. Less has been said 
explicitly about readers’ literary practices. And yet, transformations occur 
where novels encounter readers.219 We cannot assume a passive reader 
upon whom cultivation is enacted; nor a lone reader uninfluenced by the 
assemblages in which they exist (which produce them); nor a common 
reader for whom particular effects can be deemed universally applicable 
(Baugh, 2000, p. 53). How, then, and in short, might we make moves toward 
reading practices that cultivate ecological sense? 
We can enable alternative reading practices by allowing immanence and 
multiplicity into our relations and our notions of relations, rather than resting 
                                                          
219 See Clay (2010, p. 75) on poetry. 
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upon transcendentalism and unity. Where a reader is able to conceive of 
themselves as a work in progress, encounters with novels can be 
participations in Life production, rather than confirmations of identity or 
verisimilar representations of Life. Consequently, novels are not misread via 
“transcendent selections” (Haines, 2015, p. 546) that “arrest movement” 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 146), and stop experimentation. One aspect of reading to 
cultivate ecological sense involves finding novels that disrupt and are at 
odds with how we live and think (Augustine, 2010, p. 141): novels that 
enable more than an interpretation (Baugh, 2000, p. 36) or a critique 
(Bryant, 2013). We can, Mann-O’Donnell (2016, p. 138) notes, practice 
patience and expansiveness when encountering a text: letting “texts ‘air 
out’, letting one’s reading breathe”. We can bring an openness to our 
reading, and “allow” for the language of the novel to disrupt our critical 
tendencies to reduce it to something we know. In this way, we allow the 
novel to differ and “to continue to flow against […] critics’ [and readers’] 
attempts at reduction, oedipalisation and reunification” (p. 138).220 We can 
ask how, if at all, the encounter with the novel “intensifies the feeling[s] of 
Life” (Baugh, 2000, p. 53) and how, if at all, this augments or diminishes our 
powers of living. A reading practice that is to do with creative 
resingularisation, Augustine (2010) argues, is not to do with reading for 
ideas to use, but for affects, intensities, concepts, and percepts that can be 
folded into the reader; these enfoldings adding to the readers’ potential, 
always relational, and collective, futures. Readerly practices of “propagating 
                                                          
220 See also Haines (2015, p. 548). 
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virtual collectives” (Tynan, 2012, p. 160) offer experiments in entering new 
assemblages that may be safer than those encompassing more than a 
reader-text encounter. 221 
Mann-O’Donnell (2016) suggests reading practices to cultivate affective 
athleticism. Texts, she argues, can be worked on as tasks of transformation: 
“to analyse the text in question, in such a manner as to become, to defect, 
to uproot” (p. 138). Augustine (2010, p. 45) notes, after Csikszentmihalyi, 
that reading practices might generate an experience of “flow”, during which 
a reader is unable to distinguish mental from physical forces, and exits from 
conventional realms of consciousness: losing sense of self as demarcated 
body; losing spatial and temporal bearings; and experiencing complete 
immersion. Reading practices are cultivated to thrive rather than falter when 
we experience a readerly “delirium” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 4): indeterminacy, 
suspension, uncertainty, opacity, flux, and, I contend, relations with strange 
bodies. Such readings require energy, cautions Mann-O’Donnell (2016), not 
least because they are practices of refusal: refusal of dominant narratives of 
how Life occurs.222  
Deleuze does not suggest that how a novel works for him is how it will 
work for others, nor that the work will be the same each time, and nor, in the 
context of this thesis, can I predict that certain literary practices will cultivate 
aspects of ecological sense. Accordingly, I must concur with Deleuze’s 
promiscuous and experimental remedy for this problem: “if it doesn’t work, if 
                                                          
221 See Augustine on reading as ‘assemblaging’ (2010, p. 28). 
222 See also Augustine (2010, p. 143). 
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nothing comes through, you try another book” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 8). 
However, it is never solely a matter of finding another book. This thesis 
shows that there are literary practices—writing and reading—with the 
potential to cultivate aspects of ecological sense. They involve sensitivities 
to Life as process, even though much of it may be imperceptible. They 
involve opening to the new and they open out the new. They involve the 
search for, and practice of, transversality. They involve seeking and making 
difference in itself. They involve embracing and seeking intensive relations: 
collectivities that always, already include the non-and-more-than-human. 
Via practices such as these, we involve ourselves in relations of affirmative, 
collective vulnerability that are never really just to do with reading or writing 
novels, and that are never completely determined by Crises of Ecologies. 
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